The national bureau of asian research

Arms sales. Arms sales to China have long been an important component of the bilateral 
security relationship, as well as a source of much-needed export revenue for Russia. They have 
also been a source of concern for U.S. policymakers. This is likely to continue as long as Russia has 
something to offer China that China’s defense industry cannot manufacture on its own or procure 
12 
See, for example, “Russia, China Say North Korea’s Nuclear Threats Are No Excuse to Deploy U.S. Missile Defenses,” Reuters, May 26, 2017, 
http://www.businessinsider.com/r-russia-china-urge-caution-in-countering-north-koreas-nuclear-program-2017-5. 

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elsewhere. Decisions to sell or withhold certain kinds of hardware or designs will be made on the 
basis of Russia’s own security concerns, as they have been thus far, rather than in deference to 
U.S. concerns. 
The important point here is that Russia shares many threat perceptions with China, and both 
see the United States as the militarily and technologically superior adversary whose actions 
challenge their core interests. China’s growing military power is not lost on Russian policymakers, 
but the United States represents a bigger threat to them. This applies to the U.S. pursuit of missile 
defense, precision-guided conventional capabilities, and naval, air, and space capabilities, among 
other factors. What is also not lost on Russian leaders is that the United States represents a much 
greater challenge or threat to China, which reduces the likelihood of threatening Chinese behavior 
toward Russia. Thus, security cooperation with China that undercuts the United States in areas of 
U.S. superiority serves Russian interests.
Moreover, this calculus is unlikely to change in the increasingly improbable event of a U.S.-
Russian détente. From Russia’s perspective, even if relations were to improve, the United States 
would still possess threatening capabilities. A change in Russian arms sales policy toward China 
would require major shifts in the U.S. defense posture—such as abandoning missile defense 
programs in Europe and Asia—that would be highly improbable under any U.S. administration, 
no matter how favorably inclined toward Russia.
Central Asia. Central Asia—comprising the former Soviet states Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—has undergone a fundamental strategic rebalancing 
in the past quarter century. Long considered Russia’s exclusive domain and economic dependent, 
the region has reoriented itself toward China, which has invested tens of billions of dollars in its 
vast mineral resources and infrastructure projects. Russia continues to control important export 
routes from Central Asia and is still an important market for the region’s goods and excess labor, 
but it has been eclipsed by China as a trading partner and source of investment.
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In the future, 
the disparity between Russia and China as economic partners to Central Asia promises to be even 
greater if China proceeds with the infrastructure and investment projects planned under the Belt 
and Road Initiative.
This reorientation of Central Asia toward China has encountered little, if any, resistance from 
Russia and does not appear to have had an adverse impact on relations between Moscow and 
Beijing. The former apparently has accepted the latter’s economic superiority as a fact of life, as 
well as its own inability to challenge or compete with China in this domain. Russian policymakers 
possibly even view this situation as beneficial to their interests insofar as Chinese economic 
engagement with Central Asia helps provide for the region’s economic well-being and stability, 
which Russia would have been unable to support on its own. The key factor from Moscow’s point 
of view is that Beijing—unlike Washington—does not promote political reform in the region or 
threaten its stability. The result is a Chinese-Russian condominium in Central Asia, which suits 
Russian interests and complements other aspects of their overall relationship.
13 
Toh Han Shih, “China Upstages Russia in Fight for Central Asia,” South China Morning Post, March 22, 2015, http://www.scmp.com/
business/china-business/article/1744809/china-upstages-russia-fight-central-asia.

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RUMER
Conclusion
Russia’s partnership with China is here to stay for the foreseeable future, or at least so long as 
the current domestic political arrangement exists in Russia. It is a product of Russia’s domestic 
circumstances, its position on the world stage, and global trends, as well as of a deliberate series of 
strategic choices by Russian policymakers. Any attempts by the United States to split Russia from 
China in the interest of exploiting it for geopolitical gain against China are likely to fail.
There are several reasons for this situation. First and most important is the fact that Russia is 
simply not a big enough factor in areas where U.S. interests collide with those of China. On the 
issues of both trade and the disputes in the South China Sea, Russia is a marginal actor at best and 
will remain one for the foreseeable future. In addition, any opening that the United States provides 
to Russia could enable it to engage in its own geopolitical maneuvering in the European theater, 
while doing little to weaken China. Washington must beware of unintended consequences.

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