Results-oriented Budget Practice in oecd countries odi working Papers 209

4.2 Ex ante accountabilities: legislative control 
An International Symposium for Chairpersons of Parliamentary Budget Committees of OECD 
Member countries on ‘Holding the executive accountable: the changing role of parliament in the 
budget process’ aimed to assert legislative control over executive expenditure by firstly, 

---

26
constraining fiscal aggregates and secondly by enlarging legislative control over revenue and 
spending. The Conference declaration set out the conditions that good governance requires: 
“most crucially, this requires an active partnership around the budget - the major vehicle of 
both government policy and democratic control. To be effective, parliaments require timely, 
coherent and credible information from the executive on resources and performance. Several 
parliaments of OECD Member countries are re-examining their internal organisation and 
processes for the discussion of the budget. Parliamentary budget processes and policies 
support sound governance when they promote fiscal responsibility, transparency, a future 
orientation, as well as all the financial commitments which are not included in the budget, 
and when they demand credible information on the nature, cost and impact of public 
policies” (OECD, 2001, p 1).
The ability to prosecute public sector reform may, according to Olsen and Peters, be a function of 
the type of politico-administrative regime. Hence, Thatcher’s ability to reform in the 1980s was a 
function of her holding office within a parliamentary system enabling her to achieve results less 
likely to be achieved in the “divided, presidential regime of the United States” (Olsen and Peters, 
1996, p 21). Elsewhere, for example Germany, Norway and Switzerland, the existence of minority 
or coalition government may militate against reform when compared with majoritarian government 
such as the United Kingdom. In particular, politicians may appeal to “vague and general values” in 
order to maintain broad coalitions, often rejecting “careful comparative evaluations” (Pollitt, 2001, 
14). Kristensen et al (2002, p 13) argue that elected officials will rarely use performance 
information alone to make judgements about programme decisions. 
Kristensen et al (2002) identify a number of implementation issues. In particular they ask where 
the drivers for reform come from. Among the key questions are whether the drive comes from the 
legislature or the executive, and, if it is driven by the legislature, whether there is a legal basis to the 
reforms. They question whether it is possible to institutionalise reform without a legislative basis. 
Well rehearsed academic distinctions in the public administration and social policy literatures on 
the differences between the Anglo-Saxon and European systems (Esping-Andersen, 1990) may no 
longer be sustainable when applied to the particular case of public sector budgeting. There is a 
growing body of evidence that European OECD countries are moving towards performance 
budgeting systems. For example, Finland has adopted results budgeting, Sweden uses performance 
budgeting and the Netherlands Court of Audit devotes two thirds of its time to performance audits 
(Blöndal and Kristensen, 2002). An outcome approach to Parliamentary scrutiny of budgets is 
encouraged in France, where Parliament votes on programmes with missions related to outcome 
objectives rather than input based budgets (Kristensen et al, 2002, p 21). 
Schick (2002a) traces the decline of parliamentary influence over states’ budgets in OECD 
countries, which he attributes to the rise in party discipline and control over the legislative agenda, 
the escalation of public expenditure especially on entitlements and income support, and the rise in 
interest groups and corporatist political arrangements. Thus, legislatures are typically restricted to a 
reactive role, with marginal influence over the budget exercise taking place behind the scenes. 
In relation to results based budgeting, Schick’s proposals for reform of the legislative process entail 
parliaments’ taking a programme approach, addressing priorities and shifting resources to higher 
priories and productive units based on “expected or actual performance”. This will require effective 
use of technology and the hiring of professional support staff. He cites the US as an example 
where Congress has a Budget Office with 200 professional staff capable of non-partisan objective 
analysis.

---

27