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A quarterly journal devoted to the study of Ukraine
Vol. XL, No. 1
NICHOLAS L. FR.-CHIROVSKY, LEV SHANKOVSKY,
Ol-EH S. ROMANYSHYN
Price: £5.00 or $10.00 a single copy
Annual Subscription; £20.00 or $40.00
The Association of Ukrainians, in Great Britain, Ltd,
Organization for the Defense of Four Freedoms
Research Institute (Canada)
The Executive Editor, “The Ukrainian Review'
200 Liverpool Road, London, N1 1LE
Su b scrip tion s:
“The Ukrainian Review” (Administration),
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Printed in Great Britain by the Ukrainian Publishers Limited
200 Liverpool Road, London, N1 ILF
Tel: 071 607 6266/7
Fax- 071 607 6737
The Ukrainian Review
Vol. XL, No. 1
A Quarterly Journal
C O N T E N T S
THE BANKRUPTCY OF LEGISLATIVE POWER Viktor Fedorchuk
UKRAINE’S CUSTOMS SERVICE: CONTROLLING THE “TRANSPARENT
BORDERS” Olena Zvarych
CAN KUCHMA PULL UKRAINE OUT OF THE CRISIS? Viktor Marchenko
PRIVATISATION — YET ANOTHER DECEPTION Roman Radyletskyi
PATRIOTIC PESSIMISTS Ihor Dlaboha
AN ENGLISHMAN IN UKRAINE, 1918
PROBLEMS OF THE HISTORY OF THE OUN AND UPA Wolodymyr Kosyk 2 4
THE MATRON WHO WOULD NOT BE A MAID Ralph G.Bennett M.D.
TO OSNOVYANENKO Taras Shevchenko
SPRING SONGS Ivan Franko
News From Ukraine 44
Documents & Reports 82
i ! r !> V
With this iv>ue. "The Ukrainian Review" enters its fortieth calender !c :r
publication. Forty years, of course, is a figure » it:i evocative overtone.', le i g
according to the book ol i'.xodus. the period wETh the Israelite:- were o b ip ’i' .o
spend in the
so tli..i no one who had v-er been a .-.line in Egyp- s- o Id
enter the Promised land, Indeid, it is with
limy ; ears —
that Ivan Fianko ..pens his I'.rs at narrative j> a-; ! 'Moses ', la whkh he us-.-s he
Exodus story to symbolise and elucidate the long struggle of Ukraine for
independence. It is a pleasing coincidence, therefore, that in the opening issue of
this fortieth year; we record an event which, to readers in the United Kingdom,
must have fully brought home Ukraine’s changed status in the world — the visit
to Britain of President Leonid Kravchuk of Ukraine.
Informed observers of the East European scene had, of course, taken on board
U kraine’s steps tow ards independence culminating in the independence
referendum of 1 December 1991, which dealt the
to the moribund
Soviet Union. But For those not familiar with that scene, the collapse of the
world’s largest state into fifteen independent republics — with the strong
possibility that at least one of them would disintegrate further, was too much to
grasp. There were no historical precedents: the dismemberment of the Austro-
Hungarian and Ottoman empires following World War I was accomplished by
international treaty; the colonies of the British Empire moved towards
whwnr in an orderly queue. But here, the political order of one sixth of the
world's land surface fell apart overnight. Even to the most dedicated opponents
o f the ills of Soviet power the shock was enormous.
, therefore, was a year in which the international community had to come to
terms with a new and still highly confused, map of Eastern Europe, when businessmen
wishing to establish relations with the new, independent republics, were bereft of the
normal structures of trade attaches to brief them and consulates to issue them visas.
Foreign ministries throughout the world hastily rescheduled their budgets to fund new
embassies — and Set their staff to learning hitherto-obscure languages; university
departments revamped their courses and restructured their “Soviet studies"
departments, and cartographers, philatelists, and vexillologists revelled in a surfeit of
new maps, stamps, and flags. As the months passed, the confusion gradually grew less.
Ukraine now has an Embeissÿ in London, and the United Kingdom an Embassy in
Kiev. In 1992. the Royal Institute of International Affairs had four major meetings on
Ukraine-relatèd topics, while London University' now has not only a regular seminar
series on Ukrainian affairs at its School of Slavonic and East European Studies, but also
has held several conferences on security issues (sponsored by King’s College) in which
Ukrainian issues were prominently featured.
With this new emphasis on Ukraine and Ukrainian affairs as matters of general, rather
than specialised, importance, the Editors of
Ukrainian Review feel that this journal
has a major role to play in making Ukrainian history, literature and culture known to the
new, wider public who, for the first time perhaps, find Ukraine and things Ukrainian on
their personal or business agendas. We hope, over the next few issues, to tailor our
contents to the needs of this new audience, while, we hope, still continuing to interest
and satisfy our loyal readers of the past four decades. We should therefore like to invite
all readers, old and new, to let us know what they would like to see in our pages, and
how, in their opinion, this journal can best, in the world situation of 1992, serve the
better mutual understanding of Ukraine and the Anglophone world.
TH E BANKRUPTCY OF LEGISLATIVE POWER
By taking the u n p reced en ted step , on N ovem ber 18, o f tem porarily
e n tru stin g legislativ e p o w e r to g o v e rn m e n t m in isters, the U krainian
parliament has created a new socio-political situation in the country. With
the concentration o f legislative and executive pow er in its hands, the Cabinet
of Ministers, formerly accountable to the president and the Supreme Council;
has for the time being replaced these two government institutions.
Executive power is being reinforced with the intention of achieving an efficient
implementation o f market reforms and their legal reinforcement by a single
government institution. This step is, however, unconstitutional. Article 9 7 of the
Constitution of Ukraine directly rules out similar experiments: “The single organ
of legislative power of Ukraine is the Supreme Council of Ukraine”. According to
this constitutional principle, the country’s executive power cannot perform a
The Supreme Council has the right to review and adopt decisions on all
matters, with the exception of restricting its own legislative powers, ceding
them to the executive or judicial branches of government. Such a step is a
symptom o f political bankruptcy, political impotence, and a renouncement of
power. If nothing more, then it is at least a sign of disrespect towards the
The present Supreme Council of Ukraine still has a long w ay to g o to
achieve the professionalism of Western parliaments. To some o f the deputies,
for instance, the Supreme Council is n o m ore than a secon d job, their
primary concern being the local posts of importance they occupy in their
own constituencies: directors o f collective and state farms, factory directors,
bank managers and heads o f commercial enterprises. These deputies are
thus completely unprepared for carrying out a legislative function. They d o
not participate in the formulation o f legislation and leave their constituencies
merely to pose in front o f television cam eras in parliament. On the o ne
hand, they want to create the impression o f serious political activity, and, on
the oth er, n o t to lo se o u t o n th e p ay an d b en efits o f th eir p rim ary
em ploym ent. Such a parliam ent is incapable o f implem enting eco n o m ic
reform and backing it u p with appropriate legislation, and o f resolving the
problems of building an independent state.
The first and forem ost course of action in today’s com plicated s o cio
econom ic situation in Ukraine is to develop legislative power, transforming it
into a professional permanent body, and not to reinforce executive power at
th e e x p e n s e o f the legislatu re. Do the p resen t Suprem e C ouncil and
government actually want to implement econom ic and political reforms? All
their measures so far have fell short of implementing actual reforms. ’The Fokin
governm ent drew up four econom ic programmes, which w ere ratified by
parliament but never implemented. The Supreme Council passed a series of
laws, including one on the nationalisation and privatisation of state enterprises
and the housing fund, but no progress has been made. So far no one has
begun to tackle land reform or has any intention of doing so.
Political pow er and econom ic structures are in the hands of communist
partocrats and the mafia. Hiding behind Ukrainian national colours, they are
trying to give the impression o f building an independent Ukraine. These
people cannot be expected to build an independent Ukrainian state. To them
the very idea is incomprehensible and foreign. The individual thus has no
protection against the highhandedness of the communist
as in the past, the people remain the servants of the
Th e co m m u n ist
n o m en k la tu ra ,
w h ich is thriving on th e p o litica l
impotence of the state and the econom ic chaos, and which is plundering
Ukraine and preventing it from rising out o f colonial servitude, has an
interest in the deterioration of the socio-econom ic situation in Ukraine. The
CPSU, today numerically the strongest and best organised party, which is
slowly legalising itself through various parties of the socialist orientation, is
also in te re s te d in th e d e te rio ra tio n o f the situ ation in U k rain e. Th e
communists are doing everything they can to destroy the Ukrainian econom y
and drive the people to com plete impoverishment. They w ant to use the
general m ood of despondency to provoke a social explosion. Their goal is to
induce the people to quash their own independence and drive Ukraine into
a new Union. They are acting with impunity because political pow er is in
Without removing the communist
from power, the building
of an independent Ukrainian state is impossible There is only one feasible
solution: extraordinary elections, which will deliver a blow to the communist
and boost the political and econom ic processes in Ukraine.
TH E UKRAINIAN REVIEW
UKRAINE’S CUSTOMS SERVICES... ■'
CONTROLLING THE “TRANSPARENT BORDERS” :
After the USSR broke up into separate national states, Ukraine becam e like
a homestead ravaged by storm: no fences, only an ardently guarded gate.
This tragicom ic situation has quite aptly b eco m e known as “transparent
borders”. Ukraine is facing a similar situation on more than three-quarters o f
its state borders, until recently administrative boundaries with Russia;
In the spring of 1992, during the conflict in Trans-Dnistria, Ukraine replaced
its militia posts on the border with Moldova with twenty-two custesms posts,
assigning a sizable contingent of border troops for their protection. Considering
the relative stability in Russia and Belarus, Ukraine was iri no hurry to establish
customs control on its border with these two countries. President Kravchuk’s
directive of October 12, 1992, was somewhat belated in Comparison with a
similar decree by Boris Yeltsin, as a result o f which customs posts on the border
with Russia and Belarus will be operational only from January 1, 1993. Until
then, this section o f the border will be guarded by the militia.
In view of its geographical position, Ukraine should have taken this step
m uch sooner. The transit routes o f n early o ne hundred states cross its
territory. Ukraine spent vast sums of money in establishing a new customs
service. It was late in imposing customs duty (including tolls) and, up to
November 1992, charged duty according to old Soviet tariffs. Ukraine spent
half a million
to fill the gap on the Moldovan border, which went
to set up the customs posts. These inadequate sums ensure that this border
remains “transparent” and that the customs posts are incapable o f checking
the flow o f industrial and consumer contraband, money, and even arms.
According to General Bodnar of the border troop«, the demarcation line
b etw een Ukraine and M oldova, as w e ll as Russia and B elaru s will be
established only in the second half o f 1993. For every customs post along the
Moldovan border there are around thirty roads which go around it, which
the sm ugglers readily use. Smugglers pay drivers arou n d five thousand
for every car that drives their merchandise past a customs post
u n d etected , and around ten thousand for ev ery bus. T here is thus no
shortage of local volunteers for the job. The present customs posts therefore
amount to no more than a statement of sovereignty.
With no demarcation line, this “transparent” border is the most convenient for
the movement o f non-ferrous metals, which are being smuggled to the Vtfest.
Moreover, many petty businessmen use this border to transport consum er
THE UKRAINIAN REVIEW
technology, commodities, and so on. Jewels and narcotics generally leave
Ukraine through its western borders. They are smuggled in diplomatic bags after
bribing customs officers, or other means. In the summer of 1992, large quantities
of arms were frequently moved between Moldova, Trans
Following the official withdrawal of the Russian Cossacks from the Trans- Dnister
region, however, the flow of arms was markedly reduced.
Ukrainian armoured vehicles no longer deter the villagers, who use their
free days to visit markets across the border. In the evening hours shots can
still be heard from Trans-Dnistria, despite the presence there of Russia’s
peacekeeping force. People living in the border area therefore have no
illusions about peace along the Trans-Dnistrian border. The Trans-Dnistrians
are still prepared to fight for their independence in spite of the cost.
F or the tim e b ein g, h ow ever, an tagonism on the b o rd er co n ce rn s
Moldova’s unsuccessful attempts to impose its customs service on Trans-
Dnistria, which has established its own militia posts. The reaction of the
Trans-Dnistrians is unanimous: why should another country establish its
customs posts in their region?
Ukraine can be glad of one thing. Its control points on this section of the
border are superior to Moldovan and Trans-Dnistrian customs posts. Ukraine
has a separate border and customs control, and new customs declarations
are being produced. However, the control posts are practically without w ater
and heat. They lack all facilities and are manned by officials unfamiliar with
custom s regulations. U nem ployed volunteers from the local population,
primarily former soldiers, settle for these close to extrem e conditions for a
pay of around four to five thousand
These volunteers are compelled to take on this difficult and thankless job not
only because of unemployment, but also by a craving for an easy income in the
form of bribes and confiscated goods. For the time being, however, the customs
officers are without hot meals or any confidence in the day to come. They
freeze along the roads, surrounded by wind-swept fields, going inside their
booths from time to time to warm their hands beside an old-fashioned heater.
Today the m ajority o f cu stom s posts still lack telep h o n e or radio
communications. Five or six customs posts arc scattered along an area hundreds
of kilometres across without any good roads. They have no cross-country vehicles
only one small car between all of them, unsuitable for existing driving conditions.
In contrast to their Polish, Hungarian and Czech colleagues, Ukrainian customs
officers do not carry arms, even those who serve on the dangerous Moldovan
border. One night at the end of October, for instance, unknown persons shot up
a customs post at Krasnooknynsk. Three days after the incident, persons driving a
stolen car to Moldova fired several bursts of automatic fire at the Maiaky customs
post, in the Odessa oblast, killing four customs officers.
The situation on the Moldovan-Ukrainian border cannot be attributed to
Ukraine’s poverty or remaining traces of Soviet negligence alone. Certain
business circles in Ukraine have a particular interest in “transparent borders”. ■
KUCHMA PULL UKRAINE :
O U T
C R IS IS ? '
At the end o f last year and the beginning o f this year the Cabinet o f
Ministers issued a series of decrees, which constituted the government’s first
p ra ctica l ste p s to w a rd s o v e rco m in g the p re s e n t crisis. T h e c h a n g e s
introduced by these decrees affect various aspects o f social life but contain
very few surprises, b n ly the measures sanctioning the unrestricted circulation
o f hard cu rrency con tradicted the plans o f d eputy prim e minister Thor
Yukhnovskyi. Yukhnovskyi maintained that the exchange rate between the
and the dollar is being deliberately
inflated and should be fixed by the state. In practice, these measures have
endorsed a virtually unrestricted circulation of hard currency in Ukraine at a
fluctuating exchange rate.
The remainder o f the laws are fully consistent with previous declarations
by members o f the government. Taxes on business have undergone a partial
reduction. Value added tax, for instance, has been reduced from 2 8 to 20 per
cent, and taxes on profit have replaced taxes on turnover. The lucrative
income of state and private companies is being restricted. The government
has declared its intention to put an end to bureaucratic corruption and the
misappropriation o f state property. State firms have been barred from setting
up private companies. Several high-ranking government officials have been
dismissed, som e of them arrested on charges o f corruption. However, it is
the people who will have to pay for the implementation o f new reforms in
Wage indexing has been abolished and there is a restriction on w age
increases at state firms, which em ploy the majority of the labour force.
Simultaneously, the government delivered a powerful blow to private trade.
The duty imposed on privately exported consumer goods will inevitably lead
to a marked increase in prices on the commodities markets, where prices are
relatively lower and most people buy their consum er goods.
The inspiration behind the reforms, Economics Minister Viktor Pynzenyk,
is o p tim is tic a b o u t o v e rc o m in g th e e c o n o m ic cris is an d a c h ie v in g
stabilisation this year. He plans to reduce the rate of inflation to 2-3 per cent
per annum from the present 3000 per cent. H ow ever, the governm ent’s
capacity to implement its own programme is extrem ely doubtful. The tax
reductions are riot sufficient en ou gh to m ake Ukraine a businessm an’s
p a ra d ise . A re d u ctio n in ta x e s d o e s n o t a u to m a tica lly c r e a te b e tte r
THE-: UKRAINIAN REVIEW
conditions. Taxes are still high enough to impede econom ic development in
Ukraine. This primarily con cern s value added tax, w hich is, in practical
terms, a sales tax that enable? the same goods to be taxed several times.
M oreover, p rofit will be ta x e d tw ice: as the firm ’s p rofit an d as the
p ro p rietor’s profit. Thus an influx o f capital into Ukraine is not to be
expected. Naturally, changes in tax policy will create better conditions for
econom ic development. They will not, however, ensure sufficient growth to
avert the further collapse of the econom y and the growing impoverishment
of the population.
The second weak point in Kuchma’s policy is his determination to lay the
en tire b u rd en o f the transition p eriod on the p eo p le. U krainians are
distinguished for their exceptional patience, but there is a limit to this patience.
Last year there was a sharp decrease in living standards, which are rapidly
becoming too low to satisfy even elementary physiological needs. Those earning
an average income can no longer feed or clothe themselves on their wages, let
alone support their family or manage their household.
A legal restriction on lucrative income can initially win popular support as
hopes for a drop in prices begin to rise. But the initial euphoria will soon
p ass as m ark et p rice s a re d eterm in ed not by net p rice s , but b y the
interrelation between supply and demand. The disproportion resulting from
such artificial restrictions will play into the hands of the mafia speculators,
which is already thé case with railway tickets. Speculators are buying up
train tickets in bulk, reselling them at 3 - 4 times their nominal price. This new
development will only strengthen the position of the powerful local mafias.
The Cabinet o f Ministers can make whatever plans it likes. The point is,
however, Whether the people will go on tolerating the government’s whims.
The people feel cheated. All promises concerning social rights and interests
have b een broken. The w ave o f public rallies follow ing the lis t price
increases demonstrated the level o f social tension in the country, which is
leading to a new mass, uncontrolled explosion of indignation, which will put
an e n d to all re fo rm s. T h e situ a tio n can only b e a lle v ia te d b y an
improvement in the material position of the people, but there are p esenü
n o serious grounds for such hopes in the near future.
It is also difficult to ascribe any success to the governm ent’s plan to
establish order in the state econom ic sector. All hopes of setting up efficient
state firms ap p ear naive. This w as even beyond the cap acity of Stalin,
compared to whom today’s government leaders look like apprentices. Another
factor, which predetermines the failure of these plans is the close ties of
Ukraine’s econom y to the Commonwealth of Independent States, primarily
Kuchma is thus impossible without contacts with
Russian leaders, who are neither inclined nor able to help Ukraine.
The reduction in centralised planning in government businesses does not
bring them greater freedom. The new government measures do not offer any
incentives. In practice this will mean that state businesses, which Kaye no
interest in their own productivity, will make no attempt to win the market and
supply it with their own goods. This has happened on numerous occasions.
The liberalisation of prices on industrial goods and food left shops empty.
H ow ever, instead o f creatin g an interest In p rodu ctivity, th e Kuchm a
government has resorted to tough measures to achieve positive results.
Ukraine’s econom y remains greatly dependent on Russia. For instance,
although fuel prices in Kyiv have already reached international standards,
making the im port o f oil from countries o th er than Russia a lucrative
prospect, there are no private firms capable of undertaking anything on this
scale. The state, on the Other hand, does not seem interested in making a
profit. The latest government decrees do nothing to improve this situation.
The Cabinet o f Ministers has failed to take realistic and decisive steps
towards alleviating and simplifying Ukraine’s painful transition to the market.
The government has missed the opportunity to carry out privatisation more
effectively, to reduce the bureaucratic
which is impairing private
initiative and is the so u rce o f co rru p tio n , an d to cre a te an efficien t
mechanism to protect citizens’ rights and property. Such measures, Which do
not require a large capital investment, can have an immense econom ic effect
in a relatively short period of time.
Is the Polish scenario feasible in Ukraine? The question remains open.
However, Ukraine has already lost the opportunity for a slow, evolutionary
transformation of the economy and society, the leitmotif of government speeches.
From Poland’s shock therapy Ukraine borrowed only shock, and from the
evolutionary model — the absence Of swift results. Only one course remains
open for Ukraine: to force through reforms as quickly as possible in order to
achieve positive results. But the new prime minister, in whatever ways he may
differ from Vitold Fokin, is implementing a programme that would have been
effective last year and is repeating the fundamental mistakes of his predecessor:
the slow pace of reform, hopeless attempts to resolve new problems by old
methods, and reservations concerning decisive steps towards the market. Thus
hie government’s capacity to successftilly implement constructive policies in the
present situation remains doubtful.
^ V. ^
PRIVATISATION — Y E T ANOTHER DECEPTION
The Cabinet of Ministers has finally turned to privatisation. Privatisation
vouchers worth thirty thousand
Ukrainian rouble) will
be distributed free to the entire population. This, however, is a purely symbolic
gesture as the vouchers can only b e used for buying shares in privatised state
firms and cannot be sold or exchanged between private individuals.
In February arid March of last year, the Ukrainian parliament passed a
series o f laws, one on the Privatisation of Small Enterprises and one on the
Privatisation o f Large Enterprises, and a Law on Privatisation Vouchers.
Together with the Law o n Foreign Investment, this legislation established
the m echanism o f privatisation.
Despite these m easures, no progress was m ade with privatisation last
year. Like virtually all econom ic reforms in Ukraine, the plans to transform
ineffective state businesses into effective private enterprises met with failure.
However, the principal flaw o f the privatisation programme lies not in the
failure to meet deadlines, but in the inherent flaws in its mechanism.
Th e privatised state firms are to be sold at open auctions and every
citizen will receive special vouchers to buy shares in privatised businesses.
Certain firms, primarily the larger enterprises, however, will be privatised
not through sale at open auction, but on a so-called competitive basis, that
is through direct deals'.'
Privatisation, which will be carried out in two stages, will take a minimum
of four years to com p lete. Initially, small businesses —- sh op s, various
services and a number o f small industrial firms — are to be privatised, to be
followed by the large and medium-sized enterprises in 1994-1995.
The free hand-over o f part of state property to the public is intended to
demonstrate the state’s concern for its people, to create an equal opportunity
for every citizen, and to symbolise the social justice of the new Ukraine. The
principles of social justice and concern for the welfare of the general public,
however, are pure fiction. As bids for state enterprises can also be m ade using
cash, this will cause the value of the vouchers to drop. Inflation has already
reduced the real value of the vouchers by at least 150 per cent. Although
inflation will continue to rise, the vouchers will no longer b e indexed. Thus,
when privatisation is actually introduced, the ordinary citizen’s shares in state
property will be worth next to nothing. In the eyes of som e politicians this
may constitute social justice. In practice, however, it is those with money —
the mafia, the
w ho made their fortune through speculation
and the large-scale misappropriation of state property, who will benefit from
It is, however, procedural matters that will deliver the
coup d e gra ce to
the g en eral public. T h e a v e ra g e citizen ca n n o t k e e p track o f all the
countless privatisation auctions, or assess the condition and real value of
businesses or their prospects. The average citizen will thus have to turn to
third parties to organise and manage his investment, who will, naturally,
charge a commission for their services. The fixed assets of small businesses
are relatively low, which will increase competition on the market between
the vouchers and cash, devaluing the vouchers even farther. At the second
stage, the remaining vouchers will have to com pete with an even greater
abundance of cash, which will eventually reduce them to an abstract symbol
of the well-meaning intentions o f parliament. In Ukraine the vouchers will
be worth much less than in Russia and, in view of the m eagre benefits, a
significant section of the population will simply not find it worth their while
to go through all the bureaucratic red tape unnecessarily.
The private citizen will thus receive hardly anything. But the state will
gain nothing either. H uge profit losses will ensure another few years o f
inefficient production by the state sector. The potential losses incurred by
the people will be markedly higher than the value of the vouchers they
receive from the state. The privatisation o f services and shops will not
improve the overall econom ic situation and welfare o f the people since they
do n o t c re a te su fficien t m aterial re so u rce s. State b u sin esses, w h o se
employees have always shown little concern for communal property and
w hose fixed assets have dropped- by an average o f 50 -8 0 per cent, will
con tin u e to u se their o u td ated , u n eco n om ical m achinery. As a result,
completely drained small firms with antiquated equipment will be privatised
during the first stage o f the plan. If we add the huge expenses required to
maintain the bureaucratic apparatus which runs the State Property Fund,
responsible for establishing the guidelines for privatisation and for the sale
of state property, and the various local privatisation commissions, then the
complete ineptness of the privatisation plan becom es clear.
those who drew up the plans for privatisation, will
benefit. They have already acquired the best positions in the State Property
Fund and on the local privatisation commissions: Prospective buyers will have
to pay huge bribès for confidential information and fo r the privilege of
acquiring a business. The other beneficiaries will b e the various third parties,
which will claim their own lion’s share of commissions from clients.
An intelligent approach to privatisation could give a powerful boost to
economic development in Ukraine and solve the social and economic problems.
If the most energetic and ambitious citizens are offered a genuine opportunity to
increase their wealth and raise their social status by free shares in state firms, they
will eventually become an important factor in the economic development of the
country. Moreover, this would greatly reduce soda! tension.
THE UKRAINIAN REVIEW
Th e sale of o th er state enterprises for cash w ou ld co v e r th e sta te ’s
enormous budget deficit without increasing the tax burden on businesses and
the general public. The rate o f privatisation is no less important: the sooner
factories acquire new owners, the sooner they will begin to operate normally
a s each day of delays entails huge losses.
Economics Minister Viktor Pynzenyk recently stated that one of the stumbling
blocks of privatisation is the lack of sufficient capital to buy shares in businesses.
The Cabinet of Ministers is thus clearly demonstrating its failure to grasp the
essence of market reforms. Privatisation should not be carried out purely for the
sake of turning people into capitalists, but in order to change the producer's
attitude towards production and thereby to use the powerful lever of personal
interest and initiative in building the country’s economy. Those with capacity and
energy will turn to business, while those without will simply sell their shares.
This will not affect the interests of die wealthy. It makes no difference to them
from whom they buy up shares, from the state, or from small proprietors.
However, the utilisation of the powerful econom ic potential o f the state
to accelerate econom ic development remains purely theoretical. In the short
period o f ind ep en d en ce m any opportunities have b een lost and many
illusions have been shattered. The free hand-over of state enterprises to the
general public is merely another myth.
in this 175-page collection Wolodymyr Kosyk subjects the Third Reich’s
attitude towards the Ukrainian question to a painstaking analysis by
compiling and commenting on the crucial documents covering a decade
(1934-1944) which encom passes both peace and war.
This period of Germ an-Ukrainian relations has heretofore been largely
overlooked by Ukrainian and other scholars. Thus, Kosyk’s attempt is a
pioneering one. He draws the materials for his work from such sources
as: the German Federal Archives (civil and military), the German Foreign
Ministry, a id the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg.
Ukrainian Central Information Service, London
Price: £8.00 ($15.00 U S )
; f’leaseaend your order to:::.
UCIS, 200 Liverpool Road, London N1 I L F
(Results of a public survey in Ukraine, November 1992)
It is safe to say that ev eryo n e is in terested in the d ev elo p m en t o f
dem ocracy in Ukraine and the nation’s reaction to that process. After 350
years of Russian subjugation and more than 7 0 years of Communist Russian
domination, the question that is on the minds of many people is what do the
man and woman on the street today actually think about their new-found
fre e d o m an d in d e p e n d e n c e , th e D e c e m b e r 1, 1 9 9 1 , re fe re n d u m ,
A recent poll of Ukrainians has shown that despite the current econom ic
and political uncertainties, and a pessimistic outlook on future personal well
b ein g, m ost resp o n d en ts in U kraine o ffer a positive, th ou gh critical,
assessment of the events of the past year and only an insignificant minority
longs for a return to the socialist days. In general, the survey reveals that
Ukrainians support the democratic and econom ic reforms in their country,
however, many favour a quicker pace in their development. Furthermore,
patriotism and religion, or belief in God, have also increased in Ukraine.
The results of the Times Mirror Centre for the People and the Press survey,
co n d u cted in Ukraine in N ovem ber 1992, have been recently reported,
though the article’s spin focused disproportionately on one misinterpreted
negative, albeit dramatic,
— that 52 p er cent o f the people said
they disagree with events in Ukraine in the past 12 months ■
adding an analysis of other questions and their responses.
“As their standard of living goes from bad to worse and uncertainty about
the future increases, the Russian people have soured on dem ocracy", the
Centre wrote. “D em ocracy also eroded in Ukraine and Lithuania, but not
nearly so severely as in Russia”.
The Ukrainian su rvey, co n d u cte d u n d er th e d irectio n o f Dr. Elena
Bashkirova, managing director of Romir Ltd. o f Moscow, is based on 1,400
personal interviews held on N ovem ber 1-15, 1992, with a representative
sample of persons over the age of 15. The Centre said the Ukrainian poll was
carried out in l
‘ primary sampling units that were drawn from a sampling
frame that was stratified by region and city size. The current survey was a
follow-up to one conducted in May 1991.
In response to the question: “Overall, do you strongly approve, approve,
disapprove or strongly disapprove of the political and econom ic changes that
have taken place in our country over the past few years”, 52 per cent did, in
fact, respond that they do not. Thirty-three per cent said they approved,
while 15 per cent didn’t know.
The survey, which was simultaneously conducted in Russia and Lithuania,
showed that in Russia the sam e number disapproved, while 31 per cent and
THE UKRAINIAN REVIEW
17 per cent, respectively, approved or didn’t know. Meanwhile, in Lithuania,
64 per cent approved, 27 disapproved and 9 didn’t know.
On the surface, the responses in Ukraine could lead a reader to interpret
the num bers as indicating lire population does not favour the country’s
situation. However, answers to questions about the kind of political order
they would like to see in Ukraine or the pace of political and econom ic
reforms demonstrate that Ukrainians support the changes, though they feel
they are proceeding too slowly.
For example, as for which political order should develop in Ukraine,
cent favoured the old socialist system, down 2 per cent from May 1991; 20 per
cent favoured democratic socialism, down 7 per cent from the previous poll; 15
per cent sided with a modified form of Scandinavian capitalism, down 11 per
cent; 19 per cent favoured Western capitalism, down 4 per cent, and 38 per
cent offered no opinion on the matter, an increase of 24 per cent in 18 months.
At worst, this question reveals that the people are confused about which
political-economic order they favour, and at best, only a few people want a
return to command socialism.
As for the pace of democratic reforms, 45 per cent of Ukrainians feel it is
progressing too slowly,
per cent say it is too fast and 14 per cent think it is
about right. The latter two figures show insignificant changes from May 1991,
while the “too quickly” group dropped 9 percentage points. In contrast, 31
per cent of Russians felt is was proceeding too slowly, down from 4 0 per
cent in the previous poll.
In its analysis of the results, the Centre wrote: “Ukraine lags Russia in
econom ic reform, however, and greater disaffection with both dem ocracy
and free markets may appear in the future if the speedier movement toward
free markets, as promised by the new prime minister, Leonid Kuchma, brings
The responses to the question about free-market reforms reveal a jump to
4 8 per cent among those who say it is too slow and a decrease to
cent in the too-quickly category.
Responses to queries about patriotism am ong Ukrainians also offered
positive information. The data showed that in the past 18 months it has
remained well above 50 per cent, though the two categories — completely
and mostly agree — show striking differences. In May 1991, 22 per cent o f
Ukrainians said they com pletely agreed with the statem en t “I am very
p a trio tic”. A y e a r an d a h alf later, the figure jum ped to 41 p e r cen t.
Conversely, reacting to the same statement then, 40 per cent replied then they
mostly agreed, while today 27 per cent mostly agreed. As for the cumulative
results for the disagree category, previously 27 per cent sided with those
choices and in November 1992, only 18 per cent chose those characteristics.
In analysing patriotism or nationalism in Ukraine, the Centre wrote: “som e
rise in patriotic sentiment occurred, especially in western and central Ukraine,
where nationalists are determined to create greater ‘national consciousness’ by
em phasizing their new-found distinctiveness from Russians and recalling
historic injustices allegedly done them b y ‘the Moscow colonizers’”.
Also, the Centre found, “East-west differences tin Ukraine] go beyond the
socialist sentiment and language preference. The heavily-Russianized eastern
much more pro-authoritarian than the w est, 45 p ercent to I I
percent, and much less inclined to dem ocracy 0 8 percent to
Easterners were also less approving of the political and econom ic changes of
recent years, more disillusioned with the Ukrainian parliament, less religious,
less patriotic, and less inclined to say parts o f neighboring territories belong
to Ukraine. Not surprisingly, 99 percent of easterners have favorable views of
Russians, compared with 84 percent of those in western Ukraine”.
Some of the questions in the survey also asked respondents to judge other
nationalities, territorial claims and military intervention.
Though a question about Ukrainians’ favouring Russians or not in Ukraine
was not posed, Russians, when asked whether they favoured Ukrainians in
Russia, responded positively by 82 per cent. In contrast, Jew s garnered only
6 5 -per cent favourable responses. While this answer may not actually reveal
what Russians really feel towards Ukrainians, a question about the use of
Russian troops to defend Russians in neighbouring countries elicited a
cent positive response, with the greatest number o f those in favour coming
from persons under 25, with a higher education and income living in the
This question was also not asked In Ukraine. The Centre did
find that the unfavourability rating o f Jew s in Ukraine dropped from 22 per
Ukrainians w ere included in a question about “parts o f neighboring
countries that really belong to us”. Twenty-eight per cent agreed with the
statement, while 43 per cent did not. The responses did not reflect any
radical d ifferen ce b etw een the tw o polls. Also, a grow ing n u m b er o f
Ukrainians responded that they have less in common with other nationalities
and races in their country.
Russians, on the o th e r hand, rep lied by 3 7 p er ce n t that p arts o f
neighbouring countries are Russian, up 15 per cent from May 1991, with 27
per cent in disagreement today, down
The responses to these questions reveal that among Russians there may be
latent feelings of superiority, chauvinism, even aggression tow ards non-
While 50 per cent of Ukrainians favour a democratic form o f government
(down 7 per cent) and 29 per cent support a strong leader, Leonid Kravchuk
continues to hold the favour of
per cen t o f the p eop le. In judging
Kravchuk, 24 per cent view him mostly unfavourably, and 9 per cent very
unfavourably. When asked’ about Boris Yeltsin, 38 per cent of Ukrainians said
they favoured him, 15 points fewer than in May 1991.
Leonid Kuchm a.has the favour of 29 per cent of die population, with 9
per cent falling in the negative category and 43 per cent saying they don’t
know. Vyacheslav Chornovil, transliterated in the tabulations as “Vladislav
Tchernovil”, has the support of 29 per cent and the disfavour of 53 per cent.
Council Chairman Ivan Plyushch’s tallies are 41 per cent v. 28 per
cent, and Rukh’s, 27 per cent v. 52 per cent.
The Supreme Council of Ukraine also showed signs of falling into disfavour.
When asked if the parliament has a good influence on the way events are
proceeding in the country, 23 per cent said yes, compared with 45 per cent
earlier. The unfavourable rating egged up from 24 per cent to 29 per ce n t
Thirty-two per cent of Ukrainians believe there Is more dem ocracy today
than in the past (Only 22 p e r cent in Russia), while 37 per cent say there is
per cent offered; no opinion.
W hen asked where on“'die ladder of life the respondents find themselves
today, compared with five years ago and five years from now, Ukrainians said
average to low in all cases, though differences between the two ap p eared
Less than 10 per cent felt they are, were or will be on the higher rungs.
As for today, 28 per cent replied average and 7 0 per cent low; 46 per cent
replied average five years ago and 44 per cent low, and 31 per cent average
five years from now and 54 per cent low.
Admitting that the country is suffering a malaise, Ukrainians placed most
of the blam e for it on the Communists and today's leaders, though the
current government edged out the Communists 6 7 per cent to 49 per cent.
Private property is supported in Ukraine by an overwhelming majority o f
per cent to 23 per cent. H ow ever, they also feel that
capitalism will not make them rich. Sixty-four per cent said that hard work
offers little guarantee of success*
per cent believe people get ahead at the
expense of others (29 per cent say it is based on ability and ambition).
As for radio and television, 51 per Cent believe they have a good influence
on the country’s events, up
per cent from the last poll, but 31 per cent agree
w ith placing greater constraints and controls on what newspapers print and
television and radio broadcast. In the last survey, 70 per cent disapproved of
controls, while today 51 per cent disapprove. W hen asked about political
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