Switzerland: Financial Sector Stability Assessment; imf country Report 14/143; April 16, 2014

Accounting and 
disclosure 
BCP 22 
Consider using a range of international 
experts and audit firms for the special 
audits. 
Consider the periodic rotation of audit 
firms. 
In addition to the use of regular audit firms, FINMA 
uses third-party experts/firms for performing 
targeted interventions, such as investigations of 
complicated problems/matters; delivery of a 
second opinion, if it is not convinced by the 
assessments and confirmations given by the 
ordinary external audit firms.
No action taken. Rotation of lead auditors is 
required but not of audit firms.
Corrective and remedial 
powers of supervisors
BCP 23 
The Swiss Federal Banking Commission 
(SFBC) should have the authority to 
impose direct civil monetary penalties on 
banks, directors, or managers. 
No action taken on the measure, but FINMA has 
been making extensive use of its general corrective 
and remedial powers to achieve prudential results. 

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SWITZERLAND
40 
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
Table 7. Switzerland: Previous FSAP Findings and Key Recommendations—IOSCO
 
Reference Principle 
Recommended Action 
Status 
Principles 1–5
Relating to the
Regulator
Securities regulation should be updated to 
include all types of securities transactions and 
securities intermediaries, including primary 
markets and all asset managers. 
Modalities for removal of board members 
could be clearly spelled out in the law.
Rules on incompatibilities with other 
professional activities could be improved. 
Full budgetary independence should be 
granted to the SFBC, and an increase in its staff 
resources would be justified.
The FDF is currently preparing legislation that 
would apply to asset managers and public offers 
of unlisted securities.
FINMASA notes that the Federal Council removes 
members of the FINMA BOD, if the conditions for 
holding office are no longer fulfilled. The Swiss 
authorities recently published the conditions for 
appointment, but the conditions for removal 
could be made more explicit.
The FINMA BOD approves FINMA’s budget. 
FINMA still has limited resources by peer 
comparison. 
Principles 6–7
Self-Regulation
A more proactive role for the SFBC in 
supervising self-regulating organization (SROs) 
is desirable.
The role performed by certain trade 
associations in regulation and supervision 
could be formalized. 
FINMA has slightly increased its supervision of 
the SIX Swiss Exchange and Eurex Zurich from the 
situation in 2002 in which no direct supervision 
was conducted.
FINMA can approve the standards issued by trade 
associations as minimum standards. They are not 
SROs under Principle 9.