Faculty of Culture and Society Department of Global Political Studies

891215 0458

Faculty of Culture and Society
Department of Global Political Studies

“Administrative reforms in the Ottoman Empire 1839 – 1876;

A discourse on sovereignty, liberalism and constitution.

By Eleftherios Ntotsikas

MA in Global Political Studies

Course: GP601L-20142-GP449, Global Political Studies, 15 credits

International Relations
Words: 4,625

Academic year: 2014 – 2015

Malmö 2014
Contents
1. Introduction………………………………………………………………………………3
1.1. Question Formulation…………………………………………………………………3
2. Theoretical Framework
2.i. Liberalism……………………………………………………………………………….4
2.ii. Krasner and sovereignty discourse………………………………………………….5
3. Main part
i. First reformist efforts…………………………………………………………………….6
ii. Modernization of the central administration body………………………………….7
iii. The new structure of the provincial government…………………………………...8
iv. The constitution of 1876………………………………………………………………...9
v. The social impact of reforms…………………………………………………………...10
4. Conclusion………………………………………………………………….……………..11
5. Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………....11

1. Introduction

The purpose of this essay is to outline all the parameters that led the Ottoman Empire to the very need of reforming itself. Thus we have to explore the very nature of the reforms needed, especially in the administration sector that is this case study field. Our point of view will consider the theoretical framework o f liberalism in the international relations theory. Here arises the question why do we really study this period? The reformist events of the Tanzimat period (1839- 1876) left an indelible mark on both the Ottomans and the modern Turkish state. More specifically, the attempt of the Ottoman ruling class sought to build a new administrative machine entrenched bases, institutions, cultures and Western ones.¹ In this effort, the Ottomans proponents of Western rationality recorded a series of successes.
Initial success was granted by the Sultan of Hatti Serif² of Gulhane³ in November 1839 to follow the Hatti Humayun in 1856 and later the first Ottoman constitution. The Sublime Porte undertakes to adopt westernized concepts by making a radical modernization of the management, and the general economy, law, education and military affairs.⁴ Undoubtedly given new impetus to the empire of Osmanli, momentum allowed the Ottoman state to continue building what life as the dawn of the 20th century. The whole effort was supported under specific forms of Ottoman political and economic life, active personalities like Resint Pasha⁵ and Midhat Pasha⁶ However many reform projects antedate the period of the Tanzimat. Thus this essay’s ambition is to discuss the motives, the images, and the perception of the reforms from aspects such as history, public administration and liberal critique.
1.1 Question formulation
Ottoman Empire in the 19^th century faces a power decline. This decline created the eastern question regarding the balance of power in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East in general. This is the main reason that great powers understood the need to reform the Ottoman political system, so that it could become sustainable. The question that we will discuss in this paper is: did the European liberalism have a significant impact on the Ottoman Empire in terms of administrational restructuring? In order to understand the impact of the reforms in the Ottoman political establishment it is crucial to discuss the issue of sovereignty, therefore this paper will approach Krasner’s standpoint over the westphalian sovereignty question. At the same time I will try to outline what kind of reforms took place in the Ottoman entity during the so called “Tanzimat” period.
2. Theoretical framework
2.i. Liberalism
One of the two mainstream rationalist theories in international relations theory is liberalism. Liberalism stands for political freedom, democratic institutions, civil rights and equality of all the individuals regardless occupation before the law. According to Fukuyama, liberal values could be characterized unchallenged as a model of political, economical and societal development.⁷ The western path to modernity faces no national, cultural or ethnical borders; the only alternative remains the introduction of western institutions in domestic affairs. This position constitutes of Kantian ideas that particular states, with liberal democratic institutions, remain an ideal that other countries have to emulate.⁸
For liberal theorists, the belief in human cooperation and moral values depicts the inner potential of individuals and states to establish representative governments that are peaceful and legitimate.⁹ Thomas Hobbes constructed the idea of a social contract which individuals enter in order to guarantee their security.¹⁰ John Locke, pointed out the need for the state to be the guard of individual rights, thus he argued that when the state becomes a tyrant, that constituted a violation of the social contract, which bestows life, liberty, and property as a natural right. ¹¹
The notions of democracy and civil rights are neither culturally specific, nor ethnocentric, so they could be adopted as well by societies that do not adopt a clear western cultural orientation. The promotion of civil rights “from the core to the periphery assumes a degree of moral superiority – which the West not only possesses moral truths…but it can sit in judgment on other societies.”¹²

2.i. Krasner and sovereignty discourse.
The state is sovereign because no other social institution or group may legitimately challenge its claim to be society's ultimate decision-making power or seek to join in governing without its permission.¹³ Therefore states monopolize all the means of violence.¹⁴ Machiavelli¹⁵ equates the prince with the state, a notion that many social scientists find problematic, however this is what states have been historically. "Aristotle treats tyranny as a monstrosity whereas Machiavelli rather deals with tyranny as essential in the foundation of society itself. In this point, as well as in others of the same character, Machiavelli is closer to Plato than to Aristotle."¹⁶ As Hanna Pitkin observes “it is not enough to ask whether Machiavelli means the nation or the Prince’s position: the point is that the two form a single concept for him.”¹⁷
Krasner is approaching sovereignty, arguing that it could be characterized as an ”organized hypocrisy." Organized hypocrisy "occurs when the logic of appropriateness and the logic of consequences are in conflict"¹⁸- that is, when ruling class preferences to remain in power conflicts with the behavior required by norms. Hypocrisy is being defined from Krasner as the “gap between the professed norms and principles of political action (logic of appropriateness) and the strategic calculations on which such action is based (the logic of consequences).”¹⁹ By using Krasner’s words, “hypocrisy is an inherent problem for political organizations.”²⁰
Following Krasner’s argumentation we could argue that Ottoman Empire’s ruling class chose the way of reforming its own political system based on logic of consequences. The Russian threat was eminent during the 19^th century and in order to avoid the collapsing of the system, Ottomans followed the rational path of implementation of certain political reforms. Krasner speaks about the importance of westphalian sovereignty. Westphalian sovereignty according to Krasner refers to the political power that is able to control its own territory with the exclusion of external actors from this given entity.²¹ Analyzing the European pressure²² to the Ottoman regime to reform itself and to include liberal policies in certain sectors of the state along with the respect to civil and religious rights of certain minority groups, this could be consider a violation of the principle of westphalian sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire.
Krasner's defines Westphalian sovereignty and "logic of appropriateness" as:
an institutional arrangement for organizing political life that is based on two principles: territoriality and the exclusion of external actors from domestic authority structures. Rulers may be constrained, sometimes severely, by the external environment but they are still free to choose the institutions and the policies they regard as optimal. Westphalian sovereignty is violated when external actors influence or determine domestic authority structures.²³
3.i. First reformist efforts
Until the 19th century the responsibility for the exercise of governmental policy has been a central council composed of military and civilian officials, the “Divani”. Initially the meetings of that body were chaired by the Sultan. By Suleiman II the Magnificent and after convening the “Divani” was chaired by the grand vizier. The “Divani” consisted of ex officio members who were both “kazaskerides”, that the army chiefs of Europe and Asia, both “Beylerbey”, ie local commanders Asia and Europe, both responsible for the financial affairs of the empire, “Defterdar”.²⁴ The body of Janissaries represented by a quarterback, at the same time the admiral of the fleet was also present, the so called “Kapoudan Pasha”.²⁵
The first reformist attempt was made by Selim III around 1800, when the reformer²⁶ ruler attempted the military modernization through the creation of a new army besed upon the new European standards of Nizami Tzenint.²⁷ But Selim was forced to abdicate and then murdered by the Janissaries in 1808. Sultan Mahmud II' managed to abolish the body of Janissaries in 1826 by relentless prosecutions; besides the organization has achieved diplomatic service and the imposition of central control authority over the provinces.²⁸
3. ii. Modernization of the central administration body
By signing the Hatti Sherif and Hatti Humayun in 1839 and 1856 respectively, Sultan initiated the administrative reforms in the Ottoman Empire. In the place of “Divani”, a cabinet chaired by the grand vizier and with the participation of ministers has been created now (1839). Thus there was founded the ministries of Foreign Affairs, Finance, Education, Religious Endowments and Trade.²⁹ As for the ministry of Interior, it became autonomous substantially in February 1869 after the death of Fuat Pasha, Grand Vizier, as by then (from 1838-1869) the functions performed by an existing assistant of the grand vizier, the so called “sadaret mustesari”.³⁰Apart from ministers military officials were participating also in this institution.³¹ The "Supreme Council of Judicial Affairs' with responsibilities including oversight of justice, legislation and control problems with the administration or reform founded in 1838.³² During the period 1854 - 1861 there was established the "Supreme Council Reform" (Meclis-I Ali-i Tanzimat) primarily with legislative and advisory responsibilities.³³ However, in order to achieve the proper functioning of the state these two bodies merged into a single one under the name “Supreme Council of Judicial Affairs.” The new body composed of minor subgroups regarding the specific area of judicial power like "Laws and Regulations", "Administration and Finance" and "Judicial Affairs."³⁴ However in 1867 it was decided to re-split the body into two boards. Thus was created the "Council of State" with powers to produce the bulk of legislation and oversight of public administration, chaired by Midhat Pasha.³⁵ The other institution was the newly formed "Council Judiciary Regulations" chaired by Ahmet Cevdet Pasha.³⁶
The role of ministries has also been monitoring the reforms in the administration of the empire. More specifically, the Interior Ministry had overall responsibility for the operation of public administration laws and proposed changes in legislative bodies.³⁷ The head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was the second in command after the grand vizier and therefore his influence was far from being negligible.³⁸ The areas of responsibility have included sending diplomats abroad, foreign trade, interstate agreements of any kind, while it maintained the power of controlling the issues of the various millets of the Empire.³⁹ Second in line of ministries follows the Ministry of Finance, which was responsible for collecting taxes and the general economic governance.⁴⁰ The Commerce Department was responsible respectively for trade etc.
3.iii. The new structure of the provincial government
Apart from the central administration reforms, structural changes were made to the provincial government. The main reason for this reform has been the modernization of the dysfunctional timar system. Thus was founded in 1840 as a result of the Hatti Sherif, an advisory body for each eyalet, consisting of both Muslims and non-Muslim representatives, aiming to control the power of the governor of the province.⁴¹ From the most revolutionary measures in terms of enterprises was the appointment of a committee responsible for economic issues (muhassil).⁴² Already in 1844 and 1846, the sultan himself made ​​inspections in Anatolia and Europe to become a partaker of any local failures and complaints.⁴³ In 1845 convened in Istanbul a meeting of representatives of the provinces to express their views on a range of issues related to provinces such as taxes and other financial issues.⁴⁴ The year after the number of eyelets (provinces) increased significantly from 28 to 36, resulting in the further decentralization of the state.⁴⁵
The implementation of the Vilayet Law in 1864 was a substantial and fundamental change in the administrative structure of the Ottoman regional administration. The empire was divided into vilayets, each vilayet in sancaks, kazas and Nahias.⁴⁶ Vali will be the General Commander of the vilayet with responsibilities both administrative and military. In each vilayet were economic service, postal service, foreign affairs department, the department of public works, service trade and agriculture, government service and file address public education vilayet.⁴⁷ Each vilayet had three advisory bodies which included both Muslims and non-Muslims. The first was the General Council, in which the members were two representatives of the Muslim community and two from other religious groups, that body’s mission has been to meet once a year.⁴⁸ The general board which was appointed under the precedence of the vali, had been granted with the responsibility for the management, finance and general fundamental domestic issues of villayet; as for the members they were financial managers, directly appointed by the vali and four elected members, including both non-Muslims.⁴⁹ And last there has been a council responsible for issues such as water and transport.⁵⁰ As for the Judicial Service, the head of which is appointed by the sultan, and public policy issues regulated by the Police Service.⁵¹
Below the vali was being placed the moutesarif, commander of the county (sancak), who performed his duties with the help of a board representing all social and religious groups of the sancak.⁵² As for the next local level kazas, the administration was in the hands of Kaimakam. They were under the direct responsibility of the administration, economic governance and the police, while a more thorough completion of their work enjoyed the assistance of a secretary and a board which was attended by the spirit of the Tanzimat, the judge kaza, the religious leaders and three citizens.⁵³ The kazas has been divided in nahias under the rule of "moudirid." Each Nahia had a council, which formed from representatives of the local communities of Nahias, with jurisdiction on issues between local communities.⁵⁴ The lower level of government was the community, the head of which (Mouchtar) was elected; there were only two conditions for an individual to get elected: a) was aged over 30 years and b) pay tax at least 100 piastres, the office was annual course.⁵⁵
3.iv. The Constitution of 1876
On December the 23rd, 1876 signed the first Ottoman constitution consisting of 119 articles.⁵⁶ The constitution proclaimed Ottomanism as the official state ideology, and stressed the egalitarianism of citizens and equal treatment by the state regardless of religion, remained the official state religion Islam.⁵⁷ The face of the sultan remained sacred and kept the caliphate.⁵⁸ Moreover, the sultan is the head of state decided to wage war, a treaty, and ceased appointed ministers, held the command of the army, convene and dissolve parliament, supervise the observance of the holy law. From the above it is obvious the fact of over-concentration of powers in the face of the sultan and the inevitable weakening of the institutional power of the grand vizier. The powers of the latter were diminished. Now the responsible ministers bore full responsibility for the activities of the ministry and were responsible only to the sultan.⁵⁹Regarding the Parliament, it was divided into two chambers the House of Representatives⁶⁰ that would arise after elections, and the House of Nobles, whose members were appointed directly by the sultan. The voting procedure laws stipulated that in order for a bill to become state law should be passed by both legislatures. Even for members of Parliament provided freedom of action in Parliament and immunity.⁶¹ Swan song of this modernizing effort has been the adoption of the first Ottoman constitution of 1876, which political father and inspirer has been Midhat Pasha, a western-educated liberal persona that played a leading role. However the constitution itself, as well as the inspirer of it, were being persecuted. Midhat exiled, while the regiment was stopped by Abdul Hamid in 1877.
3.v. The social impact of reforms
The intention of the modernizations that Tanzimat bore, has been nothing else than the creation of a more complete western central and local government. Such an effort includes also social implications. More specifically, the operation of the provincial government was not always smooth and this was because it was highly prevalent in people feeling that as if expressing grievances against a governor would not listen to their complaining as he through bribery of various bureaucrats of the portal will return stronger in position.⁶² Besides a large number of provincial governors not leave their well-being lives in Istanbul, and were appointing representatives (vekil) to command in their place, in loco parentes. Result of the whole situation was the speculation of "vekil" against the subjects of the Sultan.⁶³ The government therefore had not always the person who was against the nationals, which of course remains compared with previous centuries during the Tanzimat was an improvement of relations between the state - national appreciably.
The Ottoman social structure had been based for centuries upon Islamic principles. Ottoman Muslims always enjoyed certain rights and privileges; this was not the case for the non Muslim subjects who were treated, as second class citizens. Hence all the reforms undertaken between 1839 -1876 attempted to provide equal rights to non-Muslim subjects as individuals, in order to create a civil society within a multicultural, multi-religious framework. Such attempts were challenged by the Muslims who were not pleasant with losing their privileged status within the Ottoman social system. The consequence was the polarization within the society.⁶⁴
4. Conclusion
The goal of this paper has been to present the reforms in the Ottoman administration during 1839- 1876. I followed the theoretical framework of liberalism and discussed the issue of Ottoman sovereignty as well. My ambition has been to outline the reforms that took place in public and provincial administration, based upon the liberal ideas of modernization. The longstanding period of Tanzimat, a period of renewal and modernization, allowed the Ottoman state structure not to terminate its life, but to lead a groundbreaking state transformation that has been a vital assistance for the crumbling empire. Adopting however administrative constructs of the West caused a reasonable reflection on whether these patterns corresponded to the particular cultural and historical origins of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman sultans ruled a multinational structure that formed a both Muslims and non-Muslims, that is not a nation-state as opposed to the European countries. Moreover, the changes were being imposed from above that were not a product of social demands and struggles as the West. The Westernization has caused some problems in regards of how "alien" it looked to the Ottoman administration and customs, but I conclude that the rationalization of the management offered more benefits than disadvantages.

5. Bibliography

Baylis J.,Smith S., The globalization of world politics: An introduction to international relations. 3rd edition. Oxford: Oxford university press, 2005, pp. 288-289.
Bulent, O., Ottoman Reforms and Social Life, Instabul, 2003.
Burchill, S., ”Liberalism” in Burchill et all, Theories of International Relations, 2005² .
Cvetkova, B., “To the prehistory of the Tanzimat”, in Etudes Historiques, vol. VII, San Fransisco, 1975.
Davison, R. Η., Reform in the Ottoman Empire 1856- 1876, Princeton, 1963.
Davison, R. H., Tanzimat στο Encyclopedia of Islam, vol. X. Leiden, 2000.
Davutoglu, A., The Strategic Depth; The international position of Turkey, trans. N. Raptopoulos, ed. N.. Sarris, Poiotita Publications, Athens, 2010.
Doyle, Michael, Liberalism and World Politics, John Hopkins University, American Political Science Review, vol. 80, n 4., 1986.
Findley, C. V., Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire, Princeton 1980.
Fukuyama, Francis, The End of History and the Last Man, New York, The Free Press, 1992.
Gardner, J. W., On leadership, New York, The Free Press, 1990.
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Howard, Sir Michael, War and the Liberal Conscience, London, Hurst, 1978.
Hoffman. S, ‘The Crisis of Liberal Internationalism’, Foreign Policy, 1995, vol. 98, pp.159-177.
Kant, I., Political Writings, ed. H. Reiss, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1970.
Karpat, K., The land regime, social structure and modernization in the Ottoman Empire στο Beginning of Modernization in the Middle East, επιμ. W. Polk – R. Chambers, Chicago, 1968.
Krasner, S., Sovereignty; Organized Hypocrisy, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1999. 
Koksal, Y., “Reform in the province of Edirne”, Thrace, vol. 2, Xanthi, 2002.
Machiavelli, N., The Prince, tr. by Havrey Mansfield., Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1985.
Mardin Ş., “Super Westernization in Urban Life in the Ottoman Empire in the Last Quarter of the Nineteenth Century.” Pp. 135-63 in Religion, Society and Modernity in Turkey, Syracuse, Syracuse University Press, 2006.
Pitkin, H.-F., The Concept of Representation, University of California Press, 1972.
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Ralston, D. B., Importing the European Army: The Introduction of European Military Techniques and Institutions into the Extra-European World, 1600-1914, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1990.

Sebi, Z., The Vilayet of Thessaloniki during the period of Ottoman reforms (Tanzimat) 1839-1876, PhD thesis, Thessaloniki 1998.
Sfetas, S., Introduction to Balkan History; From the Ottoman conquest of the Balkans until the First World War (1354- 1918), Vanias, Thessaloniki, 2009.
Shaw, S., - Shaw, E., History or the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, vol. II. : Reform, Revolution and Republic: The rise of Modern Turkey, 1808- 1975, Cambridge 1977.
Strauss L., Thoughts on Machiavelli, University of Chicago Press, 1958.
Stavrianos, L.S., Balkans; From 1453 Onwards, trans. E.. Delivanis, ed. B.. Gounaris, Thessaloniki 2007
Weber, Max, The theory of social and economic organization, New York: Free Press, 1964.
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Young, S., Beyond Rawls: An Analysis of the Concept of Political Liberalism. Lanham, MD, University Press of America, 2002.
Zacher, M. W. and Matthew, R., “Liberal International Theory: Common Threads, Divergent Strands”, in C.W. Kegley, Jr. (ed.) Controversies in International Relations Theory. Realism with the Neoliberal Challenge, New York, St Martins’s Press, p.107- 150, 1995,.

1^ A. Davutoglu, The Strategic Depth; The international position of Turkey, trans. N. Raptopoulos, ed. N.. Sarris, Poiotita Publications, Athens 2010, p. 140.

2^ Official edict which the Sultan signed in person. This was the practice of the historic right of the Sultan to legislate on matters not provided for the religious law (Seriat). The R.. Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire 1856- 1876, Princeton 1963, p. 38.

3^ Gulhane: name portion of the gardens next to the palace of Topkapi which signed the Edict of 1839. Ibid.

4^ S. Sfetas, Introduction to Balkan History. Book A. From the Ottoman conquest of the Balkans until the First World War (1354- 1918), Thessaloniki 2009, p. 117.

5^ Resint Pasha (1800- 1858) Foreign Minister, he was the ambassador of the Empire in London and Paris. S.. Sfetas, p. 118.

6^ Ottoman officer, twice successful provincial governor 1864 (Tuna) and 1869 (Baghdad). He was one of the pioneers of the 1876 Constitution was exiled in 1877 by the sultan. WF Weiker, The Ottoman bureaucracy: Modernization and Reform in Administrative Science Quarterly, Cornell University 1968, vol. 13, No 3, s.465-468.

7^ Fukuyama, F., The End of History and the Last Man, New York, The Free Press, 1992, pp. xi-xii, 48.

8^ Kant, I., Political Writings, ed. H. Reiss, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1970– Fukuyama, F., The End of History and the Last Man, New York, The Free Press, 1992, p. xx.

9^ Kant, I., Political Writings, ed. H. Reiss, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1970, p. 100 – Doyle, M., Liberalism and World Politics, John Hopkins University, American Political Science Review, vol. 80, n 4., 1986, p. 1151 – Howard, M., War and the Liberal Conscience, London, Hurst, 1978, p. 31 – Gardner, J. W., On leadership, New York, The Free Press, 1990, pp. 23- 39 – Hoffman S, ‘The Crisis of Liberal Internationalism’, Foreign Policy, 1995, , vol. 98, pp.159-177. – Zacher and Matthew, Liberal International Theory: Common Threads, Divergent Strands', in C.W. Kegley, Jr. (ed.) Controversies in International Relations Theory. Realism with the Neoliberal Challenge, New York, St Martins’s Press, 1995, p.107-150.

10^Young, Shaun (2002). Beyond Rawls: An Analysis of the Concept of Political Liberalism. Lanham, MD: University Press of America. pp. 30–1.

11^ Ibid.

12^ Scott Burchill, ”Liberalism” in Burchill et all, Theories of International Relations, p.68, 2005² .

13^ Weber, Max, The theory of social and economic organization, New York: Free Press, 1964, p. 156.

14^ Ibid.

15^ Machiavelli, Niccolò, The Prince, University of Chicago Press, 1985, translated by Havrey Mansfield.

16^ Strauss Leo, Thoughts on Machiavelli, University of Chicago Press,1958, p.293.

17^ Pitkin, Hanna-Fenichel, The Concept of Representation, University of California Press, 1972, p. 312.

18^ Krasner, Stephen (1999) Sovereignty. Organized Hypocrisy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 66.

19^ Michael Goodhart, Review: Sovereignty: Reckoning What Is Real, Polity, Vol. 34, No. 2. (Winter, 2001), pp. 242 Available at: http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/3235436?uid=3738984&uid=2&uid=4&sid=21104409254511, retrieved: 27/10/2014.

20^ Krasner, Stephen (1999) Sovereignty. Organized Hypocrisy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 65.

21^ Krasner, Stephen (1999) Sovereignty. Organized Hypocrisy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 3-4.

22^ David B. Ralston Importing the European Army: The Introduction of European Military Techniques and Institutions into the Extra-European World, 1600-1914 Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990, pp. 11, 62-9.

23^ Krasner, Stephen (1999) Sovereignty. Organized Hypocrisy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 20.

24^ L. S. Stavrianos Balkans. From 1453 onwards, trans. E.. Delivanis, ed. B.. Gounaris, Thessaloniki 2007, p. 208- 209.

25^ Ibid.

26^ B. Cvetkova, To the prehistory of the Tanzimat, στο Etudes Historiques, T. VII, San Fransisco, 1975 p. 133.

27^ L.S. Stavrianos, ibid, p.433.

28^ Ibid.

29^ C. V. Findley, Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire, Princeton 1980, p. 173

30^ K. Karpat, The land regime, social structure and modernization in the Ottoman Empire στο Beginning of Modernization in the Middle East, επιμ. W. Polk – R. Chambers, Chicago 1968, σ. 81. - S. Shaw - E. Shaw, History or the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, vol. II. : Reform, Revolution and Republic: The rise of Modern Turkey, 1808- 1975, Cambridge 1977, p. 71- 72.

31^ C. V. Findley, ibid p. 173.

32^ S. Shaw – E. Shaw, ibid. p. 77 - C. V. Findley, ibid. p. 174.

33^ C. V. Findley, ibid. p. 175.

34^ S. Shaw – E. Shaw, ibid. p. 79.

35^S. Shaw – E. Shaw, ibid. p. 80.

36^ Ibid.

37^ C. V. Findley, ibid. p. 179 – 180 - S. Shaw – E. Shaw, ibid. p. 72.

38^ C. V. Findley, ibid. p. 183 - S. Shaw – E. Shaw, ibid. p. 72 -73.

39^ C. V. Findley, ibid. p. 183 - S. Shaw – E. Shaw, ibid. p. 73.

40^ S. Shaw - E. Shaw, ibid. p. 73.

41^ R. H. Davison, Tanzimat στο Encyclopedia of Islam, Leiden 2000, vol. X, p. 202

42^ Ibid.

43^ R. H. Davison, ibid. p. 203.

44^ Ibid.

45^ Ibid.

46^ Sfetas, S., ibid. p. 118.

47^Sebi, Z., The Vilayet of Thessaloniki during the period of Ottoman reforms (Tanzimat) 1839-1876, PhD thesis, Thessaloniki 1998 σ. 27 – 28.

48^ Ibid.

49^ Y. Koksal, Reform in the province of Edirne στο Peri Thrakis, vol. 2, Xanthi, 2002, p. 188.

50^ Ibid.

51^ Ο. Βϋlent, Ottoman Reforms and Social Life, Instabul 2003, p. 156.

52^ S. Shaw – E. Shaw, ibid. p. 89.

53^ Sebi, Z., ibid. p. 31.

54^ Ibid.

55^ S. Shaw – E. Shaw, ibid. p. 91.

56^ S. Shaw – E. Shaw, ibid. p. 175.

57^ S. Shaw – E. Shaw, ibid. p. 177.

58^ S. Shaw – E. Shaw, ibid. p. 175.

59^ Ibid.

60^ S. Shaw – E. Shaw, ibid. p. 176.

61^ Ibid.

62^ Ο. Βϋlent, ibid. p. 167.

63^ Ibid.

64^ See Donald Quataert 'Clothing Laws, State, and Society in the Ottoman Empire, 1720-1829.' International Journal of Middle East Studies 29/3 (Aug., 1997): 403-425 for an extensive discussion, especially pages 403-9, 411-4, and 421. See also Şerif Mardin 'Super Westernization in Urban Life in the Ottoman Empire in the lAst Quarter of the Nineteenth Century.' Pp. 135-63 in Religion, Society and Modernity in Turkey Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2006, especially pp. 139-142, 144, 148, 151-2, 156 and 162.