2000 Cochabamba protests - Law 2029
2000 Cochabamba protests - Rate hike As a condition of the contract Aguas del Tunari had agreed to pay the $30 million in debt accumulated by SEMAPA
2000 Cochabamba protests - Rate hike While the consortium had no interest in building the dam, it was a condition of their contract, as it was backed by an influential member of Banzer's megacoalition, the mayor of Cochabamba, Manfred Reyes Villa
2000 Cochabamba protests - Rate hike
2000 Cochabamba protests - Protests and state of emergency Anarchists from the middle-classes came from the University of Cochabamba to denounce the World Bank and International Monetary Fund and neoliberalism
2000 Cochabamba protests - Protests and state of emergency Protesters halted Cochabamba's economy by holding a general strike that shut down the city for four days. A ministerial delegation went to Cochabamba and agreed to roll back the water rates; still the demonstration continued. On February 4, 2000, thousands marching in protest were met by troops and law enforcement from Oruro and La Paz. Two days of clashes occurred with the police using teargas. Almost 200 demonstrators were arrested; 70 protesters and 51 policemen were injured.
2000 Cochabamba protests - Protests and state of emergency Throughout March 2000 the Bolivian hierarchy of the Roman Catholic Church tried to mediate between the government and the demonstrators. In the meantime, the Coordinadora made their own referendum and declared that out of fifty thousand votes, 96% demanded the contract with Aguas del Tunari be cancelled. The government's reply was that There is nothing to negotiate.
2000 Cochabamba protests - Protests and state of emergency In April 2000, demonstrators again took over Cochabamba's central plaza
2000 Cochabamba protests - State of emergency The Bolivian Constitution allows the President (with the support of his Cabinet) to declare a 90-day state of siege in one or more districts of the nation as an emergency measure to maintain public order in cases of serious danger resulting from an internal civil disturbance
2000 Cochabamba protests - State of emergency On April 9, 2000, near the city of Achacachi, soldiers met resistance to removing a roadblock and opened fire, killing two people (including a teenage boy) and wounding several others. Angry residents overpowered soldiers and used their weapons against military leaders. They wounded Battalion commander Armando Carrasco Nava and army captain Omar Jesus Tellez Arancibia. The demonstrators then found Tellez in hospital, dragged him from his bed, beat him to death and dismembered his body.
2000 Cochabamba protests - State of emergency Also on 9 April 2000, 800 striking police officers fired tear gas at soldiers (to which the soldiers then fired their weapons in the air)
2000 Cochabamba protests - Government view of the demonstrators The coca growers of Bolivia led by then-Congressman Evo Morales (later elected President of Bolivia Bolivian presidential election, 2005|in December 2005) had joined the demonstrators and were demanding an end to the United States-sponsored program of coca eradication of their crops (while coca leaf can be heavily refined and made into cocaine it is used legally by many in Bolivia for teas and for chewing)
2000 Cochabamba protests - Protesters' demands expand Teachers of state schools in rural areas went on strike calling for salary increases (at the time they made $1,000 a year).
2000 Cochabamba protests - Protesters' demands expand In the capital city of La Paz students began to fight running battles with police. Demonstrators put up roadblocks of stones, bricks and barrels near Achacachi and Batallas, and violence broke out there as well (one army officer and two farmers were killed and dozens injured). Soldiers and police soon cleared most of the roadblocks that had cut off highways in five of the country's nine provinces.
The Banzer government then told Aguas del Tunari that by leaving Cochabamba they had abandoned the concession and declared the $200 million contract revoked
2000 Cochabamba protests - Aftermath Quotation|The mayor and the Bolivian government were wrong to insist on an expensive and unnecessary dam. But the bigger problem was that Semapa's water tariffs had been too low for too long, starving the system of investment. Had the tariffs been raised earlier, more cash would have been available to improve service. These twin failings meant that any new contract, public or private, was bound to lead to unacceptable price rises.|The Economist
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