Box 4.4 Role of Government-Owned Banks
The disappointing performance—not only of govern-
ment-owned banks but also, more important, of sys-
tems in which the banks will play a major part—has
been extensively documented in recent cross-country
empirical literature (see Barth, Caprio, and Levine
2004 and La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer
2002). This performance does not imply that indi-
vidual countries and individual government-owned
banks cannot perform exceptionally well along this
dimension, but it does call for special attention to
some dimensions along which many government-
dominated banking systems are known to underper-
form.
In the context of development assessment, the
effect of government ownership is not simply a ques-
tion of embedded fiscal costs in a nonperforming or
problematic loan portfolio reflecting the inheritance
of politically or socially motivated loans. Such fiscal
costs can imply a future national tax burden that will
tend to slow growth. However, development assess-
ment must pay attention to subsidized and other
loans made on other-than-commercial principles
insofar as those loans tend to discourage private
banks from incurring the cost of developing risk-
assessment techniques that are needed to lend into
difficult segments, such as small and medium enter-
prises (SMEs) and rural areas. Government-owned
banks often fail to deliver services to their stated
target markets—with subsidies often being captured
by large, state-owned borrowers or politically con-
nected firms—which can damage the performance of
the sector as a whole.
The mission of government-owned banks should,
therefore, be examined for compatibility with the
competitive provision of financial services generally;
their governance structures should also be scrutinized
for consistency with the stated mission.
86
Financial Sector Assessment: A Handbook
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