Lessons on cooperation building to manage water conflicts in the Aral Sea Basin; Technical documents in hydrology: pc-cp series; Vol.: 11; 2003
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Kazakh- stan (south) Kyrgyz Republic Tajik- istan Turkmen- istan Uzbek- istan Needed operational costs 32.0 115.50 117.0 2 139.0 575.0 Actual operational costs, including: 1.6 5.28 9.75 39.8 392.0 budget financing 0.32 3.40 7.10 39.8 392.0 water users’ fee 1.28 1.88 2.56 – – Actual operational costs as % of demand 5.0 4.60 8.30 18.8 68.1 Specific needed costs, $ per ha 111.3 108.90 162.00 127.9 137.0 Specific actual costs, $ per ha 5.6 5.00 13.50 24.0 93.3 Note: All figures in million $US. Services for maintenance and repair of the on-farm irrigation and collector- drainage network could by provided by state water divisions or by associations of water users (WUA). In all cases the water users pay for these services. In Soviet times capital investments in the water sector, including water resource conservation and land reclamation, were funded by the federal government as well as republican budgets. The current financial status of the Central Asian states has led to a reduction of investment in the water sector. It is worth noting that investment rates differ sharply for different countries depending on government commitment and financial status. The agricultural sector in all of the countries needs state support or subsidies. This can be justified in cases where the state regulates the price of the main agricultural products such as cotton and grain, which are sold to the state for fixed prices which are lower than world market ones. All the Central Asian states recognize the need to charge for water. Payments for water use not only solve the economic problems of water organizations, but facilitate better management, rational water use, and water saving in all branches of the economy. All the states need to decide on legally enforceable charges for pollution. The level of pollutants released in water sources needs to be determined by interstate agreements with sanctions applied to particular states when these limits are exceeded. Provisions for payment for pollution, release of substances at higher than permitted concentrations, excessive water use, restrictions on water transfer, and similar regulations should be coordinated by interstate agreements that set criteria for water allocation and use, and are based on the following well-known principles: ● the previous user presumption ● the “do no harm” rule ● equitable and reasonable water use. At the national level it is proposed to establish charges for waste produced by non- irrigation consumers related to pollutant concentration. Using funds raised by fines for 23 release of pollutants to the rivers and tributaries in excess of permitted limits, or for exceeding the permitted concentration of toxic elements, it is hoped to create national ecological water funds to finance “clean technologies” and improve the ecological state of rivers and water bodies. Water users who have licenses for guaranteed quantities of water could transfer (sell) any surplus part of their quotas, or the entire quota, to other users in mutually beneficial transactions. The main factor that could make this possible could be the use of water-saving technology. This method could be especially effective at WUA level. In the Kyrgyz Republic, in particular, official government policy predicates that, where use of irrigation water is reduced by using up-to-date technologies, the WUA has a right to sell the saved water at market prices. Trade rights should be provided to water-related organizations that invest in water-saving measures and additional water resources involvement. Other prospects for promoting water saving at the WMO level entail bonus payments to staff of the organization related to permanent expenses per cubic meter of water delivery cost. Contrary to the provisions of existing law, which ignores public participation, new laws should initiate the creation of public bodies of stakeholders for the institutional and financial framework of water management. Common tasks for developing economic mechanisms for the water sector and for implementing them at the interstate level are as follows: ● to provide sustainable mechanisms for financing and maintaining interstate water resource management systems and interstate bodies ● to create incentives for all states and water users to conserve water and to ensure it is available to meet environmental needs ● to apply the “polluter pays” principle in practice ● to create a mechanism to balance benefits and costs at the level of interstate water distribution and use. There are no strict financial obligations on states to engage in joint water management and development. Although the operational budget is confirmed each year by a decision of the ICWC before the beginning of the fiscal year, only Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have fully met their obligations to pay for operational requirements and repair work. As for research work, only Uzbekistan has fully met its obligations, with very small contributions from the other states. Attempts to facilitate the financing of reconstruction and development have met opposition from all the states’ financing bodies. As a result only a small part of the required reconstruction works for hydrometeorological services on transboundary rivers and for one headwork in BWO has been done. Some new financial measures for interstate relations are now being considered or are in their preparatory phase. One of these is a proposal to share water and power supplies on the Syr-Darya river by implementing charges for the volume of water to be delivered to lowland states as a result of water regulation; the charges might be seasonal or multiyear. The amount charged per unit of water to water users below reservoirs must cover the running expenses for collecting and conserving this volume. The charge must also compensate for the “lost benefit” of water release through dams, which might otherwise have been used for energy generation. Of course, prices charged under seasonal regulation are often less than prices under multiyear regulation. Another of these measures relates to negotiations about the creation of a “Water–Power Consortium,” as a financial body that will determine more efficient options for power exchanges and allocation among users, bearing in mind the best interests of local authorities. 24 |
