A prep course for the month-long World Cup soccer tournament, a worldwide pheno

t on Bueso 's behalf . Then Bueso would be released and deported back to Hondura

s . Over the next two weeks North arranged a series of meetings in which he lobb

ied the upper echelons of the Reagan administration on Bueso 's behalf . Among t

he officials who supported his efforts , according to a several participants in 

the meetings , were Gorman ; Dewey Clarridge , the head of CIA operations in Lat

in America ; and Elliott Abrams , assistant secretary of state for Latin America

 . Gorman was not available for comment . Abrams declined to answer questions on

 the matter . Clarridge , now a senior vice president at General Dynamics in San

 Diego , says North 's actions were appropriate . `` We considered the fact that

 he ( Bueso ) had been helpful to us in the past . And there was a feeling he ha

d been set up as part of some type of overzealous , unfair sting operation . The

re was a real question as to whether Bueso even had any idea what was going on a

t all . '' At a meeting with top State and Justice department officials on Sept.

 24 , 1986 , North argued that Bueso was only tangentially involved in the assas

sination plot , according to a deposition given to congressional investigators b

y a senior Justice Department official . North proposed that Bueso be released a

nd deported to Honduras . Oliver `` Buck '' Revell , then deputy director of the

 FBI , who also attended the meeting , objected . The FBI was determined not to 

get involved in the `` manipulation of the case or attempting to get the charges

 dropped , '' says Revell , now special agent in charge of the FBI office in Dal

las . `` There was no way we could do something for someone who had been involve

d in drug trafficking aimed against the United States . '' North refused to give

 up . In early October 1986 , he called another meeting trying to get higher-ran

king officials at the State Department and the Justice Department to change thei

r position in favor of prosecution . Again , North , Clarridge and Gorman attend

ed , and all spoke in favor of letting Bueso go free . But the Justice Departmen

t representative at the meeting , deputy assistant attorney general Mark Richard

 , resisted . Richard asked North to explain why Bueso merited special treatment

 . North 's answer , according to a deposition Richard gave to investigators for

 the congressional Iran-Contra committee in 1987 , was `` very ambiguous '' and 

included `` no specifics . '' `` I said , ` Look .. . anything we do for this ma

n seems to undercut our position that we have taken repeatedly that this man is 

an international terrorist , ' ' ' Richard testified . `` This is certainly not 

consistent with the position we have articulated throughout the course of this p

rosecution that this man is a serious international terrorist and should be trea

ted accordingly . '' The Justice Department did make one concession to North . I

t acted on North 's request that Bueso be transferred from the medium-security p

rison at Tallahassee to a minimum security at Eglin Air Force base in Florida , 

known as `` Club Fed '' for its comfortable cabins and volleyball courts . Bueso

 began serving his sentence there on Oct. 9 , 1986 . After serving a total of 40

 months ( including time served before his conviction ) , Bueso became eligible 

for parole and was released in May 1989 , according to Bureau of Prisons records

 . Bueso is now retired and living in Honduras . What does North 's campaign to 

free Bueso in 1986 have to do with his effort to get elected to the U.S. Senate 

in 1994 ? Nothing , according to a spokesman for the North campaign who said , `

` It 's old news and garbage and nobody cares about it . '' William Webster , th

e director of the FBI when Bueso was arrested and later the director of the CIA 

, has a different view of the Bueso affair . `` Information about past assistanc

e to an agency of government can be supplied to the sentencing judge but the bal

ancing responsibility lies with the court , '' says Webster , now a senior partn

er at the law firm of Milbank , Tweed , Hadley and McCloy . `` It 's important t

hat loyalty or zeal not short-circuit the criminal-justice process . '' The judi

cial process was not short-circuited in the Bueso affair but not for lack of try

ing on the part of the would-be junior senator from Virginia . -O- ( Jefferson M

orley is an editor in The Washington Post 's Outlook section . Murray Waas is a 

Washington-based reporter specializing in national-security issues . )

 Gen. Jose Abnego Bueso Rosa was , in Oliver North 's words , a `` friend of the

 United States '' deserving of `` reward . '' He was the chief of staff of the H

onduran armed forces from 1982 to 1984 , making him the second-ranking military 

officer in that Central American republic . At the time , Reagan administration 

officials were transforming Honduras , a sparsely populated agricultural republi

c , into a base for projecting U.S. military power throughout Central America .

 VLADIVOSTOK , Russia Russian writer Alexander Solzhenitsyn lost no time Saturda

y , 24 hours after his return from two decades of exile in the West , in speakin

g his mind , often quite sharply , about his much-altered country . In his first

 formal news conference on Russian soil , the 75-year-old Nobel Prize winner cri

ticized the economic reforms of President Boris Yeltsin as `` brainless , '' cal

led ultranationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky a `` caricature of a patriot '' and sa

id that swaths of independent Kazakhstan were actually Russia . He also labeled 

the political system here a `` pseudo-democracy . '' Solzhenitsyn , who has neve

r shied from controversy , has made similar statements in the West , where he wa

s sent by Soviet rulers in 1974 for his defiance . But his words are taking on a

dded meaning now that he is back in Russia and can easily be heard and seen for 

the first time by his compatriots . He is widely respected here , but whether hi

s opinions will carry more weight than those of any other prominent person is an

 open question . If today was any indication , many of Yeltsin 's moderate natio

nalist critics will be quite content with what Solzhenitsyn has to say , while o

thers on both the left and right may be less happy . Solzhenitsyn said he does n

ot intend to get involved with politics , either through election or appointment

 . But he will try to `` help our homeland in these extremely difficult conditio

ns by public activity , through meetings , by persuasion and through my articles

 . Of course , I will speak as much as I can . '' Residents here seemed delighte

d that the famous writer was in their midst and were willing to listen to what h

e had to say . `` People respect him , so he 'll have some influence , of course

 , but how much depends on how he acts , '' said Nikolai Shemetov , 45 , a mecha

nic at a local power station . Solzhenitsyn pointedly avoided direct criticism o

f Yeltsin despite several questions about the Russian leader , who sent him a we

lcome-home telegram Saturday . Solzhenitsyn supported Yeltsin in the Russian lea

der 's past political crises , including last year 's battles with the now-disba

nded hard-line parliament . Saturday , however , he had nothing good to say abou

t the changes in Russia under Yeltsin 's rule , except to applaud the collapse o

f communism and Soviet power . He particularly took issue with Yeltsin 's econom

ic policies , which he said he had followed closely through news accounts and co

nversations from his home in Vermont . He said he had become convinced that the 

reforms , including the controversial program to privatize state property , had 

done nothing more than enrich a few and impoverish many . Solzhenitsyn 's first-

hand survey this morning of the new Russian economic world , at an outdoor marke

t overflowing with food and clothing , did not seem to alter his opinion . Like 

many Russians , he appeared shocked by the high prices in comparison to 20 years

 ago and seemed less impressed that so much more is available now than before . 

When he commented on the high prices to one merchant , the man responded that be

cause of inflation `` the prices will be even higher tomorrow . '' As was the ca

se on Friday , when he arrived in this naval port city from the United States , 

Solzhenitsyn was besieged everywhere he went by well over 100 local and foreign 

journalists , eager to monitor his every statement and reaction . Some Russians 

have suggested that Solzhenitsyn himself has created the commotion , by beginnin

g his return to Russia here in Vladivostok rather than in Moscow , which is much

 more accustomed to celebrities . But Saturday he complained bitterly about the 

constant swarm of reporters , saying it had made it impossible for him to meet w

ith and talk to ordinary Russians , his most important goal over the next few mo

nths . The family will travel slowly across Russia to Moscow in an effort to get

 reacquainted with the country . Solzhenitsyn has been so harried by the media t

hat one of his best moments so far , according to his sons , was when he and his

 entourage got stuck in an elevator at the Vladivostok City Hospital for 20 minu

tes with the head of the medical facility . `` There was no noise ; no one was t

here , '' Solzhenitsyn said . `` I learned a lot . ''

 BEIT HANINA , West Bank Inside the nerve center for Palestinian economic reviva

l , Deputy Managing Director Hasan Abu Libdeh is waiting for the phone to ring .

 In fact , he 's still waiting for the phone to be installed . So far , the Pale

stinian Economic Council for Development and Reconstruction , the agency set up 

to translate billions of dollars in foreign aid into jobs and prosperity for Pal

estinian self-rule , does not have a single telephone line . The Palestinians sa

y Israel 's military government in the West Bank is blocking their request for t

elephones . The military government says it is a problem of poor West Bank infra

structure . Either way , it is a clue to the uncertainty swirling around the amb

itious dreams of Palestinian economic renewal and the global rescue plan that is

 supposed to make it happen . After the self-rule accord was signed last Septemb

er between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization , nations around the

 world promised to help the nascent Palestinian Authority rebuild after 27 years

 of Israeli occupation . At a U.S.-sponsored conference in Washington , $ 2.1 bi

llion was pledged to the Palestinians over five years , including $ 600 million 

for the first year . Seven months later , the global rescue program is looking m

ore like a mirage . So far , only a tiny fraction of the money has trickled in .

 And now that the Palestinians and Israelis have started to implement their agre

ement , the Palestinians are facing enormous financial problems that they are wo

efully unprepared to solve . For now , Palestinians in the street are still cele

brating the arrival of their own police force in the Gaza Strip and the West Ban

k town of Jericho . But the best and brightest Palestinian technocrats are deepl

y worried about what will happen when the celebrations fade , when the people on

 the street discover that the government under their own flag cannot deliver the

 same services that the Israeli occupiers did . `` We 'll be drinking a lot of u

nsweetened coffee , '' said Libdeh . `` It will be the real life . '' The reason

s why the money has not yet started flowing from abroad are complex and help ill

uminate the uncertain nature of the new Palestinian experiment . PLO Chairman Ya

sser Arafat , who single-handedly controlled the finances of his revolutionary o

rganization for three decades , has not yielded to the demands of the World Bank

 and donor nations that he give up his old methods when running the new Palestin

ian Authority . While Arafat has made some concessions under pressure , authorit

ative sources said he has not given up his desire to run everything . Worried ab

out corruption , as well as about political favoritism , the international donor

s have not yet made good on their major pledges . According to these sources inc

luding Palestinians and Western diplomats familiar with the events the whole con

cept of a coordinated , global aid effort to the Palestinians may be stalling . 

Instead , the sources report , Arafat is actively looking for ways to bypass the

 World Bank by dealing directly with individual companies and countries for lucr

ative projects in Gaza and Jericho . This system would help preserve his central

 role , without the headache of restrictions being imposed by international dono

rs . The sources said British , American , French , German and Danish firms quie

tly have been beating a path to PLO headquarters in Tunis recently , with the ap

proval or acquiescence of their governments , seeking contracts for long-term de

velopment projects such as printing a new currency , building a new telephone sy

stem and constructing airports and an electric system . `` The reasons the donor

s are going to Tunis are the same reasons Israel decided to go there : That 's w

here the decisions are made , '' one diplomat said . The Palestinian economic co

uncil here , based just outside Jerusalem , was originally intended to channel t

he aid from abroad into useful projects in the West Bank and Gaza . But for mont

hs the international donors complained the council was not adequately set up to 

avoid abuse . Recently , the council 's bylaws were approved , and six top offic

ials were given six-month reappointments , including several prominent Palestini

an economists . Last week , Arafat also selected the U.S.-based investment bank 

Morgan Stanley to help manage the reconstruction efforts , according to the Pale

stinian news agency Wafa . But the big money has not started flowing , and there

 is a growing fear that it may never materialize on the scale promised . The Pal

estinian economic council `` is doing some good work , '' said another Western a

id expert , `` but the question still lingers : Who is the genuine authority ? '

' While some countries are anxious to win lucrative contracts , they are loath t

o pour money into an organization that will be exclusively controlled by Arafat 

, he said . The suspicion is strong among donors that Arafat , if left to his ow

n devices , will channel aid to political friends in the territories-for example

 , that he will build health clinics to reward operatives in his Fatah movement 

, rather than where the clinics are needed . There is also a reverse suspicion :

 The Palestinians complain that foreign donors are only interested in projects t

hat look good back home , with a plaque on the front door , rather than let Pale

stinians build what they want . But the Palestinians admit they are not in a pos

ition to turn anyone down . In the near term , the Palestinians are heading for 

an economic upheaval . The Israelis have turned over to them health , education 

and other government departments in Gaza and Jericho , but the 7,000 workers ' s

alaries have been paid only through June 1 . After that , the Palestinians have 

to begin running their own government and they are short of cash . The new Pales

tinian national authority has about $ 19 million in a special emergency fund , o

fficials said . But after a few months , it will be severely strained . During t

he occupation , Israel spent about $ 70 million a year to provide services in wh

at are now the self-rule areas of Gaza and Jericho ; by most accounts , the Pale

stinians will need two or three times that amount , since they must support poli

ce as well . Already , thousands of Palestinian policemen in Gaza and Jericho ar

e unpaid and sleeping on mattresses ; Israel recently donated military rations t

o keep them from going hungry . The Palestinians have been given the authority t

o set tax rates and collect taxes . But all the Palestinian workers in the tax d

epartment of the Israeli military government resigned six years ago at the begin

ning of the intifada , or uprising against Israeli occupation . In addition , th

e Palestinians lack expertise to run the computerized tax system left behind by 

Israel , which is entirely in Hebrew , said Elise Shazar , spokeswoman for the m

ilitary government . Moreover , it is not at all certain that Palestinians in Ga

za already hard-pressed by high unemployment and Israel 's closure of the territ

ories will be willing to pay taxes to the new authority . Palestinians estimate 

it may take months to begin to generate revenues and that the collection rate ma

y be only 40 percent of what is sought . While tax revenue is supposed to also c

ome from Palestinian workers in Israel , so far Israel has only permitted a tric

kle to return to their jobs . The result will be a skyrocketing deficit for day-

to-day needs the first year , perhaps $ 150 million or more . The Palestinians a

re hoping the international donors will decide soon pick up the tab . But a seni

or Israeli official , who spoke to reporters on condition he not be identified ,

 was skeptical . `` We know that the international community is insisting on spe

cific projects to support , '' he said . `` They don't want to pay for daily exp

enses . If everyone is stalling and there is no money for expenses , the whole t

hing may collapse . `` It 's going to become our problem in no time , '' said th

e official . `` And then what ? ''

 WASHINGTON An unresolved feud in the Clinton administration , which abruptly cu

t off Peru and Colombia from access to U.S. counter-drug intelligence , has blin

ded all three nations to the flights of drug smuggling aircraft and threatened t

o fracture a brittle alliance against the northward flow of drugs . The sudden h

alt in cooperation has created a significant opportunity for traffickers , accor

ding to civilian and military narcotics experts . Relatively few drug flights ha

ve ever been intercepted , but data on their origin and destination has set the 

stage for raids on drug labs and storage facilities that netted some 300 metric 

tons of contraband last year . Because the State and Defense Departments could n

ot agree on a policy and failed to coordinate their moves , Peru and Colombia re

ceived no warning and scant explanation of the May 1 intelligence cutoff . On th

at day , the U.S. . Southern Command suspended operation of U.S. ground-based ra

dars in those countries and stopped allowing their nationals aboard U.S. surveil

lance flights launched from Panama . The two South American nations have begun t

o retaliate . Peru has banned the American AWACS and P-3 surveillance craft from

 its air space , and Colombia threatened in writing last week to expel two U.S. 

mobiground radars . At issue is the use of American flight tracking data by Colo

mbia and Peru to locate and then force down or shoot down suspected drug planes 

. The United States has long regarded any attack on civil aircraft as illegal un

der international conventions and detrimental to U.S. interests as the world 's 

leading aviation power , but it sometimes has winked at quiet efforts against dr

ug traffickers . The Pentagon , supported by the Justice Department and a recent

 review by lawyers for eight government agencies , maintains that assisting in t

he shootdowns breaks U.S. and international law . Senior State Department offici

als , while acknowledging what one called `` legal concerns , '' want to continu

e some form of a policy under which the United States would share the tracking d

ata but express its official disapproval of attacks in flight . Beyond the legal

 concerns , the Defense Department worries about the possibility that the two So

uth American nations will down innocent aircraft by accident . Days after U.S. .

 F-15 fighters shot down two American helicopters in northern Iraq , Defense Und

ersecretary Frank G. Wisner wrote on April 20 to Undersecretary of State Peter T

arnoff . `` Recent events in Iraq , '' said his classified letter , underscored 

the need to protect innocent aircraft . The Defense Department would stop the in

telligence sharing on May 1 , he wrote , unless Colombia and Peru agreed not to 

use weapons against aircraft in flight . What threw the interagency dispute into

 crisis was its uncommon rancor and the willingness of U.S. adversaries to let i

t spill out into relations with Colombia and Peru . Noteworthy because it accomp

anies new claims of bureaucratic peace within the Clinton administration , the p

olicy feud has `` descended into hatred , '' according to one senior participant

 . Defense Department officials charge that the State Department deliberately fa

iled to provide advance notice of the May 1 cutoff to Peru and Colombia or even 

to U.S. ambassadors there in order to create maximum backlash . When the two cou

ntries protested , one Colombian diplomat said a State Department contact told h

im the Defense Department cut off the aircraft intelligence `` unilaterally '' a

nd that the military `` didn't even tell the State Department about it . '' In a

 remarkable suggestion that one U.S. official likened to `` treason , '' the sam

e State Department official even encouraged Colombia to lodge a strong protest ,

 according to the Colombian diplomat and another U.S. official with knowledge of

 the conversation . `` I have been through a lot in 27 years of service , '' wro

te Alvin Adams , U.S. ambassador in Peru , in a classified May 3 cable to compla

in that he received no word in advance . `` Of the little I can remember in my a

dvanced middle age , this is in my ken of experience a standout . '' Adams asked

 `` urgently for coordinated guidance from you . '' In Washington , two of the p

rincipal adversaries , Assistant Secretary of State Robert S. Gelbard and Deputy

 Assistant Secretary of Defense Brian E. Sheridan , each in charge of counter-na

rcotics policy for his department , are said to be not on speaking terms . State

 Department officials , according to sources there and on Capitol Hill , have to