The national bureau of asian research

South China Sea disputes. Russia has not staked out an active position on the South China 
Sea disputes, in keeping with its rather marginal interests in Southeast Asia. Its main interest in 
the region appears to be avoiding antagonizing China and protecting this bilateral relationship. 
In 2016, Russia took an important symbolic step and joined China in a maritime exercise in the 
South China Sea, but even that was conducted far from the disputed area. Russia’s overall position 
8 
“Russia Reiterates One-China Policy in Joint Statement,” Xinhua, March, 21, 2006, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-03/21/
content_4328142.htm. 
9 
“Briefing by Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova, Sochi, May 19, 2016,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Russia), May 19, 2016, 
http://www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2287934#18.
10 
“Russian Trade with China in 2016,” Russian Foreign Trade, February 28, 2017, http://en.russian-trade.com/reports-and-reviews/2017-02/
russian-trade-with-china-in-2016; and U.S. Census Bureau, “Trade in Goods with Russia 2016,” https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/
balance/c4621.html#2016.
11 
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, “U.S.-China Trade Facts,” Fact Sheet, https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/china-mongolia-taiwan/
peoples-republic-china.

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RUSSIA'S CHINA POLICY 
u
RUMER
on the territorial disputes has been that such matters should be handled by regional actors without 
interference from outside powers—a clear reference to the United States. Putin has publicly backed 
Beijing in its refusal to recognize the decision of the international arbitration court in China’s 
dispute with the Philippines.
Thus, Russia is unlikely to shift its position on the South China Seas disputes significantly, 
considering its trajectory so far and the strength of the overall relationship with China. Even if 
it did, a change in Russia’s position would be unlikely to make much difference for U.S. interests 
given the country’s marginal role in the region.
North Korea. Unlike in the case of the South China Sea disputes, Russia considers itself an 
important party to the situation on the Korean Peninsula and would insist on a seat at the table 
with veto power over any resolution pursued by the United States or another party. This is similar 
to the role that Russia played in efforts to resolve the problem of Iran’s WMD program. As a global 
power, Russia would see it as both a right and responsibility to have an active role in the resolution 
of this crisis.
In addition to concerns about prestige and recognition as a global power, Russia has several 
more tangible interests at stake in the situation on the Korean Peninsula. In some respects, its 
interests are very similar to China’s and very different from those of the United States. Although 
Russia shares a land border with North Korea, Russian policymakers do not consider North 
Korean nuclear weapons and missiles a direct threat to Russian security. From their point of view, 
North Korea’s nuclear weapons program serves as the guarantee of its survival in the face of the 
far superior enemy—the United States and South Korea. North Korea’s nuclear capability presents 
a threat to Russia only insofar as it could trigger a crisis on the peninsula leading to a military 
confrontation or outright war. Thus, U.S. policy on the peninsula poses a greater threat to Russian 
security, for it could provoke desperate actions by North Korea.
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From Moscow’s perspective, 
pressuring Pyongyang is unlikely to deliver the results that Washington is trying to achieve and 
could only aggravate the situation. This stance has the additional benefit of being highly consistent 
with China’s position and most likely will not change unless the latter pursues a different course on 
this issue. Thus, the rapprochement with Russia initially promised by the new U.S. administration 
(but which now appears unlikely) probably would not result in Moscow significantly changing its 
stance on the North Korean problem.
Looking to the future, Russian policymakers probably prefer the status quo on the peninsula 
to other options. The potential for tensions to escalate to the point of an outright conflict carries 
negative consequences for the interests of Russia as a neighbor of North Korea. But peaceful 
unification too would bring unwelcome prospects. If it is ever to occur, unification is more likely 
to be accomplished on the terms dictated by the South than by the North. That would result in an 
expansion of U.S. influence and almost certainly U.S. military presence right up to Russia’s border. 
Russian policymakers remember German unification and do not welcome its repetition on their 
Asia-Pacific frontier. In this respect, too, Russian and Chinese interests coincide.