Handbook of psychology volume 7 educational psychology
Contemporary Theories of Intelligence
Download 9.82 Mb. Pdf ko'rish
|
- Bu sahifa navigatsiya:
- CLASSICAL THEORIES OF INTELLIGENCE AND THEIR CONTEMPORARY COUNTERPARTS Implicit Theories
- Explicit Theories
- Classical Theories of Intelligence and Their Contemporary Counterparts 27
- The Theory of Primary Mental Abilities
- Fluid-Crystallized Ability Theory
- CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF INTELLIGENCE Implicit Theories Expert Views
- Contemporary Theories of Intelligence 29
- Laypersons’ Views (Across Cultures)
26 Contemporary Theories of Intelligence A Synthesis? It seems fair to say that some closed systems may be better, in some sense, than are others. For example, scores on intelligence-related measures would seem more relevant to school or job performance than would social class. But it is hard to draw definitive conclusions because the various at- tributes that are favored by a society often tend to correlate with each other. Socialization advantages may lead people of societally preferred racial, ethnic, religious, or other groups to have higher test scores. Thus, the extent to which correla- tions between test scores and status attributes are natural ver- sus manufactured is unknown because it has not been possibly to conduct a study that would look systematically and comparatively at predictors of success across societies. The closest to doing so probably comes from the work of Ogbu (1978, 1991, 1994; Ogbu & Stern, 2001), who has compared the performance of groups that in one society are of low caste but in another society are of high caste. Ogbu found that performance varies not with group but with caste: When a group is of high social caste, it performs well; when it is of low social caste, it does not. In sum, there may be some work by an invisible hand of nature, although this hand of nature almost certainly sorts on many attributes in addition to intelligence (such as height, beauty, health, and so forth). There also may be some work through societal inventions, although societies, like nature, sort on many attributes. The role of intelligence in society needs further (and unbiased) research. Studies of sorting use psychological tests of intelligence and intelligence-related skills. What are the psychological theories on which these tests are based? Consider first some of the classical theories and then some contemporary ones. CLASSICAL THEORIES OF INTELLIGENCE AND THEIR CONTEMPORARY COUNTERPARTS Implicit Theories Implicit theories are people’s conceptions of intelligence. Why even bother to study or report on implicit theories of in- telligence? There are several reasons. First, people’s day-to-day interactions are far more likely to be affected by their implicit theories than by any explicit theories. In job interviews, admission interviews, and even daily conversations, people are continually judging each other’s intelligence, based not on any formal and explicit theories but on their own implicit theories of intelligence. Second, implicit theories are of interest in their own right. Part of the study of psychology is seeking an understanding how people think, and given the importance of intelligence to society, learning how people think about intelligence is a worthy endeavor. Third, implicit theories often serve as the basis for generating explicit theories. The formal explicit the- ories of many psychologists (and other scientists) had their origins in these individual’s implicit theories. How have psychologists conceived of intelligence? Almost none of these views are adequately expressed by Boring’s (1923) operationistic view of intelligence as what intelligence tests test. For example, a symposium on experts’ definitions of intelligence (“Intelligence and its measure- ment: A symposium,” 1921) asked leading researchers how they conceptualized intelligence. Among those asked were leaders in the field such as Edward L. Thorndike, Lewis M. Terman, Lewis L. Thurstone, and Herbert Woodrow. The researchers emphasized the importance of the ability to learn and the ability to adapt to the environment. These skills seem important. Are they the skills that play a major role in explicit theories of intelligence?
We consider here the three classical theories that today have the most influence: g theory, the theory of primary mental abilities, and the theory of fluid and crystallized abilities. g Theory Probably the most influential theory in the history of intelli- gence research is the two-factor theory, which was first pro- posed by Spearman (1904, 1927) but has been carried forth by many modern theorists as g theory. Jensen (1998), himself a g theorist, summarizes much of this work. Spearman (1904) noticed that tests purported to measure intelligence exhibit a positive manifold: They tend to corre- late positively with each other. He invented a technique called factor analysis that was designed to analyze these in- tercorrelations in order to identify the purported sources of individual differences underlying the observed patterns of test scores. His factor analyses revealed two types of factors (hence the original name of his theory): the general factor (g), whose influence pervades all tests of mental abilities, and specific factors (s), whose influence is limited to a single test. Spearman proposed two separate theories to explain the pervasive presence of g. One theory (Spearman, 1927) attrib- uted the general factor to mental energy, a concept that he believed originated with Aristotle. The other theory was a more cognitive theory. Spearman (1923) suggested that three information-processing components (termed qualitative principles of cognition) were common to all of the tests. The Classical Theories of Intelligence and Their Contemporary Counterparts 27 three components were apprehension of experience, or en- coding of stimuli; eduction of relations, or inferring the rela- tion between two terms; and eduction of correlates, or applying the inferred relation in a new domain. In the analogy BLACK : WHITE :: HIGH : ?, for example, apprehension of experience would be used to encode the terms; eduction of relations is used to infer the relation between BLACK and WHITE; and eduction of correlates is used to apply the in- ferred relation from HIGH to produce LOW. Spearman’s g theory continues today in more modern form. Indeed, two books published in the late 1990s both were called The g Factor (Brand, 1996; Jensen, 1998). Jensen (1998, 2002) has defined g as a distillate of the com- mon source of individual differences in all mental tests. He has proposed that underlying g are individual differences in the speed or efficiency of the neural processes that affect the kinds of behavior measured by tests of mental ability. Jensen (1998) has built his argument in terms of converg- ing operations that, to him, seem to indicate unequivocally the presence of some biologically based common source of variation in performance on mental tests. For example, he cited eight studies prior to 1998 using magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) that showed a correlation between IQ and brain volume (p. 147). A number of other studies have shown correlations between aspects of spontaneously measured electroencephalogram (EEG) waves and IQ and between averaged evoked potentials (AEPs) and IQ (pp. 152–157). Other studies using positron-emission tomography (PET) scanning also have shown correlations with IQ (pp. 157– 159), as have studies of peripheral nerve conduction velocity (pp. 159–160) and brain-nerve conduction velocity (pp. 160– 162). Some of these kinds of works are described in more detail later. Other studies have also suggested the viability of the gen- eral factor. One example is the heritability study (see Bouchard, 1997; Jensen, 1998; Petrill, in press; Plomin, 1997; Plomin et al., 1997; Scarr, 1997). Such studies typically are designed to study identical twins separated at or near birth, to study identical versus fraternal twins, or to study adopted children (of known biological parentage) and biological chil- dren living in the same household. These kinds of studies en- able investigators to separate, to some extent, genetic from environmental contributions to intelligence. Today it is recog- nized, however, that pure influences of genetics and environ- ment are extremely difficult to disentangle (Sternberg & Grigorenko, 1997). As mentioned earlier, the theory of general intelligence has been the longest lasting and perhaps the most widely ac- cepted in all of the psychological literature. The evidence is impressive—certainly more so than that garnered for any competing theory. Nevertheless, the available evidence re- quires at least some skepticism. First, some theorists (e.g., Gardner, 1983, 1999; Sternberg, 1997, 1999a, 1999c, 1999d; whose work is described later) suggest that a general factor is obtained in tests of intelligence because the tests are limited to a class of fairly academic and somewhat artificial tasks. They argue that the general factor disappears or at least is greatly weakened when a broader range of tasks is used. Second, contrary to the claim of Jensen (1998), a general factor does tend to appear as a mathematical regularity when factorial solutions are left unrotated. Such a factor tends to be produced because the methods of both common-factor and principal-components analysis in widespread use today max- imize the amount of variance that they place in each succes- sive factor, with the most possible variance going into the first factor. Thus, the first factor maximizes the loadings of variables on it. Third, the sheer number of studies supporting a general factor does not necessarily engender support of the theory in proportion to the number of studies (Sternberg, 1999a). The large majority of these studies tends to use a somewhat re- stricted range of tasks, situations in which intelligence is tested, and even participants.
Thurstone (1938) proposed a theory of primary mental abili- ties. Although this theory is not widely used today, the theory forms the basis of many contemporary theories, including two contemporary theories discussed later, those of Gardner (1983) and Carroll (1993). It is also the basis for many con- temporary group tests of intelligence, which comprise items roughly of the types described next. Thurstone (1938) analyzed the data from 56 different tests of mental abilities and concluded that to the extent that there is a general factor of intelligence, it is unimportant and possi- bly epiphenomenal. From this point of view there are seven primary mental abilities: • Verbal comprehension. This factor involves a person’s ability to understand verbal material. It is measured by tests such as vocabulary and reading comprehension. • Verbal fluency. This ability is involved in rapidly produc- ing words, sentences, and other verbal material. It is mea- sured by tests such as one that requires the examinee to produce as many words as possible beginning with a par- ticular letter in a short amount of time.
putation and in solving simple arithmetic word problems. 28 Contemporary Theories of Intelligence • Perceptual speed. This ability is involved in proofreading and in rapid recognition of letters and numbers. It is mea- sured by tests such as those requiring the crossing out of As in a long string of letters or in tests requiring recogni- tion of which of several pictures at the right is identical to the picture at the left. • Inductive reasoning. This ability requires generaliza- tion—reasoning from the specific to the general. It is mea- sured by tests, such as letter series, number series, and word classifications, in which the examinee must indicate which of several words does not belong with the others. • Spatial visualization. This ability is involved in visualiz- ing shapes, rotations of objects, and how pieces of a puz- zle fit together. An example of a test would be the presentation of a geometric form followed by several other geometric forms. Each of the forms that follows the first is either the same rotated by some rigid transforma- tion or the mirror image of the first form in rotation. The examinee has to indicate which of the forms at the right is a rotated version of the form at the left, rather than a mirror image. Today, Thurstone’s theory is not used as often in its origi- nal form, but it has served as a basis for many subsequent the- ories of intelligence, including hierarchical theories and modern theories such as Gardner’s (1983). Thus, to the extent that a theory is judged by its heuristic value, Thurstone’s has been one of the most important in the field. Fluid-Crystallized Ability Theory The theory of fluid and crystallized abilities is one of a class of hierarchical theories of intelligence (Burt, 1949; Gustafsson, 1988; Jensen, 1970; Vernon, 1971), not all of which can be described here. The theory is still current. It was proposed by Cattell (1971) but now has been proposed in a contemporary and elaborated form by Horn (1994). Only the simple form is described here. According to this theory, fluid ability (Gf ) is flexibility of thought and the ability to reason abstractly. It is measured by tests such as number series, abstract analogies, matrix prob- lems, and the like. Crystallized ability (Gc), which is alleged to derive from fluid ability, is essentially the accumulation of knowledge and skills through the life course. It is measured by tests of vocabulary, reading comprehension, and general information. Sometimes a further distinction is made be- tween fluid and crystallized abilities and a third ability, visual
tions mentally, such as those found in tests of spatial ability (as described earlier for Thurstone’s theory). A number of contemporary tests of intelligence are based on this theory. One is the Test of g: Culture Fair (Cattell & Cattell, 1963), which seeks to capture general ability through tests of fluid abilities. Two other such tests are the Kaufman Adolescent and Adult Intelligence Test (KAIT; Kaufman & Kaufman, 1993) and the Woodcock-Johnson Tests of Cogni- tive Ability–Revised (Woodcock & Johnson, 1989; see Daniel, 2000, for a review of these and other tests). The theory of fluid and crystallized intelligence has been extremely influential in the psychological literature on intel- ligence. If one includes visual ability (Gv), the theory seems to capture three of the most pervasive abilities constituting intelligence. Some questions remain unresolved. First, it is unclear whether fluid ability is statistically sep- arable from general intelligence (Gustafsson, 1984, 1988). Such a separation appears to be difficult, and even Cattell’s own allegedly culture-fair test of g is actually a test of fluid ability, as is the Raven’s Progressive Matrices test. Second, it is unclear whether crystallized ability really de- rives from or somehow springs out of fluid ability. Such a view seemed plausible when Cattell and many others could argue persuasively that tests of fluid ability were culture-fair and that fluid ability is largely unaffected by environmental factors. It now appears that both these views are erroneous. Fluid-ability tests often show greater differences between cultural groups than do crystallized ability tests; more impor- tant, they are more susceptible to the Flynn effect (considered later) than are tests of crystallized abilities. This effect refers to secular increases in scores over time. If fluid-ability scores are increasing over time more rapidly than crystallized- ability scores, one can hardly argue that they are unaffected by enculturation or, most likely, by schooling. Indeed, Ceci (1991, 1996; Ceci & Williams, 1997) has suggested that schooling has a large effect on measured intelligence of all kinds.
Third, it appears likely that there are other kinds of abili- ties beyond those specified by the theory of fluid and crystal- lized abilities. Some of the contemporary theories considered next attempt to specify what these abilities might be. CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF INTELLIGENCE Implicit Theories Expert Views Sixty-five years after the symposium in the Journal of Educational Psychology on intelligence, Sternberg and Detterman (1986) conducted a similar symposium, again asking experts about their views on intelligence. Experts such
Contemporary Theories of Intelligence 29 as Earl Butterfield, Douglas Detterman, Earl Hunt, Arther Jensen, and Robert Sternberg gave their views. Learning and adaptive abilities retained their importance, and a new em- phasis crept in—metacognition, or the ability to understand and control one’s self. Of course, the name is new, but the idea is not, because long ago Aristotle emphasized the impor- tance for intelligence of knowing oneself. The 1921 and 1986 symposia could be criticized for being overly Western in the composition of their contributors. In some cases, Western notions about intelligence are not shared by other cultures. For example, the Western emphasis on speed of mental processing (Sternberg, Conway, Ketron, & Bernstein, 1981) is absent in many cultures. Other cultures may even be suspicious of the quality of work that is done very quickly. Indeed, other cultures emphasize depth rather than speed of processing. They are not alone: Some pro- minent Western theorists have pointed out the importance of depth of processing for full command of material (e.g., Craik & Lockhart, 1972). Even L. L. Thurstone (1924) em- phasized the importance to human intelligence of withhold- ing a quick, instinctive response, a view that Stenhouse (1973) argued is supported by evolutionary theory. Today, unlike in the past, psychologists have a better idea of the im- plicit theories of people in diverse cultures.
Yang and Sternberg (1997a) reviewed Chinese philosophical conceptions of intelligence. The Confucian perspective em- phasizes the characteristic of benevolence and of doing what is right. As in the Western notion, the intelligent person spends much effort in learning, enjoys learning, and persists in life- long learning with a great deal of enthusiasm. The Taoist tra- dition, in contrast, emphasizes the importance of humility, freedom from conventional standards of judgment, and full knowledge of oneself as well as of external conditions. The difference between Eastern and Western conceptions of intelligence may persist even in the present day. Yang and Sternberg (1997b) studied contemporary Taiwanese Chinese conceptions of intelligence and found five factors underlying these conceptions: (a) a general cognitive factor, much like the g factor in conventional Western tests; (b) interpersonal intelligence; (c) intrapersonal intelligence; (d) intellectual self-assertion; and (d) intellectual self-effacement. In a re- lated study but with different results, Chen (1994) found three factors underlying Chinese conceptualizations of intel- ligence: nonverbal reasoning ability, verbal reasoning ability, and rote memory. The difference may be due to different sub- populations of Chinese, to differences in methodology, or to differences in when the studies were done. The factors uncovered in both studies differ substantially from those identified in U.S. people’s conceptions of intelli- gence by Sternberg et al. (1981). The factors uncovered by this study were (a) practical problem solving, (b) verbal ability, and (c) social competence, although in both cases people’s im- plicit theories of intelligence seem to go far beyond what con- ventional psychometric intelligence tests measure. Of course, comparing the Chen (1994) to the Sternberg et al. (1981) study simultaneously varies both language and culture. Chen and Chen (1988) varied only language. They explic- itly compared the concepts of intelligence of Chinese gradu- ates from Chinese-language versus English-language schools in Hong Kong. They found that both groups considered non- verbal reasoning skills as the most relevant skill for measur- ing intelligence. Verbal reasoning and social skills came next, and then numerical skill. Memory was seen as least important. The Chinese-language group, however, tended to rate verbal skills as less important than did the English-language group. Moreover, in an earlier study, Chen, Braithwaite, and Huang (1982) found that Chinese students viewed memory for facts as important for intelligence, whereas Australian students viewed these skills as being of only trivial importance. Das (1994), also reviewing Eastern notions of intelligence, has suggested that in Buddhist and Hindu philosophies, intel- ligence involves waking up, noticing, recognizing, under- standing, and comprehending, but also includes such things as determination, mental effort, and even feelings and opinions in addition to more intellectual elements. Differences between cultures in conceptions of intelli- gence have been recognized for some time. Gill and Keats (1980) noted that Australian university students value acade- mic skills and the ability to adapt to new events as critical to intelligence, whereas Malay students value practical skills, as well as speed and creativity. Dasen (1984) found Malay stu- dents to emphasize both social and cognitive attributes in their conceptions of intelligence. The differences between East and West may be due to dif- ferences in the kinds of skills valued by the two kinds of cul- tures (Srivastava & Misra, 1996). Western cultures and their schools emphasize what might be called technological intel- ligence (Mundy-Castle, 1974), so things like artificial intelli- gence and so-called smart bombs are viewed, in some sense, as intelligent, or smart. Western schooling emphasizes other things as well (Srivastava & Misra, 1996), such as generalization, or going beyond the information given (Connolly & Bruner, 1974; Goodnow, 1976), speed (Sternberg, 1985), minimal moves to a solution (Newell & Simon, 1972), and creative thinking (Goodnow, 1976). Moreover, silence is interpreted as a lack of knowledge (Irvine, 1978). In contrast, the Wolof tribe in |
ma'muriyatiga murojaat qiling