Guide to Citizens’ Rights and Responsibilities


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democratization: a process by which the
powers of government are moved to the
people of a region or to their elected
representatives
referendum: a popular vote on legislation,
brought before the people by their elected
leaders or public initiative
sovereignty: autonomy; or, rule over a
political entity 
warlord: a leader, usually over a small region,
who governs by military force 
■ ■ ■  
interim: for a limited time, during a period of
transition

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267
P e a c e k e e p i n g   F o r c e s
capacities. In 2000, therefore, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan (b. 1938)
commissioned a group led by Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi (b. 1934) to write
a report on reform. The Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace
Operations, the so-called Brahimi report, 
enumerated
twenty-one broad recom-
mendations, based on a “holistic” approach to conflict emphasizing the links
between poverty, development, and war. Key among the recommendations
were the need for more integrated responses and related organizational
reforms, including better communication between the secretary-general and
the Security Council. Echoing one of the oft-cited lessons of the Rwandan crisis,
the report stated that “the Secretariat must tell the Security Council what it
needs to know, not what it wants to hear, when formulating or changing mission
mandates” (United Nations 2000).
As the implementation of the Brahimi report began, the international com-
munity was shaken by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. In the after-
math U.S.-led military forces ousted the Taliban 
regime
in Afghanistan, seen as a
base for international terrorist operations. In December 2001 the process of
rebuilding Afghanistan began with the signing of the Bonn Agreement, which
established an Interim Afghan Authority. The interim authority in this case, how-
ever, in which Afghans would take the leading role, was much more minimal
than in either the Kosovo and East Timor models. Under the Agreement, the UN
also authorized the deployment of the International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF) to maintain security in Kabul. The “light footprint” approach of the UN in
Afghanistan also is evident in that peacekeeping forces were not deployed out-
side of the capital, even though many observers saw them as necessary to
ensure the much-needed delivery of humanitarian assistance. Following U.S.-led
military action in Iraq, the UN was again called on, this time to manage the tran-
sition to Iraqi self-government, beginning on June 30, 2004.
C H A L L E N G E S   O F   P E A C E K E E P I N G
Peacekeeping forces face a variety of challenges. The first is the decision to
intervene. Traditionally, peacekeeping operations have been deployed only in
situations where the parties to the conflict have signed a cease-fire agreement
and requested assistance. This rule was relaxed in the post–Cold War era as more
extensive peacemaking and peace-building operations were undertaken under
Chapter VII of the UN Charter. One of the lessons of the 1990s, underscored in
the Brahimi report, is that peacekeeping operations, while they can be incredi-
bly effective in some tasks such as ensuring the provision of humanitarian
assistance, cannot be expected to build peace in all conflict situations. There are
limits to peacekeeping imposed by the complexities and rigors of war, as well as
by the resources available to specific missions. Financing is another key and
related problem for peacekeeping, which has become more
acute as the mandates of peacekeeping missions become more
complex. The budget for UN peacekeeping in 2003 and 2004
reached U.S.$2.17 billion. While refusing to provide adequate
funding for peacekeeping missions, some member states blame
the organization for resulting failures. 
In the Afghanistan and Iraq crises, the UN’s response of rec-
ommending more minimalist UN involvement reflects these
challenges. Yet while it makes sense for the UN to be cautious
in undertaking peacekeeping operations for which it has insufficient support,
this response is problematic. Imperfect as it is, the UN is a last hope in many
conflicts. If it does not act, who will? 
“Imperfect as it is, the UN is a last hope in
many conflicts. If it does not act, who
will?”
■ ■ ■
enumerate: to expressly name, as in a list 
■ ■ ■  
regime: a type of government, or, the
government in power in a region

A related challenge is the construction of an appropriate mandate, the basis of
any peacekeeping operation. A mandate must be both clear and realistic, specifying
what the mission is to accomplish and the rules of engagement. It also must some-
times be adjusted to respond to the changing nature of a conflict, as the Rwanda
crisis illustrates, while at the same time not falling victim to “mission creep.”
The configuration and equipping of the peacekeeping force are a further
challenge, especially important in missions involving combat. UN peacekeeping
forces may be composed of contingents of troops from dozens of different
countries with little experience working together. For this reason, regional con-
tingents that are more rapidly deployed and better organized may be better
placed to respond to crises, either directly or under UN authorization. 
Finally, one of the most difficult challenges of contemporary peacekeeping
is the maintenance of impartiality and legitimacy. The Somali case illustrates
this issue well. It is no easy task, especially in weak or failed states such as
Afghanistan where basic institutions are nonexistent or lack legitimacy. The
importance of impartiality in peacekeeping further underscores why the United
States, the occupying power in Iraq, was especially ill-equipped to oversee the
transition back to self-government. 
Given the increasing number and scope of peacekeeping operations since
the Cold War, the burden of these challenges has only grown since 1989. If 2001
marked the beginning of a new era of nation building, they will grow further still. 
See also:
Somalia; United Nations.
B I B L I O G R A P H Y
Bowden, Mark. Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War. New York: New American
Library, 2001.
Fetherson, A. B. Towards a Theory of United Nations Peacekeeping. London: St. Martin’s
Press, 1994.
Hirsh, Michael. “Calling All Regio-Cops: Peacekeeping’s Hybrid Future.” Foreign Affairs
79 (November/December 2000):6.
Kuperman, Alan. The Limits to Intervention: Genocide in Rwanda. Washington, DC:
Brookings Institution Press, 2001.
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. “The Alliance’s Operational Role in Peacekeeping.”
NATO Handbook.
Ͻhttp://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001Ͼ.
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. KFOR Information.
Ͻhttp://www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/
about.htm
Ͼ.
Power, Samantha. “Bystanders to Genocide: Why the United States Let the Rwandan
Tragedy Happen.” The Atlantic Monthly (September 2001):84–108.
Reno, William. “The Failure of Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone.” Current History 100, no.
646 (2001):219–225.
United Nations. Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping, 3rd ed. New
York: United Nations, 1996.
United Nations. Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations. August 2000.
Ͻhttp://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operationsϾ.
United Nations. United Nations Peacekeeping.
Ͻhttp://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/
home.shtml
Ͼ.
U.S. Department of State. Peacekeeping.
Ͻhttp://www.state.gov/p/io/pkpg/Ͼ.
Rachel M. Gisselquist
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P e a c e k e e p i n g   F o r c e s

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269
P e r u
Peru
Peru is located on the northern Pacific Coast of South America, bordered by
Ecuador, Colombia, Brazil, Bolivia, and Chile. Its territory of roughly 1.3 million
square kilometers (501,934 square miles) is divided into three regions: the more
economically developed arid coast, the mountainous highlands (the center of
the pre-Columbian civilizations), and the eastern tropical lowlands. The low-
lands account for only about 10 percent of the population, but contain roughly
two-thirds of the country’s landmass. According to a 2002 estimate, the coun-
try’s 26.5 million inhabitants included a mixture of European, Amerindian,
Asian, and African ancestries. Amerindians and mestizos (mixed European and
Amerindian) constituted 42 and 37 percent, respectively, of the population.
In Peru racial classifications are as much cultural as genetic. For much of the
nation’s independent history, individuals moved among categories, generally
toward the more privileged mestizo or white classes, by improving their eco-
nomic positions and adopting the lifestyle and language of the group to which
they aspired. Movement in the other direction is less common. It reportedly
occurred in the colonial period during times of economic hardship, and since
the last decades of the twentieth century some mestizos have reasserted their
indigenous identity.
H I S T O R Y
Peru was colonized by the Spanish in the sixteenth century. Its mineral
wealth and ample supply of indigenous labor made it one of Spain’s most val-
ued
viceroyalties
in the New World. It had previously been the center of a series
of dynamic and complex Amerindian civilizations. The last of these, the Incas,
conquered an empire that extended into what, in modern times, is Ecuador to
the north, and to the south, the northern reaches of Chile. Beset by internal
conflicts, the Incas quickly fell to the Spaniards who replaced them as the mas-
ters of the 
subjugated
peoples. Disease and harsh working conditions rapidly
decimated the indigenous population and encouraged the adoption of still
harsher policies to ensure access to the native workforce. Individual colonists
received legal claim to much of the inhabited territory, thereby enhancing their
control over the supply of labor located in the Andean highlands.
The principal Spanish settlements, including the new capital, Lima, were in
the more hospitable coastal region. This facilitated communication with the
outside world, but weakened contacts with the interior, forcing a dependence
on intermediaries, indirect controls, and parallel institutions to link the old and
new population centers. Thus, although the Spanish brought their formal insti-
tutions with them, outside the urban areas, traditional practices and the will of
the local cacique ( boss), either the large landowner or his resident manager,
were the effective government until well into the twentieth century.
Peru achieved independence from Spain in 1824. Until the 1870s, when the
first civilian president was elected, civil wars and a series of transitional govern-
ments left Peru in a state of turmoil. Periods of constitutional government then
alternated with military and civilian dictatorships until the mid-twentieth century.
Typically, the military intervened at the request of traditional elites to protect
them from popular unrest. Economic growth during these decades followed
a boom-and-bust pattern, with the booms based on international trade in single
commodities (rubber, nitrates, oil, fishmeal, etc.). This heightened the eco-
nomy’s vulnerability to fluctuations in world markets and also contributed to
an extremely unequal pattern of income distribution that persisted. As of 2003,
viceroy: one who governs a territory as the
representative of the monarch
subjugate: to force into submission
■ ■ ■  

270
G O V E R N M E N T S   O F   T H E   W O R L D
P e r u
50 percent of the population remained under the poverty line. The most severe
poverty was concentrated among indigenous groups in the rural highlands and
migrants to urban areas.
Peru’s political history since the mid-twentieth century has been relatively
chaotic. General Manuel Apolinario Odría Amoretti (1897–1974), who seized
power in 1948 and was then elected to office, was followed by two civilian pres-
idents: Manuel Prado Ugarteche (1889–1967) between 1956 and 1962, and
Fernando Belaúnde Terry (1912–2002) from 1963 until 1968. A brief military
interregnum
between the two set the stage for a major military intervention
in 1968. Remaining in power until 1974, the first “revolutionary” phase of gov-
ernment broke with the military’s traditional identification with the elite.
It attempted to transform the country through the 
nationalization
of major
industries and services, a massive land redistribution program, worker participa-
tion in industrial management, recognition of Indian rights, and elimination of
traditional political structures (political parties, the Congress, all elections).
After military leaders drove the country into economic collapse and debt, an
internal 
coup
replaced them with a more moderate 
faction
. Under the leader-
ship of General Francisco Morales Bermúdez (b. 1921), the second phase of
government promised to return the country to civilian control under a new con-
stitution (promulgated in 1979).
interregnum: the period of time between
the reigns of two successive monarchs
nationalization: the process of giving
control or ownership of an entity to the
government
coup: a quick seizure of power or a sudden
attack
factionalism: a separation of people into
competing, adversarial, and self-serving
groups, usually in government 
■ ■ ■  
S e c h u r a
D e s e r t
Mt. Huascarán
 22,205 ft.
 6768 m.
Mt.Coropuna
21,079 ft.
6425 m.
Machupicchu
Punta Negra
Punta Lachay
Punta Pejerrey
C
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A
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Isla Lobos
de Tierra
Islas Lobos
de Afuera
Isla Independencia
Lima
Iquitos
Piura
Chiclayo
Trujillo
Chimbote
Callao
Huancayo
Cusco
Arequipa
Pucallpa
Ica
Tumbes
Talara
Sullana
Cajamarca
Tarapoto
Chachapoyas
Benjamin
Constant
Rodrigues
Huacho
Mollendo
Ocoña
Barranca
Breu
Huánuco
Cerro de Pasco
Pisco
Iberia
San Nicolás
Huaraz
Huancavelica
Ayacucho
Puerto
Maldonado
Esperanza
Foz do
Jordão
Juliaca
Puno
Tacna
Guaqui
Abancay
Moyobamba
Andoas
Pantoja
Puca
Urco
PACIFIC
OCEAN
Lago
Titicaca
Lago Junín
Pa
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Tig
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Marañó
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Paracas Bay
San Nicolás Bay
B O L I V I A
B R A Z I L
C O L O M B I A
E C U A D O R
W
S
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Peru
PERU
400 Miles
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400 Kilometers
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(MAP BY MARYLAND CARTOGRAPHICS/ THE GALE GROUP)

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271
P e r u
Civilian control resumed in 1980, but economic and political problems con-
tinued. They were aggravated by an internal terrorist movement, Sendero
Luminoso (the Shining Path), the growing importance of drug trafficking, and
the collapse of the fishmeal industry. Conditions worsened under the next three
elected presidents: the reelected Belaúnde, Alán García Pérez ( b. 1949), and
Alberto Fujimori ( b. 1938). In 1992, two years into his constitutional term,
Fujimori staged a self-coup. He suspended the Congress, proposing to rule by
executive decree until a new constitution could be instituted (which occurred
in 1993). Fujimori’s early successes in defeating the terrorist groups, ending
hyperinflation, and restarting economic growth resulted in his general popular-
ity and re-election in 1995. However, his repressive control, disregard for the
constitution and the law, and the increasing evidence of his administration’s
corruption, human rights abuses, and financial mismanagement brought about
the collapse of his third presidency in late 2000. Fujimori fled into exile in Japan,
protected by his dual Japanese-Peruvian citizenship.
An
interim
government, headed by Valentín Paniagua ( b. 1936), was fol-
lowed by the election of Alejandro Toledo ( b. 1946) in 2001. Toledo had a rocky
first three years. He successfully managed the economy, producing one of the
few positive growth rates in the region. Nonetheless, such accomplishments
did not reduce the high rate of unemployment or meet the expectations of his
supporters among the poor. By mid-2004, his popularity had plummeted to
6 percent, and observers wondered whether he would finish his term.
S T R U C T U R E   O F   G O V E R N M E N T  
Peru has a constitutional government, based on its fifth constitution in
the last century. All governments have concentrated powers in the executive
(president). The formerly bicameral Congress became 
unicameral
with the
1993 constitution. The constitutions recognized three principal branches of
government, with a series of other entities (Public Ministry, Human Rights
ombudsman
, Electoral Board, Comptroller) accorded autonomous status. The
government is unitary, but since the early 1920s there have been repeated
efforts to create elected departmental or regional governments. The reform
underway in the early twenty-first century would make the regions cotermi-
nous with the nation’s twenty-four departments and one constitutional
province, each with an elected assembly and executive. The unresolved point
of contention remained how much of the public budget these regions should
manage. In 2003 Peru’s public budget was among the most 
centralized
in the
region.
Despite the dictatorial inclinations of Fujimori, its sponsor, the 1993 consti-
tution added some theoretical limitations to the president’s powers. He or she
may still declare states of emergency, but there are now strict time limits for
their duration, and any extension must be approved by Congress. The Congress
can challenge sitting ministers and demand their resignation with a simple
majority vote. Congress can also censure and force the resignation of the entire
cabinet. After two such actions, the president must suspend the Congress and
call for new legislative elections. Congress may 
delegate
legislative powers to
the executive, but must specify time limits and areas for their exercise. Once
Congress has enacted a law, the president may request reconsideration, but
Congress can override his or her objections with a simple majority vote.
Although Congress must approve the budget, if it fails to do so, the executive
budget goes into effect by default. The 1993 constitution also severely limits
congressional ability to create or increase budgetary expenditures.
centralize: to move control or power to
a single point of authority 
delegate: to assign power to another, or,
one who represents another 
interim: for a limited time, during a period of
transition
■ ■ ■  
unicameral: comprised of one chamber,
usually a legislative body
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