Minds and Computers : An Introduction to the Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence
particular mental state. However, unlike Australian materialism, this
Download 1.05 Mb. Pdf ko'rish
|
document (2)
particular mental state. However, unlike Australian materialism, this is not a type identification. The neural state is token-identified with the mental state by virtue of being token-identified with a particular func- tional role which itself is type-identified with the mental state. In other words, types of mental states just are types of functional roles. So mental states are type-identical to functional categories. Any state which is apt to carry out that function just is the mental state but not by virtue of any intrinsic properties of the state. This is why the identity is only a token identity. Anything at all could stand in place of the neural state in Figure 6.1 if it carries out the appropriate function. Yet another way of saying this is that the neural state, in Figure 6.1, happens to be identical to the mental state in this instance – it happens to be the thing which is the mental state – but not by virtue of being any particular type of neural state. Any type of neural state (in fact any type of state at all) can happen to be identical to the mental state if it happens to carry out the requisite function. Unlike the token physicalism we briefly considered at the end of the last chapter, functionalism is not methodologically vacuous with 46 Figure 6.1 Type/token identity. neural state X token identification mental state X functional category type identification tok en identification respect to empirical investigation. Quite the contrary. By virtue of the type-identification between mental states and functional categories, we know precisely how we should investigate mentality empirically. Psychological inquiry, on the functionalist account, is a matter of determining and investigating the characteristic functions of parti- cular types of mental states. This is one clear advantage of the functionalist framework – it directs psychological inquiry in just the way we require from an empirically adequate theory of mind. To better understand mentality is to develop an account of the mediation by particular types of mental states of their relations to characteristic inputs, outputs and other mental states. A further advantage of functionalism lies in its preservation of the intuitions which underwrote precursor theories. The behaviourist intuition that mentality crucially involves relations between stimulus and behaviour is preserved and the Australian materialist intuition that mental life is to be accounted for in terms of neural activity is accommodated. It is important to appreciate, however, that while one is at liberty to identify neural states as those things which serve the role of mental states, one is not committed to doing so simply by virtue of commit- ting to functionalism. It is an important feature of functionalism that it is substrate inde- pendent and, hence, ontologically neutral. Anything at all – including a state of non-physical substance – can be a mental state on the func- tionalist account, provided it carries out the requisite function. This substrate independence is precisely what allows the functionalist to accommodate the multiple realisability of mental states without succumbing to methodological vacuousness. A corollary of this substrate independence is the avoidance of the species chauvinism inherent in Australian materialism. As far as the functionalist is concerned it is an open question whether or not non-human entities – biological or otherwise – have mental states. Functionalism allows for the possibility of dog minds, cat minds, Martian minds and – crucially – man-made artefacts with minds. The functionalist framework allows for the possibility of artificial intelligence. As well as enjoying substrate independence, functionalism is also mechanism independent. It says nothing about the actual mechanism by which mental states carry out their function in mediating relations between inputs, outputs and other mental states. For this reason, functionalism is often called a ‘black box’ theory of mentality. 47 Mental states, on the functionalist account, are akin to black boxes. We know neither what they are made of, nor what goes on inside them. While this confers the theoretical advantages we have described, there is also a sense in which one is left wanting by the func- tionalist account of mental states. One wants to know more, in par- ticular, about the details of the mechanisms which facilitate the mediation held to be characteristic of mental states. This is why I refer to functionalism as a theoretical framework. Di fferent ways of speci- fying the mechanism in question result in various fully-fledged func- tionalist theories. A prime candidate for a mechanism which is apt to carry out pre- cisely such mediation is computation. Fleshing out functionalism with a computational account of the mediating mechanism will deliver us the theory we are centrally concerned with – computationalism. In order that we might do so responsibly and accurately, we are going to need a rigorous formal account of just what computation is. This will be the target of the next three chapters. Before we move on to this formal material, however, let’s briefly consider a couple of standard philosophical objections to the broad functionalist framework. 6.3 QUALIA OBJECTIONS The two objections we will raise here target not any particular kind of functionalism but, rather, the claim at the heart of the functionalist framework. These are objections to the contention that there is nothing more of importance to know about mental states beyond their function and that carrying out such a function is su Download 1.05 Mb. Do'stlaringiz bilan baham: |
Ma'lumotlar bazasi mualliflik huquqi bilan himoyalangan ©fayllar.org 2024
ma'muriyatiga murojaat qiling
ma'muriyatiga murojaat qiling