International Relations. A self-Study Guide to Theory

Self-study (1) 
Read chapters 1,2 and 3 of Power and Interdependence. World Politics in 
Transition written by Keohane/Nye (1977). Learn about the function the 
concept of “complex interdependence” as an “ideal type” has for theory 
building. 
2.2.
Power and interdependence 
The core question of the book is an issue that relates to (American) foreign 
policy, i.e. how to exercise power under conditions of interdependence 
(hence the title). The question is relevant because conventional power cannot 
be used under conditions of interdependence: military force proves ineffec-
tive in such situations. In order to understand the answer given to this ques-
tion by Keohane and Nye, we have to understand the position of interdepend-
ence in the theoretical explanation. Interdependence as a systemic, structural 
feature is introduced as an intervening variable. It “works” between power 
(as the independent variable) and the outcomes of international politics (as 
the dependent variable). This “condition” changes the context and the struc-
ture of international bargaining processes. 
As we have seen already, neoinstitutionalist and neorealist theories are 
based on the assumption that states are rational actors and make rational 
choices in accordance with cost-benefit calculations. The neoinstitutionalist 
argument is that interdependence constrains the autonomy of states as actors. 
Due to the effects of interdependence as an intervening variable, it becomes 
impossible to “directly translate” power resources and political power into 
political outcomes. In terms of the distribution of power under conditions of 
interdependence, different issue areas of international politics have distinct 
structures. Mutual dependencies in issue areas are not necessarily symmet-
rical. Asymmetrical interdependence therefore constitutes an important 
source of power and enhances the state’s scope for less dependent action. 
States may be tempted to manipulate the international system in their own in-
terests. The problem exists on two levels: 
1)
“From the foreign-policy standpoint, the problem facing individual gov-
ernments is how to benefit from international exchange while maintaining 
as much autonomy as possible.” 

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2)
“From the perspective of the international system, the problem is how to 
generate and maintain a mutually beneficial pattern of cooperation in the 
face of competing efforts by governments (and non-governmental actors) 
to manipulate the system for their own benefit.” (Keohane/Nye 1987: 
730, my italics). 
Because unilateral action cannot be successful under conditions of interde-
pendence and against the background of declining American hegemony, 
Keohane and Nye suggest multilateral politics as a strategy of policy coordi-
nation and international leadership (Keohane/Nye 1977: 239). According to 
the two scholars, “multilateralism is based on action to induce other states to 
help stabilize an international regime”. (Keohane/Nye 1977: 231) 
In the politics of interdependence as suggested by Keohane and Nye, the 
US plays a leading role in establishing international policy coordination. This 
is based on the conviction that international cooperation and international in-
stitutions are the best means of achieving policy goals under conditions of in-
ternational interdependence. Keohane develops this argument further in After 
Hegemony. Cooperation and Discord in International Politics (1984), in 
which he formulates regime theory. 
2.3.
International cooperation, international institutions and the 
“civilization” of world politics
Interdependence has two effects: first, under conditions of interdependence, 
military power becomes meaningless; and second, interdependence enhances 
the need for international cooperation. Under conditions of interdependence, 
states as rational actors have a strong interest in international cooperation and 
peaceful international politics. They seek not to enhance their power, but to 
achieve absolute gains. International cooperation is a win-win solution to col-
lective action problems in international politics. By cooperating, all parties in 
the interdependent relationship that is causing a collective action problem 
will be better off. 
Robert Axelrod has done some important work on cooperation among 
egoists under conditions of interdependence, which was modeled on the 
game of prisoner’s dilemma and published in his book The Evolution of Co-
operation (1984). In the book, Axelrod demonstrated that expectations about 
the future significantly influence the results of cooperation (“shadow of the 
future”) and that they will lead to stable patterns of cooperation. However, 
levels of uncertainty can inhibit the evolution of cooperation; information 
that reduces uncertainty thus constitutes an important factor in world politics. 

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International institutions can reduce uncertainty by providing information, 
therefore affecting international political behavior (Keohane 1986b: 195, 
196). Finally, stable cooperation will foster and increase interdependence 
again, as well as enhancing institutionalization in international politics. In the 
long term, institutionalization can be understood as an evolutionary process 
in the construction of a peaceful world order that will lead to a “transfor-
mation” of anarchy. Anarchy will continue to persist as a structural feature of 
international politics but, in the long run, this will develop into “regulated an-
archy” and world politics will become “civilized”.