History of Civilizations of Central Asia
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Contents The Ayub Khan era . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 414
The Yahya Khan regime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 416 The Bhutto era . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 418
The Zia era . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 420 The democratic era . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 423
Pakistan came into being on 14 August 1947. In pursuance of the Indian Independence Act of 1947, the British transferred power in Pakistan to the All-India Muslim League. The league’s president, Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad ‘Ali Jinnah, became the governor-general and its general secretary, Liaquat ‘Ali Khan, the prime minister. At the time of indepen- dence, Pakistan was a geographically divided country, located in the Muslim-majority areas in the northwest and north-east of the South Asian subcontinent. A provisional constitu- tion, based on the Government of India Act of 1935, provided an interim constitutional framework until a new constitution could be drawn up. 1 The Pakistan areas were economically the least developed regions of British India. Basically agricultural, even the industries for raw materials produced here were in the Indian areas. Additionally, Pakistan faced unprecedented problems at its birth. Commu- nal violence not only caused a tragic loss of human life but also resulted in mass migra- tions across the borders. More than 7 million people arrived in Pakistan. The immediate problem was their rehabilitation and resettlement. But more lasting was the problem of their integration in the indigenous population. * See Map
5 . 1 Callard, 1957
, p. 79; Choudhury, 1969
, pp. 17–19, 23–34. 411
Contents ISBN 92-3-103985-7 PAKISTAN (SINCE 1947) The pre-independence communal distrust was passed on to India and Pakistan in the form of embittered relations between the two states. There were differences over the dis- tribution of assets and liabilities. Although a fixed ratio of division was agreed upon, it was followed by conflict over the actual delivery of various items. Evacuee property was another problematic issue. It was only time that diluted the intensity of discord on these issues. More serious were the disputes over the sharing of waters of rivers that flowed into Pakistani Punjab from the Indian territories and the accession of the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir. When the two countries failed to settle the waters dispute through bilateral negotiations, they accepted the offer of the president of the World Bank for mediation. The Kashmir dispute resulted in armed conflict that only ended when the United Nations arranged a ceasefire. It has so far defied any solution acceptable to the two countries. 2 Pakistan faced these and other problems with its limited resources. Since there was no federal capital, Karachi (the capital of the province of Sind) was selected to serve as the federal capital as well. This arrangement proved shortlived and Sind soon had to find a new capital. The takeover of Karachi by the centre caused a centre–Sind rift. Pakistan had inadequate sources even to run the administration at the centre. It met its financial obligations by adopting frugal policies, securing loans and taking over certain provincial taxes. However, soon after independence there was an unexpected increase in the demand for Pakistani raw materials, especially jute and cotton, in the international market as a result of the war in the Korean peninsula. The resultant trade boom brought in handsome revenues, which facilitated Pakistan’s economic independence. The framing of a constitution posed more intractable problems. This task was assigned to a 79-member Constituent Assembly, which also served as the national legislature until a new one was elected after the framing of a new constitution. Two issues particularly hindered the constitution-making process. First, the assembly had to decide the Islamic character of the future constitution, which had been the dominant theme of the Pakistan ‘ulam¯a’ movement. After lengthy debates, they drafted detailed Islamic provisions but failed to determine the status of the Qadianis, whose spiritual head had made messianic claims. The ‘ulam¯a’ demanded that the Qadianis be declared non-Muslims, but the federal government refused to accept their demand. The crisis that followed could not be con- trolled by the civilian agencies. Martial law was imposed to restore order in the province of Punjab. 3 After that, the Islamic issue did not figure seriously in Pakistan’s politics until the 1970s. 2 Lamb, 1991 , pp. 12–13; Afzal, 2002 , pp. 14–22. 3 Choudhury, 1969 , pp. 20–1, 47–50. 412 Contents
Copyrights ISBN 92-3-103985-7 PAKISTAN (SINCE 1947) Second, the constitution-makers had to determine the form of federalism. Pakistan pre- sented a unique situation. It consisted of two geographic zones. East Pakistan was one-fifth the size of West Pakistan but a majority of the population lived there. It was linguistically and ethnically more unified than West Pakistan. By 1954 Bengali, along with Urdu, had been accepted as the two national languages. West Pakistan was more diverse; it had four provinces – Punjab, Sind, North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and (British) Baluchis- tan – ten princely states, and the Tribal Areas. It was economically better-off than East Pakistan. The Punjabis and Muslim migrants dominated the civil service. West Pakistan was strategically more important than East Pakistan: it was close to the oil-rich Gulf region, it had borders with Iran, Afghanistan and China, and the Central Asian states (then part of the Soviet Union) were a few kilometres away from its borders. The defence policies followed by the British did not end with independence. During the Cold War, Pakistan aligned itself with the West and joined the US-sponsored defence alliances, the Baghdad Pact (subsequently known as the Central Treaty Organization – CENTO) and the South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). The West attached more importance to CENTO than SEATO as far as Pakistan was concerned because of (West) Pakistan’s strategic location. These factors required a West Pakistan-dominated political system. Until 1954, it was perceived that this objective could be achieved by providing parity of representation to East and West Pakistan at the federal level. But the March 1954 elections in East Pakistan, in which the United Front of four East Pakistan-based parties (Awami League, Krishak Sramik Party, Ganatantri Dal and Nizam-i Islam Party) swept the polls, revealed the flaws in this strategy. Then the idea of welding the provinces and states of West Pakistan into one unit was floated to counterbalance East Pakistan. But strong opposition from the political forces to one unit and to a pro-Western foreign policy led to the dismissal of the Constituent Assembly. 4 The army supported this change and its chief himself joined the cabinet. A second Constituent Assembly was elected on the basis of parity between East and West Pakistan when the Federal (Supreme) Court declared the dismissal of the assembly as unlawful. This assembly framed a constitution that came into force on 23 March 1956, which incorporated the principles of parity, one unit and a mild form of provincial auton- omy. The military leadership played a critical role in the acceptance of these principles. The constitution provided a federal parliamentary system with the prime minister as the administrative head. The president was empowered to invite an MNA (Member of the National Assembly) who enjoyed the support of a majority of the MNAs to form the gov- ernment. He could remove the prime minister if he thought that he had lost that support. 4 Wilcox,
1963 , pp. 183–4, 186–7. 413 Contents
Copyrights ISBN 92-3-103985-7 The Ayub Khan era This power was of little importance under normal circumstances but it could become cru- cial if no party had a clear majority in the National Assembly. 5 The constitution transformed the second Constituent Assembly into the first (interim) National Assembly until the holding of elections under its auspices. The constitution had not provided the type of autonomy that the East Pakistan-based parties had demanded. Similarly, there had been a demand for provincial autonomy in West Pakistan. Instead of providing that, the constitution had eliminated the separate identity of the West Pak- istani provinces. The pressure from political parties over these issues caused instability. Four governments were formed at the centre within two years. No economic development plan could be implemented in this atmosphere. Even the draft of the first five-year plan (1955–60) was not finalized until spring 1958, i.e. three years after it was supposed to have gone into effect. After several postponements, national elections were scheduled for February 1959. The opposition to one unit, parity and a pro-Western foreign policy in the election campaign alarmed the military leadership. As a result, the president abrogated the constitution and imposed martial law in the country. General Ayub Khan, the army chief, took over as the chief martial law administrator (CMLA)/president. The Ayub Khan era Martial law remained in force for about four years (October 1958–June 1962). The change was peaceful except for limited military action in Baluchistan. The army was withdrawn from martial law duties in one month’s time and was rarely recalled. However, martial law was strictly enforced. Restrictive laws were used to control the press. All the elective institutions from the National Assembly down to the local bodies and political organiza- tions including political parties, professional associations and student bodies were banned. Ayub Khan tried to prevent the return of the politicians after the lifting of martial law. The Elective Bodies Disqualification Order (EBDO) barred the participation in politics of more than 6,000 politicians. Ayub Khan used the peaceful atmosphere for reforms and basic changes. The federal capital was shifted from Karachi to a site near Rawalpindi, and was named Islamabad. Boundaries with neighbouring countries were demarcated. The Indus basin treaty was signed with India to settle the waters dispute, and the World Bank arranged funds for its implementation. 6 Ayub Khan introduced reforms that were recommended by the commissions that he appointed. The most important of the economic reforms concerned the land. Fragmented 5 Mahmood (ed.), 1997 , pp. 255–6. 6 Ayub Khan, 1967 , pp. 96–8, 107–13. 414 Contents
Copyrights ISBN 92-3-103985-7 The Ayub Khan era landholdings were consolidated and a ceiling was fixed on their size to break up the big landed estates. Although the reforms made available large tracts of land for distribution among landless peasants, the exemptions provided in them diluted their impact. These reforms increased production but failed to eliminate the landlord politicians, which was Ayub’s primary objective. The landlords returned to politics with the same vigour once the ban on their activities was lifted. The most radical of the social reforms were the Mus- lim Family Laws. These laws provided that permission should be sought from the court for second and subsequent marriage(s), divorce would be effective only after it had been approved by the court, the minimum age for marriage was fixed at 16 for males and 14 for females, and the grandson of a pre-deceased son was allowed to inherit the property of his grandfather. Ayub Khan suppressed the opposition to these laws. Although they were not strictly enforced, the laws did improve the status of females. 7 Ayub Khan’s system of Basic Democracies was an institution of local self-government, designed to be independent of bureaucratic controls. But Ayub Khan himself destroyed it when he used it for his own survival in power. After a positive vote from the 80,000 Basic Democrats in a referendum in which he was the only candidate, he appointed a constitution commission. But contrary to the commission’s recommendations, he adopted his own constitution, which provided for a centralized presidential system. The focal point was the president, who exercised executive, legislative and financial powers at the centre directly and in the provinces indirectly. Elections to the presidency and the legislatures were held indirectly; the Basic Democrats served as the electoral college. Initially, Ayub Khan opposed the revival of political parties, which he considered insti- tutions leading to instability. But once political activities revived, he had to allow the parties to function. In fact, he himself led a party, the Pakistan Muslim League (Convention). The political parties did not accept his system, however, and they struggled to replace it by a federal parliamentary system. It was their main plank in the 1964–5 elections, when they formed an alliance, the Combined Opposition Parties (COP). The COP put up Fatima Jin- nah, sister of the founder of Pakistan, as a candidate in the presidential elections. 8 Although Ayub Khan won the elections, he lost credibility amidst allegations of vote-rigging. Ayub Khan attempted to change his pro-Western foreign policy into one of bilateralism. He wanted balanced relationships with all the major powers. But his cultivation of China angered the US, which was providing more than 50 per cent of Pakistan’s foreign aid. At a time when his government’s foreign policy and foreign aid were in crisis, Ayub Khan plunged Pakistan into an adventure to capture Kashmir by force. The Pakistan–India war of 7 Ziring,
1997 , pp. 233–44. 8 Sayeed,
1967 , pp. 213–33. 415 Contents
Copyrights ISBN 92-3-103985-7 The Yahya Khan regime 1965 ended with grave consequences for Pakistan. The US ended all military and economic aid. After the war, economic aid was restored at a reduced level but the ban on military aid continued. The post-war Tashkent agreement relegated the Kashmir issue to the background. The ban on military aid, decline in financial allocations, and overtures to India for mutual reductions in the armed forces caused alienation in the military ranks. In addition, the war aggravated socio-economic problems that had already started to appear as a result of Ayub’s policies. Unemployment and inflation rose and the funds for social development declined. The inequitable distribution of the economic benefits of development resulted in the concentration of wealth in a few hands, leading to acute social and regional dispari- ties. Twenty-two families allegedly came to control the country’s economic resources. The inter-regional and intra-regional economic disparities had a political fallout. The resulting atmosphere was ripe for political exploitation. 9 The political parties adopted socialism and regional/provincial autonomy in their man- ifestos. The Awami League, led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, demanded regional auton- omy in its Six Points Programme. The Ayub regime used strong-arm tactics to suppress the pro-Six Points movement and detained Mujib and his close associates. Zulfikar ‘Ali Bhutto, Ayub’s foreign minister, founded the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), which advo- cated socialist reforms. He launched a movement against Ayub Khan. Although Bhutto was imprisoned, other parties joined the movement and forced Ayub Khan to negotiate. Politi- cal prisoners were released and press restrictions were removed. A round table conference managed to reach a consensus only on two issues, a federal parliamentary system and direct elections on an adult franchise basis. The movement restarted with greater intensity. The opposition parties focused on their respective demands relating to autonomy, one unit, the economy and foreign affairs. The deterioration continued unabated. Finally, Ayub Khan handed over power to the army chief rather than the speaker, as required under the consti- tution. General Yahya Khan took over as CMLA/president, abrogated the constitution and imposed martial law. 10 He promised elections once order had been restored. The Yahya Khan regime The second martial law period lasted for less than three years. The military remained on martial law duties throughout this period. Political parties were not banned but they were not allowed to conduct any activity until 1 January 1970. Unlike Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan 9 Kochanek, 1983 , pp. 77–9. 10 Afzal,
1998 , Vol. 1, pp. 265–98. 416 Contents
Copyrights ISBN 92-3-103985-7 The Yahya Khan regime had only a limited understanding of Pakistan’s political and constitutional problems. Added to this was his impatience with administrative detail. He left important matters to his mil- itary colleagues and the ‘experts’. In the beginning, he had clear objectives: to hold elec- tions, transfer power to a constitutional government and then return to barracks. These objectives blurred with the passage of time. Yahya Khan was tempted to stay in power and he manipulated the political situation as and when it suited him. He used to meet politicians individually rather than collectively. Gullible as he was, he was easily misled. He made half-hearted attempts to introduce reforms but then abandoned them half-way. The political parties also failed to devise any mechanism for forging common views and strategies on constitutional and political issues. Yahya Khan took decisions on fundamental issues without any institutional consulta- tion. The Legal Framework Order (LFO), which he issued on 30 March 1970, incorporated these decisions. The LFO also spelt out the basic principles of the future constitution. The Islamic provisions of the earlier constitutions were to be included. The constitution was to provide for a federal parliamentary system ensuring the preservation of Islamic ideol- ogy, democratic principles, and the fundamental rights and independence of the judiciary. Representation in the National Assembly was to be on the basis of population. Similarly, one unit was broken up to restore former provinces. The princely states were merged into the contiguous provinces or given a separate status. The LFO provided that the National Assembly would have 313 seats. East Pakistan had 162, plus 7 seats for women, and the remaining seats were distributed among the units of West Pakistan. The number of seats for each provincial assembly was also fixed. Yahya Khan had settled controversial issues to prevent their exploitation in the election campaign. However, he left the issue of provin- cial/regional autonomy unresolved despite demands for its resolution. 11 The elections were first scheduled for October 1970, but then, due to a disastrous cyclone in East Pakistan, they were moved to December. Political parties campaigned for the elections from January to November 1970. The focus in West Pakistan was primarily on Islam versus socialism, whereas in East Pakistan it was on regional autonomy. In the latter case, the Awami League’s Six Points became the consensual charter of the Bengali demands. The Awami League swept the polls in East Pakistan. It won all seats, except two, allocated to East Pakistan in the National Assembly, which constituted an overall majority. The PPP surprised the political analysts by winning 81 of the 138 seats allocated to West Pakistan, but its victory was confined to Punjab and Sind. The military leadership and the PPP had not given any serious attention to the Six 11 Rizvi,
1986 , pp. 176–80. 417 Contents
Copyrights ISBN 92-3-103985-7 The Bhutto era Points. When they had slowly digested their implications, they pressed for a settlement on basic issues outside the National Assembly. The Awami League felt bound by their election pledges and, with a clear majority in the house, saw no point in making any concessions before the assembly session. The president did call the National Assembly session but then postponed it under pressure from the PPP. The Awami League’s violent reaction to the postponement was suppressed by the use of military force. An unsuccessful last-minute attempt to resolve the dead- lock through negotiations culminated in a ruthless military action. The loss of human life and property was incalculable. 12 The ensuing Bengali insurgency engulfed the region in another Pakistan–India war. This resulted in the break-up of Pakistan, with the emergence in December 1971 of the independent state of Bangladesh in former East Pakistan. The Bhutto era The PPP assumed power in (West) Pakistan with Zulfikar ‘Ali Bhutto, the party chairman, sworn in as CMLA/president. Martial law continued until 21 April 1972, when an interim constitution, similar in content to the provisional constitution of 1947, came into force. The National Assembly framed a constitution that was promulgated on 14 August 1973. It provided for a federal parliamentary system with executive authority vested in the prime minister. The president was a figurehead bound by the advice of the prime minister, so much so that his signature was considered valid only if countersigned by the prime minister. The constitution tried to prevent any future military takeover, making such action an act of treason punishable by death. All the political parties represented in the National Assembly voted for the constitution. On the promulgation of the constitution, Bhutto took over as prime minister. 13 Pakistan signed a peace treaty with India, the Simla agreement, which stipulated the resolution of all disputes by peaceful means and bilaterally. The ceasefire line in Kashmir was recognized as the line of control. India vacated the territories that it had occupied during the war on the western front and returned the (over 90,000) prisoners of war. In return, Pakistan recognized Bangladesh as a separate country, at a historic summit of heads of Muslim states in Lahore. Pakistan fostered ties with Muslim and Third World countries and also developed bilateral relations with all the major powers. Bhutto attempted to reform every sector of society, as stipulated in his party’s manifesto. Land reforms introduced restrictions on landholdings, fixing a ceiling in irrigated areas at 12 Sisson and Rose, 1990 , pp. 154–60. 13 Burki,
1980 , pp. 91–8. 418 Contents
Copyrights ISBN 92-3-103985-7 The Bhutto era 150 acres (60.7 ha) and in non-irrigated areas at 300 acres. Major industries, banks, insur- ance companies and ghee, rice, flour and ginning factories were nationalized. The national- ization policy disappointed the left in the PPP and alienated those it affected. Additionally, insufficient managerial party resources damaged the management of the nationalized units. Those affected by this policy swelled the ranks of Bhutto’s opponents. 14 The cordiality that the political parties had demonstrated following the break-up of Pakistan did not last long. The National Awami Party (NAP)–Jamiat al-Ulema-i Islam (JUI) coalition ministries in Baluchistan and NWFP, which had been sworn in as a mark of tolerance, disappeared within ten months. The NAP suffered a ban and its leaders were charged with sedition. A tribunal was set up to try them. Bhutto’s intolerance of criticism, both inside and outside the party, gradually mounted. He used old techniques and devised new ones to control the opposition. The recalcitrant press was punished. His critics among the politicians were detained. Using his party’s parliamentary majority, he amended the constitution to restrict fundamental rights and to curtail the powers of the judiciary. 15 By
But in reality that was not the case. The opposition parties sprang a surprise when the general elections were scheduled in March 1977. Contrary to Bhutto’s calculations, they formed the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) to put up common candidates against the PPP candidates. The election campaign was intense and bitter. Bhutto soon realized the extent of his lost popularity. His extensive use of official agencies for assessment of his party’s electoral prospects raised doubts about the fairness of the elections. The PNA’s suspicions about the rigging of the elections were strengthened by the unopposed election of 19 PPP candidates to the assemblies. When the National Assembly results were announced on 7 March, in which the PPP won 155 seats plus the 19 unopposed seats, and the PNA 36 seats, the PNA was con- vinced of massive vote-rigging. It launched a well-organized movement that forced Bhutto to negotiate with the opposition. The negotiations were unnecessarily prolonged, partly because Bhutto believed that the PNA movement was not genuine and that the US had supported it to punish him for his refusal to retract from the agreement with France for a nuclear-reprocessing plant. Bhutto involved the army first to maintain peace and then to resolve political differences. The prolongation of the negotiations encouraged the military leadership to evolve its own strategy and options for any impending crisis. The accumulated mistrust in Bhutto frustrated all his moves for a settlement. The ‘hawks’ in the PNA had concluded that the 14 Wolpert, 1993 , pp. 173–85. 15 Newberg,
1995 , pp. 136–54. 419 Contents
Copyrights ISBN 92-3-103985-7 The Zia era military would hold elections within a specified time after ousting Bhutto from power. They played their role in blocking a PPP–PNA settlement. 16 The climax was reached on 5 July 1977, when General Zia al-Haq, the army chief, removed Bhutto from power and imposed martial law in the country. This time the constitution was not abrogated but a major part of it was held ‘in abeyance’. The Zia era The third period under martial law lasted until 31 December 1985. However, General Zia al-Haq remained in power until his death in a C-130 plane crash in August 1988. At first, he was just CMLA, but in August 1978 he assumed the office of president as well. The military was actively involved in the administration of martial law. Political parties were not banned immediately but their influence was gradually diluted. Zia moved slowly to entrench himself in power. First he proceeded against the PPP. Bhutto was tried in a murder case: the Lahore High Court convicted him and sentenced him to death. The Supreme Court confirmed the death sentence, and he was hanged on 4 April 1979. After his death, the PPP was decimated in the process of resistance and adjustment to the changed situation. The PNA parties initially sided with Zia; some even accepted ministerial positions. They were under the illusion that now that Bhutto had been eliminated, they would easily come to power in an electoral contest. But Zia had his own plans. He postponed the elections promised for October 1977 to November 1979. Then, instead of holding the elections on schedule, he deferred them indefinitely and banned all political parties. Zia’s policies broke up the PNA and a majority of its component parties arrayed against him, but by then he could face their opposition. Zia al-Haq cultivated those elements that Bhutto had alienated. He created confidence in the business community by denationalizing some of the nationalized units and by tak- ing other business-friendly measures. He embraced the PNA election slogan for the intro- duction of the Islamic system (Niz¯am-i Mustafa). His steps to reform the economy along Islamic lines and introduce the shar¯ı‘a (Islamic law) produced mixed results. Though these steps won him supporters among advocates of the Islamic system, they estranged their crit- ics and opponents. Some of the Islamic laws aggravated the Shi‘ite–Sunni sectarian con- flict that was further fuelled by the Iran–Iraq war (1980–8). Other laws alienated educated women and led to wide-scale organized activism among them. However, developments in the neighbouring countries helped Zia to withstand the oppos- ing forces. The overthrow of the shah of Iran in the Khomeini-led Islamic revolution of February 1979 shocked the West, which did not want to see renewed instability in Pakistan. 16 Syed,
1992 , pp. 224–31. 420 Contents
Copyrights ISBN 92-3-103985-7 The Zia era Then, in December 1979, the Soviet army marched into Afghanistan and Pakistan was transformed into a frontline state. As a result, more than 3 million Afghans sought refuge in Pakistan. The Zia administration provided them with all possible assistance, and the West, the Arab countries and United Nations agencies also extended economic assistance. 17 The
Afghan resistance groups enjoyed a safe sanctuary in Pakistan.Subsequently, they were trained and armed there. Substantial military aid from the US to the Mujahidin groups was channelled through the Pakistani authorities. Zia’s Afghan policy won him support- ers both in and outside Pakistan. Above all, the economy during his era did not suffer setbacks. Economic aid from the West and Arab countries flowed in without interruption. Then there was an unprecedented increase in the remittances from Pakistanis living abroad that boosted economic prosperity. Additionally, a sharp growth in agricultural production enabled Pakistan to stop imports of food-grains. 18 However, the opposition to martial law did not disappear despite the visible economic prosperity. In February 1981 the ‘defunct’ political parties formed a multi-party Move- ment for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD), but the protest movement that it was to launch in March fizzled out following the hijacking of a PIA Boeing 727 to Kabul by al-Zulfikar, a militant organization led by Bhutto’s son, Murtaza. Thereafter, the MRD’s activities were easily controlled until 1983, when it planned a countrywide civil disobe- dience movement. The regime skilfully blunted the MRD plans in all provinces except Sind, where the movement went out of control and turned violent. The military used force to control the movement. The loss of human life and property in rural Sind left immedi- ate and long-term scars on the polity. The feeling of alienation among Sindhis intensified, which sharpened the ethnic divide in Sind. The simultaneous emergence of the Muha- jir/Mutahidda Qaumi Movement (MQM) in urban Sind affected provincial and national politics and the economy. The Zia regime moved according to its plans to ‘civilianize’ the system.The opposition movement only pressured it to keep on track. It held elections to the local bodies twice, in 1979 and 1983, which diluted the opposition at the grass roots. In March 1981 it issued a Provisional Constitution Order (PCO) that restricted the powers of the judiciary and empowered the president/CMLA to amend the constitution. The PCO also provided for a nominated Federal Advisory Council (majlis-i shur¯a), which was established by the end of that year. Several politicians from the major political parties agreed to become members. The majlis could debate issues but its acceptance or rejection of any issue had little impact on the decision-making process. 17 Burki and Baxter (eds.), 1991 , pp. 8–20. 18 Talbot,
1991 , pp. 245–62. 421 Contents
Copyrights ISBN 92-3-103985-7 The Zia era Two years later, on 12 August 1983, Zia announced his plan for sharing power with the civilian leadership. Before implementing this plan, Zia arranged a presidential refer- endum in December 1984, calling on the electorate to express confidence in his policy of Islamization. Poor voter turnout did not deter him from proceeding as planned. The referen- dum was followed by national and provincial elections in February 1985. Political parties were not allowed to participate in these elections. Therefore, the MRD parties boycotted the elections in protest, hoping that voter interest would be as low as in the referendum. But impressive voter turnout in the elections to the assemblies frustrated their plans. Zia issued the Revival of the Constitution Order (RCO) before the inauguration of the assemblies, which tilted the balance of power in favour of the president. The RCO empow- ered President Zia to nominate an MNA as prime minister until 1990. The president was also given the authority to appoint armed services chiefs, governors and other key govern- ment functionaries. He could dismiss the prime minister and his government, and dissolve parliament at his discretion under Article 58.2(b). The RCO provided for a National Secu- rity Council, on which the services chiefs served as members. Zia nominated Muhammad Khan Junejo, a soft-spoken and mild-mannered Sindhi politician, as prime minister, and he obtained a vote of confidence from the National Assembly. The deliberations in parliament and the negotiations with Zia resulted in the adoption of the Eighth Amendment in the 1973 constitution. This amendment incorporated all the changes made in the constitution since the military takeover in July 1977, except the one relating to the National Security Council and a few others. Political parties were allowed to function and martial law was lifted on 31 December 1985. Junejo assumed the leadership of the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) and attempted to distance himself from Zia’s policies. His five-point economic programme had an appeal among influential political sections. His government withstood the political pressure after the historic reception of Benazir Bhutto (daughter of the former prime minister) in Lahore on her return from self-imposed exile in April 1986, and blunted the PPP-led MRD movement for fresh elections. Instead of using strong-arm tactics, Junejo cultivated the opposition parties and attempted to evolve consensus on national issues. He signed the Geneva Accords for the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan after an all-party conference on this issue. Junejo’s independent policies and cultivation of the opposition broadened his support base but soured his relations with President Zia. The rift between the two gradually widened and climaxed in April–May 1988, when there was an explosion in Ojhri camp, where arms for the Afghan Mujahidin were stored before their distribution among the Mujahidin groups. The Ojhri camp blast caused the loss of more than 100 lives and valuable property. The official report held Zia’s close associates responsible for the tragedy. Junejo reportedly 422 Contents
Copyrights ISBN 92-3-103985-7 The democratic era planned action against them but before he could do so, Zia dismissed him as prime minis- ter. Zia himself had no time to implement his plans as he was assassinated on 17 August 1988. The democratic era Zia’s death ushered in another democratic phase in Pakistan’s history. However, the politi- cal system was the same as incorporated in the Eighth Amendment. The military leadership under General Mirza Aslam Beg decided against a takeover, and elevated Ghulam Is’haq Khan, the Senate chairman, to the office of president; subsequently he was elected to that office. This democratic phase lasted until October 1999. During this phase, caretaker gov- ernments arranged four national and provincial elections. Benazir Bhutto and Mian Nawaz Sharif, the PML leader, each came to power twice as prime minister. The PPP emerged as the largest party in the National Assembly in the first elections despite opposition from a multi-party Islami Jamhoori Ittehad ( Islamic Democratic Front – IJI), headed by Nawaz Sharif. It formed coalition governments at the centre and in Sind, NWFP and Baluchistan; its partners were the MQM in Sind and the ANP ( Awami National Party) and regional parties in the other two provinces. The IJI had a clear majority in Pun- jab and Nawaz Sharif formed the government there. Inexperience and mutual distrust made it difficult for Benazir and her opponents to work for national reconciliation. Immediately after assuming office, Benazir sponsored a no-confidence move to dislodge Nawaz Sharif from the chief ministership but failed in her attempt. The following year, she herself faced a similar no-confidence move that was supported by Nawaz Sharif in retaliation. She suc- cessfully confronted that move but her government lost popularity on other fronts. Benazir’s economic programme, especially the People’s Works Programme and the Placement Bureau, was perceived as a clumsy mechanism of political patronage. The Board of Investment chaired by the prime minister, with powers to issue licences for new industrial units, and the cell in her office allegedly controlled by her husband, ‘Asif ‘Ali Zardari, to oversee bank loans were looked upon as means of corruption. Her attempt to establish her hold on the armed forces raised more serious concerns. She succeeded in replacing the ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence) chief by a retired pro-PPP general but failed in her attempt to remove Admiral Sirohey as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Commit- tee. By August 1990, she had lost the support of her coalition partners (MQM and ANP) as well as the president who, using Article 58.2(b), dismissed her government and dissolved the assemblies on charges of maladministration and corruption. Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, a PPP dissident, was installed as the caretaker prime minister to organize elections. 423 Contents
Copyrights ISBN 92-3-103985-7 The democratic era The PPP suffered defeat at all levels in the November 1990 elections. The IJI formed governments at the centre and in Punjab where it had won clear majorities, and in coali- tion with other parties in the remaining provinces. The development-oriented Punjab chief minister, Mian Nawaz Sharif, became prime minister and initiated a number of economic programmes. However, he felt that he could perform better if he had a free hand in gover- nance. He assumed the presidency of the PML but his moves in other areas brought him into conflict with the president. The conflict became public when he announced his inten- tion of repealing the Eighth Amendment. The two men also differed over the appointment of a successor to General Asif Nawaz, the army chief of staff, who had died suddenly of a heart attack. Using his powers under Article 58.2(b) in April 1993, the president dismissed Nawaz Sharif’s government and appointed a Muslim Leaguer, Mir Balakh Sher Mazari, as the caretaker prime minister. Like his predecessors, Junejo and Benazir, Nawaz Sharif appealed to the Supreme Court that the president had acted unconstitutionally. Contrary to the appeals by his predecessors, the Supreme Court ruled in his favour and restored the assem- blies. He was reinstalled as prime minister but the conflict persisted. Finally, on the inter- vention of the army chief, both the president and the prime minister resigned in July 1993.
19 Surprisingly, Moin Qureshi, a retired bureaucrat from the World Bank, was invited to head the caretaker government and arrange fresh elections. The October 1993 elections again produced mixed results. The PPP and the PML (N) (N = Nawaz) secured 86 and 72 seats, respectively, out of 207 National Assembly seats; minor parties and independents won the remaining seats. Benazir formed a coali- tion government for a second time. Her party also set up coalition governments in Punjab and Sind while the PML (N) became part of coalitions in NWFP and Baluchistan. A PPP loyalist, Sardar Farooq Ahmad Khan Leghari, was elected president to prevent any repe- tition of Benazir’s first-term of authority in financial matters to her husband, who put his friends in a few key economic positions, again invited allegations of corruption against her government. This worried President Leghari, but the conflict between him and Benazir came into the open over judicial appointments. Benazir appointed party supporters as High Court and Supreme Court judges without the consent of the respective chief justices. The Supreme Court, on an appeal by a lawyer, ruled against these appointments in the famous ‘Judges Case’. On Benazir’s ref usal to implement this order, the Supreme Court approached the president. 20 Meanwhile, Benazir’s brother, Murtaza, was gunned down outside his 19 Amin,
1994 , pp. 191–6. 20 ‘Ali Shah, 2001 , pp. 608–11. 424 Contents
Copyrights ISBN 92-3-103985-7 The democratic era residence in Karachi and the president hinted at her husband’s involvement, which com- plicated the situation. Finally, using Article 58.2(b), the president dismissed the prime minister and dissolved the assemblies to prevent any further deterioration of the situation. Malik Meraj Khalid, a veteran PPP leader, formed the caretaker government to organize new elections. In the February 1997 elections, the PML (N) won clear majorities at the centre and in Punjab, where it formed party governments. In other provinces, it was part of coalition governments. The PPP was out of power everywhere. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, who now had the requisite majority to amend the constitution, took steps to remove the hur- dles in his way. The National Assembly first repealed the Eighth Amendment, divesting the president of his powers under Article 58.2(b), and then barred floor crossing by party members, which had been a source of instability. Nawaz Sharif then had a confrontation with the judiciary similar to that of Benazir. A contempt of court case did not deter him from pursuing his objective. Chief Justice Sajjad ‘Ali Shah sought President Leghari’s sup- port, but in the end, the president and the chief justice both resigned and Muhammad Rafiq Tarar, a friend of the Sharif family, was elected president. The Nawaz Sharif government’s poor performance on the economic front was against popular expectations. Major projects like the motorway consumed huge amounts of money. Inflation and unemployment were on the rise. Severe economic strains followed Pakistan’s popularly acclaimed matching response to India’s nuclear explosions in May 1998. The freezing of foreign currency accounts and stoppage of international economic aid further damaged the already fractured economy. The government became sensitive to criticism and hostile to all suggestions. Decision-making narrowed down to a very close circle. When the chief of army staff, General Jehangir Karamat, suggested in a speech that a National Security Council was needed to advise on important national issues, he was asked to resign, which he did. Such sensitivity to all suggestions created alarm in the top military ranks. The 1999 Kargil episode, in which an attempt was made to capture strategic posts in Kashmir, and the US intervention for the withdrawal of Pakistani forces behind the line of control, contributed to the loss of trust between Nawaz Sharif and the army chief, General Pervez Musharraf. Meanwhile, all the political parties united to establish a Grand Democratic Alliance on a one-point agenda, the ‘removal of Nawaz Sharif ’. Nawaz Sharif moved against General Musharraf and announced his replacement by another general when Musharraf was return- ing from Sri Lanka. His plane was not allowed to land in Karachi. The military took action against the prime minister and arrested him and several others. On 12 October 1999 Gen- eral Musharraf took over as chief executive of the country and suspended the constitution. 425 Contents
Copyrights ISBN 92-3-103985-7 AFGHANISTAN FROM 1850 TO 1919 19 AFGHANISTAN * C. Noelle-Karimi, W. Maley and A. Saikal Download 8.99 Mb. Do'stlaringiz bilan baham: 
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