An empirical review of factors affecting revenue collection in nairobi county, kenya

© Ngicuru, Muiru, Riungu & Shisia
Some taxes and fees are gathered by the administration and directed back to the local government. In Malawi the non-tax revenue is planned to be gathered by the central government, before the resources are redistributed to District Assemblies utilizing a formula affirmed by the Cabinet. A less common illustration is from Tanzania where the collection of property tax in Dares Salaam is left to the Tanzania Revenue Authority (Fjeldstad et al, 2014).In Tanzania, accumulation of an extensive number of local government revenue sources has been outsourced as of late. They incorporate private collection of property taxes in some urban committee; market fees in both provincial and urban committees; ranger service demands (until 2005) fundamentally in country boards; cess on certain agricultural items in rural councils; transport stand; and parking fees. In Mwanza City Council, for example, more than 33% of the collection’s own revenues in 2006 were gathered by private operators.

A noteworthy challenge confronting privatized revenue collection in local government authorities is to survey the revenue potential for different tax bases. Generally, revenue evaluation is directed on a specially appointed premise, regularly in view of the earlier years accounted for collection. Considerable underestimation of the revenue potential may suggest that genuine collection by the operator is significantly higher than what is reflected in the agreement. Subsequently, there is a risk of winding up in a circumstance where the specialist keeps the generous segment of the revenues collected, which as of now is by all accounts the case in a few collections.

In a study from Uganda, Boex, and Martinez-Vazquez (2007), discovered considerable gaps between the local government appraisals of the revenue yields from local markets with the genuine revenue yield gathered by private operators. In six markets contemplated, the gaps (lost revenues) added up to somewhere around 25% and 74% of aggregate revenue collected in every market. In addition, the actual margins acknowledged by private specialists brought about by this undervaluation of market yields fluctuated around 71% and 97%. In this manner, it appears to be clear that instead of improving local revenue, the private tax collection framework in Uganda exchanges cash from standard and regularly poor provincial taxpayers and into the pockets of private tax specialists and their different partners. All things considered, 53% of all revenue gathered from sellers in the markets could be translated as immaculate redistributive transfer to individuals from the local elite.

Agyapong (2012) conducted a study to assess the viability of revenue activation systems of Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies (MMDAs) in Ghana, Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly (KMA) as a contextual analysis. The goal of the study was to turn out with methodologies that can help KMA to create enough Internal Generated Funds (IGFs) to meet its formative needs. Ranges considered under the difficulties that KMA faced included; lacking

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