Volume 12. December 2011 Transcendent Philosophy

verify the sage’s intuition of divine goodness. 
 
Characterizing God 
 
For traditional religion and mysticism God is to be identified, in the last 
analysis, with Life or Existence in all its depths and its mystery, the 
ideal pole of man, the Infinite that grounds the finite, the Origin and the 
End, the First and the Last, the Manifest and the Hidden, the Hearing 
and the Seeing, the Light of the World and the darkness beyond light, 
so close yet so elusive, pure consciousness that is objectless and still 
unmanifest, transcendent to phenomenal world yet somehow 
sustaining/incarnating or expressing itself in the phenomenal world, not 
described by this or that when it comes to capture its mysterious 
ungraspable unrepresentable essence and best expressible through neti 
neti. It is what It is ("I am what I am"). It is transcendent to all 
categories, to existence. He is beyond existence and non-existence. God 
as non-Being, as Nothing, as emptiness of emptiness, is how the 
tradition of negative divine describes Him. This concept which is to be 
found along side the concept of positive divine in all religions, 
including Islam (though better formulated and emphasized in their 
respective mystical traditions) means God can’t be conceived as an 
object of knowledge. All theological statements, if literally interpreted, 
are false as Stace argues or at best half true or pointers. The 
perennialists are strongly critical of theological and philosophical 
approaches to God. For them knowable verifiable God is no God at all. 
His Infinity, Eternity, Changelessness, Simplicity and Unity exclude 

Religious Studies and the Question of Transcendence 285 
knowing subject’s measuring rods or tests by definition. The Infinite 
and the Eternal can’t be tracked by the finite and temporal being. The 
Being of being can’t be an object of being in any empirical sense of the 
term. Zen people experience God in three pounds of flex or salt and just 
keeping breathing in a relaxed manner. 
 
Why God transcends language and thought? 
 
God is sublime (Lateef in Quranic vocabulary). This means that one 
can’t track Him in any way. The sublime, as certain postmodernists 
also understand it, is monstrous, colossal or abyss, bursts the bounds of 
reason and it refers to the inability of human beings, in their language 
and thinking, to represent the infinite, the unrepresentable and this is 
what theologian have been trying to do with our experience of God or 
unknown or our understanding of Divine Logic or His ways and 
postmodernists are not unjustly protesting against. God also is the 
inscrutable. The Quran is quite categorical about it. The Book of Job 
also makes this point. It is the pretence of certitude, even in the rare 
moment of vision of God, which we, in the tradition of Montaigne, 
should see as sure testimony of folly and extreme incertitude.  
 
Traditional metaphysics has nothing to do with the anthropomorphist 
humanized image of the divinity that modern atheism and humanism 
have been fashionably – and needlessly for traditional people and their 
perennialist interpreters – questioning. We begin with Upanisadic 
mahavakyas (great pronouncements and declarations—their analogue 
in Sufism seem to be much debated shatuhat, ecstatic utterances, a 
famous example of which is Mansur’s claim “I am the Truth”) that sum 
up the central teaching of the Upanisads. Tad ekam (That One) sarvam 
khalvidam Brahman (all this is Brahman) advityam (That without a 
second) prajnanam brahma (Brahman is pure, objectless consciousness) 
aham brahmasmi (I am Brahman). Brahman is thus the “totality of 
existence,” possible and actual. The metaphysical conception of Tawhid 
as Oneness of Being is similar. No categorical framework applies to 
non-dual reality. Brahman being formless, nameless, unperceivable, 
inconceivable, inexpressible and devoid of any and all attributes and 
relations can’t be understood as a substance in Western Aristotelian 

286 Muhammad Maroof Shah 
sense as that which remains unchanged in time as an entity or a thing as 
Puglinda explains in his insightful work on Vedanta. No categorical 
framework applies to it. Stace in his Time and Eternity (1952) argued 
on similar lines. Such categories as substance, process, attribute, 
relation, cause, effect, etc., apply only to manifest Brahman, to the 
phenomenal world. Brahman is no-thingness. When everything that can 
be thought away is thought away as is done in meditational practices, 
when all mental modifications cease, when one enters the realm of no-
mind what remains is pure objectless consciousness. This 
consciousness is the necessary being, whereas objects of consciousness 
are contingent beings as they can be thought away. (Mind too is an 
object of consciousness in the Upanisadic or traditional metaphysical 
framework; we are not a “thinking thing” as Descartes would like us to 
believe.) When the mind is stilled, all phenomena disappear. With the 
cessation of mental modifications, one doesn’t experience manifest 
Brahman. The unmanifest Brahman is none other than pure objectless 
consciousness. Atman and Brahman are non-different. Brahman is not 
theistic God, but totality of existence, both immanent and transcendent. 
Modern philosophers of religion that have raised great hue and cry 
against traditional accounts of theodicy ignore the much more nuanced 
and complex and essentially symbolic understanding of fundamental 
terms in the debate on theodicy. However they are justified in their 
rejection of literalist account of theology and thus theodicy. There are 
theologians and advocates of God who take themselves to be His 
personal secretaries and relegate to the background His transpersonal 
dimension. They implicitly assume Him to be a Cosmic Superperson, a 
being among other beings rather than Being and not to speak of 
Beyond-Being. For them God is some Cosmic craftsman or distant 
Intelligence that planned the destiny of creatures from outside. 
 
 
All our judgments are guilty of exclusions. As Puligandla explains: 
“All perceptual-conceptual truths are lower, relative, conditioned truths, 
to which categorical frameworks are relevant. These truths are the 
product of our perceptual-conceptual activities; they are inextricably 
bound up with our psycho-physiological constitution.” The truths 
proclaimed by all rational inquiries, including sciences – and 

Religious Studies and the Question of Transcendence 287 
everything with which philosophy of religion is concerned are lower 
truths. In fact the Eastern tradition doesn’t approach truth in the 
framework of propositions. Religion’s use of language is “non-
referential, evocative, symbolical and motivational." As another author 
explains that against the finite or categorical truths nothing can be said 
about the absolute truth, "about which literally and radically 
NOTHING may be accurately said in a noncontradictory fashion 
(including that one; if that statement is true, it is false). The great 
transcendental dialecticians—from Nagarjuna to Kant—have 
thoroughly demolished any such attempts, showing that every single 
one of the attempts to categorize ultimate reality (as, for example, by 
saying it is a quantum energy potential) turns on itself and dissolves in 
ad absurdum or ad infinitum regresses. They are not saying that Spirit 
does not exist, but simply that any finite statement about the infinite 
will categorically not work—not in the same way that statements about 
relative or conventional truth will work. Spirit can be known, but not 
said; seen, but not spoken; pointed out, but not described; realized, but 
not reiterated. Conventional truths are known by science; absolute truth 
is known by satori. They simply are not the same thing."  
 
 
Any use of language is necessarily abuse of intelligence that perceives 
and judges without linguistic criteria. The Intellect of which Plato, 
Plotinus and the perennialists speak transcends subject-object duality 
and sees or rather becomes truth. Mysticism has reservations on every 
philosophical attempt that tries to think Being away, that attempts to 
reduce life to logic or linguistically represent and thus name or 
demystify existence. Language doesn’t refer to reality. 
Psychoanalytical (Lacanian) and postmodern critique of referential or 
correspondence theories strengthens or converges with the mystical 
view of the same though the former may not accept the mystical map of 
the Real outside language or symbolic order. However what prevents 
traditions from falling into the absurdist trap after seeing impotence of 
reason in the noumenal realm is their acknowledgment of other 
nonrational or suprarational faculties and their attitude of trust towards 
the sacred, the mysterious. 
 

288 Muhammad Maroof Shah 
Metaphysical vs. Mystical Realization 
 
Here a few remarks on the notion of metaphysical realization as distinct 
from mystical realization (of which absurdists does take certain note 
though he seems to ignore the former) are in order. This will also 
clarify the difference between metaphysics and theology as construed 
by the perennialists. It is to be admitted that at the theological plane 
absurdists and other critics of religion have much force. However 
religions are grounded in and united by metaphysics as the perennialists 
have argued (a lucid discussion of this point is in Schuon’s magnum 
opus  The Transcendent Unity of Religions). So metaphysical 
understanding of such terms as God, Divine Will, Freedom, Divine 
Omnipotence etc. needs to be kept in the background rather than a 
purely theological viewpoint while evaluating religions such as 
Christianity. This is what many modern critics of religion including 
Camus and Beckett fail to do. Understanding the notion of 
metaphysical realization is central to the debate on religious experience 
from the Eastern and Sufi “mystical” or metaphysical perspective. A 
few remarks are in order in this connection. In the act of metaphysical 
realization (an experience that is summum bonum of all religions and 
mysticism as the perennialists note) individual domain is altogether left 
out. There is no room for feeling and sentimentalism. The mind or 
everything that contributes to a separative distinctive selfhood or 
subjecthood has to be transcended completely in order to experience the 
divine in the fullest sense of the term in the Eastern context. In fact as 
Guenon has provocatively remarked there is no such thing as mysticism 
(and religious experience in the modern sense of the term in the East. 
Here we must point out, from perennialist point of view, the difference 
between religion and metaphysics. As Guenon points out the 
metaphysical point of view is purely intellectual while as in the 
religious or theological point of view the presence of a sentimental 
element affects the doctrine itself, which doesn’t allow of it complete 
objectivity. The emotional element nowhere plays a bigger part than in 
the “mystical” form of religious thought. Contrary to the prevalent 
opinion he declares that mysticism, from the very fact that it is 
inconceivable apart from the religious point of view, is quite unknown 
in the East (Guenon, 2000: 124). The influence of sentimental element 

Religious Studies and the Question of Transcendence 289 
obviously impairs the intellectual purity of the doctrine. This falling 
away from the standpoint of metaphysical thought occurred generally 
and extensively in the Western world because there feeling was 
stronger than intelligence and this has reached its climax in modern 
times (Guenon, 2000: 125). Modern theistic appropriations of mystical 
experience by choosing to remain at the level of theology and not 
cognizing the metaphysical point of view (that brilliantly and 
convincingly appropriates such apparently divergent varieties of 
mystical and metaphysical realization as that of Buddhism and 
Christianity) cannot claim total truth as theology itself cannot do so. 
And it is not always possible to fully translate metaphysical doctrines in 
terms of theological dogmas. Only one example will suffice here. The 
immediate metaphysical truth “Being exists” gives rise to another 
proposition when expressed in the religious or theological mode “God 
exists.” But as Guenon says the two statements would not be strictly 
equivalent except on the double condition of conceiving God as 
Universal Being, which is far from always being the case in fact 
(Tillich comes close to holding this view of God), and of identifying 
existence with pure Being or what the Sufis call Zat or Essence which 
is metaphysically inexact. The endless controversies connected with the 
famous ontological argument are a product of misunderstanding of the 
implications of the two formulae just cited. It is the inadequate or faulty 
metaphysical background that contributes a lot to controversies on 
either side of the debate on religious experience in modern discourses 
of philosophy of religion.  
 
As Guenon elaborates:  
 
 
Unlike purely metaphysical conceptions theological conceptions are 
not beyond the reach of individual variations. Those who discuss such 
matters as the “proofs of God’s existence,” should first of all make 
sure that in using the same word “God” they really are intending to 
express an identical conception. However this is hardly the case 
usually and we see altogether different languages being used. 
Antimetaphysical anthropomorphism comes to the fore in this realm 
of individual variations. (Guenon, 2000: 128-129). 
 

290 Muhammad Maroof Shah 
Modern Critiques of Transcendence 
 
Modernity has been quite uncomfortable with theism, with the whole 
structure of exoteric religion. It has made quite redundant the language 
of literalist theology. Symbolic reading of theological propositions has 
been resorted to by esotericists and traditional philosophers and 
metaphysicians from the very beginning. Properly understood, this 
metaphysical esoteric understanding resists the standard critiques that 
many currents of modern thought have launched against transcendence. 
Nietzsche, Camus and Beckett are not fundamentally and absolutely 
against nondualistic metaphysics and against transcendence though 
they are, often rightly so, skeptical and critical of, certain 
representational models of theology. It is not transcendence itself that is 
dispensed with by absurdists as we have seen but the received models 
and maps of transcendence. Nietzsche particularly emphasized ultimate 
indispensability and “cruelty” of the issues related to 
sacred/transcendence. He and Beckett are critical of modernity for its 
disorientation towards transcendence. It has been my endeavour in this 
paper to show that perennialists do provide us a map of transcendence, 
in fact argue for a pathless path, trackless track, nonperspective or 
God’s perspective, post(rational) metaphysical modes of thought or 
openness to mystery of existence that (post)modern man may find 
useful.  
 
Rationalism and the Question of Transcendence 
 
A few remarks on rationalism which begets absurdism when it breaks 
under its own weight are in order as it is the rationalist background of 
modernity that alienates our absurdist writers from traditional 
religious/mystical worldview which found God everywhere and 
eternity permeating and penetrating time and always accessible through 
mystical/religious discipline and thus found the world full of meaning 
and significance. Rationalism in all its forms is essentially defined by a 
belief in the supremacy of reason proclaimed as a real “dogma” and 
implying the denial of everything that is of a supra-individual order, 
notably of pure intellectual intuition, and this carries with it logically 
the exclusion of all the metaphysical knowledge. This same denial also 

Religious Studies and the Question of Transcendence 291 
in consequence rejects all spiritual authority, which is necessarily 
derived from a ‘‘superhuman,” supernatural source (Guenon, 1953: 
111). Rationalism fits well with the modern tendency to simplification 
as Guenon has pointed out in the following words: 
 
[Rationalism] naturally always operates by the reduction of things to 
their most inferior elements, and so asserts itself chiefly by the 
suppression of the entire supra-individual domain, in anticipation of 
being able later on to bring everything that is left, that is to say, 
everything in the individual order, down to the sensible or corporeal 
modality alone, and finally that modality itself to a mere aggregation 
of quantitative determinations.” 
 
Rationalism, properly so called goes back to the time of Descartes who 
reduced the whole nature of the spirit to “thought” and that of body to 
“extension.” Reason, ratio is divorced from supranidividual faculty of 
intellect and that contributes to its gross errors and misapplications and 
misfounded claims. Rationalism postulates that Reality is rationally (i.e. 
mathematically) analyzable and unaided reason can build a 
metanarrative. The metanarrative of modern science is based upon 
claims of rationalism. Moderns claims to exclude all “mystery” from 
the world as they see it, in the name of science and a philosophy 
characterized as “rational”
1
 as Guenon, the prime expositor of 
traditional metaphysical school, has pointed out. Since the time of 
eighteenth century encyclopaedists, the most fanatical deniers of all 
supra-sensible reality have been particularly fond of invoking ‘reason’ 
on all occasions and of proclaiming themselves as rationalists.  
 
Religion and traditional metaphysics have emphatically rejected all 
these claims of rationalism. Modern philosophy and science have 
fundamentally misunderstood the nature of traditional metaphysics. 
Confusion arises in the very interpretation of the word metaphysics 
(which grounds religion’s dogmas) as “after physics” instead of 
“beyond physics” which is the perennialist traditionalist position. 
Sense-experience and reason are tied to the world of physics and thus 
unable to gain knowledge of a realm which lies beyond their area of 
operation. If physics is the science of nature in its widest sense as it is 

292 Muhammad Maroof Shah 
for the ancients, metaphysics is the study of what lies beyond nature. 
The entire physical order comprises all phenomena and metaphysics is 
beyond the phenomenal world. Parapsychology and supernaturalism 
both belong to the phenomenal and they have no access to the corridors 
of the non-phenomenal realm. Metaphysics or religion’s doctrinal or 
intellectual dimension deals with the unlimited and it can not be caught 
in the net of sensory or rational categories. By virtue of its being 
limitless it can not be defined. “In reality only something that is limited 
is capable of definition, whereas metaphysic is on the contrary by its 
very nature absolutely unlimited and this plainly does not allow of our 
enclosing it within a more or less narrow formula; a definition in this 
case would be all more inaccurate the more exact one tried to make 
it.”(Guenon, 2000: 110). Rationalism operates with definitions, 
concepts and categories. It delimits, dissects and encloses. The ultimate 
object of religion God or Nirvana as mystics assert cannot be defined 
because of the very nature of the object. Aristotle’s error consisted in 
his attempt to define metaphysics (as science of being). He was thus 
condemned to identify it with ontology and thus could not reach 
Beyond-Being or Being itself as Shahzad Qaisar presenting the 
perennialist view point says.  
 
He could not appreciate that metaphysics in its essentiality was not 
the ‘science of being’ but the knowledge of the “Universal”. Both 
‘science’ and Being were limited, incomplete and conditional than 
“knowledge” and “Universal” which were unlimited incomplete and 
absolute. Though Aristotle called metaphysics as the “foremost 
philosophy” yet it was treated as a branch of philosophy in violation 
of its character of universality. The absolute whole or the universal 
can not be encompassed in inferior categories for intellect is higher 
than reason”(Qaisar, 1990: 5).  
 
The post-Aristotelian thought of the Greeks of which modern 
philosophy is a fall from the “intellectual constant” lacked complete 
metaphysics which has been the prerogative of the East or traditional 
civilizations as perennialists have argued. For perennialists, Descartes’ 
metaphysics is no more than pseudometapysics for he only wanted to 

Religious Studies and the Question of Transcendence 293 
give a solid foundation to his physics and in the process eliminated 
intellect and intuition.  
 
He made the thinking of the individual ego the centre of reality and 
the criterion of all knowledge, turning philosophy into pure 
rationalism and shifting the main concern of European philosophy 
from ontology to epistemology. Henceforth, knowledge, even if it 
were extended to the farthest galaxies, was rooted in the cogito. The 
knowing subject was bound to the realm of reason and separated from 
both the intellect and revelation neither of which were henceforth 
considered as possible source of knowledge of an objective order 
(Qaisar, 1990: 6).
 
 
 It is no wonder that the fundamental problem of metaphysics led to 
psychophysical dualism and duality ‘spirit-matter’ became absolute and 
irreconcilable Spinoza’s and Leibniz’s attempts suffer from the same 
essential limitations. As Guenon points out “rationalism, being the 
denial of every principle superior to reason, brings with it as a 
“practical” consequence the exclusive use of reason, but of reason 
blinded, so to speak, by the very fact, that it has been silted from the