vol4.pdf [Ivanovskiy Boris Andreyevich]

Shown here are Thomas Stafford (left), Nikolay Anfimov (center), and Boris Chertok in 

Moscow in 2005 to commemorate the 30th anniversary of the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project.

ideas. He needs to hurry. He’s already 66 years old. He’s already a two-time 

Hero of Socialist Labor. But that’s not the main thing—these sorts of rockets 

and engines must go down in the history of technology so that no one will 

have any doubts as to their true chief creator. As today, no one doubts that the 

true chief designer of the R-7 and Vostok vehicle was Korolev.”

The spate of new assignments, which required continuous effort, gradually 

dampened the anguish over the N-1. In a family with few children, the loss 

of a single child can inflict very heavy injury on the parents. In a large family, 

the necessity for day-to-day worry over the remaining children softens the 

grief. Each day it was necessary to deal with the problems of the upcoming 

Apollo-Soyuz docking, testing of the new DOS, Salyut-4, and preparation of 

the latest Soyuz-15 for launch to Chelomey’s Almaz station. Moreover, that 

hot summer, every now and then, rebellious thoughts crept in about vacation.

Since no government resolution had been issued on the complete termi-

nation of operations on the N-1, in smoking rooms and during our time off, 

timid thoughts were being expressed about how the “powers that be” would 

come to their senses and make Glushko reexamine his irreconcilable stance. 

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Valentin Glushko, N-1, and NPO Energiya

There were also brave people who appealed to the Central Committee with 

letters signed by several authors in this regard.

The Party committee of the Sixth Scientific-Testing Directorate of NIIP-5, 

in violation of all traditions of military discipline, held an all-night meeting 

expressing outrage about the termination of the N-1 project.

20

 The result 

was a letter from military testers addressed to the Presidium of the Twenty-

fifth Congress of the Communist Party.

21

 The letter presented arguments for 

continuing debugging of the N-1, citing the opinions of specialists from the 

developer organizations. The firing range testers weren’t asking for much: 

“Give us the opportunity to test rockets No. 8, No. 9, and No. 10, which are 

already prepared.”

Of course, the letter didn’t arrive before the Congress. The Party apparat 

understood full well: decisions had already been made at such a level that to 

take up the time of congressional delegates and even of the Presidium served 

no purpose. The headstrong military testers, who had devoted perhaps the 

best years of their lives to Tyuratam, Baykonur, the town of Leninsk, and to 

perfecting the grandiose N-1, were told that now their main mission was the 

MKTS program. The MIK, the launch site, and a lot of other facilities needed 

to be rebuilt for it.

At his own initiative, the irrepressible Andronik Iosifyan also appealed to 

the Central Committee with a letter. He considered the termination of the 

N-1 project to be an error of principle. But an acquaintance from the Central 

Committee apparat simply telephoned him over the Kremlin line and asked 

him to stop by and pick up his letter.

Glushko’s order on the termination of the N-1 project was not 

borne out by a ministerial order or by a VPK decision. The situation heated up. 

Conversations circulated to the effect that the government was not going to shut 

down the N-1. On Friday, 13 August 1974, three months after Glushko was 

named general designer and director of NPO Energiya, Ustinov decided to verify 

“on site” the mood of the “people.” One could understand Ustinov’s concern.

It was high time to undertake a new program in place of the landing 

expedition to the Moon that never happened. A month after his appointment 

to the post of general designer, Glushko promised to develop new promising 

proposals for the Moon, orbital stations, and space transport systems. Work 

 20.  The Sixth Scientific-Technical Directorate at Tyuratam constituted the military staff at 

the firing range responsible for preparing and launching the N-1.

 21.  The Twenty-fifth Congress of the Communist Party was held between 24 February and 

5 March 1976.

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Rockets and People: The Moon Race

on N1-L3 at NPO Energiya was virtually halted, and what were the subcon-

tractors, who had enormous amounts of process stock, to do? It was time to 

listen to the chief designers and report to the Politburo.

No one could accuse me of being superstitious. On the contrary, I was 

often accused of completely disregarding well-known folk omens. I made fun 

of drivers’ fears when a black cat crossed the road in front of them; I never 

missed the opportunity to kid members of the launch team, who up until the 

last day feared that a woman would show up at the launch site; and I chuckled 

when someone proposed knocking on wood to ward off trouble or spitting 

over one’s left shoulder. But somewhere in my subconscious I had an aware-

ness when it came to two dates: 13 August 1937—the most probable date of 

the crash of Sigismund Levanevskiy’s airplane—and 27 March.

22

 I remember: 

27 March 1942—the day of my mother’s death; 27 March 1943—the day 

of Grigoriy Bakhchivandzhi’s death; 27 March 1968—the death of Gagarin. 

Perhaps 13 August 1974 would be the date of the ultimate death of the N-1.

On 12 August 1974, Valentin Glushko personally telephoned the main 

managers of NPO Energiya and courteously requested that they make them-

selves completely available the following day, 13 August: “Dmitriy Fedorovich is 

coming here for a serious conversation.” Glushko asked me to prepare a speech 

about the special features of the control system for the new Soyuz modifica-

tion—vehicle 7K-S, or “article 11F732.” He said nothing about who would 

be participating in the upcoming meeting.

At 10 a.m. on 13 August, in the large office of our former chief, now 

our general [designer], the managerial staff of NPO Energiya and its chief 

designers assembled: Barmin, Pilyugin, Ryazanskiy, and Viktor Kuznetsov. 

Afanasyev came, too, as well as his deputies, Tyulin and Litvinov. Smirnov’s 

deputy Komissarov represented the VPK. Posters hung on the walls—pictures 

of the new launch vehicles, RLA-120, RLA-135, and RLA-150. A small group 

of planners had toiled under Glushko’s personal unremitting supervision for 

the past two months on the designs of these launch vehicles.

Ustinov arrived accompanied by Serbin and Strogonov. Before Ustinov 

appeared, we didn’t take our seats, but huddled together talking about matters 

that weren’t work related. He strode in, as usual, quickly and energetically. 

When he saw me he extended his hand, and after a firm handshake, asked, 

“So, how’s the ‘old guard’?”

“We’re hanging in there,” I answered.

“You shouldn’t just hang in there; you need to move forward.”

 22.  See Chertok, Rockets and People, Vol. I, Chapter 7, for Levanevskiy.

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Valentin Glushko, N-1, and NPO Energiya

Ustinov himself opened the meeting.

“I am very glad that I once again find myself in this group and in this 

historic office where Sergey Pavlovich Korolev used to work. The other day in 

the Politburo we had a serious conversation about our space problems. The 

Politburo requested that an objective assessment be made of why we have not 

landed Soviet cosmonauts on the Moon. It was mentioned in the Politburo 

that in view of the successful landings of the Americans, the task of explor-

ing the Moon has become crucial for us. No matter what other problems 

we solve, this will remain primary and general, but in a new capacity. Today 

I would like to speak and to consult on a whole complex of problems. Your 

work is very broad here. How to organize the work so that it will not drag 

out for decades, so that it won’t be handed down to our grandchildren. Let 

them go much farther than we. It is for us to decide what we will be doing 

in the next few years.

“I would by no means curtail operations on the Soyuz project. These 

vehicles, both unpiloted and piloted, must stay with your team. This is your 

project and it must not be abandoned. The Salyut-Soyuz system is very prom-

ising. Don’t even think of abandoning it. We must examine the possibility of 

creating specialized modules for this system. Please don’t forget, under any cir-

cumstances, about those projects that have already been successfully concluded.”

These were Ustinov’s opening remarks. I don’t think that I am the only 

one from the “old guard” who viewed his speech as a warning to Glushko not 

to take it into his head to scrap and revamp a field of endeavor that Korolev 

had established and in which we had achieved universally acknowledged suc-

cess under Mishin.

Ustinov continued, “How shall we approach the solution of the general 

problem? It might be worked out so that in 10 years you will again say that it’s 

not working out with the Moon. But we must have it so that each year, do you 

understand, each year something big happens. I know that the first Council of 

Chiefs [meeting], in which the new assignments were preliminarily discussed, 

has already taken place. I specifically selected this day in order to also hear 

about these plans, which you are getting ready to approve in the next council.

“I believe we are justified in sparring between two historic council [meet-

ings]. It’s just that we need to spar about specific things. Not go off into the 

next century. Leave this job to the science fiction writers. If we are going to 

conduct business like you did with the N-1, insisting on launching in spite of 

reliability—we will obtain corresponding results.”

Afanasyev, who habitually made notes on a notepad, raised his head as 

Ustinov was saying this, and making eye contact with me, gave me a piercing 

look. He recalled our argument in November 1972 before the launch of N-1 

No. 7: “You and Dorofeyev are crawling on your bellies toward the ‘launch’ 

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Rockets and People: The Moon Race

button. Go ahead and launch. I give you my word: one more failure and they 

might terminate the N-1.”

Yes, perhaps the minister was right then, I thought, having met his piercing 

glance. If back then we had firmly said, “No, let’s wait for the new engines,” 

the fate of the N-1 might have shaped up differently. But, who knows? With 

the persistence of a schoolteacher, Ustinov continued to hammer us all with 

truths that were obvious, but so difficult to implement.

“You, specifically you, the creators of new space systems, must develop a 

general line and stick to it as strictly as possible. I propose that you listen to 

Valentin Petrovich.”

Glushko talked for more than two hours, spelling out his doctrine in detail 

for the next few years. Above all, Glushko proposed developing a series of heavy 

and super-heavy launch vehicles made from standardized blocks. All of the launch 

vehicles were assigned the designation RLA—rocket-flying apparatus.

23

 The light-

est launch vehicle was the RLA-120. With a launch mass of 980 tons, this launch 

vehicle inserted a payload with a mass of 30 tons, 10 tons more than Chelomey’s 

UR-500K-Proton, into Earth orbit. The most powerful launch vehicle, RLA-150, 

was capable of inserting a payload with a mass of 250 tons into orbit. Glushko 

approached the chalkboard and, on an area free of posters, he wrote:

RLA-120—1979 (30 tons in orbit).

POS—1979.

24

Unlike the DOS, the POS was a permanent orbital station rather than 

a long-duration station. In 1980 and 1981, it was proposed that the POS 

be expanded using specialized modules. Instead of the UR-500K, Glushko 

proposed using the new RLA-120 launch vehicle for the assembly of the 

permanent orbital station.

Today we know that the construction of a permanent orbital station actu-

ally began in 1986 rather than 1979.

25

 The RLA-120 simply didn’t appear. The 

Mir station, now known throughout the world, began to be created during 

Glushko’s lifetime with the help of Chelomey’s Proton—the UR-500K.

Glushko wrote two more lines on the board:

 23.  It’s worth nothing that the abbreviation RLA—Raketnyy letatelnyy apparat—was used by 

Glushko in the early 1930s at the Gas Dynamics Laboratory (GDL) to denote early rudimentary 

rockets.

 24. POS—Postoyannaya orbitalnaya stantsiya.

 25. The Mir core module was launched in February 1986.

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Valentin Glushko, N-1, and NPO Energiya

RLA-135—1980 (100 tons in orbit).

Expedition to the Moon—1981.

And then further down:

RLA-150—1982 (250 tons in orbit).

Flights to Mars—1983.

“We need 12 billion rubles for the whole program. If you help us,” said 

Glushko, addressing Ustinov directly. “I can with a great degree of confidence 

affirm: an expedition to Mars in the 1980s is a realistic mission. But before 

Mars we must build a permanent base on the Moon. We have such a design; 

we are certain of its feasibility. But we need reliable launch vehicles. Carrying 

out such missions using the N-1 means suffering a catastrophe.”

By the end of the report Glushko’s calm demeanor had changed. He turned 

quite red and finished his speech with emotion that was unusual for him. It 

was the first time I had seen him so stirred up.

Ustinov began to ask questions.

“Your heaviest vehicle has 28 chambers, and you yourself criticize the N-1, 

which has 30 chambers on the first stage.”

“That’s no big deal,” answered Glushko. “Our old Semyorka had 32 cham-

bers, and everyone’s accustomed to that. We noticed, by the way, that a chamber 

is one thing, but an engine is something else entirely. I propose four-chamber 

engines. In actuality there are only seven engines on the first stage.”

26

“Please note the fundamental difference between this layout and that of 

the N-1. We are proposing a block principle. Rockets differ from one another 

in terms of the number of identical blocks on the first stage, and when neces-

sary on the second stage as well. A decisive advantage of the block principle 

is the ability to manufacture each block at the factory and to transport it in 

assembled form to the firing range. We can conduct flight testing on the engines 

as part of the lightest single-block rocket and use this invaluable experience 

for multiblock rocket complexes without the risk of destroying a launch site. 

Each block should first undergo firing tests.”

 26.  As Glushko first conceived it in 1974, the first stage of the RLA-150 would have been 

constructed from six boosters derived from the first stage of the RLA-120. These boosters would 

serve as strap-ons to a central core stage powered by liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen.

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Rockets and People: The Moon Race

“Is it necessary to insert 250 tons? Isn’t that an awful lot compared with 

the Americans? They flew to the Moon and now they can’t find any work for 

their Saturn. And it only inserted 140 tons.”

“This isn’t our concern,” answered Glushko. “Let them have the headache, 

and we’ll pass them by. And after this they will fall behind in pursuit of us. Or 

they will propose collaboration.”

“And will it be tsiklin or hydrogen in the second stage?”

27

“For the time being we are conducting calculations on tsiklin. We have 

too little experience with hydrogen. We can promise, but disrupt all of the 

deadlines.”

“Let’s get this straight—you clashed with Korolev because you refused to 

make powerful engines for the N-1 running on oxygen and kerosene. And 

now that Korolev is no longer around you are proposing that we agree to 

engines that you flat out rejected when Korolev was alive?” There was a clearly 

psychological subtext to Komissarov’s question.

“Korolev and I clashed not because I was fundamentally opposed to creating 

powerful engines running on oxygen and kerosene. In the early 1960s we did 

not have the necessary experience to create such engines within the timeframe 

that the government resolution called for. From my perspective, this would have 

been a gamble. We were all working hard back then. Only now do we have the 

confidence that the creation of super-powerful oxygen-kerosene engines with 

stable combustion in the chamber, operating on a gas generator layout, is feasible. 

We selected the optimal four-chamber system for a super-powerful engine. The 

engine design makes it possible to rock the chamber for flight control, rather than 

throttling them, as was done on the N-1 to the detriment of the performance 

index. Special control thrusters will not be needed for control.

“And how will you respond to the American challenge when it comes to 

the reusable space transport system, the MKTS?”

“For this we are making a medium-sized vehicle. The first phase of the 

MKTS is a space airplane. It could appear in 1982. But this is under the condi-

tion that [the] aviation [industry] will be working [with us]. We are not going 

to build the airplane ourselves. We will ensure the insertion of the airplane on 

RLA-135. Two airplanes need to be built right away.”

“What do the deadlines you’re proposing depend on?”

 27.  Tsiklin (or sintin) is the name of an advanced synthetic hydrocarbon fuel based on 

furfural and propylene. Although much more expensive, it is more efficient than “ordinary” 

kerosene.

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Valentin Glushko, N-1, and NPO Energiya

Suddenly Radovskiy wedged his way into the fray: “The deadlines depend 

on the engine specialists. All of the RLAs are supposed to have oxygen engines, 

which aren’t yet available.”

28

No response to this remark ensued. A 10-minute break was announced. 

After the break the meeting continued with a very aggressive speech by Barmin.

“Valentin Petrovich’s proposals, which we have listened to today, constitute 

already the third version in the past two months. Valentin Petrovich is getting 

further and further away from the realities of our century and pulling us into 

the 21st century. There has been no analysis of our previous errors. Moreover, 

the errors are being repeated. We need to start building a program with the 

spacecraft and missions that we need, rather than with launch vehicles. Let’s 

be frank. For all his genius, Korolev began the lunar program proceeding from 

the launch vehicle rather than from lunar vehicles. During his own lifetime, 

he understood that there wasn’t enough energy to launch a landing expedition 

to the Moon. Modifications began on the N-1. We added six engines to the 

first stage. Next, we realized that this still wasn’t enough. We understood that 

the expedition design needed to be altered. We wanted to correct the error 

by using a two-launch scenario for the L3M. And quite recently everyone 

agreed with this. Instead of that, today a series of entirely new launch vehicles 

is being proposed. Nobody needs a launch vehicle for a 250-ton payload. The 

Americans are making the Space Shuttle because they only need one heavy 

launch vehicle, one that’s multipurpose to boot. Today, 140 organizations are 

working with us on the lunar base project. We can create it if we don’t fritter 

away our resources on unrealistic launch vehicle designs. The 12.5 billion 

rubles that Glushko mentions is two times less than what is really required 

for such a program. Multiblock configurations for launch vehicles are unsuit-

able. The selection that Valentin Petrovich is proposing to us is wrong. After 

lengthy research, Korolev selected the optimal configuration for the N-1. 

He purposely rejected multiblock rockets. The N-1 needs to undergo seri-

ous updating, instead of reinventing the wheel. We have already spent four 

billion rubles on the N-1, and we must use them. Betting on engines with a 

thrust of 1,000 to 1,200 tons is tempting, but completely unrealistic in terms 

of deadlines. Take it from me, I am not the only one who has a great deal of 

experience—we all do. Tsiklin is proposed for the second and third stages. A 

kilogram of tsiklin costs 50 rubles, while a kilogram of hydrogen costs less than 

 28.  Viktor Petrovich Radovskiy (1920–2001) was Glushko’s most senior deputy. During the 

period when Glushko was general designer of NPO Energiya, Radovskiy effectively headed (as 

chief designer) KB Energomash, i.e., the former OKB-456, which had been subsumed under 

the Energiya umbrella.

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Rockets and People: The Moon Race

30 rubles. Hydrogen is the future of our rocket-power generation. Valentin 

Petrovich’s lunar program stubbornly ignores both hydrogen and my proposals 

for the construction of a lunar base.

29

 We need to build a base on the Moon. 

To build it we need a reusable space transport system using an updated N-1. 

NPO Energiya will not pull off the program that Glushko is proposing before 

the end of the century. We need to create a system capable of taking 40 tons 

of real payload and return at least 20 tons to Earth.”

Barmin stood up, walked up to the chalkboard, and crisscrossed through 

all the lines containing information about the RLA series of launch vehicles. 

Above, he wrote: “Uprated N-1 + reusable.”

Serbin asked Barmin a question, “And how many more years will your 

uprating of the N-1 take?”

“I don’t want to answer for the developers, who are sitting here in silence. 

Most likely, Valentin Petrovich forbade them to defend the N-1, but the uprated 

launch vehicle could fly in a year and a payload needs to be prepared for it. And 

what Valentin Petrovich is proposing will hold us back on the lunar program 

by another six or seven years. I should warn about one more danger. Prominent 

psychotherapists are telling us that the human mind outside of Earth’s magnetic 

field might experience changes. The Moon has no magnetic field, and therefore 

staying there for many months is fraught with psychological problems.”

Having considered Barmin’s words regarding our silence as a hint at our 

unwillingness to speak out against our new boss, Ustinov turned to us, smiling, 

“I have no doubt that you all want to select the best scenario for carrying out 

this crucial government mission. Your statements must be bold and critical, 

but well reasoned. Without a fundamental Party relationship to the matter at 

hand we will kill any project. Speak courageously, sensibly, and authoritatively.”

“Permit me to display my courage,” requested Pilyugin.

“In my opinion, Nikolay Alekseyevich, you never lost it,” retorted Ustinov.

“Dmitriy Fedorovich, I am going to speak regarding control problems. 

Let others talk about everything else. So, today we are confident in the N-1 

control system. During the last launch, although we only got to work for a 

little while, we confirmed that the new system with the on-board computer 

reliably controls the rocket. Over the last year and a half, we have done a lot 

more and can demonstrate that control reliability will be ensured, at least for 

the first three stages. We gained a wealth of experience with the booster stages 

 29.  By this time, Barmin’s design bureau had been working on plans for long-term lunar 

bases under such code names as Bolshoye koltso (Big Ring), Kolumb (Columbus), Dal (Distance), 

and Osvoyeniye (Mastery).

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Valentin Glushko, N-1, and NPO Energiya

during the L1 launches.

30

 Therefore, here too we are confident that we will 

solve the problem. The transition proposed to us today for a series of new 

launch vehicles will initially require us to curtail current production, discard 

production stock, then design, and develop, and once again set up production 

using a new manufacturing process. We will not have an RLA in any version 

before 1979. We are wasting five or six years.”

Glushko appeared calm and unflappable. He was catching his breath after 

a difficult report and was sitting with an air of detachment, as if the speech 

had been about things that had nothing to do with him.

After Pilyugin, Ryazanskiy took the floor.

“I totally disagree with what Barmin said. We need a rocket like the RLA-

120 capable of inserting 30 tons. We have managed to do a lot for the Moon. 

For the L1, Zond, Mars, and Soyuz programs we developed radio complexes, 

which can be modified for any program. We need to create a full-fledged 

Mission Control Center as soon as possible.”

Yuriy Semyonov defused the situation somewhat trying to remind those 

assembled about the problems of orbital stations.

“We need to ensure the reliable operation of systems in orbit for decades. 

The Americans are announcing publicly that they are already working on such 

long-duration systems. We should not postpone this work; otherwise we will 

once again be playing catch-up. Orbital stations can become permanent only 

with systems that are reliable in terms of service life.”

I began my speech by walking up to the chalkboard and erasing the X 

that Barmin had placed on number 30, the payload that the RLA-120 launch 

vehicle proposed by Glushko was capable of inserting. However, I left the bold 

X that Barmin had used to cross out the number 250. I devoted the main part 

of my speech to information about the status of the on-board digital computers 

and hardware components of the radio electronics.

“In order to have a permanent orbital station, a long-duration lunar 

base, much less an expedition to Mars, we need hardware with a guarantee 

of failure-free operation for at least three to five years. For the time being, 

our radio electronic industry is promising to provide them, but it says that 

this will require three years of testing. We will also spend two or three years 

creating instrumentation for this hardware. On balance, it will be at least five 

to six years, allowing for ground developmental testing. Another way would 

 30.  This is a reference to the N1-L3’s Block D upper stage, which was also used as an upper 

stage for the Proton-K rocket.

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Rockets and People: The Moon Race

be multiple redundancy. But this will require an increase in masses, volumes, 

and, again, power generation.”

After the meeting Feoktistov said to me, “You made two errors in your 

speech. When you left the X on number 250, you displeased Glushko, and 

when you began linking reliability testing with deadlines, you irritated Ustinov 

because you hit on one of his ‘hot-button issues.’ He understands full well that 

it takes time to achieve a high degree of reliability, but this contradicts his own 

requirement to shorten the deadlines.”

Indeed, after the loss of DOS No. 3 in 1973, Ustinov had this to say at a 

meeting in the Central Committee: “Keep in mind: we are not rushing you, 

but we do demand the most thorough testing of these complex and expensive 

mechanisms at the factory, at the KIS [monitoring and test facility], and at 

the TP [engineering facility]. But we also cannot allow liberties to be taken 

with deadlines….”

Bushuyev told in detail about the progress of negotiations with the 

Americans on the Apollo-Soyuz project, about the attitudes of the American 

side, and he confirmed that they were burning with the desire to collaborate 

with us. The curtailment of the lunar program led them into a crisis, from 

which they were trying to emerge by developing the Space Shuttle.

Mozzhorin was on vacation, so Avduyevskiy spoke on behalf of TsNIImash.

31

“The Space Shuttle is advantageous for returning very expensive technology 

from space for reuse. If we follow this trend, we will need to rebuild all of our 

space programs. Barmin is correct when he says that we need to proceed from 

the final objectives, and not turn the development of launch vehicles into a 

self-contained main task.”

Our new first deputy general designer Yuriy Trufanov could not criticize 

Glushko—otherwise he would not be the first deputy.

“We must master Sun-synchronous orbits,” he said. “Once we have solved 

this problem, we will have global monitoring over the entire planet with the 

aid of the modules of the orbital station.”

I was anxious to hear the minister’s speech. How would he respond to the 

proposal to do away with the N-1? Would he really support the new rocket 

series? Ultimately he would have to answer to the Politburo!

“It is difficult to give a weighty assessment of these materials today,” began 

Afanasyev. “I am forced to admonish the head institutes of the ministry: 

 31.  Vsevolod Sergeyevich Avduyevskiy (1920–2003), a specialist in high-speed aeromechan-

ics, served as first deputy director of TsNIImash from 1973 to 1987.

548

Valentin Glushko, N-1, and NPO Energiya

From the author’s archives.