Contingent Liabilities: Issues and Practice; Aliona Cebotari; imf working Paper 08/245; October 1, 2008


The type of contingent liabilities disclosed varies across countries, in part reflecting


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Contingent Liabilities Issues and Practice

 
The type of contingent liabilities disclosed varies across countries, in part reflecting 
their relative significance. Information on explicit loan guarantees (whether to public 
enterprises, financial institutions, private companies, or students) is reported by virtually all 
countries disclosing contingent liabilities. Disclosure of guarantees related to PPP-type 
arrangements, such as minimum revenue guarantees or exchange rate guarantees, is generally 
more limited (Chile, Colombia, Indonesia, Peru, U.K.). Other types of contingent liabilities 
are also reported, including those from pension guarantees (Chile, U.S.); deposit guarantees 
(Chile, U.S.); litigation (Australia, Brazil, Colombia, Indonesia, New Zealand, U.S.); 
liabilities of the central bank (Australia, Chile); and natural disasters (Indonesia) (see 
Table 5). 
When contingent liabilities can be quantified, their fiscal significance is reported 
through a variety of measures. These include: (i) the face value or the maximum loss under 
guarantees; (ii) the expected cost of the guarantees; or (iii) the “unexpected” costs of the 
guarantee, i.e. the most government can lose at, for example, a 95–99 percent confidence 
level (the so-called “cash flow at risk”). The latter two measures are reported either as 
expected annual payments over a certain time span or as the net present value (NPV) of the 
these payments (see Table 5 for selected country examples). 
The face value is by far most commonly reported by countries. It is generally known at 
the time the guarantee is issued, reflects the maximum loss under the guarantee, and does 
not require quantification of probabilities that the guarantee would be called. It is also a 
convenient measure in cases when individual guarantees or lawsuits are disclosed, given 
that disclosing government’s expected loss in these cases could either give rise to moral 
hazard (if the beneficiary of the guarantee infers that the government is prepared to 
sustain a loss on the guarantee) or could damage the government case in courts or in 


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negotiations. Hence, many countries report the face value in the case of guarantees or 
insurance programs (Australia, New Zealand, U.S., and Chile, which reports the 
maximum amount of the guarantees for road concessions, such as in no-traffic scenarios) 
or of lawsuits (Chile, Colombia, U.S.).
The expected or “unexpected” loss measures are more involved in that they require, in 
addition to the amount, an assessment of the probability that the guarantees would be 
called (see Annex II for a discussion of the methods used to asses these). Nevertheless, 
many countries disclose the expected losses under various guarantees (Chile, Colombia, 
Peru) and some disclose also “unexpected” losses (Chile at a 95 percent confidence level, 
Colombia at a 99 percent level).
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• Another way to deal with the difficulty of quantifying probabilities for a variety of 
possible outcomes, is to provide a range of estimated losses, as done by the U.S. in the 
case of some lawsuits, for example. 

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