The national bureau of asian research

Access to Advanced Military Technology and Other Forms of Defense Cooperation
To this day and despite the decades of collaboration and problems, Russia remains an important 
supplier of advanced military technology to China. This relationship has changed over time, in 
both its breadth and depth, but remains a pillar of their ties. 
The Sino-Russian defense technology relationship started out with China purchasing 
numerous off-the-shelf Russian systems to upgrade its military after the first Gulf War in 1991. 
Iraq’s resounding defeat highlighted the glaring deficiencies in Chinese capabilities, which were 
of the same vintage. Russia gladly filled numerous gaps, across all the services and capabilities. 
In classic Chinese fashion, the relationship transitioned from the buying of large platforms into 
one of coproduction so that China could “learn” from Russia. Chinese theft of Russian defense 
technological secrets was pervasive, and this slowed and complicated—but did not stop—this 
relationship in the 2000s. As Moscow and Beijing sorted through these problems and as China’s 
defense industry improved its indigenous capabilities, the People’s Liberation Army shifted to 
buying select subsystems (e.g., engines, propulsion technology, and certain types of missiles) from 
Russia to fill critical gaps. China later focused on buying key technologies as it started building its 
own platforms and subsystems at home. 
In the span of this evolution, Russia denied China access to its most advanced surface-to-
air missiles, jet fighters, and submarines, among other highly sensitive technologies. This policy 
changed in recent years, however, as Russia’s need for hard currency grew and the strategic 
convergence between Putin and Xi gave new momentum to the relationship. For example, in late 
2016, Russia delivered the first 4 Su-35 fighter aircraft to China, as part of a previously announced 
deal that involves the purchase of 24 of the advanced fighter jets.
15
At the same time, official media 
reports suggested that given China’s progress with the domestically produced J-20 stealth fighter, 
the Su-35 could be the last combat aircraft that China needs to import from Russia.
16
China also views Russia as a useful partner in other areas of defense cooperation, including 
professional military education, training exchanges, and joint military exercises. For example, 
in September 2016 the two sides conducted a joint naval exercise in the South China Sea, which 
featured surface ships, submarines, fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters, and amphibious forces and 
concluded with a simulated island-seizure operation.
17
This was their fifth joint naval exercise in 
Asia since 2012, and these annual exercises are clearly used as signaling to the United States about 
growing Chinese and Russian presence. It is no coincidence that these exercises started just as the 
Obama administration’s Asia-Pacific rebalance gained momentum. 
15 
Zhang Tao, “Air Force Receives Four of China’s Latest Fighters,” China Daily, January 6, 2017.
16 
See Chen Yunjie, “Su-35 hao shi saho, dan xiwang zhe shi zan zuihou yici ‘haitao’ zhandouji” [The Su-35 Is Very Good, but Hopefully 
It Is China’s Last “Bought from Overseas” Fighter], Zhongguo Junwang, December 29, 2016, http://www.81.cn/jwgz/2016-12/29/
content_7429210.htm. 
17 
“China, Russia Conclude Joint Naval Drill,” China Military Online, September 19, 2016, http://english.chinamil.com.cn/view/2016-09/19/
content_7265811.htm; and “China-Russia Naval Drill Ends with Island-Seizing Mission,” China Military Online, September 19, 2016,
http://english.chinamil.com.cn/view/2016-09/19/content_7264858.htm. 

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CHINESE PERSPECTIVES ON THE SINO-RUSSIAN RELATIONSHIP 
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MEDEIROS AND CHASE