International relations of Usbekistan Difference of International relations of Uzbekistan with foreign countries

International relations of Uzbekistan with foreign countries

Plan

1. 
   International relations of Usbekistan
   
2. 
   Difference of International relations of Uzbekistan
   
3. 
   Uzbekistan with foreign countries
   

The faculty "International Relations" was established in October 1995. The main task of the faculty is to train highly qualified personnel for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Uzbekistan, as well as agencies, institutions, organizations, embassies, international organizations, which professional activities are aimed at carrying out international relations of the Republic of Uzbekistan with foreign countries.

A number of professional diplomats, political analysts and highly qualified specialists who got professional education in various fields in the sphere of international relations and currently defend the national interests of the Republic of Uzbekistan in the political arena were trained at this faculty.

At the faculty "International Relations", bachelors are trained in the educational area of the bachelor's program "World Politics (by regions)", as well as masters in the specialty "International Relations and Foreign Policy"

The curriculum of the bachelor's program "World politics (by regions)" is an educational area in the format of the humanities. It incorporates theoretical and practical activities on development of the sphere of the international relations, the definition of foreign policy prospects, a complex of the means, methods, ways and methods aimed at the increase of professional skills as well competence of implementation of the assigned powers. Both theoretical and practical activities are directly connected with system of political knowledge and knowledge of history as well as the theory of the international relations, foundation of diplomacy, international relations, history, religion, languages, economy, systems of law, literature and culture of Uzbekistan and world cultural heritage.

Training of bachelors in the educational area "World Politics (by regions)" includes such types of professional activity as mastering and researching processes connected with internal and external activity as well as analysis, synthesis and optimization of processes by the identification of prospects. It also includes application of the advanced international methods, use of system analytical models concerning processes in foreign policy, introduction of computer technologies programming and systemic related mechanisms.

The scope of the bachelor's professional activity covers the following:

The graduates of the educational area "World Politics (on Regions)" can carry out professional activity in system of the state administration bodies related to foreign policy activity in diplomatic missions and consular offices of foreign countries in the Republic of Uzbekistan, the ministries, the state committees, the khokimiyats (city councils) and other public institutions, the international departments, departments and divisions of institutions, the international organizations, in representations of the Republic of Uzbekistan in the international organizations and representative offices of the international organizations in the Republic of Uzbekistan.

Opportunities to continue education.

Bachelors who have received professional training in the educational area "World Politics (by region)" can continue their study and gain their Master’s Degree focusing on "International Relations and Foreign Policy" for a period of at least two years.

Besides, the bachelor has an opportunity to continue study in accordance with the established procedure as the senior scientific researcher or independent researcher.

At faculty there are the following departments:

International Relations;

Practical Diplomacy;
Social Sciences and humanities
Since the death of Islam Karimov in 2016, Uzbekistan has opened up economically while becoming more assertive in Central Asia affairs, placing itself at the center of discussions on border delimitation, water scarcity, and infrastructure development. Oybek Madiyev’s timely new book Uzbekistan’s International Relations offers a fresh perspective on Tashkent’s ever-changing relations with Russia, China, the United States, Japan, and the European Union. Madiyev argues each of these actors has two key motivations: the desire to invest in the energy market and to capitalize on Uzbekistan’s geopolitical potential. The book is written through the lens of a neo-Gramscian approach to political economy, emphasizing the “historical development of domestic and international settings” (p.6) and how foreign policy emerges from configurations of material capabilities, ideologies and institutions. Madiyev takes stock of regimes, civil society, business communities, and other actors who inform Uzbekistan’s foreign policy in his analysis. Alongside publicly available statistical data, country reports, and news sources, the book draws from individual interviews with former and current state officials, providing readers with an insider’s perspective on the factors which drive foreign policy decision-making.

Madiyev’s main argument is that due to the absence of a robust civil society and the closed nature of the regime in Uzbekistan, Russia and China have established stronger economic relations with the country than other international players. The two great powers were able to exert influence on Uzbekistan by “engaging directly with the top, or state apparatus, through providing political support for the ruling regime” (p.9). Due to Uzbekistan’s state-centered foreign policy under Islam Karimov, the country was susceptible to great power influence and its international relations were characterized by haphazard foreign policy decisions as demonstarted by the country’s frequent withdrawals and reentries into regional blocs. He argues that in the presence of a ‘historic hegemonic bloc,’ society’s “interacting elements create a larger unity, which is able to sustain various domestic and external pressures on various ‘manoeuvres’ from China and Russia” (p.55). But such a historic hegemonic bloc is absent in Uzbekistan.

While providing an inclusive approach regarding the actors and forces that shape Uzbekistan’s foreign policy, the application of a neo-Gramscian approach does not account for a regime’s ability to reverse major powers’ influence even in the absence of a historical hegemonic bloc. Karimov’s explicit assertion in 2015 “that Uzbekistan was not interested in either the Eurasian Economic Union or the Customs Union” (89) in the aftermath of the Crimean annexation is one example when the state was able to push back against Russian influence. Moreover, a neo-Gramscian approach in Uzbekistan’s case shows that the lack of an active civil society and other domestic interests, in fact, incentivizes the regime to make radical shifts in foreign policy without significant domestic costs. In the aftermath of the 2005 crackdown in Andijan, Karimov’s government jettisoned major U.S. investors, mining companies, and NGOs, despite the ensuing economic consequences and loss of support from donors.

Putin’s arrival to power and the subsequent consolidation of authoritarianism in Russia marked the advent of the ‘war of manoeuvre’, a direct confrontation with the state government, as it created an environment where Putin’s siloviki-based regime could directly engage with the Central Asian ruling regimes. Madiyev argues that for Putin, “Russia’s foreign policy is understood as a result of domestic economic interests” (p.80), a pattern which Madiyev calls the ‘economization of foreign policy’ (p.80). Maintaining access to Uzbekistan’s gas supplies by bringing companies such as Gazprom and Lukoil to the Uzbek market constituted Russia’s main domestic interest. The second pillar of Russia’s foreign policy, the Eurasianist perspective, “prioritizes its relations with the former Soviet countries and has the potential to expand beyond the post-Soviet sphere and ultimately integrate with broader Asia” (p.86).

The book situates China’s dynamic economic relations with Uzbekistan after 2002 within the context of Beijing’s ‘going out’ (p.110) strategy. Like with Russia, Madiyev argues that the goal was primarily economic: “the objective was to create conditions for certain Chinese companies, mainly extractive industries, to invest abroad, compete with the biggest companies in the world, and secure natural and mineral resources” (p.111). In the domestic realm, the need to develop China’s western provinces at a time when they were lagging behind its coastal regions, drove the government’s decision to launch the BRI in 2013. According to the author, the Chinese government prioritized a multilateral approach with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) acting as an initial platform for establishing energy-related projects and trade relations with Uzbekistan. In fact, all of the flagship initiatives that share the goal of maintaining China’s energy security, “the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the SCO, and the Silk Road Economic Belt are increasingly interlinked” (p.125).

U.S. relations with Uzbekistan have been characterized by constant maneuvering between human rights, security interests and energy, according to the author. Madiyev argues that U.S. programs to promote economic and political reform in Uzbekistan were, in fact, “vital investment protection measures or mechanisms to implement its long-term interests in the region” (p.139). At the period of their closest relations, the countries’ relations rested on security, which gained prevalence after the 1999 terrorist attacks in Tashkent and the launching of the Global War on Terror in the aftermath of 9/11. Facing a breakdown of relations after the 2005 Andijan events, Madiyev argues, the U.S. has switched to emphasizing counterbalancing China and Russia’s presence by introducing the New Silk Road and C5+1 initiatives. While the New Silk Road was a strategy directed at reinvigorating the traditional areas of U.S.-Uzbekistan cooperation since 2011 such as energy and security interests in Afghanistan, C5+1 was a larger U.S. initiative aimed at building stronger connections between Washington and the entire region in light of crystallizing Chinese influence.

Following independence, Japan emerged as a relatively neutral player interested in Central Asia’s energy resources and developing infrastructure. Japan came with less baggage than its rival great powers. Madiyev states that Karimov “was aware that Japan did not possess any imperialist ambitions vis-à-vis Central Asia and saw it as a safe and reliable force in comparison to Russia and China” (p.182). Despite extensive investments, Madiyev suggests that Japan was unable to establish effective trade relations with the country due its one-size-fits-all approach to the region and lack of a tailored approach towards Uzbekistan.

Although the European Union (EU) initiated Partnership and Cooperation Agreements with each Central Asian country, the EU, like Japan, was unable to build effective trade relations with Uzbekistan in part due to the absence of a tailored approach to the country and also due to Uzbekistan’s persistent authoritarianism. Madiyev argues that the EU’s interests in Uzbekistan were driven by concerns over access to Afghanistan and a long-term goal of facilitating energy exports from Central Asia to Europe. As in the case of the U.S., the 2005 Andijan events were followed by the distancing between the EU and Uzbekistan. The ensuing rapprochement spearheaded by Germany in 2007 and the introduction of the Strategy for a New Partnership demonstrated that the EU was ready to ease the assertive norm-based framework for the sake of its long-term goals in maintaining energy security.

Madiyev concludes by stating that Uzbekistan will continue to have more effective and lasting ties with Russia and China due to the structural nature of both states that largely insulate civil society from the decision-making process. At the same time, he suggests that the initial steps taken towards building a dialogue with civil society and economic liberalization signal “Uzbekistan’s willingness to strengthen ties with the West” (p.52). While increased foreign investments and support for the business sector have shaped economic reforms, Madiyev emphasizes that political “reforms are still top-down” (p.225). The country’s recent interest in joining the Eurasian Economic Union also makes it questionable that the current reforms are sufficient to distance the country from Russia and China’s influence.

Two drivers of Uzbekistan’s foreign policy are largely missing from Madiyev’s analysis. First, he does not discuss the Central Asian states tendencies to employ multi-vector policies, by building relations with different international actors in different areas of interest. Second, as Madiyev recognizes, the book does not address Uzbekistan’s relations with its neighbors, which has been the key foreign policy priority under Shavkat Mirziyoyev. Increased regional connections could become a form of “balancing regionalism” whereby the Central Asian states signal to external powers that they can solve the region’s problems without outside help. At the same time, Uzbekistan’s emergence as a strong economic and political actor is likely to introduce competition within the region, particularly with Kazakhstan, which could undermine these efforts. These shortcomings notwithstanding, the book is essential reading for those interested in the evolution of the foreign policy of Central Asia’s most populous state.

Consistent reforms, openness, transparency, renewal, and changes observed in the domestic policy of Uzbekistan in recent years, are also evident in the country's foreign policy.

Uzbekistan, as an equal actor of international relations, pursues an active foreign policy at the regional and global levels by developing mutually beneficial relations with foreign partners. This consistent and constructive foreign policy is also recognized by international experts and observers.

Even in times of global coronavirus infection, Uzbekistan has paid special attention to ensuring socio-economic stability and maintaining cooperation with the countries of the region and the world community.

One of the main foreign policy objectives of Uzbekistan is creating an atmosphere of peace, stability, and security around its territory. [i] In this regard, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev has identified the development and strengthening of friendly, good-neighborly, and mutually beneficial relations with Central Asian states as a key foreign policy priority.[ii]

Within the framework of the 2020 State Program, Uzbekistan continued its consistent, open, and pragmatic foreign policy activities, including in the direction of Central Asia.

In particular, to bring relations of Uzbekistan with the countries of the Central Asian region to a qualitatively new level, throughout 2020 state bodies for foreign policy and economic activities carried out 35 high-level visits and held various events in different directions. Moreover, public diplomacy was effectively implemented in practice. Particularly, more than 90 different meetings, video conferences, roundtables, and other events were held with the participation of scientists and artists, cultural and religious figures, businessmen and youth, tourism and sports organizations, public associations, and NGOs. [iii]

It should be noted that in recent years, as a result of the initiatives of President Shavkat Mirziyoyev which were actively supported by the leaders of neighboring countries, political dialogue and personal trust between the Presidents have been strengthened. Consultative meetings of Central Asian leaders have been set up.[iv]

As a result, the level of bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the region has reached a new level. In particular, in 2017-2019, trade turnover with Central Asian countries increased by an average of more than 50% annually and amounted to 5.2 billion dollars. According to the results of 2020, despite the global pandemic, the total trade turnover of Uzbekistan with Central Asian states made 5 billion dollars.[v] Especially, the share of Central Asian states in the total foreign trade turnover of Uzbekistan increased from 12.4% in 2019 to 13.6% in 2020, in which the share of Kazakhstan accounts for 61%, Kyrgyzstan - 18.2%, Turkmenistan - 10.6%, and Tajikistan - 10.2%.[vi]

Such improvement in trade and economic relations between Central Asia states, in general, has helped to increase the investment attractiveness of the region. In particular, during 2017 and 2020, more than 300 agreements, and also about $ 75 billion worth of contracts were signed between Uzbekistan and the countries of the region.[vii]

Also, as a result of Uzbekistan's open, constructive, and pragmatic policy towards Central Asia the complex and confusing problems such as water use, delimitation, and demarcation of state borders between Uzbekistan and neighboring countries, use of transport communications, crossing state borders have been addressed and resolved throughout 2017-2020. If five years ago, the Uzbek-Kyrgyz border was crossed by 200-300 people a day, on the eve of the global pandemic this figure reached 30 thousand a day, and the Uzbek-Tajik border was crossed by 20 thousand citizens a day.[viii]

The openness and constructive policy of Uzbekistan towards the Central Asian states is proved by the joint measures taken by the leaders of the region during the global pandemic to help each other and mitigate the impact of the spread of the coronavirus.

Despite the global pandemic, today there is an active partnership between the Central Asian states and a constant dialogue between the heads of state. Countries in the region have been providing humanitarian assistance to each other since the early days of the spread of coronavirus infection. Uzbekistan has repeatedly sent humanitarian aid to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. In response, our neighbors, such as Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, have provided humanitarian assistance to restore the Sardoba Reservoir. In December 2020, with the support of Uzbekistan, an infectious diseases hospital with 200 beds and fully equipped with the necessary medical equipment and furniture was commissioned in Kyrgyzstan.[ix] Moreover, during the pandemic, the exchange of information and experience in the field of medicine to fight against coronavirus, uninterrupted movement of goods across state borders of the Central Asian states were maintained. This allowed the region to have a lower incidence of coronavirus infection and its resulting deaths than in other parts of the world.

In January 2021, the governments of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, together with the United States, launched the Central Asia Investment Partnership to attract at least $ 1 billion over five years to support projects that advance private-sector-led growth and increase economic connectivity within Central Asia and the broader region. Working through the C5+1 platform, the initiative will seek to take advantage of opportunities for increasing trade, development, and connectivity to make each country in Central Asia stronger and more prosperous.[x]

The growing importance and role of Central Asia in the world community can be seen in the organization of various formats of multilateral cooperation between the region and external actors.

Existing multilateral cooperation formats such as "Central Asia - United States", "Central Asia - European Union", "Central Asia - Republic of Korea", "Central Asia - Japan" enriched with the new ones such as "Central Asia - India", "Central Asia - China" and "Central Asia - Russia". This indicates, firstly, that the completely new environment created by the positive changes in the region has increased the attention of the world's leading countries to Central Asia, and secondly, that foreign countries are focusing on developing not only bilateral cooperation but also a single regional multilateral relationship.

This trend indicates positive changes in the region, which raises the attention of the world's leading powers that are interested in developing diversified relations with the countries of Central Asia as a single regional partner. At the same time, the formation of new formats between the region and other states increase the geopolitical and economic importance of Central Asia.

The role of Central Asian states as a single political and diplomatic entity, as well as mutual understanding and solidarity of the countries of the region, were also reflected in the Joint Statement of the Presidents of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan to the protests and riots in Kyrgyzstan in October 2020. In the joint statement, the heads of the four Central Asian states expressed the hope that all political parties and public circles in Kyrgyzstan will make the necessary efforts to ensure peace and tranquility, and resolve the problems that have arisen, by the Constitution and national legislation.[xi]

It should be noted that the stability and solidarity of the Central Asian states, firstly, contributes to the well-being of the people, and secondly, increases the investment attractiveness of the region and creates opportunities for cooperation with foreign partners and investors. The new environment formed and further strengthened between Uzbekistan and the countries of the region will serve to achieve these goals and strengthen mutual political, trade, economic, cultural, and humanitarian cooperation.

The Address of President Sh. Mirziyoyev to the Parliament and the State Program for 2021 pay special attention to strengthening good neighborly relations with Central Asia countries.

Specifically, the State Program for 2021 – “The Year of Support for Youth and Public Health Promotion”[xii] includes an action plan for the consistent continuation of relations with Central Asian states:

development of a comprehensive program of measures to bring Uzbekistan's bilateral and regional relations with Central Asian states to the qualitatively new level;

effective use of "Public Diplomacy";
the joint solution of existing barriers to strengthening good neighborly relations;
creation of favorable conditions for the development of trade and economic relations and the growth of trade turnover, strengthening cooperation;
ensuring the effective use of transit and logistics potential of the region and the development of transport infrastructure;
intensification of cooperation between the regions (including border areas) of Central Asia.
Also, Uzbekistan will strengthen its relations with Central Asian states through multilateral cooperation mechanisms, including the United Nations (UN), the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Turkic Council, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and other structures by improving not only political and diplomatic relations but also economic, inter-parliamentary and public diplomacy.

Besides, taking into account the presidency of Uzbekistan in the SCO in 2021-2022, the development of priorities and key measures is also planned in the State Program for 2021.

Taking into account the fact that Uzbekistan is the only country in the region that borders all Central Asian states, any changes in the political, economic, and cultural spheres of the country directly affect other neighboring states. Uzbekistan's current foreign policy not only enhances its international prestige but also contributes to the sustainable and consistent development of Central Asia as a whole, turning the region into a space of cooperation with enormous opportunities.