Contingent Liabilities: Issues and Practice; Aliona Cebotari; imf working Paper 08/245; October 1, 2008
Download 1.26 Mb. Pdf ko'rish
|
Contingent Liabilities Issues and Practice
Contingency Reserve Funds
Contingency reserve funds have also been used secure financing when contingent liabilities are called. These funds serve as self-insurance against calls on various contingent liabilities, including guarantees, natural disasters, unemployment, and commodity price swings (Table 1 provides selected examples of such funds). • Contingency funds for loan guarantees are usually financed by guarantee fees paid either by the beneficiaries of the guarantees or by the public entities sponsoring the guarantees, through their budgets (Chile, Colombia, Sweden, U.S.). • Contingency funds for various insurance schemes provided by the state are usually set as insurance corporations and are funded by premia paid by the participants. For example, pension guarantee funds have been created in a number of countries in order to protect workers from their employers’ failure to honor pension obligations. In the United States, concern about the exposure of workers with underfunded defined-benefit pensions led to the creation of a government-run and supported guarantee fund in 1974 managed by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). Such pension guarantee funds also exist in the Canadian province of Ontario (created in 1980), as well as in Sweden (1960), Finland (1962, partly privatized in 1994), Germany (1974), Chile (1981), Switzerland (1985) and Japan (1989) (Cooper and Ross, 2003). • In cases where contingency funds aim to provide self-insurance against natural disaster, unemployment, or commodity price movements, these are often financed by transfers from the budget or earmarked taxes. • Contingency funds are also set up to meet general budget contingencies, including potentially contingent liabilities. Several countries transfer budget contingency reserves (discussed above) into general contingency funds, to be used for expenditures that do not have approval of the legislature, in anticipation of such approval becoming available. The creation of such funds is often authorized in the constitution (Brunei Darussalam, India, Japan, Kenya) or in legislation (U.K. Contingency Fund Act 1974). The purposes and procedures for which contingency funds may be used are usually spelt out in the law. The 28 funds are generally managed by the ministries of finance (Japan) or by the President (India). Advances from the funds are made on request from line ministries, which need to provide a justification for their request, and need to be approved by the Cabinet. After using the general contingency fund, ministries generally need to report to the ministry of finance on how the money was used, and the government in turn needs to prepare a comprehensive report on their use for parliament, which gives an ex post authorization for the expenditures. Whereas in some countries (Japan) the amount in the contingency fund is not specified in the law and the executive determines its size (with approval of the legislature), in other countries the size of contingency funds or reserves is specified. For example, the U.K. Contingency Fund Act of 1974, which authorizes the making of urgent expenditures not yet voted by Parliament, caps such spending at 2 percent of the previous year’s expenditures (Lienert and Jung, 2004). In the United States, where all but five states set up “rainy day” funds to meet unexpected expenditures or revenue shortfalls, most states cap these funds at 2–10 percent of the state’s budget, although a number of states have no limit at all. 42 Download 1.26 Mb. Do'stlaringiz bilan baham: |
Ma'lumotlar bazasi mualliflik huquqi bilan himoyalangan ©fayllar.org 2024
ma'muriyatiga murojaat qiling
ma'muriyatiga murojaat qiling