Handbook of psychology volume 7 educational psychology
Contemporary Theories of Intelligence
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- The Bioecological Model of Intelligence.
- Conclusions 39
- Intelligence as Typical Performance.
- References 41
38 Contemporary Theories of Intelligence other than those of the principal proponents of the theory to test the theory adequately.
Perkins (1995) proposed a theory of what he refers to as true intelligence, which he believes syn- thesizes classic views as well as new ones. According to Perkins, there are three basic aspects to intelligence: neural, experiential, and reflective. Neural intelligence concerns what Perkins believes to be the fact that some people’s neurological systems function better than do the neurological systems of others, running faster and with more precision. He mentions “more finely tuned voltages” and “more exquisitely adapted chemical cat- alysts” as well as a “better pattern of connectivity in the labyrinth of neurons” (Perkins, 1995, p. 97), although it is not entirely clear what any of these phrases means. Perkins be- lieves this aspect of intelligence to be largely genetically de- termined and unlearnable. This kind of intelligence seems to be somewhat similar to Cattell’s (1971) idea of fluid intelli- gence. The experiential aspect of intelligence is what has been learned from experience. It is the extent and organiza- tion of the knowledge base, and thus is similar to Cattell’s (1971) notion of crystallized intelligence. The reflective as- pect of intelligence refers to the role of strategies in memory and problem solving and appears to be similar to the con- struct of metacognition or cognitive monitoring (Brown & DeLoache, 1978; Flavell, 1981). There have been no published empirical tests of the theory of true intelligence, so it is difficult to evaluate the theory at this time. Like Gardner’s (1983) theory, Perkins’s theory is based on literature review, and as noted earlier, such literature reviews often tend to be selective and then interpreted in a way to maximize the theory’s fit to the available data.
Ceci (1996) proposed a bioecological model of intelligence, according to which multiple cognitive potentials, context, and knowledge all are essential bases of individual differences in perfor- mance. Each of the multiple cognitive potentials enables re- lationships to be discovered, thoughts to be monitored, and knowledge to be acquired within a given domain. Although these potentials are biologically based, their development is closely linked to environmental context, and hence it is diffi- cult if not impossible cleanly to separate biological from en- vironmental contributions to intelligence. Moreover, abilities may express themselves very differently in different con- texts. For example, children given essentially the same task in the context of a video game and in the context of a labora- tory cognitive task performed much better when the task was presented in the context of the video game. The bioecological model appears in many ways to be more a framework than a theory. At some level, the theory must be right. Certainly, both biological and ecological fac- tors contribute to the development and manifestation of intel- ligence. Perhaps what the theory needs most at this time are specific and clearly falsifiable predictions that would set it apart from other theories. Emotional Intelligence. Emotional intelligence is the ability to perceive accurately, appraise, and express emotion; the ability to access or generate feelings when they facilitate thought; the ability to understand emotion and emotional knowledge; and the ability to regulate emotions to promote emotional and intellectual growth (Mayer et al., 2000). The concept was introduced by Salovey and Mayer (Mayer & Salovey, 1993; Salovey & Mayer, 1990) and popularized and expanded by Goleman (1995). There is some evidence—though still tentative—for the existence of emotional intelligence. For example, Mayer and Gehr (1996) found that emotional perception of characters in a variety of situations correlated with SAT scores, with empathy, and with emotional openness. Full convergent- discriminant validation of the construct, however, appears to be needed. The results to date are mixed, with some studies supportive (Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2000) and others not (Davies, Stankov, & Roberts, 1998).
The study of intelligence has come far in the century since Spearman (1904) published his seminal paper on general intelligence. Although there is no consensus as to what intel- ligence is or how to measure it, there are many viable alter- natives. More research needs to distinguish among these alternatives rather than simply adducing evidence for any one of the alternatives. Among the psychometric theories, Carroll’s (1993) has achieved fairly widespread acclaim, perhaps because it is based on a meta-analysis of so much empirical work. Be- cause of its complexity, however, it is likely to have less in- fluence on measurement than simpler theories, such as the theory of fluid and crystallized abilities (Cattell, 1971; Horn, 1994). History suggests that very complicated theories (e.g., Guilford, 1967, 1982; Guilford & Hoepfner, 1971; Guttman, 1954) tend not to have a long shelf life. In Guilford’s case, however, it is more a compliment to than a criticism of his theory, because the demise of Guilford’s theory is related to its falsifiability (Horn & Knapp, 1973), a property that not all modern theories have shown themselves to possess.
Conclusions 39 There are some questions that no existing theories of intelligence answer. Consider a few of these.
Within recent years, several challenges from unexpected quarters have been proposed to theories and conceptions of intelligence. Two such challenges are the Flynn effect and dynamic testing.
An empirical phenomenon chal- lenges many theories of intelligence that view intelligence as some kind of fixed, largely genetically based trait. We know that the environment has powerful effects on cognitive abilities. Perhaps the simplest and most potent demonstration of this effect is what is called the Flynn effect (Flynn, 1984, 1987, 1994, 1998). The basic phenomenon is that IQ has in- creased over successive generations around the world through most of the century—at least since 1930. The effect must be environmental because a successive stream of genetic muta- tions obviously could not have taken hold and exerted such an effect over such a short period of time. The effect is power- ful—about 15 points of IQ per generation for tests of fluid in- telligence. And it occurs all over the world. The effect has been greater for tests of fluid intelligence than for tests of crystallized intelligence. The difference, if linearly extrapo- lated (a hazardous procedure, obviously), would suggest that a person who in 1892 fell at the 90th percentile on the Raven Progressive Matrices Test, a test of fluid intelligence, would, in 1992, score at the 5th percentile. There have been many potential explanations of the Flynn effect, and in 1996 Ulric Neisser organized a conference at Emory University to try to explain the effect (Neisser, 1998). Some of the possible explanations include increased school- ing, greater educational attainment of parents, better nutri- tion, and less childhood disease. A particularly interesting explanation is that of more and better parental attention to children (see Bronfenbrenner & Ceci, 1994). Whatever the answer, the Flynn effect suggests that we need to think care- fully about the view that IQ is fixed. It probably is not fixed within individuals (Campbell & Ramey, 1994; Ramey, 1994), and it is certainly not fixed across generations.
In dynamic assessment, individ- uals learn at the time of test. If they answer an item correctly, they are given guided feedback to help them solve the item, either until they get it correct or until the examiner has run out of clues to give them. The notion of dynamic testing appears to have origi- nated with Vygotsky (1934/1962, 1978) and was developed independently by Feuerstein, Rand, Haywood, Hoffman, and Jensen (1985). Dynamic assessment is generally based on the notion that cognitive abilities are modifiable and that there is some zone of proximal development (Vygotsky, 1978), which represents the difference between actually de- veloped ability and latent capacity. Dynamic assessments at- tempt to measure this zone of proximal development, or an analogue to it. Dynamic assessment is cause for both celebration and caution (Grigorenko & Sternberg, 1998). On the one hand, it represents a break from conventional psychometric notions of a more or less fixed level of intelligence. On the other hand, it is more a promissory note than a realized success. The Feuerstein test, the Learning Potential Assessment Device (Feuerstein et al., 1985), is of clinical use but is not psychometrically normed or validated. There is only one for- mally normed test available in the United States (Swanson, 1995). This test yields scores for working memory before and at various points during and after training, as well as scores for amount of improvement with intervention, number of hints that have been given, and a subjective evaluation by the examiner of the examinee’s use of strategies. Other tests are perhaps on the horizon (Guthke & Stein, 1996), but their po- tential for standardization and validity, too, remains to be shown.
Traditionally, in- telligence has been thought of as something to be conceptual- ized and measured in terms of maximum performance. The tests of intelligence have been maximum-performance tests, requiring examinees to work as hard as they can to maximize their scores. Ackerman (1994; Ackerman & Heggestad, 1997; Goff & Ackerman, 1992) has recently argued that typical- performance tests—which, like personality tests, do not re- quire extensive intellectual effort—ought to supplement maximal-performance ones. On such tests individuals might be asked to what extent statements like “I prefer my life to be filled with puzzles I must solve” or “I enjoy work that requires conscientious, exacting skills” match their attitudes. A factor analysis of such tests yielded five factors: intellectual engage- ment, openness, conscientiousness, directed activity, and science-technology interest. Ackerman’s data suggest a weak relationship between his measures of typical performance and more conventional measures of maximum performance. What is needed most at this time are incremental validity studies that show that this theory provides significant incremental validity with respect to real-world task performance over the validity provided by
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