Al-Ghaza¯lı¯’s Philosophical


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tan. Terken Kha¯tu

¯n was also the mother of one of the caliph’s wives—who by 

this time, however, was no longer alive—and she had earlier tried to yield some 


 

a   l ife   b e t w e e n   p ubl ic   a nd   p r i vat e   ins t r uc t ion  

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infl uence on the caliph’s own succession. After some hesitation and negotia-



tion—in which al-Ghaza¯lı¯, as we will see, played a role—the caliph responded 

to Terken Kha¯tu

¯n’s demands and proclaimed Mah.mu¯d as the new sultan. Soon 

after Mah.mu¯d’s name was called during the Friday prayers, he, his mother, 

and their entourage made their way to Isfahan in order to gain the support of 

the powerful Seljuq  amı¯



r s. Baghdad and the Seljuq Empire were thrown in a 

period of political uncertainty. Local Seljuq commanders (singl.  shah.na )  and 

their garrison troops became rulers of the city. 

119


  

 While the struggle over the sultanate was going on, the new vizier Ta¯j 

al-Mulk was murdered in Muh.arram 486 / February 1093, only three months 

after his predecessor was assassinated. As he had been openly accused of being 

responsible for the killing of Niz.a¯m al-Mulk, the  Niz.a¯miyya  avenged him and 

apparently killed Ta¯j al-Mulk. Later that year, Terken Kha¯tu

¯n and her son, the 

child sultan Mah.mu¯d, died of an infectious disease. Berk-Yaruq (see fi gure 1.2) 

was now free to advance to the throne; he traveled to Baghdad and was de-

clared sultan in Muh.arram 487 / February 1094.     On the following day, 15 Muh.

arram / 4 February, the Caliph al-Muqtadı¯ died, apparently of natural causes. 

120


  

Within sixteen months of Niz.a¯m al-Mulk’s assassination, the whole political 

elite of the Seljuq state was dead, including the caliph. All these deaths and up-

heaval led to a situation in which, according to the historian  ¶At.a¯-Malik Juvaynı¯ 

(d. 681/1283), “the affairs of the realm were thrown into disorder and confu-

sion; there was chaos ( harj va-marj ) in the provinces, (. . .) and turmoil and 

uproar in the kingdom.” 

121


  

 

Erika Glassen and Carole Hillenbrand have argued that these deaths 



were neither coincidence nor due to the instigation of Isma¯ ¶ı¯lite “assassins.” 

 gure 1.2 



Sultan Berk-Yaruq among his court. Miniature from Rashı¯d al-Dı¯n T.abı¯b’s 

Compendium of Chronicles. The miniatures in this manuscript (same as fi gures 1.1 

and 1.5) are the earliest extant historical illustrations in Islam (Edinburgh University 

Library, MS Arab 20, fol. 139b).


3 8   a l - gh a z a

¯ l 1


¯ ’ s   ph ilosoph ic a l   t h e olo g y

They were the result of a failed attempt by Terken Kha¯tu¯n to bring her son 

Mah.mu¯d to power, combined with a counterintrigue instigated by the so-called 

 Niz.a¯miyya . 

122

   Al-Ghaza¯lı¯’s student Abu¯ Bakr ibn al- ¶Arabi gives a full account 



of these events that concurs with Glassen’s and Hillenbrand’s analysis, sug-

gesting that Ta¯j al-Mulk was a clandestine Isma¯ ¶ı¯lite who used his contacts 

to arrange a contract killing. 

123


   Al-Ghaza¯lı¯ took an active part in the attempts 

to foil Terken Kha¯tu¯n’s plans. Shortly after Niz.a¯m al-Mulk’s and Maliksha¯h’s 

deaths, the assumption of Terken Kha¯tu¯n’s son seemed all but certain. “Things 

went smoothly,” Ibn al-Jawzı¯ writes, “until Terken Kha¯tu¯n asked the caliph for 

the installation of her son.” This was in Shawwa¯l 485 / November 1092, only 

days after Maliksha¯h’s death. The caliph hesitated and proposed to write three 

separate documents, one that would install Mah.mu¯d as sultan and two others 

that would install Mah.mu¯d’s general as  amı¯r  of the army and his confi dant Ta¯j 

al-Mulk as vizier and comptroller of fi nances. That way, the caliph would gain 

a chance to control the future appointment of these two vital offi ces, which had 

thus far been under the sole domain of the sultan. Terken Kha¯tu¯n refused to 

accept this usurpation and demanded that all offi ces be put in the hands of her 

minor son. The caliph, in turn, declined, saying that religious law would not 

allow him to place that much power in the hands of a minor. 

124

  

 Placed in this situation, al-Ghaza¯lı¯ supported the position of the caliph. 



The historian Ibn al-Athı¯r reports that when the caliph sent the letter to Terken 

Kha¯tu¯n explaining his refusal to write a single document for Mah.mu¯d, she 

refused to receive it. To mediate between the parties, the caliph sent al-Ghaza¯lı¯ 

to Terken Kha¯tu¯n. Apparently, all this happened during the week between 

Maliksha¯h’s death and Mah.mu¯d’s proclamation. Al-Ghaza¯lı¯ told the widowed 

queen in clear terms: “Your son is a minor and the religious law ( al-shar   )  does 

not allow his installation as [ full] ruler.” Eventually, Terken Kha¯tu¯n conceded 

this point and accepted the caliph’s conditions for the appointment of her son. 

When on 22 Shawwa¯l 485 / 25 November 1092, the  khut.ba  was read in his 

name, the provision for the highest military offi ce and the vizierate was clearly 

spelled out. 

125


  Four days later, Terken Kha¯tu¯n and Mah.mu¯d left for Isfahan, 

where they would both die. Al-Ghaza¯lı¯ was the most senior scholar who had 

supported the demands of the caliph; other scholars had refused this novel 

way of reading the  khut.ba . Whether al-Ghaza¯lı¯ did this in order to boost the 

power of the caliph or that of the  Niz.a¯miyya  is unclear. The caliph’s plan was 

to get rid of the Seljuq overlords. Although the party of Niz.a¯m al-Mulk would 

not support such a plan, the coup would fi t into their plot to install Berk-

Yaruq and to oust Mah.mu¯d. The historian Ibn Kathı¯r writes that the caliph 

initially refused to fully install Mah.mu¯d, “and al-Ghaza¯lı¯ agreed with him.” 

126


  

Al-Ghaza¯lı¯’s position was: “Allowed is only that what the caliph says.” 

127

   Other 



scholars from the H

. anafi te school supported the claims of Terken Kha¯tu¯n, but 

al-Ghaza¯lı¯ prevailed. 

 

Eventually, Terken Kha¯tu



¯n, her son, and the caliph, al-Muqtadı¯, soon 

passed away, and what they had negotiated was of no value to later caliphs. 

The party of Niz.a¯m al-Mulk succeeded in bringing Berk-Yaruq to power. It re-

mains unclear whether this was what al-Ghaza¯lı¯ had advocated or whether he 



 

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sincerely supported the advances of the caliph. In his political theory—both the 



early one formulated in his juvenile works on jurisprudence as well as his later 

ideas in  The Council for Kings   ( Nas.ı¯h.at al-mulu¯k )—the caliph plays no special 

role among those who bear political responsibility. If he is weak, he remains a 

largely ceremonial fi gurehead and is expected to leave the affairs of the state to 

offi cials who have real power and whom he is expected to appoint. 

128


   Al-Ghaza¯lı¯ 

argued in favor of strong governing bodies that could enforce the religious law 

effectively. 

129


  These strong governing individuals ( wa¯lin,  pl.  wula¯t ) could be ei-

ther caliphs or sultans. 

130

  If the caliph is able to acquire suffi cient authority and 



power ( shawka ), he may become himself a direct ruler and displace his appoint-

ees. 


131

   Al-Ghaza¯lı¯’s objection against the installment of a minor as a sultan may 

have been triggered simply by his desire for a strong executive power. Yet, he 

may have also supported Caliph al-Muqtadı¯’s goal to become a direct ruler over 

Baghdad and Iraq. Finally, it may have also served a third interest, namely, the 

creation of a strong vizierate for the  Niz.a¯miyya  party that could dominate a 

weak sultan and a weak caliph. 

 In a letter he wrote about ten years after these events, al-Ghaza¯lı¯ cites the 

deaths of the four viziers—Niz.a¯m al-Mulk, Ta¯j al-Mulk, Majd al-Mulk, and 

Mu 7ayyad al-Mulk—as a lesson from which to learn. 

132

  The letter is directed 



to Mujı¯r al-Dı¯n, who was then vizier to Sanjar. 

133


   Al-Ghaza¯lı¯’s elaborate prose 

makes no attempts to hide his opinion that the four viziers reaped what they 

had sowed. Niz.a¯m al-Mulk died, the letter suggests, because he was old and 

could no longer control the army. “His death,” al-Ghaza¯lı¯ writes, “was con-

nected to treachery ( khiya¯nat ) and discord ( mukha¯lafat ).” 

134


   Al-Ghaza¯lı¯ does not 

mention the Isma¯ ¶ı¯lites. 

135

  Given the fact that all four viziers died violently in 



court intrigues, the letter’s recipient is advised to take a close look at the fate of 

the four viziers and to draw his own conclusions. Al-Ghaza¯lı¯ writes that Mujı¯r 

al-Dı¯n’s situation is worse than that of his four predecessors: “You should 

know that none of the four viziers had to confront what you have to confront, 

namely the kind of oppression ( z.ulm ) and desolation ( khara¯b ) there is now.” 

136


  

Al-Ghaza¯lı¯ addresses Mujı¯r al-Dı¯n in blunt words, invoking fear that those who 

collaborate with tyrants will themselves be judged as evildoers in the hereafter. 

He predicts inevitable punishment if the vizier does not change his ways. 

 In his  Council for Kings   ( Nas.ı¯h.at al-mulu¯k ),  al-Ghaza¯lı¯ fi nds equally harsh 

words for those in power. This book was composed after 501/1108 at the request 

of Sanjar, when he was vice-regent of Khorasan. Governmental authority, al-

Ghaza¯lı¯ admonishes therein, will only be fi rm if its holders have strong faith 

ı¯

ma¯n ). Once the heart is deprived of faith, the talk will simply come from the 

tongue. Al-Ghaza¯lı¯ claims that true faith was rare with the government offi cials 

of the day; he wonders whether an offi cial who squanders thousands of dinars 

on one of his confi dants truly has anything left of his faith. On Judgment Day, 

this money will be demanded back from him, and he will be tormented for his 

waste of the community’s wealth. 

137

  

 It is hard to imagine how such a powerful state offi cial as Mujı¯r al-Dı¯n 



or the members of Sanjar’s courts reacted to al-Ghaza¯lı¯’s admonitions. In an 

anachronistic and probably anecdotal meeting between al-Ghaza¯lı¯ and the 



4 0   a l - gh a z a

¯ l 1


¯ ’ s   ph ilosoph ic a l   t h e olo g y

famous vizier and author Anu

¯shirwa¯n ibn Kha¯lid (d. around 532/1138), the 

statesman rejects the scholar’s reproaches as hypocrisy. Al-Ghaza¯lı¯’s moralistic 

posture is for him just another attempt to compete for worldly regard. After 

having listened to al-Ghaza¯lı¯’s warnings, Anu

¯rshirwa¯n said: “There is no god 

but God! When this man started his career and sought to outdo me through 

merits that appeared in his honorifi c titles, he was dressed in gold and silk. 

Now, his affairs have returned to the very same state.” 

138

  Now, Anu



¯shirwa¯n im-

plied, he would try to outdo him with his moralistic posture. But even that was 

selfi shness masquerading as virtue. 

 The letter to Mujı¯r al-Dı¯n was, of course, written after al-Ghaza¯lı¯ himself 

changed and refused to collaborate with rulers. In 485/1092 it appears that he 

was still part of the powerful political group of the  Niz.a¯miyya .  He  witnessed 

its temporary failure during the installation of Mah.mu¯d and later its mistake 

in supporting Berk-Yaruq, who as an adult was accused of sympathizing with 

Isma¯ ¶ı¯lite activities under his reign. 

139


  For al-Ghaza¯lı¯, the events of 485/1092 

and the year after must have appeared as a serious political challenge to the 

patrons of the Niz.a¯miyya madrasa and to Sunnism as a whole. The continu-

ing death toll among the leaders was accompanied by a civil-war-like period of 

religious and political subversion in Iran. Even before Niz.a¯m al-Mulk’s death, 

Isma¯ ¶ı¯lite Shiite groups, no longer loyal to the Fa¯t.imid caliph in Cairo, had 

managed to conquer and control a number of castles in Iran. In 483/1090, the 

stronghold of Alamu

¯t in the northern province of Daylam had fallen into the 

hands of these Isma¯ ¶ı¯lite Shiites. By 485/1092, the Shiites, who called them-

selves Niza¯rı¯s and were led by H

. asan ibn al-S.abba¯h. (d. 518/1124), controlled 

all of Daylam. A year later, the eastern province Quhistan was the place of a 

successful Niza¯rite uprising. 

140

  And although the Isma¯ ¶ı¯lites were never able 



to overthrow the strong Seljuq state with its numerous and powerful Turkish 

troops, they caused signifi cant unrest within its cities and in some provinces. 

 In Baghdad and Isfahan, the Shiite insurrection led to witch hunts against 

suspected Isma¯ ¶ı¯lites, killing many. 

141

  The chronicler Ibn al-Jawzı¯ refers to these 



events as “the days of the Esoterics.” 

142


  Suspected agents and missionaries of 

the Isma¯ ¶ı¯lite movement were swiftly tried and executed. 

143

  The political crisis 



over Maliksha¯h’s succession would continue until 497/1104, when Berk-Yaruq 

agreed to a division of power with his half-brothers Muh.ammad Tapar and 

Sanjar. The religious confrontation between Sunnı¯ theology and its Isma¯ ¶ı¯lite 

Shiite challengers, however, was not so easy to overcome. 

 Leaving Baghdad, Traveling in Syria and the Hijaz, 

and Returning to Khorasan 

 Al-Ghaza¯lı¯’s autobiography still offers the most detailed account of the reasons 

that led to his sudden departure from Baghdad in Dhu

¯ l-Qa ¶da 488 / Novem-

ber 1095. Here he says that at some time before the month of Rajab / July of 

that year, he began to study the writings of such Sufi s as al-Junayd, al-Shiblı¯, 

al-H


. a¯rith al-Muh.a¯sibi, Abu

¯ Yazı¯d al-Bist.a¯mı¯, and Abu¯ T.a¯lib al-Makkı¯. In their 



 

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works, he learned about epistemological paths such as “taste” ( dhawq ) and oth-



ers, which had been unknown to him, according to this account. These ways of 

knowing are described as individual experiences of the soul, and their relation-

ship to descriptive knowledge compares with the relationship between experi-

encing drunkenness and merely knowing its defi nition. Al-Ghaza¯lı¯ portrays 

himself during this time as being in a state in which “a strong belief in God, 

in prophecy, and in the Day of Judgment” had been fi rmly established within 

him. 

144


  After his studies and subsequent realizations, he writes, he began to 

understand that fi rm convictions about religious tenets are not relevant when 

it comes to the afterlife. On the Day of Judgment only an individual’s actions 

are taken into account: “It had already become clear to me that my only hope of 

attaining happiness in the next world was through devoutness ( taqwa¯ )  [towards 

God] and restraining the soul from the passions.” 

145

  In his autobiography, al-



Ghaza¯lı¯ describes his reaction after realizing this and looking at his career: 

 Next, I attentively considered my circumstances, and I saw that I 

was immersed in attachments, which had encompassed me from all 

sides. I also considered my achievements—the best of them being 

my instructions and my teaching—and I understood that here I was 

applying myself to sciences that are unimportant and useless on the 

way to the hereafter. Then I refl ected on my intentions in my in-

struction, and I saw that it was not directed purely to God. Rather, it 

was instigated and motivated by the quest for fame and widespread 

prestige. So I became certain that I was on the brink of a crumbling 

bank and already on the verge of falling into Hell unless I sat about 

mending my ways. 

146

  

 These thoughts would lead to a crisis in which al-Ghaza¯lı¯ considered leaving 



his career at the Niz.a¯miyya. He hesitated, however, and did not have the resolve 

to carry it out. In Rajab 488 / July 1095, his crisis of indecision would turn into 

a physical ailment: al-Ghaza¯lı¯ lost the ability to speak. “For God put a lock unto 

my tongue and I was impeded from teaching. (. . .) No word could pass my 

tongue and I was completely unable to say anything.” 

147


  This also affected his 

eating and drinking as he became unable to swallow or even to nourish himself 

from broth. When a physician gave up all treatment and suggested that “this is 

something which had settled in the soul and from there it affects the mixture 

[of the four humors],” 

148


  it became clear to al-Ghaza¯lı¯ that he could fi nd the cure 

nowhere else than within himself. 

 Now it became easy for al-Ghaza¯lı¯, he wrote, to fi nd the resolve and turn 

away from fame and riches ( al-ja¯h wa-l-ma¯l ), from family and children, and from 

his colleagues ( as.h.a¯b ). 

149


  This is one of the few passages in his autobiography in 

which al-Ghaza¯lı¯ mentions his family. Later, in a letter written around 504/1110, 

al-Ghaza¯lı¯ says that he did not yet have a family when he arrived in Baghdad 

in the summer of 484/1091. 

150

  Now, four years later, his situation has changed, 



and he makes provisions for them, probably sending them to T.u¯s, where they 

would ask him to come two years later. 

151

  He announced that he himself would 



go on a pilgrimage to Mecca, while he was in reality planning to turn his path 

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¯ l 1


¯ ’ s   ph ilosoph ic a l   t h e olo g y

toward Syria: “I did this as a precaution in case the caliph and all of my col-

leagues might learn about my plan to spend time in Damascus.” 

152


   Escaping 

his obligations to the caliph and the Niz.a¯miyya madrasa was an important part 

of al-Ghaza¯lı¯’s plan. On the one hand, these were professional obligations. On 

the other hand, they were personal, sealed by oaths (singl.  bay a )  toward  certain 

individuals. While a three-month-long pilgrimage would certainly be excused, 

a move to Damascus would have been considered desertion and defection from 

the promises given to caliph, sultan, vizier, and colleagues. 

 In  Dhu


¯ l-Qa ¶da 488 / November 1095, al-Ghaza¯lı¯ left Baghdad and traveled to 

Damascus. In his autobiography, al-Ghaza¯lı¯ describes that he had made proper 

arrangements for his family and his teaching position at the Niz.a¯miyya. 

153


   His 

younger brother, Ah.mad, who was then a teacher at the Ta¯jiyya madrasa, would 

stand in for al-Ghaza¯lı¯. Ah.mad was only his brother’s substitute teacher ( na¯ 7ib ) 

and not an appointed professor, and he would have to leave the Niz.a¯miyya 

after a few months. 

154


  During his travels to Damascus and later to Jerusalem, 

Hebron, and the Hija¯z, al-Ghaza¯lı¯ was accompanied by Abu

¯ T.a¯hir al-Shabba¯k 

of Gurga¯n (d. 513/1119), who had studied with al-Juwaynı¯ alongside al-Ghaza¯lı¯ 

and stayed close to his more brilliant classmate all through these years. 

155


  

 There are indications that al-Ghaza¯lı¯’s period of retreat (  ¶



uzla ),  which  ac-

cording to his autobiography began with his well-documented departure from 

Baghdad in the fall of 488/1095, may have started earlier. Abu

¯ Bakr ibn 

al- ¶Arabı¯, who was briefl y al-Ghaza¯lı¯’s student, mentions that he met the great 

“Da¯nishmand” 

156

  in Juma¯da II 490 (May–June 1097), when the theologian was 



on his way from Syria to Khorasan and stayed in Baghdad for about six months. 

In one of his books, Abu

¯ Bakr describes how al-Ghaza¯lı¯ gave him guidance 

about matters concerning the human soul. Here he writes that when he met 

al-Ghaza¯lı¯, he had already been a practitioner of Sufi sm for fi ve years. Ibn 

al-  ¶Arabı¯ specifi es that his teacher had “accepted the Sufi  path ( al-t.arı¯qa al-



s.u¯fi yya ) and made himself free for what it requires” in the year 486, which cor-

responds roughly to 1093. That is when al-Ghaza¯lı¯ had put himself in seclusion 

al- uzla ), Ibn al-  ¶Arabı¯ says, and when he had renounced all groups. 

157


  

 If  Abu


¯ Bakr ibn al-  ¶Arabı¯’s information is correct—and we have no rea-

son to doubt it—al-Ghaza¯lı¯’s turn away from fame and worldly riches and 

toward his “seclusion” (  ¶

uzla ) would have begun at least two years before he 

gave up his teaching at the Niz.a¯miyya and left for Syria. Ibn al- ¶Arabı¯’s report 

informs us that leaving Baghdad was the result of a longer process and not the 

fi ve-month-long crisis that is described in al-Ghaza¯lı¯’s autobiography. Al-

Ghaza¯lı¯’s presentation in his  Deliverer  may have been prompted by reports 

about the life of the Prophet Muh.ammad and about al-Ash ¶arı¯, who, like other 

fi gures in Islam, had a life-changing experience at the age of forty. Turning 

one’s life around in the fortieth year is a recurring motif in Muslim biogra-

phies, and, if it applies here, it would confi rm our conclusion that al-Ghaza¯lı¯ 

was born in or around 448/1056. 

 There has been a lot of speculation about the reasons for al-Ghaza¯lı¯’s turn 

in his lifestyle and his rapprochement with Sufi sm that culminated in the trip 


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