Uva-dare (Digital Academic Repository) Ethno-territorial conflict and coexistence in the Caucasus, Central Asia and Fereydan

part of Central Asia, where the prevalent type of ethno-geographic 

configuration is the mosaic type. That equation informs us that for an 

ethno-territorial encounter to lead to ethno-territorial conflict, it needs to 

be located outside the Russian Federation (f) and in a mosaic type of 

ethno-geographical configuration (M), and that at least one ethno-

territorial group should not be titular, which in this context means that the 

subordinated group should not possess territorial autonomy within the 

host republic/state (a). But on the other hand, the subordinated ethno-

territorial group needs to have transborder dominance (B). In other words, 

it needs to be contiguous to a territory in which its kinfolk is titular and is 

three times larger in number than its overlords in the host republic/state. 

In fact, there is logic to this: contiguity to an ethnic kinfolk that is three 

times larger in population than the titulars in the host country/republic 

compensates for the lack of possession of territorial autonomy. 

Hypothetically, in conflict formulas, transborder dominance (B) may go 

hand in hand with the titular status of both ethno-territorial groups (A) 

when the subordinated ethno-territorial group possesses territorial 

autonomy in its host country/republic. In reality, however, this situation 

does not appear in any ethno-territorial encounter. In addition, the absence 

of traumatic peak experiences (t) in the equation seems to be caused by 

the empirical data—i.e. is contingent upon the real existing cases—and 

cannot be supported reasonably by theoretical argumentation. Although 

hypothetically possible, there are no such encounters in the dataset in 

which such a combination appears. In other words, the result is contingent 

upon the fact that in this study no “traumatized” ethno-territorial 

encounters exist in which transborder dominance (B) is present. 

 

The second equation (8) informs us that ethno-territorial 

encounters located in a mosaic area (M) outside the Russian Federation 

(f), in which both ethno-territorial groups are titulars (A) without having 

experienced a traumatic peak experience (t), and in which the 

subordinated ethno-territorial group is contiguous to a territory in which 

their kinfolk is titular (G), lead to ethno-territorial conflicts (C). In 

addition to the above-mentioned contingency of the absence of 

transborder dominance (b), it is strange that in “non-traumatized” ethno-

territorial encounters (t) the titulars must have no demographic majority in 

 

305 

their respective homelands (d), while theoretically this condition 

contributes to a positive outcome. It is not totally clear why the 

Armenian–Azeri ethno-territorial encounter in Azerbaijan is very different 

from the Georgian–Abkhazian and Georgian–Ossetian ethno-territorial 

encounters in Georgia and the Tajik–Pamiri ethno-territorial encounter in 

Tajikistan. The case of Abkhazia is the only one in which the 

subordinated ethno-territorial group possesses no demographic majority in 

the territory in which it is titular. In addition, it is ambiguous to what 

extent the case of Armenians is different from that of Abkhazians. Both of 

these ethnic groups have experienced trauma in the past, but the 

Abkhazian trauma experience could not be qualified as a traumatic peak 

experience according to the criteria of this study. A similar case is that of 

the Yezidi traumatic-peak experience, which, like the Armenian case, also 

occurred in the Ottoman Empire. Nevertheless, as the only ethno-

territorial encounter with Yezidis in the dataset is the one between them 

and Armenians, this issue can be dealt with, implicitly, by dealing with 

the Armenian one. The main reason that the Armenians, as opposed to the 

Abkhazians, are specified as traumatized in this study is because the 

Armenian Genocide occurred in the 20

th

 century, while the Abkhazian 

deportations proceeded in the 19

th

 century. On the other hand, the 

Ossetians in Georgia (South Ossetia) also possessed titular demographic 

dominance (D) without being traumatized (t). Therefore, it could be 

expected that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict could also be explained 

without Armenians being traumatized (t). The case of Armenian–Azeri 

ethno-territorial conflict in Azerbaijan requires more investigation, and it 

will be examined further before the results of analysis with the inclusion 

of other conditions are reported.  

 

Step 4: Experimenting with T 

To investigate the aforementioned issue I made a new dataset, in which it 

is hypothetically assumed that Armenians have not had a traumatic peak 

experience and in which the condition experiencing a traumatic peak 

experience (t) is (experimentally) absent in all encounters in which one of 

the ethno-territorial groups are Armenians. After this experiment, the 

dataset with the original values will be used again in the subsequent steps. 

This experiment is, in fact, an effort to solve the aforementioned 

problem(s) in Step 3. Similar to the Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh, the 

Ossetians in South Ossetia possessed titular demographic dominance (D) 

without having undergone a traumatic peak experience (t). Possibly the 

Nagorno-Karabakh conflict can be explained by the same (parsimonious) 

formula as the South Ossetian conflict will be. The description of conflicts 

(Chapter 6) taught us that conflicts in the South Caucasus are similar to 

 

306 

each other. It is, therefore, not easy to understand why in other cases 

autonomy (A) suffices without being traumatized (t), whereas in the case 

of the Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh, who possess demographic 

majority in their autonomous territory (D), they should also be 

traumatized (T) in order to explain the conflict. Therefore, we changed 

experimentally the value of traumatic peak experience from present (T) to 

absent (t), in encounters in which Armenians are one party,

196

 to see 

whether (shorter) explanations could be produced in which traumatic-peak 

experiences are irrelevant. The results of this (experimental) analysis are 

as follows:  

 

(10) C= t * A * b * M * f 

 

(Azerbaijani–Armenian in Azerbaijan [Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict] + 

Georgian–Abkhazian in Georgia [Abkhazian Conflict] + Georgian–

Ossetian in Georgia [South Ossetian Conflict] + Tajik–Pamiri in 

Tajikistan [Tajikistani Civil War]) 

 

(11) C= T * A * D * b * M * F   

(Russian–Chechen in Russia [Wars in Chechnya] + Ingush–Ossetian in 

Russia [Prigorodny Conflict]) 

 

(12) C= t * a * d * B * M * f  

(Kyrgyz–Uzbek in Kyrgyzstan [Osh Conflict] + Tajik–Uzbek in 

Uzbekistan [Tajikistani Civil War]) 

 

In the results of this analysis, the ethno-territorial conflicts inside Russia 

are listed together (Equation 11). The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is listed 

together with other ethno-territorial conflicts outside Russia (Equation 

10), in which, in contrast to the result of the former analysis (Equation 7), 

the condition traumatic peak experience is absent (t). Although its absence 

in this conflict formula is experimental, it nevertheless means that there is 

no necessity for Armenians to have undergone a traumatic peak 

experience in order for the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict to erupt. Similar to 

other ethno-territorial conflicts in the Caucasus and the Pamiri–Tajik 

ethno-territorial conflict, the possession of territorial autonomy by the 

subordinated group in the host state/union republic (A) and location in a 

mosaic type of ethno-geographic configuration (M) suffice for the 

explanation of ethno-territorial conflicts (C) there.  

Strictly speaking, according to the formula (Equation 11), the 

condition transborder dominance should be absent (b), but as discussed 

                                                 

196

 To be more accurate, in such an experiment there should be no other group having experienced a 

traumatic peak experience in encounters with Armenians; but there appear no such cases in the dataset 

anyway. 

 

307 

earlier this is a matter of factual circumstances and cannot be interpreted 

by theoretical assumptions or common sense—simply because a similar 

equation but with capital “B” does not appear in any ethno-territorial 

encounter.  

This experiment—that is, assuming hypothetically and 

experimentally that Armenians have not undergone a traumatic peak 

experience—does not influence the results of other analyses (the next two 

steps) with the inclusion of other conditions, simply because the condition 

“traumatic peak experience” is redundant in them.  

 

Step 5: Analysis with the inclusion of A, D, B, M, F, and R 

In addition to the condition traumatic peak experience (T), the inclusion of 

religious difference also renders the conditions ethno-political 

subordination (S), linguistic difference (L), and contiguity (G) redundant. 

The analysis offers satisfactory results when the condition traumatic peak 

experience (T) is replaced by religious difference (R). The results are 

presented below:  

 

(13) C= R * A * D * b * M 

 

(Azerbaijani–Armenian in Azerbaijan [Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict] + 

Russian–Chechen in Russia [Wars in Chechnya] + Ingush–Ossetian in 

Russia [Prigorodny Conflict] + Tajik–Pamiri in Tajikistan [Tajikistani 

Civil War])  

 

(14) C= r * A * b * M * f  

(Georgian–Abkhazian in Georgia [Abkhazian Conflict] + Georgian–

Ossetian in Georgia [South Ossetian Conflict]) 

 

(15) C= r * a * d * B * M * f  

(Kyrgyz–Uzbek in Kyrgyzstan [Osh Conflict] + Tajik–Uzbek in 

Uzbekistan [Tajikistani Civil War]) 

 

The equations (13–15) resulting from this analysis with the inclusion of 

religious difference (R) or (r) are very similar to those (Equations 7–12) 

with the inclusion of traumatic peak experience (T) or (t). In these 

equations the condition religious difference replaces the condition 

traumatic peak experience. Taking this into consideration, the 

interpretation of the results of previous analyses is also valid here. Certain 

problems of interpretation appear also here. 

The condition titular demographic dominance does not appear in 

Equation 14; it is irrelevant there because while being absent in the 

Abkhazian conflict, it is present in the South Ossetian conflict. This 

 

308 

equation means that in cases outside the Russian Federation (f), whenever 

there is no religious difference (r) between the fighting groups, the 

combination of possession of autonomous territories (A) and location in a 

mosaic type of ethno-geographical configuration (M) suffices for 

explaining the ethno-territorial conflicts. Similar to the results of the 

previous steps, transborder dominance is absent (b) here simply because 

no other encounter exists which is similar in all other aspects but in which 

transborder dominance (B) is present. In addition, it is neither 

theoretically explainable, nor can it be understood by common sense, why 

titular demographic dominance is irrelevant in the cases in which no 

religious difference exists between the fighting groups (r) (Equation 14), 

but it must be present (D) in cases in which religious difference does exist 

(R) (Equation 13). Similar to the above-mentioned problem, also this 

problem is contingent upon the real existing cases (in the data-set). These 

problems are solved in the next steps (see especially Step 9). 

There is a similar problem: in this analysis it is notable that the 

Tajik–Pamiri ethno-territorial encounter in Tajikistan is explained by the 

first equation (13), in which demographic majority in the autonomous 

territory is required (D), while in the former analysis it was listed under 

those in which this condition did not even appear in the equation (10). 

Similar to the above-mentioned case, also this case is not theoretically 

apprehensible and leads us to believe in our earlier assumption that the 

presence of the extra condition traumatic peak experience (T) in the 

former, and religious difference (R) in this current, analysis may not be 

necessary for the explanation of ethno-territorial conflicts outside the 

Russian Federation. This analysis is itself one more reason to investigate 

this issue further by more analyses. 

 

Step 6: Analysis with the inclusion of A, D, B, M, F, S, and G 

The inclusion of ethno-political subordination (S) and contiguity (G) 

together renders traumatic peak experience (T), religious difference (R), 

and linguistic difference (L) redundant. Linguistic difference (L) is not 

necessary for any parsimonious equations and can be dispensed with. This 

analysis, however, produces four instead of three conflict formulas (16–

19) and has its problems of interpretation. The results are as follows:  

 

(16) C= S * A * G * b * M * f   

(Azerbaijani–Armenian in Azerbaijan [Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict] + 

Georgian–Abkhazian in Georgia [Abkhazian Conflict] + Georgian–

Ossetian in Georgia [South Ossetian Conflict])  

 

(17) C= S * A * D * g * b * M   

 

309 

(Russian–Chechen in Russia [Wars in Chechnya] + Tajik–Pamiri in 

Tajikistan [Tajikistani Civil War]) 

 

(18) C= s * A * D * G * b * M * F 

 

(Ingush–Ossetian in Russia [Prigorodny Conflict]) 

 

(19) C= S * a * d * G * B * M * f  

(Kyrgyz–Uzbek in Kyrgyzstan [Osh Conflict] + Tajik–Uzbek in 

Uzbekistan [Tajikistani Civil War]) 

 

The inclusion of ethno-political subordination (S) distinguishes between 

horizontal (Equation 18) and vertical ethno-territorial conflicts (Equations 

16, 17, and 19). The only case of horizontal ethno-territorial conflict (the 

Prigorodny conflict) is located in Russia (F) and is characterized by 

autonomous setting (A), in which both titulars (the Ingush and Ossetians) 

possess demographic majority in their respective titular territories (D). 

This is not surprising, because of all countries covered in this study only 

in Russia do lower-ranked autonomous territories border each other. Only 

in Russia can two ethno-territorially subordinated ethno-territorial groups 

be titular in two bordering lower-ranked autonomous territorial units.  

The result of the first equation of this analysis (Equation 16) looks 

very plausible. It suggests that in the cases in which one ethno-territorial 

group is contiguous to a titular territory of its kinfolk (G), the possession 

of demographic majority of population is irrelevant. This condition is not 

at all part of the equation. This simply means that contiguity renders the 

(lack of) dominant demographic position irrelevant as a condition. 

Irrelevancy, however, does not mean absence: in three out of the four 

cases the ethno-territorial groups do possess demographic majority in their 

respective titular territories. Only in the case of the Abkhazian conflict do 

the Abkhazians not possess demographic majority in Abkhazia. In the 

previous analyses the Tajik–Pamiri ethno-territorial encounter in 

Tajikistan was listed together with other cases under the conflict formulas 

in which a dominant demographic position in titular territory was 

irrelevant (Equations 8, 10), while the results of this analysis suggest that 

dominant demographic majority (D) is a necessary condition for its 

explanation. This case also requires further investigation.  

Despite what Equation 17 suggests, the requirement for the 

absence of contiguity to a titular kinfolk in a neighboring union 

republic/country (g) does not seem to be a very plausible condition in the 

explanation of the Russian–Chechen conflict (Equation 17). It is rather 

strange that a “tough” case such as the Chechen–Russian conflict requires 

the absence of a conflict-facilitating condition in order to be explained. 

The results of this analysis suggest that the different outcomes of the two 

 

310 

similar cases of the Russian–Chechen and the Russian–Ossetian 

encounters in the Russian Federation are determined only by the fact that 

the Ossetians are contiguous to South Ossetia. It is not particularly 

plausible or comprehensible to assume that contiguity to their ethnic 

kinfolk, as an extra asset, has prevented North Ossetians from rebellion 

against Russia or that Russia is deterred by the North Ossetian contiguity 

to South Ossetia. It does indeed appear strange. The only sensible 

interpretation would be that a calculating “Eurasianist” Russia would not 

attack North Ossetians because it needs to have their southern kinfolk as 

its allies. Nevertheless, as the discussions showed, these were not the host 

countries/union republics that initiated attacks on subordinated ethno-

territorial groups out of nowhere; first there were demands for separation 

and rebellion, to which the host countries/union republics reacted. In this 

particular case, however, the North Ossetians did not even rebel against 

Russia. Nevertheless, it is not too far-fetched to believe that North 

Ossetians have calculated that they had better not rebel against Russia, 

which (allegedly) was an ally of their southern kinfolk. The discussion of 

the ethno-territorial conflicts (Chapter 6), however, suggested that 

Ossetians, the only non-Slavic Orthodox Christian people in a sea of 

Sunni Muslims in the North Caucasus, had always been privileged by 

Russians and hence had not much reason to be aggrieved and yearn for 

secession from Russia. It should also be taken into account that rebellion 

against Russia is a much more difficult task than rebellion against Georgia 

or Azerbaijan.  

Apparently, the harsh ordeal through which many North 

Caucasian Muslims have gone has conditioned their ethno-political 

behavior. The analyses including religious difference (Step 5) and 

traumatic peak experience (Steps 3–4) produce much more sensible 

results than this one with contiguity (Step 6). This is one more reason to 

believe that the Chechen traumatic deportation in 1944, in which large 

numbers of Chechens died (T), in combination with other factors such as 

having a dominant demographic position in their titular territory (D) and 

being located in a mosaic type of ethno-territorial configuration (M), has 

been essential in bringing about the Chechen conflict and rebellion against 

Russia (C).  

 

Step 7: Splitting contiguity  

It seems that the dynamics of ethno-territorial conflicts in the Russian 

Federation (F) follow another logic than those outside the Russian 

Federation (f). Putting the ethno-territorial encounters inside and outside 

the Russian Federation into the same analysis creates confusions in the 

results and makes their interpretation rather difficult. Therefore, it seems 

 

311 

to be a good idea to perform separate analyses for the ethno-territorial 

encounters located inside and outside Russia.  

Before doing that another oddity needs to be addressed. The type 

of contiguity which occurs most often in ethno-territorial conflicts, and is 

sometimes difficult to interpret, seems to be a “lower-ranked 

contiguity”—that is, contiguity to an autonomous territory inside a union 

republic/state. Such lower-ranked territorial units were called ASSRs and 

AOs in the Soviet period. There are many cases of contiguity to a 

kinfolk’s titular union republic/state—that is, “higher-ranked 

contiguity”—which remain peaceful. A higher-ranked contiguity is only 

present in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In that case the Armenians in 

Nagorno-Karabakh, and Azerbaijan in general, are contiguous to Armenia 

(and the Armenian SSR). In the Abkhazian, Ossetian, and Prigorodny 

conflicts a “lower-ranked contiguity” is present. In the former conflict, the 

Abkhazians are contiguous to their Abaza and Circassian kinfolks in 

Karacheyevo-Cherkessia (and Kabardino-Balkaria and Adygheya).

197

 In 

the latter conflict, the Ossetians in South Ossetia and North Ossetia were 

contiguous to their kinfolk on either side of the Georgian–Russian border. 

South Ossetia was an autonomous province (AO) in Georgia at the onset 

of the conflict. All other mentioned territories are now autonomous 

republics of the Russian Federation and were formerly either an internal 

autonomous republic (ASSR),

198

 (North Ossetia and Kabardino-Balkaria) 

or an autonomous province (AO) (Karacheyevo-Cherkessia and 

Adygheya). 

According to the results of the above analysis (Step 6), part of the 

explanation of the Prigorodny conflict lies in the fact that Ossetians in 

Russia are contiguous to South Ossetia in Georgia. It is doubtful that 

South Ossetians have played a major role in bringing about the 

Prigorodny conflict. Of course they may have supported their northern 

kinfolk, but it is unlikely that they played any direct role in the eruption of 

that conflict. In the description of that conflict it was already mentioned 

that the North Ossetian leadership has stated that it needed Prigorodny 

District, as it offers space for the housing of the South Ossetian refugees. 

It is not certain, however, that the North Ossetian leadership would give in 

to the Ingush demands, even if there were no South Ossetian refugees.  

Contiguity to an ethnic kinfolk in war may have either a conflict-

instigating or a conflict-hampering effect, but we should bear in mind that 

                                                 

197

 Abkhazia has borders only with Karachayevo-Cherkessia. Karachayevo-Cherkessia has borders 

with Kabardino-Balkaria and is proximate to Adygheya. Abkhazia itself is also proximate to 

Adygheya and Kabardino-Balkaria. Therefore, it can be said that Abkhazia is contiguous not only to 

Karachayevo-Cherkessia but to the whole Circassian area in the North Caucasus. 

198

 These internal autonomous republics were called “Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic” (ASSR), 

which is a confusing name when one realizes that the union republics with higher level of autonomy 

were simply called “Soviet Socialist Republic” (SSR).  

 

312 

the condition contiguity (G) is not the same as contiguity to a conflict-

afflicted territory; it simply accounts only for territorial contiguity to an 

ethnic kinfolk’s titular homeland, with or without being afflicted by 

conflict.  

The formula (Equation 18) suggests that the emergence of conflict 

in Prigorodny depends on the North Ossetian contiguity to their southern 

kinfolk, even when there was no conflict in South Ossetia.  

In order to investigate this oddity further, I split the condition 

“contiguity” (G) into two: “higher-ranked contiguity” (Q) means that the 

subordinated ethno-territorial group is contiguous to a state or union 

republic, in which its kinfolk is titular; and “lower-ranked contiguity” (K) 

means that the subordinated ethno-territorial group is contiguous to a 

lower-ranked autonomous territory in which its kinfolk is titular. The 

replacement of the condition “G” by “Q” does not produce satisfactory 

results. There occurs a contradiction. The causal configuration “S * A * D 

* q * b * M * F” relates to the Russian–Chechen and Russian–Ossetian 

ethno-territorial encounters in Russia. The former one is marked by ethno-

territorial conflict and the latter is not. As expected, however, the 

replacement of the condition contiguity “G” by lower-ranked contiguity 

“K” produces satisfactory results:  

 

 

(20) C= S * A * D * k * b * M  

(Azerbaijani–Armenian in Azerbaijan [Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict] + 

Russian–Chechen in Russia [Wars in Chechnya] + Tajik–Pamiri in 

Tajikistan [Tajikistani Civil War]) 

 

(21) C= S * A * K * b * M * f   

(Georgian–Abkhazian in Georgia [Abkhazian Conflict] + Georgian–

Ossetian in Georgia [South Ossetian Conflict]) 

 

(22) C= s * A * D * K * b * M * F 

 

(Ingush–Ossetian in Russia [Prigorodny Conflict]) 

 

(23) C= S * a * d * k * B * M * f  

(Kyrgyz–Uzbek in Kyrgyzstan [Osh Conflict] + Tajik–Uzbek in 

Uzbekistan [Tajikistani Civil War]) 

 

The formulas of conflicts (Equations 20–23) are similar to those produced 

by the former analysis. It is remarkable, however, that similar to the result 

(Equation 10) of the experimental analysis (Step 4), here also, the Tajik–

Pamiri ethno-territorial conflict is grouped together with the Nagorno-

 

313 

Karabakh conflict (Equation 20).

199

 On the other hand, interpretations of 

equations with titular demographic dominance and transborder dominance 

remain problematic also in this analysis. 

All in all, and referring to all arguments in this step and previous 

ones, there is ample reason to take the ethno-territorial encounters inside 

and outside Russia into separate analyses. These separate analyses will 

make it clear whether or not our earlier assumptions were correct. 

However, one thing should be taken into account: the condition mosaic 

type of ethno-geographic configuration (M) is constantly present in the 

North Caucasus. Despite being a necessary condition in the explanation of 

all ethno-territorial conflicts in this study, this condition (M) can be 

dispensed with because its exclusion from the analysis of the encounters 

in the Russian North Caucasus does not produce contradictions. 

Nevertheless, in spite of being redundant in the parsimonious equations, 

this condition should be taken seriously. Its inclusion only adds to the 

plausibility and robustness of the results if one looks further than the 

North Caucasus. Its omission from the analysis would have produced 

unsatisfactory results if encounters from other Russian regions were also 

taken into analysis. The fact that nowhere else in the Russian Federation 

have ethno-territorial conflicts erupted but in the North Caucasus suggests 

that the mosaic type of ethno-geographic configuration (M), which 

distinguishes the North Caucasus from other regions of the Russian 

Federation, is a necessary condition in explaining ethno-territorial 

conflicts in Russia.  

 

Step 8: Analysis of the encounters in the Russian Federation 

Separate qualitative comparative analyses of the 46 ethno-territorial 

encounters in Russia produce satisfactory results consistent with our 

expectations (Equations 24–27). These analyses follow the same logic as 

those of the previous analyses, in which encounters inside and outside 

Russia were not taken separately. Transborder dominance (b) is lacking in 

the Russian Federation. Therefore, its omission from the analysis does not 

create any problems, while resulting in more parsimonious equations. 

Similar to those previous analyses, the inclusion of traumatic peak 

experience (T) renders the conditions ethno-political subordination (S), 

religious difference (R), linguistic difference (L), and all conditions 

relating to contiguity (whether G, Q, or K) redundant. It also renders the 

autonomous setting (A) redundant. Nevertheless, it does not lead to any 

conceptual or interpretative problems, as titular demographic dominance 

                                                 

199

 Also, this fact suggests that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict may be explained even when 

Armenians were not traumatized. 

 

314 

(D) also includes that condition (A). Similarly, the inclusion of religious 

difference (R) renders ethno-political subordination (S), traumatic peak 

experience (T), linguistic difference (L), autonomous setting (A), and all 

conditions relating to contiguity (whether G, Q, or K) redundant. Of the 

two conditions resulting from the differentiation of type of contiguity (i.e. 

K and Q), the lower-ranked contiguity (K) is the one that gives 

satisfactory results. Its inclusion in the analysis, in combination with 

ethno-political subordination (S), renders traumatic peak experience (T), 

religious difference (R), and linguistic difference (L) redundant. The truth 

tables pertaining to these analyses are very clear and clarifying and are, 

therefore, presented (Tables 7.5, 7.6, and 7.7).  

The result of the analysis of ethno-territorial encounters in the 

Russian Federation with the inclusion of traumatic peak experience (T) is 

as follows: 

 

(24) C= T * D * M  

(Russian–Chechen in Russia [Wars in Chechnya] + Ingush–Ossetian in 

Russia [Prigorodny Conflict]) 

 

 

Table 7.5. Truth table in the Russian Federation with T, D, and M