International Economics
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Dominick-Salvatore-International-Economics
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6, 641 .3 SDRs 313 .4 204 .1 Reserve position in the IMF 150 .9 98 .3 Total minus gold 10, 660 .7 6, 943 .7 Gold at official price 34 .8 22 .7 Total with gold at official price 10, 695 .5 6, 966 .4 Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics (Washington, D.C.: IMF, March 2012). of $1,896.50 an ounce on September 5, 2001. As part of the Jamaica Accords, the IMF sold one-sixth of its gold holdings on the free market between 1976 and 1980 (and used the proceeds to aid the poorest developing nations) to demonstrate its commitment to eliminate gold (the “barbarous relic”—to use Keynes’s words) as an international reserve asset. The official price of gold was abolished, and it was agreed that there would be no future gold transactions between the IMF and member nations. The IMF also continued to value its gold holdings at the pre-1971 official price of $35 or 35 SDRs an ounce. However, it may be some time before gold completely “seeps out” of international reserves—if it ever will. In the fall of 1996, the IMF agreed to sell about $2 billion of its gold holdings and use the proceeds to reduce the foreign debt of the poorest developing countries. One SDR was valued at $1.00 up to 1971, $1.0857 after the dollar devaluation of Decem- ber 1971, and $1.2064 after the subsequent dollar devaluation of February 1973. In 1974, the value of one SDR was made equal to the weighted average of a basket of 16 leading currencies in order to stabilize its value. In 1981, the number of currencies included in the basket was reduced to five and, with the advent of the euro, to the following four (with their respective relative weights in 2001 given in parentheses): U.S. dollar (45 percent); euro (29 percent); Japanese yen (15 percent); and British pound (11 percent). At the end of 2011, one SDR was valued at $1.5353. Since 1974, the IMF has measured all reserves and other official transactions in terms of SDRs instead of U.S. dollars. Table 21.3 shows the composition of international reserves both in U.S. dollars and in SDRs (valued at $1.5353 at the end of 2011). For the composition of international reserves from 1950 to 2011 in terms of SDRs, as presented by the IMF, see Table 21.7 in the appendix. 21.6 B Current IMF Operation Several recent changes have occurred in the operation of the IMF. The quotas of IMF member nations have been increased across the board several times, so that at the end of 2011, resources totaled $369.2 billion (up from $8.8 billion in 1947). Members are generally required to pay 25 percent of any increase in their quota in SDRs or in currencies of other members selected by the Fund, with their approval, and the rest in their own currency. New members pay in their quota in the same way. The old gold tranche is now called the first-credit tranche . Salvatore c21.tex V2 - 11/07/2012 10:29 A.M. Page 704 704 The International Monetary System: Past, Present, and Future The IMF has also renewed and expanded the General Arrangements to Borrow (GAB) ten times since setting them up in 1962; and in 1997, it extended it with the New Arrangement to Borrow (NAB) , so that at the end of 2011, the IMF could lend up to SDR $564.2 billion to supplement its regular resources. Central bankers also expanded their swap arrangements to over $54 billion and their standby arrangements to $92 billion. Borrowing rules at the Fund were also relaxed, and new credit facilities were added that greatly expanded the overall maximum amount of credit available to a member nation. However, this total amount of credit consists of several different credit lines subject to various conditions. The IMF loans are now specified in terms of SDRs. There is an initial fee, and the interest charged is based on the length of the loan, the facility used, and prevailing interest rates. Besides the usual surveillance responsibilities over the exchange rate policies of its members, the Fund has recently broadened its responsibilities to include help for members to overcome their structural problems. The new credit facilities set up by the IMF include (1) the Extended Fund Facility (EFF), established in 1974 for long-term assistance to support members’ structural reforms to address balance of payments difficulties of a long-term character; (2) the Supplemental Reserve Facility (SRF), established in December 1997 during the Asian Crisis, to provide short-term assistance for balance-of-payments difficulties related to crises of market confi- dence; (3) the Compensatory and Contingency Financing Facility (CCFF), set up in 1963 to provide medium-term assistance for temporary export shortfalls or cereal import excesses; (4) the flexible credit line (FCL), created in March 2009, to provide assistance in crisis prevention; (5) the Precautionary Credit Line (PCL), available to a wider group of countries than the FCL; (6) the Post-Catastrophe Debt Relief (PCDR) Trust, established to allow the Fund to join international debt relief efforts when poor countries are hit by the most catas- trophic of natural disasters; and the Systematic Transformation Facility (STF) to provide longer-term assistance for deep-seated balance of payments difficulties of a structural nature to encourage poverty-reducing growth. A member country’s overall access to Fund resources is now up to 200 percent of its quota in any single year, or twice the old cumulative limit of 100 percent, with a cumulative limit of 600 percent of a member’s quota. The recipients of the loans as well as the type of loans made by the Fund also changed significantly over time. During the first 20 years of its existence, industrial countries accounted for over half of the use of Fund resources, and loans were made primarily to overcome short-term balance-of-payments problems. Since the early 1980s, most loans have been made to developing countries, and an increasing share of these loans has been made for the medium term in order to overcome structural problems. Total Fund credit and loans outstanding were $14.0 billion in 1980, $41.0 billion in 1986, and $100 billion at the end of 2011. In the face of the huge international debt problems of many developing countries since 1982, particularly the large countries of Latin America, the IMF engaged in a number of debt rescheduling and rescue operations. As a condition for the additional loans and special help, the IMF usually required reductions in government spending, in growth of the money supply, and in wage increases in order to reduce imports, stimulate exports, and make the country more nearly self-sustaining. Such IMF conditionality , however, proved to be very painful and led to riots and even the toppling of governments during the late 1980s and 1990s. It also led to accusations that the IMF did not take into account the social needs of debtor nations and the political consequences of its demands, and that its policies were “all head and no heart.” Partly in response to these accusations, the IMF has become more Salvatore c21.tex V2 - 11/07/2012 10:29 A.M. Page 705 21.6 The International Monetary System: Present and Future 705 flexible in its lending activities in recent years and has begun to grant even medium term loans to overcome structural problems (something that was traditionally done only by the World Bank). In 2006, the Fund proposed some fundamental reforms of its mission toward more mul- tilateral surveillance, such as addressing the issue of global imbalances of big member countries like the United States and China, as well as providing greater representation to Asian emerging markets, especially China, to reflect their growing economic importance, rather than focusing (as in past decades) primarily on the challenges of global poverty of its low-income members and on international financial crises that affected only a small group of vulnerable emerging-market economies. By way of summary, Table 21.4 presents the most important dates in modern monetary history. ■ TABLE 21.4. Important Dates in Modern Monetary History 1880–1914 Classical gold standard period April 1925 United Kingdom returns to the gold standard October 1929 United States stock market crashes September 1931 United Kingdom abandons the gold standard February 1934 United States raises official price of gold from $20.67 to $35 an ounce July 1944 Bretton Woods Conference March 1947 IMF begins operation September 1967 Decision to create SDRs March 1968 Two-tier gold market established August 1971 United States suspends convertibility of the dollar into gold—end of Bretton Woods system December 1971 Smithsonian Agreement (official price of gold increased to $38 an ounce; band of allowed fluctuation increased to 4.5%) February 1973 United States raises official price of gold to $42.22 an ounce March 1973 Managed floating exchange rate system comes into existence October 1973 OPEC selective embargo on petroleum exports and start of sharp increase in petroleum prices January 1976 Jamaica Accords (agreement to recognize the managed float and abolish the official price of gold) April 1978 Jamaica Accords take effect Spring 1979 Second oil shock March 1979 Establishment of the European Monetary System (EMS) January 1980 Gold price rises temporarily above $800 per ounce September 1985 Plaza agreement to intervene to lower value of dollar Fall 1986 New round of GATT multilateral trade negotiations begins February 1987 Louvre agreement to stabilize exchange rates October 1987 New York Stock Exchange collapses and spreads to other stock markets around the world 1989–1990 Democratic and market reforms begin in Eastern Europe and German reunification occurs December 1991 Maastricht Treaty approved calling for European Union to move toward monetary union by 1997 or 1999 December 1991 Soviet Union dissolved and Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) formed September 1992 United Kingdom and Italy abandon Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) January 1, 1993 European Union (EU) becomes a single unified market (continued) Salvatore c21.tex V2 - 11/07/2012 10:29 A.M. Page 706 706 The International Monetary System: Past, Present, and Future ■ TABLE 21.4. (continued) August 1, 1993 European Monetary System allows ±15% fluctuation in exchange rates December 1993 Uruguay Round completed and World Trade Organization (WTO) replaces GATT January 1, 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) comes into existence January 1, 1994 Creation of the European Monetary Institute (EMI) as the forerunner of the European Central Bank by the European Union January 1, 1999 Introduction of the single currency (the euro) and European Union-wide monetary policy by the European Central Bank (ECB) October 2000 Euro falls to lowest level with respect to the dollar January 1, 2002 Euro begins circulation as the currency of the 12-member European Monetary Union (EMU) December 2006 U.S. current account deficit reaches all-time high of 6 percent of GDP July 15, 2008 Euro reaches the all-time high of $1.60 September 15, 2008 Lehman Brothers files for bankruptcy, leading to full global financial crisis September 5, 2011 Gold price reaches the all-time high of $1,896.50 an ounce February 2012 Greece restructures its debt, thus avoiding default and possibly abandoning the euro 21.6 C Problems with Present Exchange Rate Arrangements The present international monetary system faces a number of serious and closely interrelated international monetary problems today. These are (1) the large volatility and the wide and persistent misalignments of exchange rates; (2) the failure to promote greater coordination of economic policies among the leading industrial nations; and (3) the inability to prevent international financial crises or to deal with them adequately when they do arise. We have seen in Sections 14.5a and 15.5a that since 1973 exchange rates have been characterized by very large volatility and overshooting. This state of affairs can discourage the flow of international trade and investments. Much more serious is the fact that under the present managed floating exchange rate system large exchange rate disequilibria can arise and persist for several years (see Figure 14.3 and Section 14.5A). This is clearly evident from the large appreciation of the dollar from 1980 to 1985 and its even larger depreciation from February 1985 until the end of 1987. More recently, the yen–dollar exchange rate swung from 85 yen to the dollar in April 1995, to 132 yen to the dollar in February 2002, and 78 at the end of 2011. From January 1, 1999, to October 2000, the euro depreciated from $1.17 to $0.82, before rising to $1.36 in December 2004, falling to $1.18 in November 2005, and then rising to the all-time high of $1.60 on July 15, 2008. The excessive appreciation of the dollar during the first half of the 1980s and the overvaluation of the late 1990s and early 2000s has been associated with large and unsustainable trade deficits and calls for protectionism in the United States. It has also led to renewed calls for reform of the present international monetary system, along the lines of establishing target zones of allowed fluctuations for the major currencies and more international policy coordination among the leading nations. The earlier debate on the relative merits of fixed versus flexible rates has now been superseded by discussions of the optimal degree of exchange rate flexibility and policy cooperation. Some increased cooperation has already occurred. For example, in September 1985, the United States negotiated with Germany, Japan, France, and the United Kingdom (in the Salvatore c21.tex V2 - 11/07/2012 10:29 A.M. Page 707 21.6 The International Monetary System: Present and Future 707 so-called Plaza Agreement in New York City), a coordinated effort to intervene in foreign exchange markets to lower the value of the dollar. In 1986, the United States negotiated with Japan and Germany a simultaneous coordinated reduction in interest rates to stimulate growth and reduce unemployment (which exceeded 10 percent of the labor force in most nations of Europe during most of the 1980s) without directly affecting trade and capital flows (see Section 18.6c). The leading industrial nations are now paying much more attention to the international repercussions of their monetary and other policy changes. In February 1987, the G-7 nations agreed at the Louvre to establish soft reference ranges or target zones for the dollar–yen and the dollar–mark exchange rates (without, however, much success). Other examples of international monetary cooperation were the quick, coordinated response to the October 1987 worldwide stock market crash; to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States; and to some extent to the deep recession in advanced economies and sharply reduced growth in emerging markets in 2008–2009. A closely related problem to exchange rate misalignments is the huge dollar overhang , or large quantity of dollars held by foreigners and ready to move from monetary center to monetary center in response to variations in international interest differentials and expecta- tions of exchange rate changes. These “hot money” flows have been greatly facilitated by the extremely rapid growth of Eurocurrency markets (see Section 14.7). One proposal of long standing aimed at eliminating this problem involves converting all foreign-held dollars into SDRs by the introduction of a substitution account by the IMF. No action, however, has been taken on this proposal, and there are several unresolved problems, such as what interest rate to pay on these SDRs and the procedure whereby the United States can buy these dollars back from the IMF. At least for the foreseeable future, the dollar will likely remain the leading international and intervention currency (see Case Studies 14-1 and 14-2). 21.6 D Proposals for Reforming Present Exchange Rate Arrangements Several proposals have been advanced to reduce exchange rate volatility and avoid large exchange rate misalignments. One proposal, first advanced by Williamson (1986), is based on the establishment of target zones. Under such a system, the leading industrial nations estimate the equilibrium exchange rate and agree on the range of allowed fluctuation. Williamson suggested a band of allowed fluctuation of 10 percent above and below the equilibrium exchange rate. The exchange rate is determined by the forces of demand and supply within the allowed band of fluctuation and is prevented from moving outside the target zones by official intervention in foreign exchange markets. The target zones would be soft, however, and would be changed when the underlying equilibrium exchange rate moves outside of or near the boundaries of the target zone. Though not made explicit, the leading industrial nations seemed to have agreed upon some such “soft” target or “reference zones” for the exchange rate between the dollar and the yen and between the dollar and the German mark at the Louvre agreement in February 1987 (but with the allowed band of fluctuation much smaller than the ±10 percent advocated by Williamson). During the early 1990s, however, this tacit agreement was abandoned in the face of strong market pressure which saw the dollar depreciate very heavily with respect to the yen. Critics of target zones believe that target zones embody the worst characteristics of fixed and flexible exchange rate systems. As in the case of flexible rates, target zones allow Salvatore c21.tex V2 - 11/07/2012 10:29 A.M. Page 708 708 The International Monetary System: Past, Present, and Future substantial fluctuation and volatility in exchange rates and can be inflationary. As in the case of fixed exchange rates, target zones can only be defended by official interventions in foreign exchange markets and thus reduce the monetary autonomy of the nation. In response to this criticism, Miller and Williamson (1988) extended their blueprint to require substantial policy coordination on the part of the leading industrial nations so as to reduce the need for intervention in foreign exchange markets to keep exchange rates within the target zones. Other proposals for reforming the present international monetary system are based exclusively on extensive policy coordination among the leading countries. The best and most articulate of these proposals is the one advanced by McKinnon (1984, 1988). Under this system, the United States, Japan, and Germany (now the European Monetary Union) would fix the exchange rate among their currencies at their equilibrium level (determined by purchasing-power parity) and then closely coordinate their monetary policies to keep exchange rates fixed. A tendency for the dollar to depreciate vis-`a-vis the yen would signal that the United States should reduce the growth rate of its money supply, while Japan should increase it. The net overall increase in the money supply of these three countries (or areas) would then be expanded at a rate consistent with the noninflationary expansion of the world economy. Another proposal advocated by the IMF Interim Committee in 1986 was based on the development of objective indicators of economic performance to signal the type of coor- dinated macropolicies for nations to follow, under the supervision of the Fund, in order to keep the world economy growing along a sustainable noninflationary path. These objective indicators are the growth of GNP, inflation, unemployment, trade balance, growth of the money supply, fiscal balance, exchange rates, interest rates, and international reserves. A rise or fall in these objective indicators in a nation would signal the need for respectively restrictive or expansionary policies for the nation. Stability of the index for the world as a whole would be the anchor for noninflationary world expansion. As long as nations have very different inflation–unemployment trade-offs, however, effective and substantial macroeconomic policy coordination is practically impossible. For example, during the 1980s and early 1990s, the United States seemed unable or unwilling to reduce its huge budget deficit substantially and rapidly. Germany has been unwilling to stimulate its economy even though it faced a high rate of unemployment, and Japan has been very reluctant to dismantle its protectionistic policies to allow more imports from the United States so as to help reduce the huge trade imbalance between the two nations. Empirical research has also shown that nations gain from international policy coordination about three-quarters of the time but that the welfare gains from coordination, when they occur, are not very large (see Section 20.7). Another class of proposals for reforming the present international monetary system is based on the premise that huge international capital flows in today’s highly integrated international capital markets are the primary cause of exchange rate instability and global imbalances afflicting the world economy today. These proposals are, therefore, based on restricting international speculative capital flows. Tobin (1978) would do this with a trans- action tax that would become progressively higher the shorter the duration of the transaction in order “to put some sand in the wheels of international finance.” Dornbusch and Frankel (1987) would instead reduce financial capital flows internationally with dual exchange rates—a less flexible one for trade transactions and a more flexible one for purely financial transactions not related to international trade and investments. By restricting international “hot money” flows through capital market segmentation or the decoupling of asset markets, Download 7.1 Mb. Do'stlaringiz bilan baham: |
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