Foreign relations of the united states 1969–1976 volume XXXVII energy crisis, 1974–1980 department of state washington
Download 8.4 Mb.Pdf ko'rish
On November 17, Kissinger sent a note to Enders in Paris instructing him “to go to
European capitals to brief key figures in greater detail on the initiatives in my Chicago
speech and to begin the process of lining up support for our initiatives.” He added: “I rec-
ognize that you will have opportunity to meet with some of these officials in Paris during
meetings of IEA and Working Party Three. You should however go on to capitals for
follow-on discussions unless you believe it would be totally redundant. You should re-
port to me from each capital you visit as well as on the results of your talks in Paris.” (Tel-
egram 253541 to Paris; Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country
Files for Europe and Canada, Box 4, France—State Department Telegrams from
SECSTATE–NODIS (1)) Enders was in Paris for the OECD Council meeting and the first
meeting of the International Energy Agency. See Document 20.
78 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XXXVII
Memorandum of Conversation
Tokyo, November 19, 1974, 11 a.m.
Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka
Foreign Minister Toshio Kimura
Ambassador Takeshi Yasukawa
Deputy Foreign Minister Kiyohiko Tsurumi
Toshio Yamazaki, Director General, American Affairs Bureau, MOFA
Hidetoshi Ukawa, MOFA (Interpreter)
Akitane Kiuchi, Private Secretary to Prime Minister
Assistant Secretary Habib
James J. Wickel (Interpreter)
President Ford–Prime Minister Tanaka—First Meeting
[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to energy issues.]
[President:] This leads to a new subject of great mutual interest to
all of us. I personally appreciate Japan’s cooperation in energy, in the
IEG and the IEP. Both are vitally important to the consumers through-
out the world. It is vitally important for us to have a IEG and a strong
IEP. We should be prepared to move strongly, not to antagonize the
producers, but to make sure that we consumers don’t have to assume a
defensive posture in bargaining with the producers without any
strength. In our judgment it is essential for Japan to support both the
IEG and the IEP firmly. I can assure you, Mr. Prime Minister, that we
will continue to give the kind of leadership in this area, which Secretary
Kissinger has been giving. Progress up to now has been encouraging,
and we feel that anything which further strengthens the consumers will
benefit both the consumers and the producers in the long run.
PM Tanaka: In my view energy is the greatest problem we face. I
understand Secretary Kissinger’s proposal
very well. Japan has a deep
interest in the oil question, which is really at the root of the reason
many countries around the world are eating less meat. However, I
hope you understand that Japan’s circumstances differ from some
Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations,
Box 7. Secret. The meeting was held in the Guest House. President Ford made an official
visit to Tokyo November 18–22 en route to the Vladivostok Summit.
See Document 18.
August 1974–April 1975 79
other countries, like the US, UK and France. For example, Japan has no
coal; it is dependent on oil for most of its energy. Consuming about 300
million tons of oil per year—almost all of it imported—it is natural that
Japan should try to conserve oil. However, 73% of Japan’s oil is used for
industrial purposes, and only 27% for private consumption. (note: Ki-
uchi gave PM Tanaka these figures in writing.) By comparison, the 31%
of the United States consumption is for industrial purposes and 69% for
private purposes. Therefore, any conservation program automatically
means an immediate reduction of industrial production in Japan. I
would hope that these special circumstances could be reflected in any
program devised to deal with the oil question.
Secretary: May I, Mr. President, comment on two problems, con-
sumer solidarity and the specific measures by which we hope to attain
it. In preparing my Chicago speech, I linked consumption and the de-
velopment of a new system because I recognize the special position of
Japan. Obviously, all nations can’t conserve oil to the same degree as
the others, and therefore should try to compensate by increasing their
reliance on alternative supplies. We would be prepared to work with
Japan, within the framework of our joint agreement on uranium enrich-
ment and other alternatives, to take into account Japan’s specific re-
quirements relating to industrial use in working out a conservation
program for the consumers. I can assure you this energy program is not
designed for conservation at the expense of growth, but instead is
planned to achieve the conservation of energy and growth by also de-
veloping alternative sources of energy. If the consumers could achieve
greater solidarity along these lines, it would improve their position to
bargain for oil.
President: We are devoting a great deal of effort to R&D in poten-
tial alternative sources, such as solar and geothermal energy, and to
make coal a more effective and cleaner source. We are thinking of shar-
ing the results of these R&D programs as a part of the IEG and the IEP.
The development of alternative sources lessens our dependence on oil,
and thus increases our independence.
PM Tanaka: As I noted, Japan imports almost all of its oil, and our
BOP cannot continue to bear the increased cost of oil. Therefore, the
most serious consideration for us is the development of alternative
sources of energy, including nuclear, solar and geothermal. However,
Japan cannot conduct these programs alone—all of the advanced in-
dustrial democracies should combine their total efforts for this
Secretary Kissinger: We would like within a few weeks to meet
quietly with a suitable official from Japan without any public dramatics
to discuss this issue. Perhaps the Prime Minister could send someone to
Washington, or we could send someone here to discuss our thinking on
80 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XXXVII
this in detail, without making any dramatic announcements. In my
speech I used forthright language to express what we think must be
done to meet this situation.
[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to energy issues.]
In a November 25 meeting in Tokyo, where Kissinger stopped after the Vladi-
vostok Summit, Kimura informed Kissinger about his meetings with Sauvagnargues in
Tokyo a few days earlier, which focused primarily on oil, and told the Secretary that his
“impression” was that “there was no basic difference of views between the United States
and France on the question of oil.” However, he added, there were “some differences
which remain regarding the timing of implementing what is agreed, and the method-
ology.” Kissinger and Kimura concurred, as did Sauvagnargues according to Kimura’s
account of their conversation, that the matter of recycling should be handled by the
Group of Ten. Looking forward, Kissinger said, “if France cooperates with us in our con-
sumer initiative, we are prepared to cooperate with them in their producer initiative.”
(Memorandum of conversation, November 25; National Archives, RG 59, Records of
Henry Kissinger, Lot 91D414, Box 21, Classified External Memcons, May–November
1974, Folder 7)
The Governing Board of the newly-established International En-
ergy Agency held its first meeting in Paris November 18–19, 1974. The
IEA was formally established at the OECD Council meeting on No-
vember 15, at the same time the IEP Agreement was signed. See foot-
note 6, Document 9. At the inaugural session, the Governing Board
elected Etienne Davignon of Belgium as its Chairman and Ulf Lantzke
of West Germany as its Executive Director, adopted an energy pro-
gram, and decided upon a schedule for “standing groups” to meet on
various topics. Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Enders, who spoke
last on November 18, delivered a strong statement on the immediate
need to organize a long-term cooperation program. (Telegram 27638
from USOECD Paris, November 20; National Archives, RG 59, Central
Foreign Policy Files, D740335–0870) He also submitted a U.S. proposal
for such a program, which recommended “immediate action” in two
areas to reduce dependence on imported oil: 1) “Establishment of a
concrete framework of cooperation, including agreement on guiding
principles and the establishment of procedures for the regular review
and coordination of our national energy policies as they relate to our
common goal of reduced dependence”; and 2) “prompt implementa-
tion of a joint work program, including jointly conceived and financed
projects and common programs which tie together national activities
August 1974–April 1975 81
under a common set of goals and guidelines.” (Telegram 27839 from
USOECD Paris, November 21; ibid., D740355–0456)
On November 19, the Governing Board discussed the question of a
producer/consumer dialogue, as well as a French proposal for a “tri-
partite conference” on oil. The consensus among the group was that
there was “no urgency to make contact with producers,” and that it
was “most important to prepare groundwork thoroughly” if con-
sumers were to “create a position of maximum negotiating strength.”
Enders argued that this strength could “only come through taking
tough decisions soon on conservation and accelerated development,”
creating a supply/demand shift that would force prices down sharply.
The consumers could not “‘jawbone’ the producers out of income they
clearly believe they are entitled to,” he said. At the conclusion of the
discussions, Davignon said that on the issue of a “negotiating position
for the consumers to take in meetings with producers” the IEA should
manage the dialogue with France, which did not initially join the orga-
nization over concerns about alienating oil-producers. (Telegram 27921
from USOECD Paris, November 21; ibid., D740337–0970) The original
IEA membership included Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, West
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United
Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of
Paris, November 20, 1974, 1104Z.
27637. Subject: US-French Energy Relations.
1. Summary: We recommend that USG propose tradeoff to GOF on
current energy issues which would balance US acceptance in principle
of producer-consumer conference in mid 1975 against GOF acceptance
of close preparation for such conference within IEA, and support for
US recycling proposal.
Consultations should begin soonest if this
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, D740335–0877.
Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Bonn, Brussels for the Embassy and USEC,
Copenhagen, Dublin, Luxembourg, London, Rome, The Hague, and Tokyo for the
See Document 15.
82 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XXXVII
agreement to be formally reached, as it best would be, by two Presi-
dents at Martinique. End summary.
2. While initial French reaction to Secretary Kissinger’s speech
been to downplay differences between US and French positions, it ap-
pears clear to us and undoubtedly to GOF that serious differences re-
main over tactics and timing for a future oil conference. French efforts
to convince other invitees to accept GOF ideas for such a conference
may now run into stiffer resistance as result of USG reaction, and may
cause rift among EC members.
3. We believe French are unlikely to abandon conference idea
readily. This is not solely because of pride or because Giscard’s oppo-
nents from both ends of political spectrum would jump on him for
bowing to American pressure, but also because GOF firmly believes
that dialogue with producers is required and should start as soon as
possible; French balance of payments situation is such that GOF cannot
afford new oil price increases while negotiating situation ripens. We
believe however that French would be prepared to be flexible on timing
if they were to know that oil negotiations would indeed take place be-
fore too long.
4. As seen from Paris, a USG–GOF clash over this issue would not
be in our interest. It would prevent any real success at Martinique and
would probably usher in a period of embittered relations with the new
French Government. More importantly, it would split Europe on an is-
sue which as we see it most European governments would rather see
bridged over, and would also divert the EC from taking those joint en-
ergy policy steps—setting goals for reduced oil consumption and in-
creased energy production—which are basically supportive of our
goals in the IEA. Finally, it would probably provoke a French reversion
to an aggressively independent energy policy and because of France’s
key role in the EC, energy cooperation among consuming countries
will continue to be much more workable with than without France.
5. We believe that a US–GOF confrontation can be avoided, and
that we have the elements of a compromise which can both strengthen
the consumer cooperation in IEA and ease French fears that the US in-
tends to use the IEA to prepare for a confrontation with the oil produc-
ers. The settlement we propose could be struck at Martinique in a way
which moreover could open the way to more cooperative and produc-
tive US–French relations. Our proposal would consist essentially of
trading US agreement in principle to the holding of a producer-
consumer conference (possibly during the summer of 1975) against
French agreement to cooperate and consult fully with the members of
See footnote 4, Document 17.
August 1974–April 1975 83
the IEA in preparing a common consumer position for such a confer-
ence, and to support our recycling proposal. Such an exchange would
give Giscard the conference he wants—but only after a reasonable de-
lay in which the consumer position could be further consolidated. In re-
turn, France would have to associate itself much more closely with the
formulation of that consumer position within the IEA and, if possible,
commit itself to joining the IEA in due process.
6. To reach this objective, preparation through high-level discus-
sions with the GOF must begin immediately. Giscard has put the ques-
tion of EC support for French conference proposal on the agenda of the
EC Summit which will probably take place December 9–10. It is essen-
tial that we have at least a tacit understanding with GOF and adequate
consultations with our major IEA partners before that date if we are to
avoid a harmful clash between France and the EC 8, or to bring this pro-
posed deal to a conclusion at Martinique. If the Department agrees with
this proposal, I recommend that the process of consultation begin with-
Washington, December 5, 1974, 11 a.m.
Helmut Schmidt, Chancellor, Federal Republic of Germany
Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Vice Chancellor and Minister of Foreign Affairs
Berndt Von Staden, Ambassador to the United States
President Gerald R. Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Ambassador Martin J. Hillenbrand, Ambassador to the Federal Republic of
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National
Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations,
Box 7. Secret. The meeting was held in the Oval Office.
84 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XXXVII
[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to energy.]
Schmidt: Back to Giscard and oil. As I understand him, as a
person—we have talked often over the last weeks—he is willing with
you to bring about not only what looks like but really serves the pur-
poses of consolidation. With his consent. I will sketch out a few ideas
on which you and he might publicly agree.
We must avoid, if possible, a consumer-producer confrontation,
because the consumers are weaker—Europe much more than the
United States. Europe is very dependent on Middle East oil. No one
thinks we should risk confrontation if it can be avoided. So we need
government-to-government working relations with the producers. We
think we can combine the proposals raised by OECD, the U.S. ideas,
and Giscard’s carelessly launched ideas. (He consulted apparently no
Why not a sequence of three phases?
(1) Giscard invites a February meeting of senior civil servants to
Paris to set a date and invitations to a consumer-producer conference,
maybe for June, and define what might be discussed. Then everyone
will know a conference will happen and that consensus of consumers
and producers (separately) must evolve.
(2) A consumer caucus, in which France then must join. And
(3) a consumer-producer meeting.
Giscard will buy this. Before all this, we should do something pri-
vate—a small group of private citizens with access to their gov-
ernments (12–15 people) to have a meeting of brains. You could send
Shultz. Iran would send someone, and Saudi Arabia, and Algeria.
There has never been a brainstorming conference like this in the eco-
nomic area—it would be like Pugwash
—with the producers. The Shah
is not capable of knowing what he has done to the world.
During a conversation with the President and Scowcroft prior to the meeting with
Schmidt, Kissinger asserted: “Schmidt will mumble about not wanting a confrontation. It
is a false argument. We are not seeking one—but the key is the solidarity of the con-
sumers. Schmidt will want a producer contribution to the fund. But that defeats the pur-
pose and destroys our solidarity—they could contribute after the second year, after we
get going. You must put this to him on the unity of the West. Schmidt worries that he and
we will bear the burden and the others will relax. He is right. Tell him we will insist on a
country putting its own house in order before it can borrow.” (Ibid.)
Reference is to the October 24 press conference at which Giscard proposed a con-
sumer-producer conference. See Document 12.
The 24th session of the Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs opened
on August 28 in Vienna. The meetings first began 17 years earlier in Pugwash, Nova
August 1974–April 1975 85
This is a personal idea. Someone would have to host, but gov-
ernments would be recipients of the ideas.
The governments of the producers don’t understand. The French
Government doesn’t. Giscard himself may.
President: Let me think about it. We strongly feel there must be a
higher unity among the consumers—not on the basis of a confronta-
tion, but to know that we as consumers know our options, and soon.
Without that, if we go even to a preparatory conference, we will get off
on the wrong foot.
Schmidt: I agree. Secretary Kissinger knows I am trying to help.
Kissinger: Indeed, I told the President about your help at the
Washington Energy Conference.
Schmidt: But it may appear, if you attempt to do this first, before
anything, it looks like a consumer cartel. If you wrap it as I suggest, it
avoids this. You must defuse French policy in the Middle East. In re-
sponse, the French would have to participate.
Kissinger: Aside from the merits, there are a number of phony ar-
guments. What confrontation is there? Our relations with the pro-
ducers are as good as anybody’s. The French are saying we want a
Schmidt: And U.S. citizens traveling abroad.
President: Then they are ill-informed. But if consumers don’t have
some unison, we could go down the path to ineffective results.
Schmidt: I agree. But you are viewed as seeking a confrontation.
Kissinger: If bilateral relations with the producers aren’t coordi-
nated among the consumers before the meeting, a meeting will pro-
duce the same uncoordinated babble. We don’t want a confrontation.
You could argue that if we aren’t coordinated, a conference would fail
and then a confrontation would be inevitable.
Wise producers can’t want the destruction of the consumers. I
agree with Giscard. But French diplomats are stimulating these ideas of
the U.S. wanting a confrontation.
Schmidt: How would you do it?
Kissinger: Giscard is committed to a producers conference. We are
not opposed, and we could even agree on a tentative date. But we
would reverse stages A and B. We first need consumer unity. We had a
letter from Sauvagnargues in Tokyo, in which he said a producers con-
ference only makes sense if preceded by consumer cooperation.
See footnote 3, Document 2.
Sauvagnargues’s letter was not found. It was presumably a response to Kissin-
ger’s letter in Document 18.
86 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XXXVII
start preparation for a consumer/producer conference, maneuvering
would start. We can save Giscard’s face by getting the President’s com-
mitment to a producers conference. The basic point is whether a pro-
ducers conference is one where the West continues its civil war or
whether we can get a unified approach.
French diplomats are using the producers conference in an
anti-American campaign. It actually helps us because it makes us look
We worry about an unstructured conference. We want a long-term
solution which avoids confrontation.
Boumediene said to me, “If you want a slight political price cut we
can talk; if a deep cut, we can’t talk.”
Schmidt: A private meeting would help to get an understanding
on this point.
Kissinger: A producers conference could accentuate the sense of
impotence of the West that could offset all policies.
Schmidt: I am convinced.
President: The problem is to save France’s face and make it work.
Let’s try to find a formula which will work and let me finalize it at
Schmidt: There are two technical problems: (1) Indexing. I am to-
tally opposed. But there is some validity for producers to want a guar-
antee of the real price of oil.
Kissinger: It depends on the price.
Schmidt: The second problem is the $25 billion fund, about which I
am hesitant. It is an invitation for Britain and Italy to continue with in-
flation. It takes away from the Arabs the risks of investment and puts it
on us. Third, I can’t commit my country to that amount. $4 billion is an
enormous burden on our budget. It would explode my budget.
President: It gives us more freedom to have our own funds, so we
are not then dependent on both the oil produced and the money
Kissinger: It could be used to introduce discipline.
Schmidt: Italy wouldn’t fulfill the conditions.
Kissinger: If we borrow from the producers now, we have insti-
tuted a producers/consumers dialogue right away.
Schmidt: The U.S. economy is 5 to 6 times as strong as ours. We are
just a medium-size economy. I couldn’t risk being called on to pay out
billions. I would have to borrow from the Arabs.
Kissinger: Better you than the Italians.
Schmidt: Yes. But then I take all the bad risks and the Arabs get the
good risks. I would have to get parliamentary approval.
August 1974–April 1975 87
President: If we had the right kind of consumer unanimity, we
could get Congressional approval.
Schmidt: If it wouldn’t be used, I could make it, but . . .
Scowcroft’s handwritten notes and the typed transcript end here. Before Ford’s
next meeting with Schmidt in the Oval Office on December 6, Kissinger told the Presi-
dent: “On a consumer-producers conference we must hold firm. We need to manage the
energy thing for the political unity of the West. Military defense is not enough. We must
have a big joint effort. The Japanese have in effect bit it. We can’t go to a preliminary con-
ference. We can agree to it in principle and a target date. But tell him we won’t go to a
badly prepared producers’ conference. The faster we get consumer cooperation, the
quicker we can have a consumer-producer conference. If he wants to do something with
Giscard, we can immediately work on the consumer efforts.” (Memorandum of conver-
sation, December 6; Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversa-
tions, Box 7) In their meeting later that morning, Ford and Schmidt covered much of the
same ground on energy cooperation that they had the previous day. (Ibid.)
Download 8.4 Mb.
Do'stlaringiz bilan baham:
ma'muriyatiga murojaat qiling