A prep course for the month-long World Cup soccer tournament, a worldwide pheno

ction , claiming that Haiti 's constitution prohibits him from inviting foreign 

troops to intervene . `` However , I do believe that action can be taken to rid 

the nation of the thugs who have taken her hostage , '' he said . Aristide 's ch

ief American adviser , former Democratic Rep. Michael D. Barnes of Maryland , ad

ded : `` We all know what he means ; he 's just constrained from saying it expli

citly . '' The exiled Haitian president made his statement in a speech , deliver

ed in English , in a U.S. Senate hearing room part of a concerted effort to mobi

lize pressure by members of Congress and human rights groups in favor of a U.S. 

invasion of his homeland . Clinton administration officials said they have made 

no decision to invade Haiti to topple the military regime that overthrew Aristid

e , the nation 's first democratically elected leader , in 1991 . Deputy Secreta

ry of State Strobe Talbott said the administration still hopes the military rule

rs can be forced from office peacefully , through economic sanctions . But Clint

on has also said he would not rule out the option of military force if economic 

sanctions fail , and other officials have said an explicit invitation from Arist

ide would make it easier for the United States to act . One U.S. official said A

ristide 's not-quite-explicit plea Friday did not go significantly beyond earlie

r statements . But the Haitian leader 's speech , at a conference sponsored by T

ransAfrica , an African-American foreign policy lobby , signaled a stepped-up ef

fort to pressure the administration toward military action . `` I am in favor of

 intervention , '' said TransAfrica director Randall Robinson , who helped push 

the administration to provide hearings for Haitian refugees by holding a hunger 

strike last month . He said a multinational force could overthrow the Haitian mi

litary `` in a matter of days .. . ( and ) could be very quickly replaced by Uni

ted Nations peacekeepers . '' Aristide offered a four-step plan for solving the 

Haitian impasse : `` Swift and determined action should be taken to remove the c

oup leaders . '' `` The immediate deployment in Haiti of .. . ( a ) United Natio

ns technical assistance mission , '' numbering as many as 4,000 , to retrain Hai

ti 's military and police forces . `` Third , my prompt return to Haiti . '' Fou

rth , implementation of internationally supervised judicial reform and economic 

aid programs . ( Optional add end ) Aristide said he does not favor a `` militar

y occupation '' of Haiti , but added that he would accept the deployment of U.N.

-sponsored military trainers in his country for at least six months and probably

 longer . A U.S. official involved in Haiti policy said any U.N. trainers would 

need to be a virtual military force because of the need to defend themselves . `

` There 's no reason to believe that Haiti would somehow be quiet .. . if Aristi

de were restored , '' he said . As a result , the United States is discussing th

e formation of a larger , better-equipped U.N. force for Haiti with its allies .

 Until that is accomplished , he said , the administration and its allies aren't

 quite ready for a change of power in Haiti .

 North Korea , often dubbed `` The Hermit Kingdom '' because it has kept itself 

so isolated from the world community , has vaulted onto front pages as the Pyong

yang and Washington governments argue about a difficult issue nuclear proliferat

ion . In brief , does the North have nuclear weapons or doesn't it ? And if it h

as , what dangers does that pose to South Korea , the region and the world ? Her

e 's a briefing on the key elements in this controversy . Q : Why are the United

 States and North Korea at odds ? A : The United States suspects that North Kore

a has acquired nuclear weapons . But Pyongyang willn't allow international inspe

ctors to test its reactor and other nuclear plants so they can tell for sure . U

nder the international nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty , Pyongyang is obliged t

o allow inspectors to do their work . It hasn't . Q : Does North Korea actually 

have nuclear weapons now ? A : No one really knows . The Central Intelligence Ag

ency believes that Pyongyang probably has processed enough plutonium to manufact

ure at least one nuclear bomb and may well have one or two more such weapons in 

its arsenal . North Korea denies having any nuclear weapons and hasn't yet teste

d any . Q : Why should anyone care whether Pyongyang has a nuclear arsenal ? A :

 Two reasons : First , North Korea would be able to use its nuclear weapons to t

hreaten South Korea , Taiwan and Japan intensifying pressures in the entire regi

on . Second , Pyongyang also could sell nuclear bombs to other countries , such 

as Iraq , Iran , Libya and Syria as it has in the case of missiles and other wea

pons . This would worsen the problem of spreading nuclear arms around the globe 

. And if North Korea had a bomb , South Korea , Taiwan and Japan most likely wou

ld push to acquire their own nuclear weapons . ( Begin optional trim ) Q : What 

are nuclear fuel rods and why are they so important ? A : Fuel for a nuclear rea

ctor is shaped into thousands of rods , which are inserted into the reactor 's c

ore . In North Korea 's case , the fuel that it uses is unenriched uranium a che

ap material that it can cart off from its own mines . The problem is , it is als

o very easy to turn unenriched uranium into into weapons-grade plutonium-239 the

 material needed to provide the explosive power for nuclear weapons . This is do

ne simply by removing used fuel rods from a reactor and extracting the plutonium

 during reprocessing . The reactor core at Yongbyon holds seven to 10 tons of fu

el enough to provide plutonium for four or five nuclear bombs . Q : What is the 

International Atomic Energy Agency and why does it have any business in North Ko

rea ? A : The IAEA is a U.N.-related organization set up to serve as a clearingh

ouse and inspection agency to help administer the nuclear Non-Proliferation Trea

ty . Based in Vienna , Austria , it maintains a staff of about 100 bureaucrats a

nd nuclear scientists to help carry out this task . Q : How can IAEA inspectors 

use the disposed fuel rods to determine whether a country such as North Korea is

 diverting its spent fuel to make nuclear bombs ? A : They analyze the fuel to s

ee how much radioactive waste and contamination they contain , which tells them 

how old the fuel is and , therefore , how recently the North Koreans replaced th

eir spent fuel . That , in turn , can help them tell whether fuel has been repro

cessed . Q : But hasn't North Korea been permitting some inspections by the IAEA

 ? News reports said that the team was there last week ? A : It has , but the in

spectors have been very restricted , and the North Koreans have denied them perm

ission to take the necessary samplings and make the tests that they need . Essen

tially , Pyongyang has been playing a cat-and-mouse game for 15 months . ( End o

ptional trim ) Q : What brought on the current crisis ? A : North Korea decided 

abruptly two weeks ago to shut down its reactor and begin removing fuel rods lea

ving IAEA inspectors high and dry . IAEA officials thought they had a few more m

onths to negotiate over inspection rights . But the shutdown meant they had to a

ct quickly or they would lose the chance to analyze the spent rods completely an

d tell for sure whether Pyongyang has been making nuclear weapons . IAEA inspect

ors were denied access to the materials and records that they needed , and the N

orth Koreans removed the spent fuel rods so rapidly that the IAEA inspectors wer

e unable to complete their work in time . As a result , while the IAEA has confi

rmed that North Korea isn't now diverting spent fuel for use in nuclear weapons 

, it could not tell whether the Koreans did so in 1989 the last time the reactor

 was shut down . That was the key point in determining whether Pyongyang actuall

y has nuclear weapons . Because the United States had warned repeatedly that tha

t would be the critical point in its dealings with North Korea , the administrat

ion has begun a push to get the U.N. . Security Council to impose punitive econo

mic sanctions against Pyongyang . Q : How likely is it that the administration w

ill succeed in persuading the Security Council to impose sanctions ? A : It 's u

nclear . Although the Western allies generally agree it 's time to crack down on

 North Korea , China and Russia two of five permanent members of the Security Co

uncil , who have power to veto a sanctions resolution say they still aren't read

y to support punishments for Pyongyang . The administration is trying to work ou

t a compromise . But it may have to settle for gradual imposition of sanctions .

 China 's vote is crucial . If Beijing were to veto a sanctions resolution , the

 United States would have to try to go outside the Security Council to muster a 

coalition . And the sanctions likely would be far less effective . Washington al

so faces resistance from South Korea and Japan , both of which fear that imposin

g sanctions on North Korea might spur Pyongyang into military action . The North

 Koreans already have warned repeatedly that they would regard sanctions as an a

ct of war . North Korea has 80 percent of its 1.2 million heavily armed troops m

assed near the South Korean border , ready to invade . And it has long-range mis

siles admittedly crude , but still dangerous that could reach portions of Japan 

. Q : What impact would imposing sanctions have ? A : Proponents say that imposi

ng sanctions would squeeze North Korea economically and , hopefully , force the 

regime of long-time leader Kim Il Sung to halt its nuclear program and become le

ss-aggressive toward its neighbors . The North Korean economy already is in dire

 straits . Food is at a premium . And fuel supplies are short . Others mainly th

e Russians and Chinese argue that tightening the noose now will only make the re

gime more desperate and force it to become even more recalcitrant . There also i

s some question even among Western economists about how effective sanctions woul

d be . Q : Would the United States be ready to intervene militarily if the situa

tion got worse ? And who would be the winner of such a conflict ? A : Presumably

 , it would . The Clinton administration already has pledged to protect South Ko

rea with all the resources at its command . The United States has some 37,000 tr

oops in the country . Over the past few months , the Pentagon has begun beefing 

up U.S. forces in the region , sending Patriot missile batteries to help protect

 South Korean cities and military bases , and it is deploying more fighter aircr

aft and expanding supplies . But the U.S. would only act in defense that is , No

rth Korea would have to be preparing to launch an attack . There 's little doubt

 that the United States and South Korea have the firepower and troops ultimately

 to win a war with the North . But the allies are certain to take heavy casualti

es in the process . Not only is North Korea 's army sizable about double the siz

e of the 650,000-person South Korean force but it 's capable of doing extensive 

damage to Seoul , which is only a few miles from the border . In short , the all

ies clearly would win , but the price could be very high .

 In CLINTON-TIMES ( Broder ) sub for 10th graf ( adding `` Stars of David '' ) x

xx battle . '' The leaves have now returned , and the Nettuno cemetery is a lush

 memorial garden of evergreen holly oak and cypress trees . Row on row of perfec

tly aligned white marble crosses and Stars of David mark the graves . Before Fri

day 's ceremony , Italian school children placed Italian and American flags and 

a single red or yellow carnation upon each grave . PICK UP 11th graf : `` We xxx

 :

 WASHINGTON Insistent advice from Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan 

to President Clinton during the presidential transition and early in the new adm

inistration led Clinton to pursue lower deficits at the expense of the economic 

populism of his campaign , according to a new book . The book , `` The Agenda : 

Inside the Clinton White House '' by Washington Post Assistant Managing Editor B

ob Woodward , is an intimate look at how the new Democratic president and his st

umbling , feuding team of advisers struggled to formulate and adopt an economic 

program during Clinton 's first year in office . It depicts a chaotic policy-mak

ing operation , crucial intercessions by Hillary Rodham Clinton and an active po

licy role played by four outside political advisers . The four were given open a

ccess to the White House , which they used in part to criticize the economic tea

m . They complained that Clinton 's fall in popularity was a result of policies 

being promoted by the economic advisers or at least the way those policies were 

packaged for sale to the public . The two groups are described as virtually at w

ar with each other . The book describes Clinton temper tantrums , and it depicts

 him as frequently indecisive and reluctant to delegate . It portrays virtually 

every member of Clinton 's inner circle , including Hillary Clinton , as critica

l of the president 's management style . On the vital economic front , Greenspan

 is described as a central player , albeit once removed from the inner circle . 

The book recounts what Woodward calls a crucial meeting between Clinton and Gree

nspan in Little Rock , Ark. , in December 1992 , the month before Clinton 's ina

uguration . During the 2 1/2-hour session , the Fed chairman told the president-

elect that reducing the long-term federal budget deficit was `` essential '' and

 that the economic recovery could fall on its face if policies credible to Wall 

Street , particularly to bond-traders , were not advanced . Greenspan , in later

 conversations with Treasury Secretary Lloyd Bentsen , put a number on what woul

d be credible : cutting the deficit $ 140 billion or more by 1997 . By tradition

 and law , the Fed is an independent agency it sets monetary policy while the Wh

ite House and Congress decide how much the government will spend , raise in taxe

s and borrow . It is customary for the president and the Fed chairman to hold pe

riodic meetings . But in Woodward 's recounting of their relationship , Greenspa

n , a Republican appointed by President Ronald Reagan and reappointed by Preside

nt George Bush , comes across as a senior adviser , almost a teacher to Clinton 

. In what became a pattern , the Fed chairman made suggestions , Clinton acted o

n them , and Greenspan rewarded the action with approving words to Congress , or

 other public comments meant to signal his approval . Greenspan outlined to Clin

ton an economic policy Woodward calls the `` financial markets strategy , '' in 

which policy was constructed to send a message to Wall Street , which responded 

by driving down in long-term interest rates that allowed Greenspan to keep short

-term rates down as well . According to the theory , the economy would then impr

ove , Clinton would have more to spend on favored domestic programs in later yea

rs and ultimately would be re-elected . But the theory , and the policy Clinton 

adopted , bore little resemblance to the economic program on which Clinton had c

ampaigned . Clinton 's `` Putting People First '' campaign banner stressed gover

nment `` investment '' in programs that would improve the lives of middle-class 

Americans such as job training , early education , government promotion of cutti

ng-edge technology . A middle-class tax cut and health care for all Americans we

re additional sweeteners . As events developed , Greenspan 's economic scenario 

was not entirely accurate either . The bond market did react positively to Clint

on 's economic package initially , but then early this year nervousness about in

flation began to push interest rates up again , and Greenspan 's Fed raised its 

basic lending rate by 1.25 percent . Today long-term interest rates are nearly i

dentical to what they were when Clinton took office . But the economy is stronge

r now than in January 1993 and has added 3 million jobs since then . Woodward 's

 334-page book recounts the anguish and infighting produced by the transition fr

om Clinton 's winning campaign platform to a national economic policy . It attri

butes words and thoughts to participants in the debate , including both Clintons

 and virtually all of their top aides , without saying directly who provided the

se words to the author . In an introduction Woodward writes that whenever he quo

tes someone , the quotation comes from `` at least one participant , from memos 

, or from contemporaneous notes or diaries of a participant. .. . ' ' It appears

 that Woodward has talked to all the principals in his narrative , including the

 Clintons and Greenspan . He writes that all his interviews were conducted on ` 

` ` deep background , ' which means that I agreed not to identify these sources 

. '' The Washington Post will publish four excerpts from `` The Agenda '' beginn

ing Sunday . The book goes on sale next week . Greenspan 's advice to Clinton th

at a long-term deficit-reduction program was of paramount importance was backed 

not only by Bentsen , but also by Budget Director Leon E. Panetta and his deputy

 , Alice M. Rivlin , according to the book . The president 's economic advisers 

, with his assent , quickly jettisoned the tax cut , delayed health care reform 

, and then added an energy tax and spending cuts . Clinton 's political team cam

paign advisers James Carville and Paul Begala , media adviser Mandy Grunwald and

 pollster Stan Greenberg are portrayed as horrified and disgusted with this effo

rt to please the market . Carville is quoted as joking he used to want to die an

d come back in a second life as the pope or president , but now he just wanted t

o be the bond market because it seemed to run the world . The four seem to have 

spent much of last year decrying what that saw as mismanagement at the White Hou

se and firing off memos arguing that the president and some of his aides had los

t their souls to the deficit-cutters . In one memorable scene depicted in the bo

ok , Grunwald told White House deputy economic adviser Gene Sperling who had hel

ped formulate the campaign budget plan that his new emphasis on deficit-cutting 

was coming `` dangerously close '' to betraying the themes that had gotten Clint

on elected . Later , Grunwald told others that Sperling 's body had been snatche

d by Washington insiders and deficit hawks and that `` hostile forces '' were se

izing control of Clinton 's White House . Even Clinton , while intellectually ac

quiescing in the devastation of his investment programs , raged nonetheless at h

ow it happened . While the book depicts him as highly intelligent and energetic 

, it recounts several Clinton temper tantrums , quoting senior aide George Steph

anopoulos as calling them `` the wave '' overpowering , prolonged rages that sho

cked outsiders and often seemed far out of proportion to their cause . In one sc

ene late in the campaign , a low-level aide had told an audience that Clinton di

d not want local voters at an event . The president , discovering this , angrily

 said of the culprit , `` I want him dead , dead . I want him horsewhipped . '' 

He sent aides to Little Rock to find and fire the young man . After he cooled do

wn , Clinton relented . In another scene , with the campaign en route to Chicago

 , Clinton discovered his staff had told Mayor Richard M. Daley the candidate ha

d no time for a requested meeting with him . A furious Clinton asked , `` Who th

e hell could make such a dumb .. . mistake ? '' and ranted on and on . White Hou

se counselor David R. Gergen , witnessing the Clinton temper for the first time 

, is said to have been so alarmed that he raised it with Stephanopoulos , the fr

equent recipient of Clinton 's verbal abuse . Stephanopoulos brushed it off as p

art of Clinton 's personality . A recurring theme in the book is Clinton 's inab

ility to terminate debate and make a decision and his reluctance to delegate . A

mid the internal debate over the budget , Clinton is portrayed as holding repeat

ed , seemingly endless meetings at which issues rarely were decided , and during

 which he frequently changed his mind . Once the budget was passed by one vote i

n the House and a tie-breaking Senate vote by Vice President Al Gore Bentsen is 

said to have taken Clinton aside and warned him he was mismanaging the presidenc

y by trying to make every small decision and refusing to delegate . Bentsen beli

eved Clinton had a superior , inquisitive mind and was capable of genuine vision

 , Woodward reports . Bentsen compared Clinton to Jimmy Carter displaying admira

ble energy and intellect but getting bogged down in the range of opinion and deb

ate he demanded inside his government . Clinton `` could not contain his own dou

bts , '' Bentsen told associates . `` The lapses of discipline and restraint '' 

kept him from acting methodically as a president should . Some of those concerns

 appeared to grow out of a White House with little management structure , in whi

ch the four political aides had unusual status . Outside the normal avenues , th

ey sent anguished , internal memos into the White House warning of the near-coll

apse of the Clinton presidency and demanding meetings with the president and sen

ior advisers . One of the memos , written in July as the White House headed into

 the crucial month leading up to the budget vote , warned apocalyptically that t

he `` current course , advanced by our economic team and congressional leaders ,

 threatens to sink your popularity further and weaken your presidency . '' The m

emo , referring to extensive polling and focus groups , recommended dropping the

 gasoline tax , paring back the deficit-reduction package , and repackaging and 

reselling an economic program so it was not about taxes but about getting the na

tion 's economic house in order . The memo prompted Hillary Clinton to go to Whi