Appellate division : fourth judicial department decisions filed


§ 120.10 [1]).  It is well established that criminal intent may be


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§ 120.10 [1]).  It is well established that criminal intent may be
inferred from the totality of the circumstances (see People v Mike,
283 AD2d 989, 989, lv denied 96 NY2d 904).  Intent may also be
inferred from the natural and probable consequences of defendant’s
conduct (see People v Roman, 13 AD3d 1115, 1115, lv denied 4 NY3d
802).  Here, the People presented evidence establishing that defendant
took a knife from the victim and used it to stab the victim multiple
times, causing “life-threatening” injuries.  We therefore conclude
that the evidence is legally sufficient to sustain the conviction of
assault in the first degree, inasmuch as there is a “valid line of

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reasoning and permissible inferences which could lead a rational
person to the conclusion reached by the jury on the basis of the
evidence at trial” (People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495).  Moreover,
although defendant testified that the victim initially attacked him
with the knife and that the victim had been injured by an “inadvertent
stabbing” committed in self-defense, the verdict is not against the
weight of the evidence because the jury was entitled to reject
defendant’s testimony and credit the testimony of the victim and an
eyewitness that the victim did not use a knife against defendant (see
Goley, 113 AD3d at 1084; People v Thomas, 105 AD3d 1068, 1070-1071, lv
denied 21 NY3d 1010; see generally Bleakley, 69 NY2d at 495).  
With respect to the conviction of criminal possession of a weapon
in the third degree, we reject defendant’s contention that the
conviction is based upon legally insufficient evidence and is against
the weight of the evidence because the People failed to disprove his
defense of temporary lawful possession of the weapon.  “[A] person may
be found to have had temporary and lawful possession of a weapon if he
or she took the weapon from an assailant in the course of a fight”
(People v Hicks, 110 AD3d 1488, 1488, lv denied 22 NY3d 1156), but in
such circumstances there must be “facts tending to establish that,
once possession has been obtained, the weapon had not been used in a
dangerous manner” (People v Williams, 50 NY2d 1043, 1045).  Here, the
evidence establishing that defendant possessed the knife for the
purpose of inflicting serious physical injury to the victim and that
he did not immediately turn over the weapon to the police is “utterly
at odds with [defendant’s] claim of innocent possession . . .
temporarily and incidentally [resulting] from . . . disarming a
wrongful possessor” (People v Snyder, 73 NY2d 900, 902 [internal
quotation marks omitted]; see People v Robinson, 63 AD3d 1634, 1635,
lv denied 13 NY3d 799).  We therefore conclude that the evidence is
legally sufficient to support the conviction of criminal possession of
a weapon in the third degree (see generally Bleakley, 69 NY2d at 495),
and that, viewing the evidence in light of the elements of the crimes
as charged to the jury (see Danielson, 9 NY3d at 349), the verdict is
not against the weight of the evidence (see generally Bleakley, 69
NY2d at 495). 
Entered:  December 23, 2016
Frances E. Cafarell
Clerk of the Court

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department
939    
KA 14-02102  
PRESENT: WHALEN, P.J., CENTRA, CARNI, CURRAN, AND TROUTMAN, JJ.        
                                                            
                                                            
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT,            
                                                            
V
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
                                                            
TOMMY L. MARTIN, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
                                                            
THE LEGAL AID BUREAU OF BUFFALO, INC., BUFFALO (SHERRY A. CHASE OF
COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.   
MICHAEL J. FLAHERTY, JR., ACTING DISTRICT ATTORNEY, BUFFALO (MICHAEL
HILLERY OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.                                   
                       
Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Erie County
(Christopher J. Burns, J.), rendered October 28, 2014.  The judgment
convicted defendant, upon a jury verdict, of burglary in the second
degree.  
It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is
unanimously affirmed. 
Memorandum:  Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him
upon a jury verdict of burglary in the second degree (Penal Law 
§ 140.25 [2]).  Defendant contends that Supreme Court failed to comply
with the mandatory requirements of CPL article 730, and thus denied
him due process of law and erred in finding him competent to stand
trial.  At the outset, we note that defendant was not required to
preserve that contention for our review (see People v Armlin, 37 NY2d
167, 172; People v Winebrenner, 96 AD3d 1615, 1615-1616, lv denied 19
NY3d 1029; People v Meurer, 184 AD2d 1067, 1068, lv dismissed 80 NY2d
835, lv denied 80 NY2d 907).  Nonetheless, we conclude that the record
contains no indication that the court failed to comply with the
requirements of CPL article 730 (see generally Winebrenner, 96 AD3d at
1616).  Upon determining that defendant may be an incapacitated
person, the court properly issued an order of examination (see CPL
730.30 [1]).  Contrary to defendant’s contention, the order of
examination was “issued to an appropriate director” (CPL 730.10 [2]),
inasmuch as it was issued to “the director of community mental health
services of the county where the criminal action [was] pending” (22
NYCRR 111.2 [a]). 
Defendant further contends that the experts who testified at a
competency hearing were not specialists in the field of developmental
disabilities and therefore were not qualified to offer an opinion
whether defendant was an incapacitated person.  We reject that

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contention.  The director appointed two psychiatrists to examine
defendant (see CPL 730.20 [1]), and at a competency hearing held upon
defendant’s motion (see CPL 730.30 [2]), the parties stipulated to the
qualifications and expertise of the psychiatric examiners to obviate
the need for an extensive evaluation of their credentials (see
generally People v Vandemark, 225 AD2d 716, 716, lv denied 88 NY2d
943).  Indeed, we note that one of those psychiatrists testified that
he worked specifically with persons who suffer from developmental
disabilities and routinely performed mental competency evaluations on
such persons.  
Contrary to defendant’s further contention, the statute does not
require the court to issue a written decision containing any
particular findings.  After reviewing the evidence presented at the
hearing, the court, being “satisfied that the defendant is not an
incapacitated person,” properly ordered the criminal action to proceed
(CPL 730.30 [2]).
Defendant failed to preserve for our review his challenge to the
legal sufficiency of the evidence that he unlawfully entered a
dwelling (see People v Gray, 86 NY2d 10, 19).  In any event, we
conclude that the conviction is supported by legally sufficient
evidence (see generally People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 349).  A
dwelling is “a building which is usually occupied by a person lodging
therein at night” (Penal Law § 140.00 [3]; see People v McCray, 23
NY3d 621, 625-626, rearg denied 24 NY3d 947), and this building was
used for that purpose.  Although the building that defendant
unlawfully entered contained a restaurant, at trial the People
introduced photographs of the interior of the building that depicted
bedrooms, a bathroom with shower, and a washer and dryer.  Moreover,
the restaurant’s owner testified that he, his wife, and his son slept
in the building every night, including the night of the burglary.
We conclude that defendant failed to preserve his further
contention that Penal Law § 140.25 (2) is unconstitutionally vague as
applied to him inasmuch as he did not move to dismiss the indictment
on that ground (see People v Iannelli, 69 NY2d 684, 685, cert denied
482 US 914; People v Knapp, 79 AD3d 1805, 1807, lv denied 17 NY3d
807). 
Finally, defendant’s sentence is not unduly harsh or severe.
Entered:  December 23, 2016
Frances E. Cafarell
Clerk of the Court

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department
949    
CA 15-01830  
PRESENT: WHALEN, P.J., CENTRA, CARNI, CURRAN, AND TROUTMAN, JJ.        
                                                            
                                                            
IN THE MATTER OF STATE OF NEW YORK, 
PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,
                                                            
V
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
                                                            
LERRYL SMITH, RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.                         
(APPEAL NO. 1.) 
                                            
EMMETT J. CREAHAN, DIRECTOR, MENTAL HYGIENE LEGAL SERVICE, BUFFALO
(MARGOT S. BENNETT OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT-APPELLANT. 
ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN, ATTORNEY GENERAL, ALBANY (LAURA ETLINGER OF
COUNSEL), FOR PETITIONER-RESPONDENT.                                   
                      
Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Erie County (John L.
Michalski, A.J.), entered August 18, 2015 in a proceeding pursuant to
Mental Hygiene Law article 10.  The order, among other things,
directed that respondent be confined in a secure treatment facility.  
It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is
unanimously affirmed without costs.
Memorandum:  In appeal No. 1, respondent appeals from an order
revoking his prior regimen of strict and intensive supervision and
treatment (SIST), determining that he is a dangerous sex offender
requiring confinement, and committing him to a secure treatment
facility (see Mental Hygiene Law § 10.01 et seq.).  In appeal No. 2,
respondent appeals from an order that denied his motion for leave to
reargue the determination that he is a dangerous sex offender
requiring confinement and for an order stating the facts deemed
essential to Supreme Court’s determination.  Initially, we dismiss the
appeal from the order in appeal No. 2 insofar as it denied leave to
reargue because no appeal lies therefrom (see Empire Ins. Co. v Food
City, 167 AD2d 983, 984). 
With respect to appeal No. 1, we note that respondent does not
challenge the determination that he violated his SIST conditions (see
Mental Hygiene Law § 10.11 [d] [1], [4]).  He contends, however, that
the court’s determination that he is a dangerous sex offender
requiring confinement (see § 10.07 [f]) is against the weight of the
evidence inasmuch as respondent’s SIST violations did not involve
sexual misconduct directed at any victims.  We reject that contention.
Respondent’s SIST violations are “highly relevant regarding the level
of danger that respondent poses to the community with respect to his

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risk of recidivism” (Matter of State of New York v Donald N., 63 AD3d
1391, 1394; see Matter of State of New York v DeCapua, 121 AD3d 1599,
1600, lv denied 24 NY3d 913), and we conclude that petitioner
established by clear and convincing evidence that respondent is a
dangerous sex offender requiring confinement (see Matter of State of
New York v Connor, 134 AD3d 1577, 1578, lv denied 27 NY3d 903;
DeCapua, 121 AD3d at 1600).  Contrary to respondent’s contention, the
court did not err in crediting the testimony of petitioner’s expert
over that of respondent’s expert (see Connor, 134 AD3d at 1578;
DeCapua, 121 AD3d at 1600). 
We further conclude that respondent’s contention that he should
be permitted to appear anonymously in this proceeding is not properly
before this Court.  We previously denied such an application by
respondent, and he failed to move for leave to renew or reargue that
determination (see generally 22 NYCRR 1000.13 [p]).  Finally, we
conclude in appeal No. 1 that, inasmuch as defendant has been confined
to a secure treatment facility, his contentions regarding the lack of
treatment during the pendency of the evidentiary hearing have been
rendered moot (see generally Matter of Jeanty v Commissioner of Corr.
Servs., 92 AD3d 1160, 1161). 
In appeal No. 2, we reject respondent’s contention that the court
failed to state in its decision “the facts it deem[ed] essential” to
its determination (CPLR 4213 [b]; see Matter of Skinner v State of New
York, 108 AD3d 1134, 1134).  Here, the court’s “decision, despite its
brevity, fully complies” with section 4213 (b) (Vance Metal
Fabricators v Widell & Son, 50 AD2d 1062, 1063).  We also reject
respondent’s contention that he was denied due process because the
court failed to set forth detailed findings of fact in support of its
decision.  There is no such requirement in Mental Hygiene Law article
10 and, in any event, we conclude that the court’s decision adequately
sets forth the basis for its determination (see Matter of State of New
York v Brusso, 105 AD3d 1435, 1435).
Entered:  December 23, 2016
Frances E. Cafarell
Clerk of the Court

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department
950    
CA 15-01831  
PRESENT: WHALEN, P.J., CENTRA, CARNI, CURRAN, AND TROUTMAN, JJ.        
                                                            
                                                            
IN THE MATTER OF STATE OF NEW YORK, 
PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,  
V
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
                                                            
LERRYL SMITH, RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.                         
(APPEAL NO. 2.) 
                                            
EMMETT J. CREAHAN, DIRECTOR, MENTAL HYGIENE LEGAL SERVICE, BUFFALO
(MARGOT S. BENNETT OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT-APPELLANT. 
ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN, ATTORNEY GENERAL, ALBANY (LAURA ETLINGER OF
COUNSEL), FOR PETITIONER-RESPONDENT.                                   
                                               
Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Erie County (John L.
Michalski, A.J.), entered September 18, 2015 in a proceeding pursuant
to Mental Hygiene Law article 10.  The order, among other things,
denied respondent’s motion for leave to reargue.  
It is hereby ORDERED that said appeal from the order insofar as
it denied leave to reargue is unanimously dismissed and the order is
affirmed without costs.  
Same memorandum as in Matter of State of New York v Smith
([appeal No. 1] ___ AD3d ___ [Dec. 23, 2016]).
Entered:  December 23, 2016
Frances E. Cafarell
Clerk of the Court

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department
954    
KA 15-01108  
PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., CARNI, LINDLEY, DEJOSEPH, AND SCUDDER, JJ.       
                                                            
                                                            
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT,            
                                                            
V
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
                                                            
MARTIN SMALLWOOD, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.  
                    
JAMES S. KERNAN, PUBLIC DEFENDER, LYONS (ROBERT TUCKER OF COUNSEL),
FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.  
RICHARD M. HEALY, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, LYONS (BRUCE A. ROSEKRANS OF
COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.                                              
                      
Appeal from a judgment of the Wayne County Court (Daniel G.
Barrett, J.), rendered March 26, 2015.  The judgment convicted
defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of criminal sale of a controlled
substance in the third degree (three counts).  
It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is
unanimously affirmed. 
Memorandum:  Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him
upon his plea of guilty of three counts of criminal sale of a
controlled substance in the third degree (Penal Law § 220.39 [1]). 
County Court imposed on defendant a determinate term of imprisonment
of two years in accordance with section 70.70 because the crime herein
constituted defendant’s second felony drug offense, with the term of
imprisonment to be followed by 1½ years of postrelease supervision. 
The court also directed the Department of Corrections and Community
Supervision to enroll defendant in the shock incarceration program
(see § 60.04 [7] [a]).  Defendant was removed from the shock
incarceration program prior to completion, finished the remainder of
his determinate sentence in prison, and was subsequently released to
parole supervision.
Inasmuch as defendant has completed his term of incarceration and
is currently on parole, his contention that he was entitled to
placement in an “alternative-to-shock-incarceration program” during
incarceration is moot (Penal Law § 60.04 [7] [b] [i]; see generally
People ex rel. Dickerson v Unger, 62 AD3d 1262, 1263, lv denied 12
NY3d 716), and none of the issues raised by defendant fall within the
exception to the mootness doctrine (see generally Matter of Hearst
Corp. v Clyne, 50 NY2d 707, 714-715).
Contrary to the further contention of defendant, we conclude that

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KA 15-01108  
the sentence is not unduly harsh and severe.  However, we note that
the certificate of conviction and the uniform sentence and commitment
form should be amended because they incorrectly reflect that defendant
was sentenced as a second felony offender when he was actually
sentenced as a second felony drug offender (see People v Oberdorf, 136
AD3d 1291, 1292-1293, lv denied 27 NY3d 1073). 
Entered:  December 23, 2016
Frances E. Cafarell
Clerk of the Court

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department
958    
KA 11-01423  
PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., CARNI, LINDLEY, DEJOSEPH, AND SCUDDER, JJ.       
                                                            
                                                            
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT,            
                                                            
V
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
                                                            
QUINTIN A. NOWLIN, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.                     
(APPEAL NO. 1.)                                             
                                                            
THE ABBATOY LAW FIRM, PLLC, ROCHESTER (DAVID M. ABBATOY, JR., OF
COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.  
QUINTIN A. NOWLIN, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT PRO SE.
SANDRA DOORLEY, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, ROCHESTER (NANCY GILLIGAN OF
COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.                                              
                       
Appeal from a judgment of the Monroe County Court (Patricia D.
Marks, J.), rendered October 15, 2010.  The judgment convicted
defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of criminal possession of a
controlled substance in the third degree.  
It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is
unanimously affirmed. 
Memorandum:  In appeal No. 1, defendant appeals from a judgment
of Monroe County Court (Marks, J.) convicting him upon his plea of
guilty of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third
degree (Penal Law § 220.16 [12]) and, in appeal No. 2, he appeals from
a decision and order of the same court (Argento, J.), which denied his
CPL article 440 motion to vacate the judgment of conviction in appeal
No. 1.  In appeal No. 3, defendant appeals from another judgment of
the same court (Piampiano, J.), convicting him upon a jury verdict of
criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree 
(§ 220.16 [1]), and criminal possession of a controlled substance in
the fourth degree (§ 220.09 [1]).  
In appeal No. 1, defendant contends in his pro se supplemental
brief that the court erred in failing to conduct a sufficient inquiry
pursuant to People v Outley (80 NY2d 702) into his violation of the
conditions of the plea agreement and drug treatment court contract
before imposing an enhanced sentence (see People v Goree, 107 AD3d
1568, 1568, lv denied 21 NY3d 1074; see generally People v Scott, 101
AD3d 1773, 1774-1775, lv denied 21 NY3d 1019).  Defendant failed to
preserve that contention for our review (see CPL 470.05 [2]).  In any
event, defense counsel conceded that defendant had been rearrested in

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958    
KA 11-01423  
violation of the conditions of his plea agreement, and thus the court
had no duty to conduct a further inquiry (see People v Harris, 197
AD2d 930, 930, lv denied 82 NY2d 850).  Defendant further contends in
his pro se supplemental brief with respect to appeal No. 1 that the
court erred in terminating his drug court placement because the drug
court contract did not contain a no-rearrest clause.  That contention,
however, is belied by the drug court contract in the record before us. 
With respect to appeal No. 2, we reject defendant’s contention in
his pro se supplemental brief that the court erred in denying without
a hearing his motion pursuant to CPL article 440.  In that motion,
defendant contended that trial counsel in appeal No. 1 was ineffective
in failing to challenge the court’s determination that defendant
violated the conditions of his drug court contract.  That contention,
however, is based on defendant’s contention that there was no clause
in the drug court contract prohibiting rearrest, which, as noted
above, is belied by the record.  The court therefore had discretion to
deny the motion pursuant to CPL 440.30 (4) (d), because “the
allegations essential to support the motion are contradicted by the
record and there is no reasonable possibility that they are true”
(People v Bonilla, 6 AD3d 1059, 1061; see People v Crenshaw, 34 AD3d
1315, 1316, lv denied 8 NY3d 879). 
With respect to appeal No. 3, defendant contends in his main
brief that the part of the judgment convicting him of criminal
possession of a controlled substance in the third degree is not
supported by legally sufficient evidence that he intended to sell the
cocaine, and that the verdict is contrary to the weight of the
evidence for the same reason.  Initially, we reject the contention of
the People that defendant failed to preserve that contention for our
review, and we conclude that defendant incorrectly concedes this issue
on appeal.  The Court of Appeals has “held that where[, as here,] the
trial court reserves decision on a defendant’s motion to dismiss, the
preservation rules do not bar review of defendant’s claim” that the
evidence is legally insufficient (People v Nicholson, 26 NY3d 813,
830; see People v Payne, 3 NY3d 266, 273, rearg denied 3 NY3d 767;
People v Ubbink, 120 AD3d 1574, 1574-1575; People v Evans, 59 AD3d
1127, 1127, lv denied 12 NY3d 815).
Nevertheless, we conclude that the evidence is legally sufficient
to establish defendant’s intent to sell the drugs (see People v King,
137 AD3d 1572, 1573-1574, lv denied 27 NY3d 1134; see generally People
v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495).  Furthermore, with respect to
defendant’s contention that the verdict under both counts of the
indictment is contrary to the weight of the evidence, viewing the
elements of the crimes as charged to the jury (see People v Danielson,
9 NY3d 342, 349), we further conclude that the verdict is not against
the weight of the evidence (see People v Freeman, 28 AD3d 1161, 1162,
lv denied 7 NY3d 788; see generally Bleakley, 69 NY2d at 495). 
With respect to appeal No. 3, defendant further contends in his
main brief that the court erred in its Sandoval ruling.  “By failing
to object to the court’s ultimate Sandoval ruling, defendant failed to
preserve that contention for our review” (People v Poole, 79 AD3d

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958    
KA 11-01423  
1685, 1685, lv denied 16 NY3d 862; see People v Taylor, 140 AD3d 1738,
1739; People v Kelly, 134 AD3d 1571, 1572, lv denied 27 NY3d 1070). 
In any event, any error in the court’s Sandoval ruling is harmless
inasmuch as the evidence of defendant’s guilt is overwhelming, and
there is no significant probability that defendant would have been
acquitted but for the error (see People v Arnold, 298 AD2d 895, 896,
lv denied 99 NY2d 580; see generally People v Grant, 7 NY3d 421,
424-425).
With respect to appeal No. 3, defendant also contends in his main
brief that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his
attorney failed to request a lesser included offense with respect to
the first count of the indictment.  It is well settled that, in order
“[t]o prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, it is
incumbent on defendant to demonstrate the absence of strategic or
other legitimate explanations” for defense counsel’s allegedly
deficient conduct (People v Rivera, 71 NY2d 705, 709; see People v
Benevento, 91 NY2d 708, 712; People v Schumaker, 136 AD3d 1369, 1372,
lv denied 27 NY3d 1075, reconsideration denied 28 NY3d 974), and
defendant failed to make such a showing here.  Indeed, we note that
counsel explained his strategy on the record when he declined to
request the lesser included offense at issue, and thus defendant’s
current contention is no more than a mere “disagreement with trial
strategy, which does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel”
(People v Cheatom, 295 AD2d 959, 960, lv denied 98 NY2d 729; see
People v Flores, 84 NY2d 184, 187; Rivera, 71 NY2d at 708-709).  
In his main and pro se supplemental briefs, defendant makes
further claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in all three
appeals.  We conclude with respect to all of defendant’s claims of
alleged ineffective assistance of counsel that the evidence, the law,
and the circumstances of this case, viewed in totality and as of the
time of the representation, establish that defendant received
meaningful representation (see generally People v Baldi, 54 NY2d 137,
147).
Defendant also contends in his main brief that the court punished
him for exercising his right to trial in appeal No. 3.  Contrary to
the People’s contention, “the record establishes that this issue is
preserved for our review; the court ‘was aware of, and expressly
decided, the [issue] raised on appeal’ ” (People v Collins, 106 AD3d
1544, 1546, lv denied 21 NY3d 1072, quoting People v Hawkins, 11 NY3d
484, 493).  Nevertheless, we conclude that the sentence does not
constitute a punishment for defendant’s exercise of his right to go to
trial.  “ ‘Given that the quid pro quo of the bargaining process will
almost necessarily involve offers to moderate sentences that
ordinarily would be greater . . . it is . . . to be anticipated that
sentences handed out after trial may be more severe than those
proposed in connection with a plea’ ” (People v Smith, 21 AD3d 1277,
1278, lv denied 7 NY3d 763, quoting People v Pena, 50 NY2d 400, 412,
rearg denied 51 NY2d 770).  We take particular note that the court
specifically stated that it was not punishing defendant for exercising
his right to go to trial.  In addition, “although the appeal by
defendant from the judgment convicting him of the predicate conviction

-4-
958    
KA 11-01423  
upon which his adjudication as a second felony offender is based
remain[ed] pending [at the time of sentencing],” we nevertheless
reject his contention in his pro se supplemental brief that “the court
could not use that conviction as the basis for that adjudication”
(People v Bailey, 90 AD3d 1664, 1666, lv denied 19 NY3d 861).  With
respect to defendant’s contention in appeal No. 3, which is raised in
his pro se supplemental brief, that the court erred in imposing a fine
without holding a hearing or otherwise determining that the amount of
the fine corresponded to defendant’s gain from the offense, “ ‘[a]
fine for a felony, when initially authorized by article 60, may be
imposed, irrespective of whether the defendant gained money or
property [L. 1977, c. 352; (Penal Law) § 80.00]’ ” (People v
McFarlane, 18 AD3d 577, 578, lv denied 5 NY3d 791, quoting William C.
Donnino, Practice Commentary, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 39,
Penal Law art 80, at 5; see People v Ortiz [appeal No. 1], 104 AD3d
1202, 1203).  The sentence is not unduly harsh or severe.
We have considered defendant’s remaining contentions in all three
appeals in his main and pro se supplemental briefs, and we conclude
that none warrant reversal or modification of the judgments or order.
Entered:  December 23, 2016
Frances E. Cafarell
Clerk of the Court

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department
959    
KA 11-01097  
PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., CARNI, LINDLEY, DEJOSEPH, AND SCUDDER, JJ.       
                                                            
                                                            
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT,            
                                                            
V
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
                                                            
QUINTIN A. NOWLIN, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.                        
(APPEAL NO. 2.)                                             
                                                            
THE ABBATOY LAW FIRM, PLLC, ROCHESTER (DAVID M. ABBATOY, JR., OF
COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 
QUINTIN A. NOWLIN, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT PRO SE. 
SANDRA DOORLEY, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, ROCHESTER (NANCY GILLIGAN OF
COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.                                              
                                      
Appeal, by permission of a Justice of the Appellate Division of
the Supreme Court in the Fourth Judicial Department, from an order of
the Monroe County Court (Victoria M. Argento, J.), entered April 19,
2011.  The order denied the motion of defendant to vacate a judgment
of conviction pursuant to CPL 440.10.  
It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is
unanimously affirmed. 
Same memorandum as in People v Nowlin ([appeal No. 1] ___ AD3d
___ [Dec. 23, 2016]).
Entered:  December 23, 2016
Frances E. Cafarell
Clerk of the Court

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department
960    
KA 13-00958  
PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., CARNI, LINDLEY, DEJOSEPH, AND SCUDDER, JJ.       
                                                            
                                                            
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT,            
                                                            
V
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
                                                            
QUINTIN A. NOWLIN, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.                     
(APPEAL NO. 3.)                                             
                                                            
THE ABBATOY LAW FIRM, PLLC, ROCHESTER (DAVID M. ABBATOY, JR., OF
COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
QUINTIN A. NOWLIN, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT PRO SE.   
SANDRA DOORLEY, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, ROCHESTER (NANCY GILLIGAN OF
COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.                                              
                                      
Appeal from a judgment of the Monroe County Court (James J.
Piampiano, J.), rendered April 12, 2013.  The judgment convicted
defendant, upon a jury verdict, of criminal possession of a controlled
substance in the third degree and criminal possession of a controlled
substance in the fourth degree.  
It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is
unanimously affirmed.
Same memorandum as in People v Nowlin ([appeal No. 1] ___ AD3d
___ [Dec. 23, 2016]).
Entered:  December 23, 2016
Frances E. Cafarell
Clerk of the Court

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department
978    
KA 16-00854  
PRESENT: WHALEN, P.J., PERADOTTO, NEMOYER, CURRAN, AND TROUTMAN, JJ.   
                                                            
                                                            
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, APPELLANT,             
                                                            
V
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
                                                            
RICHARD A. RODAS, JR., DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.
                
VALERIE G. GARDNER, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, PENN YAN (DAVID G. MASHEWSKE OF
COUNSEL), FOR APPELLANT. 
TIFFANY M. SORGEN, CANANDAIGUA, FOR DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.
     
Appeal from an order of the Yates County Court (W. Patrick
Falvey, J.), dated April 7, 2016.  The order, among other things,
granted the motion of defendant to suppress certain statements.  
It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is
unanimously affirmed and the indictment is dismissed.
Memorandum:  In this criminal action arising from defendant’s
alleged conspiracy with his girlfriend to sexually abuse the
girlfriend’s daughter, the People appeal pursuant to CPL 450.20 (8)
from an order granting defendant’s motion to suppress statements that
he made, as well as letters that he gave, to a Yates County Department
of Social Services child protective caseworker during a series of
interviews conducted at the Yates County Jail, where defendant was in
custody on an unrelated charge on which he was represented by counsel. 
At the outset, we note that the “factual findings and credibility
determinations of a hearing court are entitled to great deference on
appeal, and will not be disturbed unless clearly unsupported by the
record” (People v Collier, 35 AD3d 628, 629, lv denied 8 NY3d 879,
reconsideration denied 9 NY3d 841; see People v Hogan, 136 AD3d 1399,
1400, lv denied 27 NY3d 1070).  Likewise, “in the event the proof
permits the drawing of conflicting inferences, the choice is for the
[hearing court] and should be upheld unless unsupported by the
evidence” (People v Davis, 221 AD2d 358, 359, lv denied 87 NY2d 920
[internal quotation marks omitted]). 
Here, we conclude that County Court properly determined that the
caseworker obtained the statements and letters in violation of
defendant’s right to counsel (see generally People v Lopez, 16 NY3d
375, 380), inasmuch as there was such a degree of investigatory
cooperation between the caseworker and a Village of Penn Yan police
investigator that the caseworker acted as the agent of the police in
questioning defendant and obtaining the letters from him outside the

-2-
978    
KA 16-00854  
presence of defense counsel (see People v Wilhelm, 34 AD3d 40, 46-50;
People v Greene, 306 AD2d 639, 640-641, lv denied 100 NY2d 594; see
generally People v Rodriguez, 135 AD3d 1181, 1184-1185, lv denied 28
NY3d 936).  In the weeks before the caseworker’s interviews with
defendant, she and the investigator communicated at least four times
and kept each other closely apprised of their respective investigatory
findings.  Right before the caseworker first interviewed defendant,
she called the investigator again to let him know what she was doing
and to ask him to accompany her to the jail.  The investigator
informed the caseworker that he could not do so because defendant was
represented by counsel on the unrelated charge and had told the
investigator that defendant would not speak to him in the absence of
counsel.  Although both the investigator and the caseworker testified
at the suppression hearing that the investigator did not give the
caseworker instructions or directions before she interviewed
defendant, the caseworker also testified that the investigator
specifically asked her not to “focus on” certain letters that might be
possessed by defendant at the jail, to avoid defendant’s destruction
of those letters before the investigator could obtain a warrant for
their seizure.  Additionally, during the interviews, the caseworker
told defendant that she was “working together” with “law enforcement”
and would be “sharing” with the police any information that she
obtained from him (see Greene, 306 AD2d at 641; see generally Wilhelm,
34 AD3d at 47-48).
Moreover, after the caseworker interviewed defendant, she briefed
the investigator on the substance of defendant’s statements and turned
over copies of the letters that she had obtained from defendant (see
Wilhelm, 34 AD3d at 47-48).  In turn, the investigator allowed the
caseworker to read and make copies of letters that he had acquired
from defendant’s girlfriend.  The caseworker further shared with the
investigator other information that she had learned during the
investigation, including the location of yet another set of letters. 
We thus conclude that defendant’s right to counsel, the nature and
effect of which the caseworker specifically had been apprised before
she interviewed defendant (cf. id. at 49), was circumvented because
the caseworker was acting as an agent of the police at the time that
she interviewed defendant (see id. at 48-49; Greene, 306 AD2d at 641). 
In light of our determination, the indictment must be dismissed
because “ ‘the unsuccessful appeal by the People precludes all further
prosecution of defendant for the charges contained in the accusatory
instrument’ ” (People v Moxley, 137 AD3d 1655, 1656-1657).
Entered:  December 23, 2016
Frances E. Cafarell
Clerk of the Court

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department
982    
KA 13-01619  
PRESENT: WHALEN, P.J., PERADOTTO, NEMOYER, CURRAN, AND TROUTMAN, JJ.   
                                                            
                                                            
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT,            
                                                            
V
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
                                                            
ANTHONY FORD, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 
                         
FRANK H. HISCOCK LEGAL AID SOCIETY, SYRACUSE (PHILIP ROTHSCHILD OF
COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.   
WILLIAM J. FITZPATRICK, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, SYRACUSE (JAMES P. MAXWELL
OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.                                           
                  
Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Onondaga County
(John J. Brunetti, A.J.), rendered September 6, 2013.  The judgment
convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of criminal possession
of a controlled substance in the third degree (two counts).  
It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is
unanimously reversed on the law, the plea is vacated, those parts of
the motion seeking to suppress physical evidence and statements are
granted, the indictment is dismissed, and the matter is remitted to
Supreme Court, Onondaga County, for proceedings pursuant to CPL
470.45. 
Memorandum:  Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him
upon his plea of guilty of two counts of criminal possession of a
controlled substance in the third degree (Penal Law § 220.16 [1],
[12]).  The charges arose from the seizure by police officers of a
quantity of cocaine from defendant following the stop of the vehicle
in which he was a passenger.  Defendant moved, inter alia, to suppress
the cocaine and statements he made to the police as the fruit of
illegal police conduct.  The evidence at the suppression hearing
established that, after the stop, a police officer directed defendant
to exit the vehicle.  When defendant asked why he was being directed
out of the vehicle, the officer physically removed him from the
vehicle, placed him face down on the ground, handcuffed him and patted
him down, which resulted in the seizure of three bags of crack cocaine
from defendant’s pants pocket and defendant’s statement that he
possessed the drugs.
Defendant contends that Supreme Court erred in denying his motion
to suppress the cocaine.  At the outset, we note that “[d]efendant
failed to preserve for our review his contention that the conduct of
the police following the stop . . . constituted a de facto arrest for

-2-
982    
KA 13-01619  
which the police did not have probable cause” (People v Andrews, 57
AD3d 1428, 1429, lv denied 12 NY3d 850; see People v Cash J.Y., 60
AD3d 1487, 1489, lv denied 12 NY3d 913).  We see no reason to exercise
our power to review that contention as a matter of discretion in the
interest of justice (see CPL 470.15 [3] [c]), inasmuch as we find
merit in defendant’s alternative, preserved contention that the
patdown was unlawful.
We also note that defendant does not dispute that the vehicle was
lawfully stopped based upon a police officer’s observation of a
Vehicle and Traffic Law violation (see People v Robinson, 97 NY2d 341,
349; People v Grimes, 133 AD3d 1201, 1202), or that the officers were
thereafter entitled to direct defendant to exit the vehicle “as a
precautionary measure and without particularized suspicion” (People v
Garcia, 20 NY3d 317, 321; see People v Robinson, 74 NY2d 773, 775,
cert denied 493 US 966).  Defendant contends, however, that the
patdown was not justified inasmuch as the police officers lacked the
requisite reasonable basis to suspect that he was concealing a weapon
or that they were otherwise in danger (see generally People v Goodson,
85 AD3d 1569, 1570, lv denied 17 NY3d 953; People v Everett, 82 AD3d
1666, 1666).  We agree.  
Based upon the evidence at the suppression hearing, we conclude
that “the officers did not have any ‘knowledge of some fact or
circumstance that support[ed] a reasonable suspicion that the
[defendant was] armed or pose[d] a threat to [their] safety’ ”
(Everett, 82 AD3d at 1666, quoting People v Batista, 88 NY2d 650,
654).  Defendant’s evident nervousness as the officers approached the
vehicle was not an indication of criminality or a threat to officer
safety (see Garcia, 20 NY3d at 324; People v Hightower, 136 AD3d 1396,
1397).  Nor was the patdown justified by the fact that the vehicle was
in a high crime area (see People v Carr, 103 AD3d 1194, 1195; People v
Riddick, 70 AD3d 1421, 1423, lv denied 14 NY3d 844), particularly when
the stop occurred on a busy street during rush hour (see People v
Savage, 137 AD3d 1637, 1639).  Moreover, “there was no suggestion that
a weapon was present or that violence was imminent” (People v Butler,
127 AD3d 623, 624).  Finally, neither defendant’s initial refusal to
exit the vehicle nor his demand for an explanation why he was being
asked to exit the vehicle gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that he
posed a threat to the officers’ safety (see People v Driscoll, 101
AD3d 1466, 1467-1468). 
Inasmuch as the patdown was unlawful, the cocaine seized by the
police and defendant’s statements should have been suppressed.  We
therefore reverse the judgment, vacate the plea, grant that part of
defendant’s motion seeking suppression of physical evidence and
statements, dismiss the indictment and remit the matter to Supreme
Court for proceedings pursuant to CPL 470.45.  
Entered:  December 23, 2016
Frances E. Cafarell
Clerk of the Court

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department
986    
KA 12-01527  
PRESENT: WHALEN, P.J., PERADOTTO, NEMOYER, CURRAN, AND TROUTMAN, JJ.   
                                                            
                                                            
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT,            
                                                            
V
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
                                                            
MATTHEW V. NOCE, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 
                      
TIMOTHY P. DONAHER, PUBLIC DEFENDER, ROCHESTER (DAVID R. JUERGENS OF
COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
SANDRA DOORLEY, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, ROCHESTER (LEAH R. MERVINE OF
COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.                                              
                    
Appeal from a judgment of the Monroe County Court (Frank P.
Geraci, Jr., J.), rendered July 25, 2012.  The judgment convicted
defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of assault in the first degree.  
It is hereby ORDERED that the case is held, the decision is
reserved and the matter is remitted to Monroe County Court for further
proceedings in accordance with the following memorandum:  On appeal
from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of assault in
the first degree (Penal Law § 120.10 [1]), defendant contends that
County Court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw
his plea without a hearing.  We agree.   
This case arises from an incident in which defendant unlawfully
entered his ex-girlfriend’s home, found a man sleeping in her bed, and
repeatedly struck him about the head with a blunt object.  During the
plea colloquy, it was noted that defendant “had some kind of brain
surgery” in the weeks before the assault.  The court asked defendant
if he had discussed with defense counsel whether the recent brain
surgery “would raise any issue,” and defendant responded, “I’m told
no.”  Defendant thereafter submitted a sentencing memorandum that
included a report from a neurologist who stated that, only 22 days
before the assault, defendant underwent resection of a portion of his
brain and was prescribed multiple medications.  
Before sentencing, defendant discharged his counsel and moved
through new counsel to withdraw his guilty plea.  In his affidavit in
support of the motion, defendant stated that he had wanted to go to
trial and assert a psychiatric defense instead of pleading guilty, but
his prior defense attorney had falsely told him that such a defense
was unavailable because his neurosurgeon had refused to testify at
trial.  Defendant also submitted an affidavit from his neurosurgeon,
who stated that he never spoke to defendant’s prior attorney and never

-2-
986    
KA 12-01527  
refused to testify.  In a responding affirmation, the prosecutor
stated that, upon information and belief, defendant’s prior attorney
did not tell defendant that his neurosurgeon had refused to testify.
It is well settled that the determination whether to grant a
motion to withdraw a guilty plea is within the court’s discretion and
that a defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing only in rare
instances (see People v Manor, 27 NY3d 1012, 1013; People v Henderson,
137 AD3d 1670, 1670-1671).  The denial of such a motion is not an
abuse of discretion “unless there is some evidence of innocence,
fraud, or mistake in inducing the plea” (Henderson, 137 AD3d at 1671
[internal quotation marks omitted]).  Here, if the allegations in
defendant’s affidavit are true, then defendant’s plea was not
voluntarily and intelligently entered inasmuch as it was based upon a
mistaken belief that a psychiatric defense was unavailable (see id.). 
We therefore conclude that defendant’s motion was not “patently
insufficient on its face” (People v Mitchell, 21 NY3d 964, 967), and
that the court abused its discretion in denying the motion without an
evidentiary hearing (see Henderson, 137 AD3d at 1671).  Thus, we hold
the case, reserve decision, and remit the matter to County Court for a
hearing on defendant’s motion.  
Entered:  December 23, 2016
Frances E. Cafarell
Clerk of the Court

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department
990    
CA 16-00252  
PRESENT: WHALEN, P.J., PERADOTTO, NEMOYER, CURRAN, AND TROUTMAN, JJ.   
                                                            
                                                            
WILLIAM J. KUHN, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,                       
                                                            
V
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
                                                            
WILLIAM GIOVANNIELLO AND LORRAINE GIOVANNIELLO,             
DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.
                                     
PULOS AND ROSELL, LLP, HORNELL (WILLIAM W. PULOS OF COUNSEL), FOR
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT.   
LAW OFFICES OF JOHN TROP, ROCHESTER (TIFFANY D’ANGELO OF COUNSEL), FOR
DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.                                                
                 
Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Steuben County (Peter
C. Bradstreet, A.J.), entered May 7, 2015.  The order granted the
motion of defendants for summary judgment, dismissed the complaint and
denied the cross motion of plaintiff for partial summary judgment.  
It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is affirmed
without costs.
Memorandum:  In this Labor Law § 240 (1) action, plaintiff seeks
damages for injuries he allegedly sustained while he was removing and
replacing a sewer pipe in the basement of defendants’ pizzeria.
Contrary to plaintiff’s contention, Supreme Court properly granted
defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and
denied plaintiff’s cross motion for partial summary judgment on the
issue of liability.  According to plaintiff, while standing at ground
level, he was struck in the shoulder by a falling pipe that weighed
approximately 60 pounds.  “Liability may . . . be imposed under [Labor
Law § 240 (1)] only where the ‘plaintiff’s injuries were the direct
consequence of a failure to provide adequate protection against a risk
arising from a physically significant elevation differential’ ”
(Nicometi v Vineyards of Fredonia, LLC, 25 NY3d 90, 97, rearg denied
25 NY3d 1195, quoting Runner v New York Stock Exch., Inc., 13 NY3d
599, 603).  Although there is conflicting deposition testimony
concerning the exact elevation of the pipe, it is undisputed that the
pipe was, at most, one foot above plaintiff’s head, and that the pipe
was always within his reach.  We therefore conclude that plaintiff’s
injury did not fall within the scope of section 240 (1) inasmuch as
“any height differential between plaintiff and the [pipe] that fell on
him was de minimis” (Joseph v Lakeside Bldrs. & Devs., 292 AD2d 840,
841; see Capparelli v Zausmer Frisch Assoc., 96 NY2d 259, 269-270;
Christiansen v Bonacio Constr., Inc., 129 AD3d 1156, 1158-1159).
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