Examples of pipelines that bypass Iran and Russia are the Baku

Examples of pipelines that bypass Iran and Russia are the Baku-
Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, a project theUnited States has long urgedKazakhstan
to join, a project thatwould see the construction of a pipeline under the Caspian
Sea; the proposed Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan (TAP) line which may
even be extended to India; or alternatively a potential pipeline delivering
newly discovered Afghan energy resources to the subcontinent. Beyond the
scope of pipelines, there has even been an initiative to link Central Asian and
South Asian electricity networks.10

While Washington admittedly seeks energy access for US firms on a

competitive basis, it knows fullwell that it cannot completely supplant Russian
or Chinese interests in the region. Rather, in keeping with the geopolitical imperative
of preventing any imperial revival in Eurasia, America simply wants
to prevent Russia or any other foreign power from dominating Central Asian
energy markets. Consequently, Washington has championed pipelines like
those of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to China and the projected TAP and
Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) line to India.

In 2006 Minister Ivanov

again stated that Russia viewed any threats to the constitutional order of CIS
regimes as a major threat to Russian security.2

Most probably Russia desires more access to the base because

Uzbekistan will more than likely become the regional headquarters for a unified
air defense system. This regional systemwill become a component of the
CIS Unified Air Defense incorporating preexisting facilities and structures.
To some degree this deal represents what the Russian military analyst VladimirMukhin
calls a “reanimation” of the Soviet defense structure.Meanwhile
Uzbek Su-27 and MiG-29 aircraft will be posted there as part of a regular
peacetime deployment.Mukhin also opined thatMoscowwanted the base because
one of Russia’s primary interests in Uzbekistan is uranium production
and enrichment, now being done at the Navoi Mining and Smelting facility
close by. Allegedly this new defensive capability will help protect those
works from air attacks and international terrorism.
According to the American expert on Central Asia, Daniel Burghart,
For too long, Central Asia has been defined in terms of what others sought to gain
there, and to a certain degree that is still the case. What is different is that since
1991, the region has begun to define itself, both in terms of national identities that
it never had before, and a regional identity that it is trying to create.2
The simultaneity of these two dynamics reveals that the agency of external actors
is distinguished not by an imperial desire for the control of territory, but by the
establishment of “niches of influence”. Consequently, the notion of the “new great
game” comes to characterize the dynamics of processing, selection and
internalization of some externally promoted ideas and not others.12
Tajikistan together with Kyrgyzstan is playing an important geo-strategic role in the region, due
to the fact that both republics control 90% of all water resources of CAR.
Here, there is the competition in economic, military and political interests of Russia, China, Iran, Turkey,
India, Pakistan, the non-regional governments and structures (U.S., EU, NATO).