Foreign relations of the united states 1969–1976 volume XXXVII energy crisis, 1974–1980 department of state washington
Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in
Download 8.4 Mb.Pdf ko'rish
- Bu sahifa navigatsiya:
- Kissinger 72. Memorandum From Robert Hormats and Robert Oakley of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy
Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in
Washington, July 15, 1975, 0018Z.
165677. Subject: Status of Preparations for Resumption of Producer-
1. Please pass following message to Davignon from Assistant Sec-
2. I want to give you our assessment of the current state of play on
the resumption of the dialogue following our talks with the French
during Secretary Kissinger’s visit to Paris last Thursday.
3. The French now agree that the dialogue should resume with a
second meeting of the Kleber group. This meeting would be followed
by a conference at Ministerial level of the 27 countries tentatively
agreed upon in April. Both meetings would be short, thoroughly pre-
pared, and with the purpose of establishing 3 commissions on energy,
raw materials, and development.
4. On the question of timing, the French have come around to the
view that it is not feasible to try to reconvene the preparatory meeting
before the UN Special Session. They showed some initial preference for
a meeting before the September OPEC session, but I believe they now
agree that this is also impracticable and that we should aim for early
October. They would share the IEA view that there should be some an-
nouncement of the reconvening of the preparatory meeting and subse-
quent timetable before the UN Special Session, i.e. before the end of
August. On this basis, we would announce within the next several
weeks that the preparatory meeting would reconvene in early October.
The Ministerial meeting would follow within approximately 60 days
and the commissions could begin their work before the end of the year.
5. On the basis of our bilateral talks with the Iranians, Saudis, Ven-
ezuelans, and Brazilians, we are confident that this general approach
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P850036–2610. Se-
cret; Immediate; Nodis; Stadis. Drafted by Bosworth, cleared by Roger A. Sorenson (E)
and Preeg, and approved by Enders. Repeated Immediate to USOECD Paris.
Kissinger met with Sauvagnargues in Paris on July 9. They agreed that by the end
of August, before the next OPEC meeting and before the UN Special Session, they should
announce that they recommended the resumption of a producer/consumer dialogue.
They also discussed establishing one commission to tackle commodity issues, which
Kissinger said the United States preferred “except for energy.” Kissinger also said that by
the time of the UN meeting, the U.S. Government would overcome internal differences
and settle on a unified commodity policy. (Ibid., Records of Henry Kissinger, Lot 91D414,
Box 11, Classified External Memoranda of Conversations, July 1975) Kissinger also met
with Giscard, and their discussion is described in telegram 17951 from Paris, July 10.
(Ibid., Central Foreign Policy Files, P840084–1763)
April 1975–October 1975 245
on procedure and timing will be acceptable to them. However, there
are still some key points which remain to be resolved both with the
French and with the Seven. On the question of participation, the French
are somewhat vague about our earlier understanding reached in April
that the 19 LDCs represented at the conference of 27 would include 8
OPEC members. We believe this is an important condition and one
which we must nail down before convening a second Prepcon. The
French also want to leave the question of membership on the commis-
sions themselves in the hands of the two groups (the 8 industrialized
representatives and the 19 LDCs). We continue to prefer objective crite-
ria for determining membership on the commissions, and have re-
ceived tentative endorsement of this approach from Venezuela.
6. On the critical question of the autonomy of the commissions and
whether they will report back to a second conference of the 27, the
French are now talking in terms of a “stock taking” meeting of the 27
some 6 months after the first meeting and the launching of the commis-
sions. They argue that this second meeting can be kept both short and
procedural in nature. We continue to have reservations on this score. If
the large conference can meet every six months, soon it will be meeting
for six months at a time and will have practically preempted the dia-
logue, thereby condemning it to sterility. But we recognize that pres-
sure is building for some kind of a schedule, and this is a key issue we
will want to discuss at the next Governing Board meeting.
7. The role of the IEA in the resumed dialogue is also still at issue.
In our view, agreement to reconvene the preparatory meeting in the
same format means by definition that the IEA will be present as an ob-
server. We can seek through previous negotiation to establish the cos-
metics of this presence in such a way as to minimize the possibilities for
confrontation with the Algerians. But we can not agree to exclude the
IEA from the preparatory meeting. As for the Ministerial meeting of 27,
we should consider in the IEA whether in fact IEA presence is required
since the scope of that meeting would cover all economic relations
between industrialized and developing countries. On the other hand,
the IEA must be present as an observer with the right to speak in the
8. The French have told us that they plan to circulate soon to the
Group of Ten a paper
laying out what in their judgment could be a
basis for resuming the dialogue. This would be the vehicle through
which agreement among the Ten would be crystallized and assurance
obtained against another failure. If we receive the French paper before
the July 28 Governing Board meeting, we would not plan to respond to
246 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XXXVII
it formally until after we have had an opportunity for full IEA consulta-
tion at that meeting. In the meantime, we will continue our bilateral
contacts with the Seven, and Under Secretary Robinson now plans to
visit Algeria during the week of July 21.
9. At the July 28 Governing Board meeting, I think we should try to
reach agreement on the timetable as well as the basic questions of
format and procedure. In particular, I think we will have to reach a po-
sition on the “reporting back” issue which I view as the key unresolved
proposals for moving ahead at the July 28 meeting on both long term
cooperation and the emergency system. I believe it is particularly im-
portant on the former that we make steady progress toward our De-
cember 1 date, narrowing each of the key issues in each meeting as we
did during the ECG negotiation of the IEP itself.
According to a message from Enders to Kissinger, at the July 28 IEA Governing
Board meeting, “consultations with other members” of the Board on resuming the
producer/consumer dialogue “went according to plan.” “No substantive objections”
were raised to the proposals that the United States had given to France, Enders wrote. He
added that the “main focus of discussion” was the IEA’s role in the dialogue, and that the
Board agreed with the U.S. position that 1) the IEA “should be present” at the new prep-
con on the “same basis as before,” but “would not ask to speak”; and 2) the IEA would
“be asked to participate as an observer in the energy commission” with the “right to
speak.” Japan and Italy worried that the United States had not mentioned IEA participa-
tion in consultation with oil producers and wanted to be sure that IEA participation
would not become a “make-or-break issue” upon the dialogue’s resumption. (Telegram
19570 from USOECD Paris, July 28; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy
Davignon replied that “in general” he agreed with the U.S. position and that he
was “particularly pleased with the Department’s views on IEA participation at the sec-
ond preparatory meeting and on the energy commission.” (Telegram 6417 from Brussels,
July 15; ibid., P850081–2024)
April 1975–October 1975 247
Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in
Washington, July 24, 1975, 1425Z.
174416. Subject: Message for Sauvagnargues.
1. Please transmit the following message to Foreign Minister
I understand that, as a result of the several discussions between Di-
rector of Economic Affairs Froment-Meurice and Under Secretary Rob-
inson during the past few days,
we appear to have resolved the re-
maining questions regarding resumption of the producer/consumer
dialogue. I have also learned from Under Secretary Robinson that, al-
though the Algerians continue to hold some reservations regarding the
plan, they are now prepared to support our initiative on this basis.
To avoid any possible misunderstanding we reconfirm our will-
ingness to proceed with this dialogue—and have also obtained agree-
ment from most of the key participants in the original Group of Ten—
on the basis of the four-stage approach outlined below:
1. The Group of Ten which met in Paris in April to reconvene again
in Paris on October 6 for a meeting to establish the basis for selection of
an additional seventeen participants, thereby expanding the group to
twenty-seven. Eight would be from the industrialized nations and
nineteen from developing nations, of which eight will be members of
OPEC. The industrialized and developing nations will each select their
additional members on a basis assuring a properly representative ex-
The Group of Ten will also agree on the formation of three com-
missions to deal with the problems of (A) energy, (B) other commod-
ities, and (C) development—each with not more than fifteen partici-
pants selected from the group of twenty-seven.
In addition, the Group of Ten will select the site for the meeting
of the enlarged Group of Twenty-Seven, presumably Geneva or
Paris, and the chairman for that meeting which could be from a
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P850038–1826. Se-
cret; Flash; Nodis. Drafted by Robinson; cleared by Sonnenfeldt, Enders, Hartman, and
Preeg; and approved by Kissinger.
The July 24 conversation between Robinson and Froment-Meurice is summarized
in a July 24 memorandum from the Under Secretary to Kissinger. (Ibid., P830152–1204)
Telegram 1640 from Algiers, July 21, contains an account of Robinson’s meeting
with Boumediene. (Ibid., Central Foreign Policy Files P860035–0233)
248 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XXXVII
neutral country, or a revolving arrangement acceptable to the Group
2. The Group of Twenty-Seven will meet thirty to sixty days later
at the site selected and after the additional seventeen participants have
been selected and formally invited. This will be a short two-day
meeting at Ministerial level. Its primary objective will be to confirm the
decisions reached at the Group of Ten meeting for establishment of (A)
three separate commissions, (B) brief guidelines for commission work,
and (C) reporting-back procedures.
3. The three commissions will be formed on the basis previously
agreed by the Group of Ten. Industrialized and developing nations will
each select their representatives on these commissions approximately
preserving the eight-to-nineteen relationship within the group of
twenty-seven. General criteria reflecting degree of direct involvement
in the subject matters of each commission will be applied in this selec-
tion process with the understanding that the results must be generally
acceptable to the group of twenty-seven. Each commission will main-
tain a free exchange of information with the other commissions and
with other international fora as considered appropriate by each
Any of the three commissions may establish a sub-commission for
consideration of monetary and financial matters related to its subject
4. The Group of Twenty-Seven will reconvene again at Ministerial
level after twelve months from the launching of the commissions to re-
ceive progress reports from all three commissions. This will be a
two-day meeting with the understanding that there will be no substan-
tive debate. At this meeting consideration will be given to possible fu-
ture action on the part of any or all of the commissions.
In addition, we are in agreement on the status of observers, with
both OPEC and IEA invited to sit behind a single plate labeled “ob-
servers” at the Group of Ten meeting with the understanding that no
observer will speak. There will be no observers at the meetings of the
Group of Twenty-Seven, but both OPEC and IEA will be invited to par-
ticipate in energy commission meetings with the right to speak.
You and I have worked together intimately with a mutual desire to
see a resumption of the dialogue for which you served as host at the ini-
tial Prepcon in Paris last April. In this spirit and with the same desire to
maintain the close cooperation between us, we would support your is-
suance of a letter to the members of the Group of Ten which contains
the terms of the plan outlined above on which we are now agreed, and
which makes clear that its acceptance by all participants is a condition
for issuance of invitations to a reconvened meeting. We share your con-
viction that there must be a commitment to this plan in advance to
April 1975–October 1975 249
avoid confusion which could threaten the success of this meeting. Our
detailed bilateral discussions with key participants could be helpful in
guiding this approach to avoid unnecessary problems. I hope that you
and I will continue to maintain close and continuing contact as this im-
portant process evolves. Warmest regards. Henry A. Kissinger.”
Washington, July 25, 1975.
Oil Price Increase
As you know, there is increasingly heated controversy within this
country over the price of oil and gas, and its consequences for the
economy. This pertains to the programs proposed by the President and
by Congress for domestic energy (decontrol, price levels, etc.) and to
the price of foreign oil. There is a strong body of criticism that in the for-
eign field the Administration has made no effort to keep OPEC oil
prices down, just as it is pushing prices up domestically.
In order to prepare for a possible OPEC price rise this fall (the in-
formal interagency consensus is that it will be about $1.50 per barrel),
the President needs to have a thorough analysis of the problem and the
options open to him in dealing with it. Next week CEA will table a pa-
per in the EPB on the economic effects of an OPEC oil price increase this
preparing for this contingency. A second aspect is to identify those do-
mestic monetary and fiscal policy options available to offset the eco-
nomic impact of the increase. This task will almost certainly be given to
CEA and their collaborators on the economic effects paper.
Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Files of NSC Logged
Documents, Box 24, 7505097—Oil Price Increase. Secret. Sent for action. At the top of the
page, Scowcroft wrote “OK” and initialed.
250 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XXXVII
The third aspect of the problem—more basic and probably more
important—is to examine what we can do to discourage or minimize
the price increase. The President has stated that it would be “unaccept-
able,” but has not adduced any convincing arguments that it will not
occur. Treasury continues to make threatening noises on its own, but is
not thinking through what can actually be done. There have also been
threatening statements from Defense, although the President has pub-
licly ruled out the use of military force under present circumstances.
State publicly follows the Administration line of concern, but internally
seems rather indifferent.
In fact, there has been no systematic analysis of what possible ac-
tions might be taken to induce OPEC not to raise oil prices, the likely
effects of such actions, and the desirability of undertaking them. In the
absence of such a systematic study, there can be no firm guidance from
the President and Secretary Kissinger to the rest of the Executive
Branch on what to do and say about possible OPEC oil price increases.
Moreover, we are open to accusations by critics like Senators Church
that there has been no systematic study of the problem and
that the Administration refuses to use its alleged “leverage” with the
oil producers (e.g., cutting off or restricting arms deliveries, stopping
the sale of food or manufactured products or raising their prices).
We intend to prepare a systematic study of available options for
dealing with a possible OPEC oil price increase.
This will form the
third part of the package which the President needs, complementing
the two being done by the CEA. Given the sensitivity of this question,
we will use the same quiet approach we have used successfully in pre-
paring Contingency Studies for a possible oil embargo.
been no publicity about or leak from this ad hoc NSC-chaired group
its six months of existence.) We will submit the draft study to you for
review before circulating it to other agencies or the EPB. We will tell the
EPB that the NSC will undertake such a study and will make it avail-
able to the EPB Executive Committee when it is completed.
Senators Frank Church (D–ID) and Richard Stone (D–FL).
See Document 93.
See Document 40.
No record of this group has been found.
April 1975–October 1975 251
Minutes of the Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting
Washington, July 25, 1975, 8–9:06 a.m.
[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to energy.]
Mr. Robinson: You know, we ran into a snag on the producer-
consumer conference with Yamani. I’ll go ahead with it.
Secretary Kissinger: Yes, but we are not sucking around him. For
anyone who doesn’t want a conference there’s not going to be a confer-
ence, and you’re not taking a trip out there; and the French are not
going to mediate this.
We’ve stated our position. We’ve spent a month negotiating it.
Anyone wanting to jump off now—they’ll have to hold a conference
without the United States.
Mr. Robinson: I’ll proceed on that basis.
Secretary Kissinger: In fact, I better call Sauvagnargues today.
Mr. Robinson: “You’re going to be in touch with us.” It might be
Secretary Kissinger: Their position or our position? If they don’t
want to send out a letter of invitation, fine; we don’t need the
Mr. Robinson: Well, that’s the position I took. We don’t want a
conference on this basis. There’s been something that went on between
the Saudis and France in this negotiation this last week that is behind
Secretary Kissinger: The French want to have something to me-
Mr. Robinson: They’ve asked me to mediate this one.
Secretary Kissinger: What?
Mr. Robinson: They asked me to mediate this one. They asked me
to get it cleared up.
Secretary Kissinger: I just think it’s undignified to ask someone
from the United States to send someone out on such a technical point.
I’d be glad to write to Yamani if that adds to it.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Secretary of State Kissinger’s
Staff Meetings, Lot 78D443, Box 3, Secretary’s Staff Meetings. Secret. Kissinger presided
over the meeting, which was attended by all the principal officers of the Department or
their designated alternates. A table of contents and list of attendees are not printed.
252 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XXXVII
Mr. Robinson: It might help. Why don’t I reword the cable
put it on that basis?
Secretary Kissinger: Why I clear cables in the evening if they don’t
go out anyway is not clear to me.
Mr. Adams: No. I gave it immediately to S/S.
Mr. Robinson: I want to clear the wording with NEA before it goes
[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to energy.]
Robinson sent a message to Yamani that day, writing: “I have just learned from
Froment-Meurice of the French Government that you have indicated unwillingness to re-
sume the producer-consumer dialogue unless there is agreement to form a full commis-
sion dealing with monetary and financial affairs.” Robinson concluded: “We have con-
ceded to the wishes of the developing nations on other key matters and I now ask for
your cooperation on this one remaining issue.” (Telegram 175796 to Jidda, July 25; ibid.,
Central Foreign Policy Files, P850059–1688) On July 31, Akins reported that he had pre-
sented Robinson’s letter to Yamani, who continued to “insist on creation of a fourth com-
mittee on monetary and financial matters as precondition to reconvening of prepcon.”
(Telegram 5371 from Jidda; ibid., P850126–2379)
Download 8.4 Mb.
Do'stlaringiz bilan baham:
ma'muriyatiga murojaat qiling