A noniterative reconstruction algorithm for lfsr prng


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A noniterative reconstruction algorithm for LFSR PRNG

NO.

State1

State2

Used IDs*

Used IDs

Time Elapsed*

Time Elapsed

1

f6920c40

e07c2ea

12

15

5.679

138.379

2

190c0f66

4a3883b7

14

15

8.732

121.071

3

d074e57a

5c53697f

9

15

5.083

118.334

4

f9941fda

4af71039

9

15

8.486

121.723

5

5c1b80fd

d20d8331

15

15

13.614

133.166

    1. columns with * means our algorithm.

    2. here unit of time elapsed: us.

TABLEⅡshows that our reconstruction algorithm is more efficient than iterative algorithm, which only needs about 1/10
—1/24 time of what the iterative needs. What’s more TABLE
Ⅱalso shows that our algorithm needs less IDs to reconstruct the full states in some conditions.



  1. CONCLUSION

In this paper, we have discussed and analyzed the weakness of LFSR based PRNG in detail. A reconstruction algorithm is
proposed to fully reconstruct the states of LFSRs by utilizing a sequence of IDs. Our comparative experiment shows our algorithm is more efficient and less resource-consuming than existing algorithm.
As far as we know, by the writing of this paper, there are still some DNS servers in the Internet use BIND 9.2.4 or lower version, which is very insecure. It’s strongly recommended that users update their DNS server to newer versions.

REFERENCES





    1. Paul Mockapetris, “Domain names — concepts and ficilities (RFC 1034),” November 1987, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1034.txt.

    2. Paul Mockapetris, “Domain names — implementation and specication (RFC 1035),” November 1987, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1035.txt.

    3. Steven M. Bellovin, “Security problems in the TCP/IP protocol suite,” Computer Communications Review, vol. 19, pp. 32-48, April 1989.

    4. Christoph Schuba, “Addressing weaknesses in the Domain Name System protocol,” Master’s thesis, Purdue University, August 1993.

    5. Derek Atkins, Rob Austein, “Threat analysis of the Domain Name System (DNS) (RFC 3833),” August 2004, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/ rfc3833.txt.

    6. J. Stewart, “DNS cache poisoning — the next generation,” LURHQ, Technical Report, January 27th, 2003.

    7. Michal Zalewski, “strange attractors and TCP/IP sequence number analysis,” RAZOR/Bindview Corporation, April 21st, 2001.

    8. Y. Kadakia, “Dan Kaminsky’s DNS cache poisoning vulnerability explained,” August 2008, http://www.yashkadakia.com/2008/08/dam- kaminskys-dns-cache-poisoning.html.

    9. Amit Klein, “BIND 9 DNS Cache Poisoning,” Technical Report, Trusteer Ltd., June 2007.

    10. TW Williams, W Daehn, M Gruetzner, “Bounds and analysis of aliasing errors in linear feedback shift registers,” IEEE Computer- Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems, vol. 7, pp. 75-83, Jan. 1988.

    11. ISC, “BIND 9.2.4 source code,” http://ftp.isc.org/isc/bind9/9.2.4/ bind-9.2.4.tar.gz.

    12. Daniel J. Bernstein, “How long can an NS chain be?” December 28th, 1998. http://www.ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/namedroppers.199x namedroppers./msg03692.html.

339



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