Foreign relations of the united states 1969–1976 volume XXXVII energy crisis, 1974–1980 department of state washington
Download 8.4 Mb.Pdf ko'rish
- Bu sahifa navigatsiya:
- Christopher 269. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Venezuela, Nigeria, and Saudi Arabia
- 270. Memorandum of Conversation
- 271. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (Komer) to the President’s Special Representative for Economic Summits (Owen)
- R.W. Komer
Leslie J. Goldman
Printed from a copy with this typed signature and an indication that Goldman
signed the original.
Washington, April 28, 1980, 0415Z.
112008. Subject: De´marche In Response to Iranian Oil Cutoff.
1. Entire text Confidential.
2. Posts should promptly approach host government to inform
them of measures taken or being contemplated by the U.S. Government
in response to the cutoff of Iranian oil to Japanese and British oil com-
panies and to seek their cooperation in coordinated efforts aimed at
avoiding the repetition of last year’s price explosion in the world oil
3. You may draw upon the following talking points:
(A) The National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) is seeking a $2.50
per barrel increase in the price of Iranian oil. British and Japanese oil
companies which were purchasing Iranian oil have refused to buy at
the higher price and on April 21 Iran stopped all crude oil deliveries to
(B) Because of this, Iranian exports have reportedly fallen substan-
tially. It is possible that Iran will find other customers for a portion of its
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, D800212–0983.
Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Todd and approved by Rosen. Repeated to
Algiers, Abu Dhabi, Baghdad, Caracas, Doha, Jakarta, Jidda, Kuwait, Lagos, Libreville,
Mexico, and Quito.
846 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XXXVII
exports, although it will probably have to lower its asking price in
order to do so.
(C) In the meantime, we are seeking ways to cope with the cutoff in
order to prevent an explosion of spot prices which could lead to in-
creased OPEC official prices such as occurred in 1979.
(D) At this time, loss of Iranian oil to UK and Japan ought not to
pose unmanageable difficulties if the oil consuming countries coop-
erate in several ways.
(E) We urge IEA member governments and France to counsel their
oil companies to refrain from spot purchases beyond normal levels and
at unwarranted prices.
(F) Consuming countries should also urge producers with whom
they have influence to increase production to offset the impact on the
market of the loss of Iranian supplies.
(G) The United States is taking the following measures:
—We are discussing with the major U.S. oil companies ways of al-
locating oil within their systems on a consumption basis, to ensure that
countries which suffer an interruption in oil supplies from Iran do not
bear an unfair burden;
—We are actively seeking antitrust mechanisms (i.e., Business Re-
view Letters) to improve the capability of U.S. oil companies to operate
more effectively in dealing with shortfalls which may emerge;
—We are approaching certain producing countries in OPEC and
elsewhere to encourage them to maintain or increase production levels;
—With respect to the spot market, we are ready to implement im-
mediately a quick response reporting system; this will give us lifting
prices for crude imports by our 35 largest refiners, with a maximum lag
of two weeks from the date of loading;
—We are already discussing with our largest companies the need
to avoid spot market pressure, and have alerted them to the prospect of
coordinated IEA action;
—We are willing to consider with other IEA members additional
measures to dampen spot market pressures.
4. For Tokyo: Please assure GOJ that we have their requests very
much in mind. We continue to work with U.S. oil majors and with oil
producing countries, and we are actively considering what else we can
do. In the meantime, however, it will be important that the GOJ do
what it can to keep companies from paying high spot prices, to draw
down stocks as required in the interim, and to share supplies as neces-
sary among refiners.
5. For London and Oslo: We urge that the UK and Norway maxi-
mize production during this period in order to alleviate the impact of
the Iranian cutoff.
January 1979–January 1981 847
6. For London and Paris: Host governments should be encouraged
to approach Iraq, Kuwait, and the UAE to seek expanded production.
269. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in
Venezuela, Nigeria, and Saudi Arabia
Washington, April 28, 1980, 0037Z.
112009. Subject: Approach Re Increased Oil Production.
1. Entire text Confidential.
2. Unless you believe it would be counterproductive, Embassy Ca-
racas should promptly approach host government to urge that current
oil production levels be increased to meet market demand stemming
from cutoff of Iranian oil to Japanese oil companies, British Petroleum
and Shell. Embassy Lagos should make a similar approach, expressing
USG appreciation that oil production was not reduced April 1, and urg-
ing that present output be maintained and if possible increased. Posts
may draw upon the following points:
—Since Iranian oil exports resumed in March 1979, Iran has de-
manded prices not justified by traditional standards of quality and lo-
cation, and it is not surprising that the market will not support Iran’s
latest price hikes.
—The absence of substantial quantities of Iranian oil in the market-
place risks renewal of unsettling pressures on the spot market, which,
owing to joint efforts by producers and consumers, has recently been in
somewhat better balance.
—Any disturbances in the world oil market at this time will further
exacerbate the current delicate state of the world economy.
—The United States is pursuing a strong conservation policy and
producing at maximum levels; we believe orderly oil market condi-
tions are in the best interests of producers and consumers alike.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, D800212–0980.
Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Todd; cleared by Hinton, Twinam, Michael
A. Armacost (EA), and Edward L. Morse (E) and in ARA/AND, AF/W, and DOE/IA;
and approved by Rosen. Repeated Priority to all OECD capitals, Algiers, Abu Dhabi, Ja-
karta, Kuwait, Baghdad, Doha, Quito, Libreville, and Mexico, and to Helsinki and
848 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XXXVII
—Thus we urge producer governments, especially those which re-
cently reduced oil production levels, to increase output to meet market
demand resulting from the loss of Iranian oil exports.
3. For Jidda: Unless Ambassador West sees overriding reasons not
to do so because of the other pressures on our relationship at this time,
it would be helpful if he could make our concerns known to Petroleum
Minister Yamani, and pursue with him in the context of the SAG effort
to reunify OPEC oil prices Yamani’s thoughts on what might be done to
encourage other producers with the capacity of doing so to increase
production at this time, and whether the Saudis might be helpful in this
4. Info addressees in oil producing nations may draw upon this
message if they believe it might be useful, or if they discern any evi-
dence that host governments might be contemplating a reduction in
present oil production levels. FYI We are suggesting to the British and
French Governments that they consider making similar approaches in
Iraq, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates.
January 1979–January 1981 849
270. Memorandum of Conversation
Washington, May 1, 1980, noon–2 p.m.
Summary of the President’s Meeting with Prime Minister Ohira of Japan
President Jimmy Carter
Vice President Walter Mondale
Acting Secretary, Warren Christopher
Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown
Secretary of Treasury, William Miller
Secretary of Energy, Charles Duncan
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Zbigniew Brzezinski
Special Trade Representative, Reubin Askew
Ambassador Mike Mansfield, Ambassador to Japan
Ambassador Henry Owen, Ambassador at Large
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Richard Holbrooke
NSC Staff Member, Donald Gregg (Notetaker)
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Michael
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Nicholas Platt
Japan Desk Officer, Alan Romberg
United States Interpreter, Cornelius Iida
Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira of Japan
Foreign Minister, Saburo Okita
Ambassador Yoshio Okawara, Ambassador to The United States
Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary, Koichi Kato
Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, Yasue Katori
Minister Kiyoshi Sumiya
Director-General, North American Affairs Bureau, Shinichiro Asao
Director-General, Economic Affairs Bureau, Reishi Teshima
Director of the First North American Division, Hiroshi Fukuda
Executive Assistant to the Prime Minister, Yoshiyasu Sato
Counselor, Embassy of Japan, Koichiro Matsuura
First Secretary, Yutaka Kawashima
Chief of Second North American Bureau, Kazuo Ogura
Japanese Interpreter, Sadaaki Numata
The President opened the meeting by extending greetings to Prime
Minister Ohira as a great leader and a great friend. Prime Minister
Ohira responded by saying that he was pleased to be meeting with the
Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File,
Box 38, President’s Memoranda of Conversation. Secret. The meeting was held in the
Cabinet Room of the White House. Prime Minister Ohira visited Washington April
30–May 1. Documentation on his visit, including the full text of this memorandum of con-
versation, is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, volume XIV,
850 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XXXVII
President in very trying times. Ohira said that he was gratified by the
strong leadership exerted by President Carter, not only for Japan’s sake
but for the entire world. He said he hoped to revitalize the underlying
trust which exists between our two countries.
[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to energy.]
In a more serious vein, the President said that he recognized the
special significance of actions taken by Japan in not buying high-priced
The President said that he knew that this action had been a
difficult one for Japan, but that it had been highly important to have
held the line on oil prices. The President added that if Iran continues to
sell its oil to other countries, the total world supply ought to be suffi-
cient for Japan to make up its short-fall. This is particularly true, the
President noted, since both our countries have good oil reserves at the
moment. The President said that countries like Mexico and Saudi
Arabia have been asked to increase their production, to help ease the
situation. The President went on to say, however, that he wanted Prime
Minister Ohira to know that the US will help Japan acquire oil, if such a
need arises. The President said that in an emergency situation, Amer-
ican oil could go to Japan. He added that he did not feel that this would
be necessary, since Japan purchases oil so wisely. The President said
that he felt that he could get US oil companies to help Japan voluntarily,
and had the authority to order it on a mandatory basis, should the need
arise. The President said that this assurance was being offered in the
privacy of the meeting, but that it could be made public at a later time,
should Japan wish. The President concluded by saying that should
Japan decide to trigger the IEA plan, the US would support its position.
Ohira expressed his gratitude for the President’s offer. He said that
Japan has to be careful in its oil purchases so as not to “disturb the
world market.” It was for this reason that Japan refused to buy from
Iran at such a high price. Ohira said that if there were to be a sustained
world oil shortage, Japan would be in a difficult position. Ohira said
that if Japan got into “dire straits” it might ask for US help. Ohira again
thanked the President for his offer of oil, and for his stand on triggering
the IEA plan. As of now, Ohira said, Japan would try to meet its oil
needs through its own efforts.
The President said that since the Tokyo Summit, the US has made
progress in reducing oil consumption. As of now, the US is using and
importing 5% less oil than one year ago. He expressed the hope that
more countries can follow suit in reducing oil use. The President urged
Ohira to join forces with him in Venice to urge others to cut back on oil
use, and to thereby stabilize the international oil market. The President
See footnote 3, Document 267.
January 1979–January 1981 851
said that America’s reduction of oil use was a source of pride, but that
we can do more. He praised the fine example that Japan has set in terms
of limiting its oil use.
Ohira said that at least year’s Summit in Tokyo, the President had
taken the lead in setting oil ceilings. This had helped save the interna-
tional economy. Ohira noted that statistics show the progress America
has made in reducing oil use, but that all major countries need to do
more. Ohira said that along with setting numerical ceilings, we need to
develop policies that will sustain those numerical quotas. Such policies
will need to be developed on conservation, development of alternative
sources of energy, etc. Ohira joined the President in calling for more
progress to be made at Venice.
The President asked what the Japanese experience has been with
conservation over the past year. Ohira replied that Japan had been suc-
cessful in reaching its goal of 5% reduced oil consumption. In JFY (Japa-
nese Fiscal Year) 1979, oil use was 99.6% of the previous year, while the
economy grew by 6%. The President noted that the Japanese economy
is more efficient than ours. He noted that we use about 50% of our oil
for transportation. This means, the President noted, that we have the
potential to reduce oil use more. The President said that in the near fu-
ture, Congress will finish passing legislation involving tens of billions
of dollars that will be devoted to the development of alternative
sources of energy, and improved public transportation. He noted that
the recently passed windfall profits tax
will help pay for this program,
that will involve development of new technology, new plants and new
equipment to convert shale and coal into usable energy.
Foreign Minister Okita noted that Japan’s oil consumption has
held steady for the past six years, while its GNP has increased by 35%.
The President expressed admiration for this record, and said that
America had done well in terms of industrial energy use, but not in
[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to energy.]
President Carter signed the Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act (P.L. 96-223) on
April 2. For the text of his remarks on signing the bill, which he called “an historic step to
the Nation’s energy security,” see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Jimmy
852 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XXXVII
271. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy (Komer) to the President’s Special Representative for
Economic Summits (Owen)
Washington, May 8, 1980.
Harold, Dick Cooper, David Aaron and I agree that the energy
crunch has critical security implications which ought somehow to be
aired at the Venice Summit. Here are some propositions to prove the
Oil price increases are slowing economic growth and promoting
inflation in both developed countries and LDCs to an extent that is seri-
ously undermining needed real defense budget increases. In the US,
FRG, France, Japan and other countries added fuel costs appear to be
major reasons why defense strengthening cannot proceed faster and
why real budget increases instead get partially eaten up by inflation.
Indeed added fuel costs themselves are directly eating up an ever
greater proportion of defense outlays. The FY 80 DoD fuel bill alone
will be around $7 billion, compared to $3.3B in FY 79.
The oil cost impact is even greater on key LDCs like Korea, Thai-
land, Pakistan, and Turkey whose net outflow on oil account probably
exceeds the net inflow from foreign aid. We are providing massive mil-
itary and economic aid credits to these countries which will never be re-
paid because the money will go to OPEC instead.
The energy crunch has far greater adverse impact on Free World
deterrence/defense than it does on the USSR’s. It is an added major
Free World burden not imposed on the USSR, whose military spending
already is much larger than that of the US. In sum, we keep running
faster just to stay in place, and can’t catch up with the Soviet effort.
Ironically, this impact of the energy crunch is undermining our
ability to defend the oil-producing states, who depend on our security
umbrella to protect them from the Soviets. The Persian Gulf producers
are good cases in point. They are now undermining their own security
For all these reasons we must not treat energy issues as primarily
politico-economic, but take fully into account the dire security
Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File,
Box 65, Summits, 9/79–5/23/80. Confidential. The salutation is handwritten.
January 1979–January 1981 853
The West badly needs an energy strategy which will reduce the se-
curity impact of the energy bind.
Komer signed “Bob” above this typed signature.
272. Telegram From the Department of State to Selected
Washington, May 12, 1980, 2226Z.
125558. Subject: OPEC Meeting in Taif and Algiers.
1. Secret entire text.
2. Action addressees are requested to seek early meetings with Oil
Ministers or other appropriate officials to seek impressions of OPEC
long-term strategy meeting held May 7 in Taif.
You should cast your
inquiry in context of importance USG attaches to sustaining an ex-
change of views with producers on how consumers and producers can
best work together over long haul to fulfill common responsibility to
achieve orderly transition to new energy economy in a manner that
safeguards the health of the international economic system.
3. During course of discussion of long-term market prospects you
should take occasion to reinforce recent approach in certain capitals on
maintaining or increasing production levels (State 112009)
USG view is that price restraint by producers continues to be essential.
You may draw on the following:
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, D800236–0401. Se-
cret; Exdis. Drafted by David Patterson (NEA/ECON) and Todd; cleared by Rosen,
Schotta, John A. Bushnell (ARA), and Morse (E) and in EA/IMBS, NEA/ARP, EUR/RPE,
ARA, AF/W, and the Energy and Treasury Departments; and approved by Twinam. Sent
Immediate to Jidda and Priority to Abu Dhabi, Kuwait, Jakarta, and Caracas. Repeated to
Algiers, Quito, Libreville, Baghdad, Dhahran, Lagos, Manama, Muscat, Riyadh, Cairo,
London, Paris for the Embassy and USOECD, Bonn, Rome, Tokyo, Ottawa, and Brussels
for the Embassy and USEC.
The meeting in Taif considered the report of the Long-Term Strategy Committee.
854 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XXXVII
—World economic conditions and the basic oil market situation
over next few months do not in our view justify a new round of oil price
increases. Such increases at this time would deal a severe blow to the
world economy, struggling to cope with the extraordinary price in-
creases of the last eighteen months.
—We are urging buyers to exercise restraint and to follow rational
stocking policies. Producers in turn should feel responsibility to avoid
raising prices or imposing new premiums and to refrain from testing
the market to bid up prices. It would be inconsistent with our long-term
common interests and common responsibilities for producers to take
advantage of the current short-term uncertainty.
—The U.S. is making strong and painful efforts to cope with infla-
tion, about which producers have indicated great concern, by re-
straining credit and balancing the budget. Equally painful and inten-
sive efforts to reduce dependence on imported oil are in train and have
been welcomed by producers. These are taking effect: U.S. oil imports
have dropped and per capita energy use, as well as oil use, is declining.
Interest rates have fallen and we believe we have turned the corner on
—We face the prospect of very low or negative growth rates in sev-
eral major countries, a trend that would be accelerated by new oil price
—If recession deepens sharply in major industrial countries, with
attendant declines in general imports, the developing countries, a
number of which are now in serious difficulty, will be caught in a hope-
less squeeze between declining export revenues and rising oil import
—It is imperative that producers carefully consider the full impact
of their decisions in order to avoid lasting damage to the structure of in-
ternational trade, finance and security in which they have a large and
3. For Jidda, Abu Dhabi, Doha, and Kuwait: We are aware that
Gulf countries oppose Iranian sanctions and might argue that uncer-
tainty in market is a result of USG actions and is thus USG responsibil-
ity. If they do so, you should respond by drawing on standing guidance
on U.S. policy. In doing so, you should stress that Gulf countries have
urged that we seek to resolve Iranian situation by peaceful means and
that sanctions are important component of our efforts to do so.
4. For Jidda: You should point out to Yamani that in line with his
urgings we have engaged in strong and sensitive efforts to resist Ira-
nian attempts to pressure consumers to accept higher prices (State
January 1979–January 1981 855
122313 and State 122311).
You should add that we appreciate his ef-
forts at price unification; in view of market situation, which we would
characterize as tightening somewhat in an atmosphere of uncertainty,
we hope SAG will be cautious about trying to achieve reunification
unless it has firm assurances that others will cooperate by holding the
line on prices.
5. For Lagos: This cable is FYI at this time, since Nigeria reportedly
did not attend the Taif meeting, but you should draw upon it if appro-
priate occasions arise.
6. For Quito, Libreville, Algiers, Baghdad: You may draw upon
this cable if you believe it might be useful and if appropriate occasions
Download 8.4 Mb.
Do'stlaringiz bilan baham:
ma'muriyatiga murojaat qiling