8 th Euroseas conference Vienna, 11–14 August 2015

Part II of this double panel looks anthropologically at everyday state-citizen interactions in Indonesia and Cambodia. 
The rights-claiming, autonomous citizen is generally studied in the context of a liberal, high-capacity welfare state. We 
still know little about the forms of democratic citizenship in the context of a more weakly institutionalized state and a 
predominantly clientelistic political system. Yet Southeast Asia is also caught up in the Third Wave of democratization. 
Citizens have enhanced rights and responsibilities in such polities.
Moving beyond the electoral cycle, the panel asks: to what extent are the clientelistic practices that undermine citizen 
rights sustained, and even preferred, by ordinary denizens of the state, even in a democracy? How, where, and why are 
these practices changing? Do citizens want the clientelistic exchanges offered them by politicians, or can we observe, 
also in Southeast Asia, significant ‘post-clientelist initiatives’ (James Manor)?
Presenters will focus on those uneasy hybrid situations in which elements of dependent clientelism and autonomous 
citizenship co-exist. They take a particular interest in non-elites (and their social movements) who take advantage of 
new citizen regimes emerging under democratization while at the same time investing new energies in clientelistic 
dependencies.
All panelists are researchers in the Dutch-Netherlands research consortium ‘From Clients to Citizens?’.
— Vote Buying in Indonesia: Modes and Meanings
Edward Aspinall (Australian National University)
This paper will address some of the major questions that have guided comparative research on vote buying in recent 
years: How do politicians decide which voters to target when engaging in vote buying? How do they ensure that voters 
stick to their side of the ‘bargain’? What role do brokers play when votes are exchanged for cash? And how is this ex-
change understood by the actors: as a purchase akin to an enforceable contract? A non-binding sign of the candidate’s 
generosity? Something else? The paper attempts to answer these questions by focusing primarily on vote buying in 
one electoral district in Central Java during the 2014 legislative election. This district was the subject of intensive study 
by a team of researchers as part of a broader project the author was helping to coordinate. In the election virtually all 
candidates we encountered in this district engaged in the strategy of the so-called serangan fajar, or ‘dawn attack’, dis-
tributing large numbers of envelopes containing cash payments to voters. To understand this phenomenon, we used 
a mixture of ethnographic research and surveys of voters and brokers that were drawn up on the basis of vote-buying 
lists prepared by candidates. This paper will draw on material garnered using both methods.
— Clientelism at the Subnational Level: Paving a Way for the Emergence of Political Dynasties in Indonesia 
Yoes Kenawas (Northwestern University)
Since the introduction of direct local elections (Pemilukada) in 2004, Indonesia has witnessed the emergence of nu-
merous local political dynasties. Clientelistic practices at the local level have paved a way for local political dynasties 

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to emerge in many provinces and districts across Indonesia. This paper explores the relation between clientelistic 
practices and the rise of political dynasties in Indonesia. By exploring this relationship, we can address the paradox in 
Indonesians’ perceptions toward political dynasties, wherein at the national level they reject the existence of political 
dynasties, but at the subnational level large segments of the society still vote for dynastic politicians. By addressing 
the paradox, we can gain an alternative perspective to interpret ongoing dynamics in the democratic consolidation 
process in Indonesia.
— The Political Economy of Clientelistic Exchange: A Comparative Study of Indonesia’s Patronage Democracy 
Ward Berenschot (KITLV)
Under what conditions does a polity become more (or less) clientelistic? There are plenty of hypotheses about factors 
that foster political clientelism – from poverty and a weak civil society to a state-dependent economy and indirect 
colonial rule. Yet an assessment of the value of these hypotheses is hampered by the difficulty of assessing the extent 
to which a polity is clientelistic. To boost such a comparative study of clientelistic politics, this study has combined 
ethnographic fieldwork on election campaigns with an expert survey executed among 533 journalists, academics, ngo 
activists and campaigners in 37 districts in 16 Indonesian provinces. Finding both continuity and variation across 
Indonesia, this paper discusses which of the above-mentioned hypotheses can best account for this pattern.
— The Interplay between Partisanship and Money Politics: A Lesson from the 2014 Legislative Election in 
Indonesia
Burhanuddin Muhtadi (The Australian National University)
Efforts at vote buying require the high cost of money which include financing a structure of success team members 
and the price of the items actually used to engage in vote trafficking. With limited and fixed resources in hands, candi-
dates and their success team members will distribute material benefits to some voters, but exclude others. What kinds 
of voters to be targeted? The conventional wisdom among political scientists is that parties or candidates will not waste 
their budgets on loyal supporters, but instead spend on swing voters. This is based on assumption that the loyal voter is 
captive. This dominant view, however, is not supported by strong evidence in the Indonesian case. Based on the results 
from the post legislative election survey I conducted, parties and candidates tend to set the target on own core voters 
for whom voting behavior can be maximized by increasing their turnout. My research design, which primarily relies 
on sample surveys, augmented by survey of brokers and in-depth interviews, allows me to explain why politicians 
target their own loyal voters. This paper will also examine the incongruities of party identification and the interplay 
between partisanship and money politics.
— Citizens (De)Facing the Dynasty: Digital Citizenship and Anti-Corruption Campaigns in Banten, Indonesia 
M Zamzam Fauzanafi (Leiden University)
The paper presents early research findings on the formation of citizenship afforded by anti-corruption campaigns in 
the social media in Banten, Indonesia. This new province is well-known as being ruled by a patrimonial and clientelis-
tic regime - ‘the Banten political dynasty’. In this context, citizenship is scrutinized as a political subjectivity produced 
through acts of citizenship that go beyond the formal citizenship status bestowed by the state. Social media, in this 
case Facebook, facilitate new, less formal forms of civic engagement. The anti-corruption campaign becomes an arena 
through which the state is to be imagined and citizens defined.
— Political Networks and Urban Poor Access to Health Care Rights 
Retna Hanani (University of Amsterdam)
The development of a welfare regime in Indonesia, especially after the fall of the New Order, is closely related to the 
democratization process. At the local level, many welfare policies are part of local leaders’ political strategies. Local 
direct elections also provide new avenues for ordinary people to demand social policies. In Jakarta, the Jokowi-Ahok 
administration introduced the Jakarta Health Card in 2012. The scheme is presented as an example of universal health 
care, where every Jakarta resident is entitled to free health services. However, discrimination against the card holders 
remains pervasive, especially among poor JHC holders. This study investigates strategies the poor employ to claim 

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their health care ‘rights,’ and how these strategies shape their notions of rights and entitlements. In contrast to studies 
on liberal social citizenship, which focus on individual rights and individual capacities of the claimant, this study finds 
that urban poor strategies to access public health care facilities are shaped by a political network of local MPs, bro-
kers, and clients. Instead of treating the network as ‘the limit’ of democratic reform, this study sees the particularistic 
relationship as part of the strategy the urban poor deploy to develop their political agency. It is an important aspect to 
making politics and politicians more accountable and representative.
— Indonesian Local-Government Accountability System: Past and Present Challenges 
Muhammad Hudaya (State Polytechnic of Banjarmasin)
The collapse of the New Order Regime (led by President Soeharto 1967-1998) in May 1998, marked a reform era in 
Indonesian history. During the New Order regime, the practice of local-government accountability system was con-
siderably controlled by the regime. This was possible due to almost all aspects of Indonesian people life from the social 
order, political structure to state bureaucracy being ‘directed’ by and succumbed to the regime.
Not surprisingly, the accountability system of local government at that time was designed to be more accountable to 
the regime (the central government) than to the public. Law No. 5 (1974) on Local Government, for instance, did not 
consider the public as a party to whom the government should be accountable, even to the extent of merely keeping 
them well-informed. 
The shift from an authoritarian and centralized regime to a democratic and decentralized government system, how-
ever, does not automatically revamp Indonesian local-government accountability system. This is evidenced by the 
content of Government Regulation (GR) No. 3 (2007) on Accountability Reporting of Local Government that does 
not necessarily recognize the public as the mandate-giver.
Among the three entities (central government, local parliament, and the public), to whom the local government re-
ports should be submitted, the public receives the most limited information. This is because the accountability report 
the public receive (ILPPD) is only a summary of that submitted to the central government (LPPD).
This study aims to investigate historical aspects of Indonesian local-government accountability system and identify its 
present challenges. In terms of research methodology used, this study employs bibliographic research strategy.
The contribution of this study will offer a more complete portray of the practice of Indonesian local-government 
accountability system from Pre-Reform to Reform era, as well as presenting its contemporary challenges faced by 
Indonesian local-governments.
— Patron or Representative? The Role of “Volunteer Cadre” on Service Provision and Local Politics in a West 
Javanese Village 
Prio Sambodho (AISSR, University of Amsterdam)
This paper describes early research results on how democratization in Indonesia shapes ordinary villagers’ notions 
and practices of citizenship, especially as regards access to government services and livelihood resources. The research 
focuses on the collective action and political agency of villagers, especially the poor and marginalized, in negotiating 
access to services with the local elites, service providers and other power holders. They do this in the context of preex-
isting structures of patronage, clientelism and ongoing democratization. I will explore the role of new non-state elites, 
known as “cadre”, who acts as broker for services. Cadre emerge as the new political elites at the village level, empow-
ered by their mediating position in the plethora of new government social assistance programs and local democratic 
mechanisms. Are these new elites benevolent representatives of their community, who rise up through a democratic 
process at the village level? Or do they form a new class of patron within the enduring local patronage structure of 
democratizing indonesia?
— Towards Recognition of Customary Land Rights: Adat Claims in Conflict-Stricken Bulukumba 
Willem van der Muur (Leiden University)
This paper examines the trajectories of two land disputes in Indonesia involving collective claims to customary land. 
It addresses several factors that account for why one claim is more likely to lead to real security of tenure for the 
claimants than the others. In the light of the growing attention and the current expansion of the legal framework on 
customary land rights, hopes are high for an improvement of the situation regarding the many unresolved land dis-

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putes. This study points out that, despite the recent legal and institutional developments, the outcome of a customary 
land claim depends strongly on the socio-political structures on the ground. During a fieldwork period of 6 months 
in Bulukumba district, South-Sulawesi, the author identified various types of customary land claims, varying from 
claims based on recognition during colonial times to claims based on a decision by the Indonesian Supreme Court. 
The study shows that given the district governments’ discrete authority to recognize claims, the economic and political 
interests of regional state agents, as well as claimants’ ties to the district government are highly determinative of the 
outcome. Furthermore, claims that reconcile best with the dominant discourse of influential NGO’s are most likely to 
result in entitlement by state authorities.
Panel: Perilous Presidentialism in Southeast Asia? 
convener: Mark Thompson (City University of Hong Kong)
panel abstract
Presidentialism has long had a bad name in the political science literature. Commonly understood as a regime form 
in which a chief executive (popularly elected to a fixed term) is independent of the legislature, critics argue it is inher-
ently unstable. Following the insights of Juan Linz, they suggest that because the president and legislature are elected 
separately competing claims to legitimacy are likely to arise as both can point to popular support through elections. 
Given that there are usually few institutions empowered to resolve disputes between president and legislature except 
an often politicized court system (which itself can become a source of conflict between the other two branches), presi-
dential systems are more likely to break down.
Recent empirical studies however suggest that the situation is more complicated, as parliamentary systems (without 
a separately elected and independent executive) are just, if not sometimes even more likely to become unstable due 
to elite competition. In Southeast Asia, this point seems particularly valid given the instability of Thai parliamentary 
democracy over the last decade (and of course many decades before that if a longer view is taken). Yet recent events in 
Indonesia, in which a newly elected president Joko Widodo and a hostile parliament (controlled by a coalition headed 
by his defeated opponent in the presidential race Prabowo Subianto) suggest that the presidentialism has become 
perilous in Southeast Asia as well.
A closer look at the Philippines suggests there too presidentialism has been troubled, with the “extra-constitutional” 
removal (read civilian-initiated military coup) of elected (and still popular) President Joseph E Estrada in 2001 being 
the chief example. (In a parliamentary system Estrada might have simply been removed by a no-confidence vote, but 
given the higher bar of impeachment/conviction in the country’s presidential system frustrated opponents of a presi-
dent charged with corruption took to the streets instead.) Even in “transitioning” Myanmar, the country’s presidential 
system has become a source of potential instability. Conflicts between “reformist” president Thein Sein and the asser-
tive parliamentary speaker Shwe Mann may foreshadow institutional conflicts ahead. Although Myanmar remains a 
recently-civilianized but still basically military regime, formal governmental institutions are beginning to matter more 
as the country liberalizes, raising questions about the suitability of presidentialism as regime form.
The panel will also include discussions of other relevant Southeast Asian cases, particularly East Timor where leader-
ship divides in a semi-presidential system have been a major source of instability.
— Perilous or Stabilizing? Praetorian Presidentialism in Myanmar’s Uncertain Transition 
Marco Bünte (Monash University, Malaysia Campus)
After two decades of direct military rule, institutions in Myanmar are still weak and dominated by strong personali-
ties. Moroever, the military’s influence on the evolving polity is pervasive. The paper looks at Myanmar’s presidential 
system during Myanmar’s uncertain transition and tries to characterise the relationship between the president and a 
more and more assertive parliament under Parliamentary speaker Shwe Mann.
— The Inutility of Institutionalism: Notes from Southeast Asia 
William Case (City University of Hong Kong)
This paper examines three new democracies in Southeast Asia, trying to account for variations in their durability and 

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quality. Thailand’s politics amount to “intermittent” democracy, perennially vulnerable to authoritarian reversals. The 
Philippines suffers from “degraded” democracy, subject to incremental erosion of civil liberties and political rights. 
Only in Indonesia has procedural democracy persisted, albeit with diminished quality. Standard explanatory factors 
for these varying outcomes include historical legacies, social structures, developmental levels, transitional dynamics, 
and institutional design. However, in weaving accounts from these factors, they lead wrongly to our anticipating stable 
democracy in Thailand, stable, but low quality democracy in the Philippines, and democracy’s breakdown (were it 
even to emerge) in Indonesia. Particular attention is given to institutions, showing how in the absence of any analysis 
of the elites who design and run them they only deepen ambiguity. Next, an alternative model is proposed which, after 
charting inter-elite relations and social coalitions, revisits standard explanatory variables, especially institutions. In 
this way, a better explanation is developed for democracy’s mixed fortunes in our three Southeast Asian cases.
— Semi-Presidentialism and the Consolidation of Democracy in Timor-Leste 
Rui Feijo (University of Coimbra)
Semi-presidentialism has asserted itself as a tertium genus of government systems, and became increasingly popular 
in the “third wave of democratization”. However, the nature of its relationships to the consolidation of young democra-
cies has generated heated debates.
For a while, semi-presidentialism was regarded as a unified type of government systems. The existence of dual legiti-
macy derived from the direct election of both the President of the Republic and the Parliament was regarded as a po-
tential source of friction between the two, and therefore instability was perceived as a potentially endogenous feature 
of this system.
Later work by Robert Elgie has suggested that semi-presidentialism is better understood as an umbrella which cov-
ers a range of diverse constitutional solutions which deal in different ways with the issue of the relations between the 
President and the Prime Minister. Bearing in mind the distinction proposed by Shugart and Carey between “premier-
presidential” and “president-parliamentary” systems, Elgie has argued that these sub-types of semi-presidentialism 
perform differently as far as the contribution to democratic consolidation is concerned
Timor-Leste deserves particular attention in this respect, as the model adopted in the country – which I argue is a 
“president-parliamentary” one, that is, the one more prone to lead to instability and democratic breakdown – has 
coexisted with a rather stable process of democratic consolidation after 2002.
A review will be provided of the literature on the performance of Timorese semi-presidentialism, including authors 
who argue that it bears responsibility for major events that shook the basis of the regime, and others (in which I am in-
cluded) who suggest that this sort of government system was critical in controlling the rival forces at play in Timorese 
society. The major episode of the clash between the President and the Prime Minister in 2006 will be discussed.
The final section will be devoted to an explanation of the role of the President of the Republic, and the nature of its 
mandate, in the complex system of checks and balances of the Timorese democracy, highlighting the importance 
of “independent” presidents (that is, individuals without formal party affiliation) in the construction of a “common 
house” for all political actors.
— Exit from Peril? Public Voices and Consolidation of Presidential Power in Early Months of Jokowi
Wawan Mas’udi (Gadjah Mada University and Victoria University) 
While in case of Philippines the popular power was perilous to presidential power, in Indonesian case of President 
Joko “Jokowi” Widodo during early months in power, public voices seemed to help him to exit from political peril. 
The main threat to Jokowi presidency was generally assumed to be from a hostile parliament support controlled by 
Prabowo Subianto’s camp, his rival in presidential race. But, looking at the early months after his inauguration in 
October 2014, the greater peril facing Jokowi’s presidency is surprisingly comes from his own patron (Megawati Su-
karnoputri) and the administration political camp (PDIP alliance). While the challenges from Prabowo’s supporter 
are normal practices of opposition, political attack came from the inside revealed a bitter collision of interest between 
position of Jokowi as “party-agent” (particularly PDIP) and as “public delegate”. 
The two cases which will be highlighted in this paper are the process of cabinet formation and the nomination of the 
police commander. In case of cabinet formation, Jokowi involved the anti-corruption commission (KPK) to track the 
record of corruption and illegal transaction of ministerial candidates, and also he invited the public to express prefer-
ence and/or critics to the candidates. The strategy was successful in that it limited pressure from political parties which 

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wanted more ministerial posts, while demonstrating a commitment to form more professional cabinet. In the case of 
the police commander, Jokowi nominated sole candidate based on Megawati and PDIP’s preference, but the nomina-
tion turned into political saga as KPK named the candidate as suspect in a graft case. Amid public outrage, Jokowi 
postponed the inauguration in order not to risk his support within civil society.