Appellate division : fourth judicial department decisions filed


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SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
APPELLATE  DIVISION : FOURTH JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
 
DECISIONS FILED 
DECEMBER 23, 2016
HON. GERALD J. WHALEN, PRESIDING JUSTICE
HON. NANCY E. SMITH
HON. JOHN V. CENTRA
HON. ERIN M. PERADOTTO
HON. EDWARD D. CARNI
HON. STEPHEN K. LINDLEY
HON. BRIAN F. DEJOSEPH
HON. PATRICK H. NEMOYER
HON. JOHN M. CURRAN
HON. SHIRLEY TROUTMAN
HON. HENRY J. SCUDDER, ASSOCIATE JUSTICES
FRANCES E. CAFARELL, CLERK

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department
368/15    
KA 13-01176  
PRESENT: CENTRA, J.P., PERADOTTO, LINDLEY, AND DEJOSEPH, JJ. 
                                                                
                                                            
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT,            
                                                            
V
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
                                                            
MATTHEW A. DAVIS, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 
                     
PATRICIA M. MCGRATH, LOCKPORT, FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 
MATTHEW A. DAVIS, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT PRO SE.
NIAGARA COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, LOCKPORT (THOMAS H. BRANDT
OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.                                           
                     
Appeal from a judgment of the Niagara County Court (Matthew J.
Murphy, III, J.), rendered April 18, 2013.  The judgment convicted
defendant, upon a jury verdict, of murder in the second degree (two
counts), burglary in the first degree and robbery in the first degree. 
The judgment was modified by order of this Court entered March 27,
2015 in a memorandum decision (126 AD3d 1516), and defendant and the
People on September 3, 2015 were granted leave to appeal to the Court
of Appeals from the order of this Court (26 NY3d 966), and the Court
of Appeals on November 21, 2016 modified the order and remitted the
case to this Court for consideration of the facts (___ NY3d ___ [Nov.
21, 2016]). 
Now, upon remittitur from the Court of Appeals,
It is hereby ORDERED that, upon remittitur from the Court of
Appeals, the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.
Memorandum:  This case is before us upon remittitur from the
Court of Appeals (People v Davis, ___ NY3d ___ [Nov. 21, 2016], modfg
126 AD3d 1516).  We previously modified the judgment of conviction by
reversing those parts convicting defendant of two counts of murder in
the second degree (Penal Law § 125.25 [3]) and dismissing those counts
of the indictment.  We concluded that the People failed to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant’s actions caused the victim’s
death and thus failed to establish defendant’s guilt of the two counts
of felony murder (Davis, 126 AD3d at 1516-1517).  We otherwise
affirmed the judgment insofar as it convicted defendant of burglary in
the first degree (§ 140.30 [2]) and robbery in the first degree 
(§ 160.15 [1]).  In modifying our order, the Court of Appeals
concluded that the evidence at trial was legally sufficient to support
defendant’s conviction of two counts of felony murder.  The Court

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wrote that, based on the evidence presented by the People, “the jury
could have reasonably concluded that defendant’s conduct was an actual
contributory cause of the victim’s death” and “that the victim’s heart
failure, induced by the extreme stress and trauma of such a violent
assault, was a directly foreseeable consequence of defendant’s
conduct” (Davis, ___ NY3d at ___). 
  
After addressing the issues raised by defendant on his appeal
from our order, the Court of Appeals affirmed the remainder of our
order and remitted the matter to this Court “for consideration of the
facts” (id.see CPL 470.40 [2] [b]).  Those facts have been
considered and are determined to have been established.  Inasmuch as
defendant did not raise any challenge to the weight of the evidence in
his appeal to this Court, we do not address that issue.
Entered:  December 23, 2016
Frances E. Cafarell
Clerk of the Court

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department
677    
CA 15-01950  
PRESENT: WHALEN, P.J., CENTRA, PERADOTTO, AND CARNI, JJ. 
                                                                    
                                                            
FREDERICK INGUTTI AND MARY INGUTTI, 
PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS, 
                                                            
V
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
                                                            
ROCHESTER GENERAL HOSPITAL, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
            
OSBORN, REED & BURKE, LLP, ROCHESTER (JENNIFER M. SCHWARTZOTT OF
COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.  
MCCONVILLE, CONSIDINE, COOMAN & MORIN, P.C., ROCHESTER (PETER J.
WEISHAAR OF COUNSEL), FOR PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS.                      
                         
Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Monroe County (Evelyn
Frazee, J.), entered August 3, 2015.  The order, insofar as appealed
from, denied that part of the motion of defendant seeking dismissal of
plaintiffs’ second, fourth and fifth causes of action.  
It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is affirmed
without costs.
Memorandum:  Plaintiffs commenced this negligence and medical
malpractice action seeking damages for injuries sustained by Frederick
Ingutti (plaintiff) when he left defendant hospital after signing a
form entitled “Release From Responsibility For Discharge” (RFRD) and
was found approximately two hours later by the police, disoriented and
with frostbitten fingers that required partial amputation.  On a prior
appeal, we held that Supreme Court erred in denying defendant’s motion
for partial summary judgment dismissing the first cause of action, for
ordinary negligence (Ingutti v Rochester Gen. Hosp., 114 AD3d 1302,
appeal dismissed 23 NY3d 929).  After our decision, defendant moved to
dismiss the remaining causes of action in the complaint pursuant to
CPLR 3211 (a) (7), which alleged medical malpractice, gross
negligence, lack of informed consent and loss of consortium.  The
court granted the motion only in part, dismissing the cause of action
for gross negligence.  We affirm.
In the prior appeal, in the context of defendant’s motion for
partial summary judgment seeking dismissal of the ordinary negligence
cause of action, we held that, pursuant to Kowalski v St. Francis
Hosp. & Health Ctrs. (21 NY3d 480, 484-485), defendant did not have a
duty to prevent plaintiff from leaving the hospital against medical
advice or to ensure plaintiff’s safe return home (Ingutti, 114 AD3d at
1302-1303).  Here, we are now called upon to assess plaintiffs’

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CA 15-01950  
medical malpractice cause of action in the context of defendant’s CPLR
3211 (a) (7) motion to dismiss.  Defendant contends that Kowalski is
dispositive of plaintiffs’ medical malpractice cause of action and
that there is no distinction between the duty analysis with respect to
plaintiffs’ ordinary negligence and medical malpractice causes of
action.
 
Our standard of review is well established: “[o]n a motion to
dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211, the pleading is to be afforded a
liberal construction” (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87, citing CPLR
3026).  Courts must “accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as
true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable
inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within
any cognizable legal theory” (id. at 87-88).  In reviewing a motion
under CPLR 3211 (a) (7), a court may freely consider affidavits
submitted by plaintiffs to remedy any defects in the complaint (see
Rovello v Orofino Realty Co., 40 NY2d 633, 635), and “the criterion is
whether the proponent of the pleading has a cause of action, not
whether he [or she] has stated one” (Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d
268, 275).
 
Although “no rigid analytical line separates the two” (Scott v
Uljanov, 74 NY2d 673, 674), we have long recognized the distinction
between an ordinary negligence cause of action against a hospital
and/or a physician (see Mancusco v Kaleida Health, 100 AD3d 1468,
1468-1469; White v Sheehan Mem. Hosp., 119 AD2d 989, 989) and a
medical malpractice cause of action against a hospital and/or a
physician (see Harrington v St. Mary’s Hosp., 280 AD2d 912, 912, lv
denied 96 NY2d 710; Smee v Sisters of Charity Hosp. of Buffalo, 210
AD2d 966, 967).  We note that there is no prohibition against
simultaneously pleading both an ordinary negligence cause of action
and one sounding in medical malpractice (see e.g. Piccoli v Panos, 130
AD3d 704, 705-706; Miller v Albany Med. Ctr. Hosp., 95 AD2d 977, 978-
979; see generally CPLR 3014).  It is simply beyond cavil “that an
action for personal injuries may be maintained, in the proper case, on
the dual theories of medical malpractice or simple negligence where a
person is under the care and control of a medical practitioner or a
medical facility” (Twitchell v MacKay, 78 AD2d 125, 127).  Moreover,
in a proper case, both theories may be presented to the jury (see
Kerker v Hurwitz, 163 AD2d 859, 859-860, amended on rearg 166 AD2d
931).
Here, the medical malpractice cause of action alleges, inter
alia, that defendant did not properly assess plaintiff’s medical and
mental status and rendered medical care that was not in accordance
with good and accepted medical practice, and that the discharge of
plaintiff was not in accordance with good and accepted medical
practices.  In opposition to defendant’s motion, plaintiffs submitted
the affidavit of a physician specializing in psychiatry and forensic
psychiatry who attested to numerous deviations from the standard of
care in the treatment and assessment of plaintiff by defendant prior
to the time that plaintiff signed the RFRD.  We note that, although
defendant contends that plaintiff was not “discharged,” defendant’s

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CA 15-01950  
own RFRD belies that contention.  Plaintiffs also submitted the
affidavit of a registered nurse who attested to numerous deviations
from the standard of nursing care by defendant’s staff in the
treatment and discharge planning of plaintiff, all of which occurred
leading up to and prior to the time that plaintiff signed the RFRD. 
Contrary to defendant’s contention, we conclude that those allegations
together with the complaint state a cause of action for medical
malpractice with a duty and standard of care distinct from that
alleged in plaintiffs’ now-dismissed ordinary negligence cause of
action (see Fox v White Plains Med. Ctr., 125 AD2d 538, 538-539). 
    
Defendant further contends that the fourth cause of action, for
lack of informed consent (see Public Health Law § 2805-d), should have
been dismissed because plaintiff’s injuries did not result from an
affirmative violation of his physical integrity.  That contention is
raised for the first time on appeal and is therefore unpreserved for
our review (see Ring v Jones, 13 AD3d 1078, 1079).  Although
defendant’s notice of motion and supporting attorney affirmation made
reference to the fourth cause of action, the court properly noted that
defendant made no specific legal or factual arguments with respect
thereto, and we decline to consider that contention (see Healthcare
Capital Mgt. v Abrahams, 300 AD2d 108, 109), particularly in light of
the fact that defendant’s tactical course deprived plaintiffs of the
opportunity to submit affidavits to remedy any defects in the
complaint (see Rovello, 40 NY2d at 635). 
In light of our determination with respect to plaintiffs’ medical
malpractice and lack of informed consent causes of action, we reject
defendant’s contention that the court erred in denying its motion to
dismiss the derivative cause of action (cf. Klein v Metropolitan Child
Servs., Inc., 100 AD3d 708, 711).   
All concur except C
ENTRA
, J.P., who dissents and votes to reverse
the order insofar as appealed from in accordance with the following
memorandum:  I respectfully dissent and agree with defendant that
Supreme Court should have granted defendant’s motion to dismiss the
complaint in its entirety.  As noted by the majority, we held on the
prior appeal that, pursuant to Kowalski v St. Francis Hosp. & Health
Ctrs. (21 NY3d 480, 484-485), defendant did not have a duty to prevent
Frederick Ingutti (plaintiff) from leaving the hospital against
medical advice or to ensure plaintiff’s safe return home (Ingutti v
Rochester Gen. Hosp., 114 AD3d 1302, 1302-1303, appeal dismissed 23
NY3d 929).  We therefore held that the court erred in denying
defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment dismissing the first
cause of action, for negligence (id. at 1302).  Defendant now seeks to
dismiss the remaining causes of action in the complaint pursuant to
CPLR 3211 (a) (7).  
With respect to the medical malpractice and lack of informed
consent causes of action, I conclude that those causes of action
should be dismissed for the same reason that the negligence cause of
action was dismissed.  Those causes of action are based on similar
allegations that defendant allowed plaintiff to leave the hospital

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677    
CA 15-01950  
against medical advice.  In Kowalski (21 NY3d at 484), the plaintiff
also alleged causes of action for negligence and medical malpractice,
which were both dismissed on appeal.  Plaintiffs here argue that
defendant committed malpractice by failing to plan and provide for a
proper and safe discharge of plaintiff and by failing to assess and
document plaintiff’s treatment and condition before he left the
hospital.  As in Kowalski, however, the gravamen of the complaint is
that defendant should not have allowed plaintiff to leave the hospital
(see id.).  Here, as in Kowalski, “[n]othing in this record . . .
supports an inference that there was any causal connection between any
of the alleged departures from protocol . . . and plaintiff’s injury. 
This case is about whether defendant[] had a duty to prevent plaintiff
from leaving the hospital, and nothing else” (id. at 486).
Inasmuch as I conclude that the medical malpractice and lack of
informed consent causes of action should be dismissed, the derivative
cause of action must be dismissed as well (see Moore v First Fed. Sav.
& Loan Assn. of Rochester, 237 AD2d 956, 957). 
Entered:  December 23, 2016
Frances E. Cafarell
Clerk of the Court

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department
715    
KA 14-02132  
PRESENT: WHALEN, P.J., CARNI, LINDLEY, DEJOSEPH, AND NEMOYER, JJ.      
                                                            
                                                            
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT,            
                                                            
V
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
                                                            
NICHOLAS J. LOUGHLIN, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 
                 
TIMOTHY P. DONAHER, PUBLIC DEFENDER, ROCHESTER (JAMES ECKERT OF
COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.  
SANDRA DOORLEY, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, ROCHESTER (NANCY GILLIGAN OF
COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.                                              
                     
Appeal from an order of the Monroe County Court (James J.
Piampiano, J.), entered November 18, 2013.  The order determined that
defendant is a level three risk pursuant to the Sex Offender
Registration Act.  
It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is
unanimously affirmed without costs.
Memorandum:  Defendant appeals from an order determining that he
is a level three risk pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act
(Correction Law § 168 et seq.).  Inasmuch as defendant’s counsel
agreed at the hearing that it was within County Court’s discretion to
consider, under risk factor 9, defendant’s prior person in need of
supervision (PINS) adjudication involving a sexual offense, defendant
waived his present challenge to the court’s application of that prior
adjudication in determining defendant’s risk level on the ground that
it is a PINS adjudication (see generally People v Dominguez, 257 AD2d
511, 512, lv denied 93 NY2d 872).  We reject defendant’s further
contention that the court erred in considering the PINS adjudication
because defendant was only 10 years old at the time he committed the
sexual offense.  The record reflects that the court properly
considered defendant’s age at the time of the offense under risk
factor 8, “Age at First Sex Crime.”  According to the risk assessment
guidelines, “[t]he offender’s age at the commission of his first sex
crime . . . is a factor associated with recidivism:  those who offend
at a young age are more prone to reoffend” (Sex Offender Registration
Act:  Risk Assessment Guidelines and Commentary, at 13 [2006]).  
Defendant also contends that the court improperly assessed 15
points against him under risk factor 12, “Acceptance of
Responsibility,” based upon his alleged refusal to participate in sex
offender treatment.  We agree.  Here, the case summary establishes

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715    
KA 14-02132  
that defendant was “removed” from his sex offender treatment program
based on disciplinary violations, which under the risk assessment
guidelines is “not tantamount to a refusal to participate in
treatment” (People v Ford, 25 NY3d 939, 941; cf. People v Jackson, 134
AD3d 1580, 1581).  However, even without those 15 points, defendant
remains a level three risk (see generally People v Laraby, 32 AD3d
1130, 1131).
Finally, although defendant is correct that the court should have
applied a preponderance of the evidence standard to his request for a
downward departure from his presumptive risk level rather than a clear
and convincing evidence standard (see People v Gillotti, 23 NY3d 841,
860-861), remittal is not required because the record is sufficient to
enable us to determine under the proper standard whether the court
erred in denying defendant’s request (see People v Merkley, 125 AD3d
1479, 1479).  We conclude that the court properly determined that
defendant’s alleged mitigating factor was not otherwise accounted for
in the risk assessment guidelines (see generally People v Watson, 95
AD3d 978, 979), but defendant failed to meet his burden of
demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence how that alleged
mitigating factor would tend to reduce the risk of his own recidivism
or danger to the community (see generally People v Johnson, 120 AD3d
1542, 1542, lv denied 24 NY3d 910).  Thus, the court lacked discretion
to depart from the presumptive risk level (see id.).
Entered:  December 23, 2016
Frances E. Cafarell
Clerk of the Court

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department
799    
KA 14-01127  
PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., CARNI, LINDLEY, DEJOSEPH, AND SCUDDER, JJ.       
                                                            
                                                            
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT,            
                                                            
V
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
                                                            
DERRICK MANIGAULT, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.  
                   
THE LEGAL AID BUREAU OF BUFFALO, INC., BUFFALO (BARBARA J. DAVIES OF
COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 
MICHAEL J. FLAHERTY, JR., ACTING DISTRICT ATTORNEY, BUFFALO (DAVID A.
HERATY OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.                                    
                             
Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Erie County
(Christopher J. Burns, J.), rendered June 24, 2014.  The judgment
convicted defendant, upon a jury verdict, of assault in the first
degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree.  
It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is
unanimously affirmed. 
Memorandum:  Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him
upon a jury verdict of assault in the first degree (Penal Law § 120.10
[1]) and criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree (§ 265.02
[1]).  We reject defendant’s contention that his conviction of assault
in the first degree is not supported by legally sufficient evidence of
a serious physical injury, which includes a physical injury that
causes “serious and protracted disfigurement” (§ 10.00 [10]).
“A person is ‘seriously’ disfigured when a reasonable observer
would find [the person’s] altered appearance distressing or
objectionable” (People v McKinnon, 15 NY3d 311, 315), and “the injury
must be viewed in context, considering its location on the body and
any relevant aspects of the victim’s overall physical appearance”
(id.).  Here, the evidence at trial established that defendant used a
box cutter to cut the victim’s face and chest, resulting in a facial
wound that required five deep sutures and 20 superficial sutures to
close.  The victim testified at trial and lifted his shirt to show the
jury a chest scar that was 12 centimeters in length.  The jury was
also shown photographs taken approximately one month after the
incident that depicted scars on the victim’s face and chest, and the
victim testified that, despite some healing, at the time of the trial
the scars were the same length and width and equally as visible as
depicted in the photographs.  Thus, the evidence established that the
victim sustained a permanent scar on his chest and a permanent facial

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KA 14-01127  
scar that was slightly over three inches in length and was prominently
located on his cheek.  Viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the People (see People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 349), we
conclude that the evidence is legally sufficient with respect to the
element of serious physical injury to support the conviction of
assault in the first degree (see People v Robinson, 121 AD3d 1405,
1407, lv denied 24 NY3d 1221; see also People v Reitz, 125 AD3d 1425,
1425-1426, lv denied 26 NY3d 934, reconsideration denied 26 NY3d 1091;
People v Irwin, 5 AD3d 1122, 1122, lv denied 3 NY3d 642). 
We reject defendant’s contention that the verdict is against the
weight of the evidence with respect to assault in the first degree. 
In particular, defendant contends that the People failed to prove that
he intended to cause a serious physical injury inasmuch as the
evidence established that the victim’s lacerations were inflicted by
accident.  It is well settled that a defendant may be presumed to
intend the natural and probable consequences of his actions (see
People v Roman, 13 AD3d 1115, 1116, lv denied 4 NY3d 802), and that
the element of intent may be inferred from the totality of defendant’s
conduct (see People v Mike, 283 AD2d 989, 989, lv denied 96 NY2d 904). 
Here, the People presented evidence establishing that defendant
attacked the unarmed victim with a box cutter during a fist fight, and
thereby established that defendant intended to cause serious physical
injury to the victim (see People v Marzug, 280 AD2d 974, 974, lv
denied 96 NY2d 904).  Contrary to defendant’s further contention, the
People disproved the defense of justification beyond a reasonable
doubt (see People v Gaines, 26 AD3d 269, 270, lv denied 6 NY3d 847). 
Thus, viewing the evidence in light of the elements of assault in the
first degree as charged to the jury (see Danielson, 9 NY3d at 349), we
conclude that the verdict is not against the weight of the evidence
(see generally People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495). 
Defendant further contends that he was denied a fair trial by
prosecutorial misconduct.  Initially, we note that defendant failed to
preserve for our review his contentions that the prosecutor committed
misconduct during summation by improperly shifting the burden of proof
and denigrating the defense (see People v Smith, 32 AD3d 1291, 1292,
lv denied 8 NY3d 849).  In any event, we conclude that the challenged
remarks were “fair comment upon the evidence” (People v Mulligan, 118
AD3d 1372, 1375, lv denied 25 NY3d 1075), did not exceed the broad
bounds of rhetorical comment permissible in summation, and constituted
a fair response to defense counsel’s summation (see People v Love, 134
AD3d 1569, 1570, lv denied 27 NY3d 967).  We reject defendant’s
contention that he was denied a fair trial by the remaining instances
of prosecutorial misconduct.  Specifically, the prosecutor on
summation did not misstate the law with respect to justification, and
we note that Supreme Court instructed the jury that it should accept
the law as charged by the court (see People v Lopez, 96 AD3d 1621,
1623, lv denied 19 NY3d 998).  Although we agree with defendant that
the prosecutor’s characterization of defendant’s testimony as a
“manufactured story” was improper (see People v Morgan, 111 AD3d 1254,
1255; People v Seeler, 63 AD3d 1595, 1596, lv denied 13 NY3d 838), we
conclude that this single instance of misconduct, which was undermined

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KA 14-01127  
by a successful defense objection, did not cause defendant such
substantial prejudice that he was denied a fair trial (see People v
Manigat, 136 AD3d 614, 616, lv denied 27 NY3d 1135; cf. People v
Griffin, 125 AD3d 1509, 1512).  
Defendant also failed to preserve for our review his contention
that he was not properly sentenced as a second felony offender because
the People failed to comply with the procedural requirements of CPL
400.21 (see People v Butler, 96 AD3d 1367, 1368, lv denied 20 NY3d
931).  In any event, that contention is without merit.  Defense
counsel admitted that defendant had a prior felony conviction (see
People v Califano, 84 AD3d 1504, 1506-1507, lv denied 17 NY3d 805),
and the record establishes that defendant had an opportunity to
controvert the allegations in the second felony offender statement but
did not do so (see People v Brown, 140 AD3d 1740, 1741; People v
Hughes, 28 AD3d 1185, 1185, lv denied 7 NY3d 790).  We therefore
conclude that, “under the circumstances presented here, . . . there
was the requisite substantial compliance with CPL 400.21” (People v
Irvin, 111 AD3d 1294, 1297, lv denied 24 NY3d 1044, reconsideration
denied 26 NY3d 930; see generally People v Bouyea, 64 NY2d 1140,
1142).       
Entered:  December 23, 2016
Frances E. Cafarell
Clerk of the Court

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department
824    
KA 15-00812  
PRESENT: PERADOTTO, J.P., CARNI, DEJOSEPH, NEMOYER, AND CURRAN, JJ.    
                                                            
                                                            
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT,            
                                                            
V
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
                                                            
CHRISTOPHER J. KELLY, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.   
               
DAVID P. ELKOVITCH, AUBURN, FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
JON E. BUDELMANN, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, AUBURN (CHRISTOPHER T. VALDINA OF
COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.                                              
                 
Appeal from a judgment of the Cayuga County Court (Thomas G.
Leone, J.), rendered November 23, 2011.  The judgment convicted
defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of attempted murder in the second
degree.  
It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is
unanimously affirmed. 
Memorandum:  Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him
upon a guilty plea of attempted murder in the second degree (Penal Law


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