A prep course for the month-long World Cup soccer tournament, a worldwide pheno

neered by Cornelius Ryan , whose 30-year-old `` The Longest Day '' still reads m

arvelously well , this grunt's-eye view of chaos , blood and panic interspersed 

with moments of boredom and humor , is how battles are experienced . But they ar

e not the full story of the way wars are decided . And World War II was not deci

ded on the Normandy beaches . On June 23 , just 17 days after D-day , Hitler 's 

Army Group Center on the Eastern Front lost five divisions ( over 50,000 men ) a

t Vitebsk alone . Part of Operation Bagration , this parallel and simultaneous S

oviet battle that smashed the German army and cleared the way to Warsaw , puts D

-day into proportion . Until the invasion , the British and U.S. troops never fa

ced more than a dozen German divisions . Even after D-day , they never fought mo

re than 60 . The Red Army fought and beat over 200 divisions and the bulk of the

 panzer armies . The great merit of Gerhard Weinberg 's monumental history of th

e war as a whole is to remind us of the vast sweep of the conflict , industrial 

as well as strategic . In Stephen Ambrose 's riveting book , this industrial com

ponent of D-day is brought home when he quotes the comment of Gen. Eisenhower th

at `` the man who won the war for us '' was Andrew Higgins . In the teeth of off

icial opposition , he designed , built and forced into production the essential 

landing craft . From the almost token chapters given to the non-American role in

 D-day in this spate of 50th anniversary books , a casual reader might miss the 

fact that the Americans were a minority of the invading force . The Canadians at

 Juno Beach suffered rather worse than the Americans at Omaha , losing 1,200 men

 , or one in 18 of those committed , compared to the U.S. loss of one in 19 up t

he coast at Omaha . Even so , compared to the first serious test of Hitler 's co

astal defenses , the disastrous Dieppe raid in 1942 , Juno Beach was a cakewalk 

. At Dieppe , the 2nd Canadian Division had taken more than 6,000 casualties in 

six hours . And the British , thanks in part to their special tanks , took only 

630 casualties at Sword Beach and about 400 at Gold Beach , as they put 55,000 m

en ashore . But with the exception of the Americans at Omaha , who stumbled upon

 the good Wehrmacht units of General Kraiss ' 352nd Division , the Allies were f

ighting a ragbag force , the gleanings on which Hitler depended after five years

 of war . At Utah Beach , Lt. Robert Brewer of the 101st Airborne captured four 

Koreans in German uniform . Originally conscripted by the Japanese , they had be

en captured and forced to fight by the Red Army , and then captured yet again an

d made to fight by the Germans . At the time of the invasion , every sixth rifle

man in the Wehrmacht forces in France was from an `` Ost '' battalion captured R

ussians and Poles and Ukrainians and Balts . Germany was exhausted . The average

 age of the troops in the 709th Division , based in the Cotentin peninsula , was

 36 . ( Begin optional trim ) It was not just luck that put the Allied troops as

hore in Normandy , where the defenses were relatively feeble , but planning . Th

e best German troops , the six panzer divisions , were stuck in the Pas de Calai

s , where Hitler believed the real invasion was coming . A complex deception ope

ration , with fake radio signals from fake headquarters , succeeded brilliantly 

in fooling the Germans . But if those Panzer divisions were not available to rep

el the invasion in its most vulnerable first few hours , they had to be fought l

ater , in the grinding battles of June and July as the Allies tried to break out

 from their beachhead . Under Gen. Montgomery , the British attacks repeatedly f

ailed . But they drew to their front around Caen the bulk of the German armor , 

opening the way for the Americans under Gen. Omar Bradley and Gen. George Patton

 to break out into the heart of France . Nigel Hamilton 's new book on Montgomer

y , an edited and truncated version of his three-volume biography , refights the

 rather silly postwar squabble of the Allied generals and their memoirs . Yes , 

Monty was a crotchety and arrogant ally who stretched the truth to claim that he

 had planned the American breakout all along . But with his first command decisi

on in January of 1944 , insisting that the Allied assault be made with five divi

sions rather than three , Monty probably won the battle . ( End optional trim ) 

The point about D-day was that it was not a single event , but part of a long ca

mpaign . With hindsight , we might even say that , for the future , the battle o

f Arnhem three months later in September 1944 was more significant . Arnhem was 

a battle that concerned far more than the defeat of Germany ; it was about the p

ostwar map of Europe . The goal was for the British and American armies to use a

n airborne landing to bounce their way across the Rhine and into the heart of Ge

rmany before winter set in . The ambition was clear . With Germany 's industrial

 heartland of the Ruhr under their guns , the Anglo-Americans could occupy Germa

ny before the Russians did . Defeat at Arnhem kept the Western Allies on the wro

ng side of the Rhine until the spring of 1945 and helped define the parameters o

f the Cold War itself . But that was not how it felt for the lonely parachutists

 , landing in the blackness of a hostile Normandy night . It was not how it seem

ed for the bewildered infantry of the U.S. 1st Division , dumped ashore at the w

rong place , under intense fire and with most of their tanks sinking to the seab

ed . For that flavor of D-day , Russell Miller 's `` Nothing Less Than Victory '

' is the most useful account , with each interview telling a coherent soldier 's

 tale . ( Begin optional trim ) Richard Goldstein , Ronald Drez and Gerald Astor

 have produced almost interchangeable narratives , peppered with ill-organized a

nd random individual reminiscence . Collectively , they show how not to use the 

rich archives of oral history , the largest collection of individual accounts of

 a single battle anywhere in the world , which are now gathered at the National 

D-Day Museum at New Orleans . Stephen Ambrose 's book relies rather than depends

 upon them , using the intense personal perspective to illuminate a battle that 

amounted to rather more than the sum of individual experiences . ( End optional 

trim ) It took another 11 months of fighting , but D-day began the great peace t

hat began to civilize Europe . It marked the moment when the fractious and warli

ke European tribes began to come under the adult supervision of the United State

s and Soviet Union , two superpowers with far too much at stake to permit the en

dless squabbles of the Old World to rise again . More than just a peace , a kind

 of miracle emerged , in which the Europeans laid aside their martial pasts and 

adapted comfortably to the extraordinary new role of an economic giant that chos

e perhaps for the first time in history not to spend that wealth on becoming a m

ilitary superpower . The real essence of that European decision , whatever the i

nter-alliance squabbles along the way , was trust in the Americans as an honorab

le ally and a reliable custodian of the stability and the democratic hopes of Eu

rope . And the real meaning of D-day was that it symbolized the moment when that

 trust was earned , in blood .

 Pvt. Robert Murphy looked down . In the moonlight , through the open door , he 

could see the coastline . The C-47 banked to the left . Over the engine noise , 

his commanding officer shouted : `` Hook up ! '' At 300 feet , the pilot hit the

 green light and yelled : `` Let 's go ! '' Murphy , face blackened , carrying h

is Thompson submachine gun , 300 rounds of ammunition , a six-inch boot knife , 

a switchblade and a 40-pound radar , was the third man out the door . He bent fo

rward , tucked his knees up to his chest and folded his arms over them . His par

achute snapped open and jerked . In seconds , he hit the ground . He tumbled and

 rolled . He reached into his boot , pulled out the knife and cut himself out of

 his straps . Accidentally , he also sliced off his ammunition pouch . But he ha

d a full magazine in the gun . He was in the corner of a field . He thought he s

aw someone under a tree . He kept one hand on his gun . He put his other hand to

 his lips to signal silence . It was 1:10 a.m. , 50 years ago June 6 . D-day had

 begun . If there was someone under the tree , whoever it was did not shoot , di

d not make a sound . Murphy , a pathfinder with the 82nd Airborne , and scores l

ike him , set up radar beacons and signal lights to guide hundreds of C-47s carr

ying thousands of paratroopers into the fields of Normandy . During the next 24 

hours , 175,000 soldiers , drawn mostly from the United States , Britain , Canad

a and France , along with 50,000 battle vehicles of all kinds , invaded Nazi-occ

upied France . Most of them landed under fire on five beaches along the Normandy

 coast . France , along with much of the rest of Europe , had fallen under Adolf

 Hitler 's shadow during the darkest months of World War II . The Allied invader

s , bearing the arms , the hopes and the prayers of freedom , were carried acros

s the English Channel by more than 5,300 vessels and nearly 11,000 aircraft . It

 was the most powerful armada ever assembled , and it conducted the greatest amp

hibious assault in human history . It would be the pivotal battle of the war , a

nd Hitler knew it . `` The destruction of the enemy 's landing , '' he told his 

commanders in Europe , `` is the sole decisive factor in the whole conduct of th

e war . '' The Allied assault succeeded , and France was liberated . The Anglo-A

merican offensive overran Germany 's industrial heartland ; and , for freedom , 

the war in Europe was won . The D-day assault was important for an additional re

ason . `` It was an open question , '' says Stephen E. Ambrose , an eminent hist

orian of D-day , `` whether a democracy could produce young soldiers capable of 

fighting effectively . Hitler was certain the answer was no . Totalitarian fanat

icism and discipline would always conquer democratic liberalism and softness . '

' But the Allied forces showed remarkably superior courage , steadiness under fi

re , competence and willingness to take the initiative . `` On D-day , '' Ambros

e says , `` the soldiers of democracy showed that they could outfight and outthi

nk the soldiers of totalitarianism . '' This is the story of that triumph . It i

s based upon interviews by the Los Angeles Times with veterans of D-day on both 

sides of the fighting ; upon interviews , letters , oral histories and other doc

uments at American and British government repositories and in the Eisenhower Cen

ter at the University of New Orleans . It is also based upon published accounts 

of the assault , including `` The Longest Day , '' a classic by war corresponden

t Cornelius Ryan ; `` Six Armies in Normandy , '' an authoritative account by Br

itish military scholar John Keegan , and `` D-Day June 6 , 1944 : The Climactic 

Battle of World War II , '' a new history by Ambrose . Most of all , it is a sto

ry about the soldiers who won , many of them very young men , and how they fough

t and the terrible cost of their victory . `` To them , '' Ambrose says , `` we 

owe our freedom . '' -0- CAT AND MOUSE The Allies had resolved that a cross-chan

nel attack was necessary to free Europe from the Nazis . The Soviets , who had t

urned back the Germans in the east , were demanding a second front . And Hitler 

expected one . Where to attack was a matter of debate . The sands at Pas-de-Cala

is looked ideal . Calais was the French shore closest to England , and it offere

d the straightest route from London to Germany 's industrial Rhine-Ruhr region a

nd then on to Berlin . It was at Calais , however , that the Germans had built t

he strongest part of their main defense of Fortress Europe , a steel-reinforced 

concrete barrier called the Atlantic Wall . Pas-de-Calais was out . Instead , Al

lied planners chose the Normandy coast . It had Caen , a port to bring in men an

d supplies . Nearby was an airport . Routes from the beach could take armor inla

nd . Moreover , the capture of Caen would cut off the Cotentin Peninsula and pos

ition the Allies to threaten the Germans holding Paris . There were guns along t

his part of the Atlantic Wall as well , but behind it was only one division of P

anzer tanks . The Allies could feint toward Calais and then might be able to sur

prise the Germans at Normandy instead . So it was that Dwight D. Eisenhower , th

e supreme commander of Allied forces , agreed to invade on five Normandy beach a

reas , code-named Utah , Omaha , Gold , Juno and Sword . The Allies gave the ent

ire assault a code name . They called it Overlord . They mounted an elaborate ef

fort to fool the Germans into thinking that any attack on Normandy was a feint a

nd that the real assault would come at Calais , maybe even elsewhere : perhaps t

he Biscay coast , maybe Scandinavia , perhaps Marseilles . ( Begin optional trim

 ) They sent aging British officers to Scotland to create radio messages in easi

ly broken cipher that spoke of invading Norway . But Eisenhower dispatched Lt. G

en. George S. Patton to Dover , opposite Calais . Hitler believed Patton to be t

he best Allied commander . Eventually Eisenhower would bring him to France for t

he breakout attack across Europe . For now , however , he made Patton part of hi

s most elaborate ruse . He gave him inflatable rubber tanks and plywood-and-canv

as landing craft . From the air , they looked real , and Patton let German plane

s photograph them at will . All the while , the Allies developed their real plan

s in strictly enforced secrecy . ( End optional trim ) The deceptions and the se

crecy worked . Because the British had broken German encryption , Allied intelli

gence could understand German war radio . It provided clear evidence that German

 generals had come to expect feints in Biscay , the south of France and in Norma

ndy . There might be an actual attack in Norway , they thought . But , more impo

rtant , they began preparing for the main D-day invasion at Pas-de-Calais . -0- 

THE ALLIED BUILDUP In the winter and spring of 1944 , thousands of Allied troops

 trained throughout Britain . First Lt. Jack Isaacs , 21 , saw mountains of supp

lies lining the roadsides , some of it in half-moon shaped prefabricated shelter

s made of corrugated metal , called Quonset huts . By April , the men were engag

ed in D-day dress rehearsals . It was dangerous . Planes collided , killing para

troopers . Live ammunition went astray , killing infantrymen . In addition to th

eir K rations and grenades , the men were issued books of Scripture . They were 

small enough to be tucked into their shirt pockets . Chaplains held Catholic , P

rotestant and Jewish services . ( Begin optional trim ) Pvt. Milton Villarreal ,

 19 , went to Mass , confessed his sins and took Communion . He had a rosary , a

nd he prayed to Our Lady of Guadalupe . He thought of her often and took courage

 from her image , which he visualized firmly in his mind . At the last Mass that

 Staff Sgt. Charles Klein , 20 , would attend before the invasion began , the Re

v. Joe Lacy , a short , chubby Irishman , told his congregation : `` I want you 

men to do all your praying here and now . When we hit the beaches , if I see any

 man praying when he should be fighting , if he 's within the reach of my boot ,

 he 'll get the toe of my boot . I 'll do the praying when we go in . You do the

 fighting . '' ( End optional trim ) In May , the entire Allied Expeditionary Fo

rce descended upon southern England , nearly 2 million strong , with half a mill

ion vehicles . Some were conventional , others were not . Sherman tanks . Floati

ng `` deuce-and-a-halfs , '' 2-ton trucks with propellers , called DUKWs , or ``

 Ducks . '' Standard landing craft . Plywood cigar boxes 36 feet long with squar

e metal bows , called Higgins boats for the Louisiana man who made them . Briefi

ngs began , and the number of people who knew the secrets of Overlord started to

 grow . Still the Allied invasion plan did not leak . ( Begin optional trim ) St

aff Sgt. Lowry Brooks , 23 , was assigned to the briefing room for the 1st Batta

lion in the 29th Division . On the wall was a map of the Normandy coast . The in

vasion routes were drawn on a celluloid overlay . It was marked for specific bea

ches . Objectives were circled . The map was plotted with down-to-the-minute ins

tructions for the attack . The briefings went on for two weeks . Brooks was not 

allowed to leave the room . His meals were brought to him , and a guard stood at

 the door . ( End optional trim ) Allied planes had bottled up the Luftwaffe in 

Germany . John Keegan , the military scholar , says that the Allies had such air

 superiority that their planes ultimately would paralyze much of Germany 's armo

r as well . Still , German reconnaissance planes occasionally sneaked through . 

`` It is one of the great mysteries of World War II , '' historian Ambrose says 

, `` that although the Germans saw the buildup in southern England .. . they com

pletely failed to draw the right conclusions . '' Part of the solution to these 

mysteries , Keegan says , is that Allied aircraft permitted the German spy plane

s to see only what the Allies wanted them to see . Another part of the answer la

y with the Nazi high command back in Germany and among the German generals in oc

cupied France . Often they found themselves hamstrung . Despite Hitler 's bombas

t about the military superiority of totalitarian discipline , his insecurities a

nd his distrust of those around him prompted him to proceed by what Manfred Romm

el , son of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel , calls `` divide and rule . '' At times 

, these divisions caused paralysis . He put his senior field marshal , Gerd von 

Rundstedt , in charge . Von Rundstedt was 69 and short of energy and supplies . 

Apart from the fortifications at Pas-de-Calais , not much wall-building had been

 done . Hitler 's chief of operations suggested that Rommel be given tactical co

mmand . Characteristically , Hitler bisected the authority . Von Rundstedt would

 retain overall tactical control , but Rommel would take charge of the principal

 defense : the wall . Never was it clear , Ambrose says , whether Rommel or Von 

Rundstedt would direct the upcoming battle for Europe . Rommel grew obsessed wit

h the wall and ways to reinforce it . He mined the channel . He booby-trapped it

s tidal flats with obstacles , including mined logs driven into the sand at an a

ngle pointing toward the sea . These and similar logs in farm fields , designed 

to impale gliders , came to be called `` Rommel 's asparagus . '' He ended train

ing and put all of his troops to work building and reinforcing the wall and his 

obstacles . Robert Vogt , 19 , a private in the German infantry , heard Rommel s

ay : `` You must stop them here on the first day . If you don't stop them here ,

 it 's over . '' ( Begin optional trim ) But even Rommel guessed wrong about whe

re the Allied invasion would come . He also guessed wrong about when the invader

s would come . He predicted that any assault would come at high tide , which off

ered the shortest beach to cross . From the outset , however , Eisenhower planne

d to invade on a rising tide . That would permit his landing craft to run onto t

he beach , then to float free so they could be used again . On June 1 , Rommel a

nalyzed the tide tables . The English Channel did not seem suitable for an invas

ion until possibly the middle of the month . His first inkling of the Allied inv

asion came at 7:30 in the morning , when the telephone rang at his country house

 at Herrlingen . He canceled his meeting with Hitler and set out by car for Norm

andy , because Allied air superiority made it too risky to fly . As Rommel drove

 toward Normandy , Maj. Hans von Luck , 32 , commander of a panzer regiment east

 of Caen , climbed a hill behind his headquarters and saw the Allied armada comi

ng . `` It is enormous , '' he thought . `` They will succeed . '' ( End optiona

l trim ) -0- ` OK , LET 'S GO ' Across the channel , Dwight Eisenhower had no qu

estion about who was in charge . He was . Allied planners had picked May 1 for D

-day . He moved it to the first suitable day in June , to take advantage of an e

xtra month 's production of landing craft . Which day would depend upon the tide

s and the moon and the weather . Eisenhower wanted to cross at night , to mainta

in surprise ; under a half-moon , to provide at least some light for the fleet ;

 with a rising tide , to keep his Higgins boats from getting stuck on the sand ,

 and at first light , to give his troops a full day to gain a foothold . This me

ant June 5 , 6 or 7 , or June 19 or 20 . He chose June 5 . Loading began on May 

31 . There were 2,727 transports from 12 countries . As the troops marched onto 

their ships , each received an order . It was from the supreme commander himself

 . `` You are about to embark upon the Great Crusade , '' Eisenhower wrote . `` 

The hopes and prayers of liberty-loving people everywhere march with you . '' As

 the vessels formed into convoys , a drizzle became a heavy rain . At 4 a.m on J

une 4 , Eisenhower and his commanders met to consider the situation . In the mes

s room at Southwick House , a command post in Portsmouth , on the south shore of

 Britain , a weather briefer told them that the storm would continue on June 5 ,

 sending clouds down to at least 500 feet in some places and all the way down to

 the coastline in others . Eisenhower told his commanders that the invasion woul

d succeed only with air superiority , and that these clouds might cancel this ad

vantage . Did anyone disagree ? There was no dissent . At 6 a.m. , Eisenhower pu

t the armada on hold until June 6 . At 9:30 p.m. on June 4 , Eisenhower convened

 his commanders again at Southwick House . Rain still rattled against the French