Grand Coulee Dam and the Columbia Basin Project usa final Report: November 2000
Effects of the Treaty Dams on Canadian Resources and People
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- Table 4.3.1 Storage and Generation Capacity of Columbia River Treaty Dams
- 4.3.2 Programmes to Compensate Communities Adversely Affected by Canadian Treaty Dams 129
- 4.4 Cumulative Impacts of Projects on Ecosystems 4.4.1 Basin-wide Factors Affecting Anadromous Fish
- Table 4.4.1 Selected Hatchery Facilities in the Middle Columbia River and Tributaries Facility Species Capacity in Millions of
4.3 Effects of the Treaty Dams on Canadian Resources and People 4.3.1 Environmental and Social Impacts of the Treaty Dams Construction of the Columbia River Treaty dams created a new reservoir (Kinbasket, behind Mica Dam) and enlarged two lakes — Arrow and Duncan. In addition, Libby Dam created Koocanusa reservoir, which lies in both the US and Canada. Table 4.3.1 summarises storage and generation capacities for the Treaty dams. Grand Coulee Dam and Columbia Basin Project 87 This is a working paper prepared for the World Commission on Dams as part of its information gathering activities. The views, conclusions, and recommendations contained in the working paper are not to be taken to represent the views of the Commission Table 4.3.1 Storage and Generation Capacity of Columbia River Treaty Dams Dam Lake Comp- letion Date Generat- ing Capacity (MW) Treaty Storage (MAF) Treaty Storage (million m 3 ) Non- Treaty Storage (MAF) Non- Treaty Storage (million m 3 ) Duncan Duncan 1967 None 1.4 1 727 None None Keenleysid e a Arrow 1968 None 7.1 8 758 0.25 308 Mica Kinbasket 1973 1 740 7.0 8 624 5.0 6 167 Libby Kookanusa 1973 640 5.0 6 167 None None a Keenleyside dam was previously referred to as the Arrow Lakes project; hydroelectric power generators are currently being installed at Keenleyside. The advantages of the Columbia River Treaty projects to Canada go well beyond the downstream power benefits and flood control payments from the US detailed in the Treaty. For example, Duncan and Libby produce power benefits downstream in Canada on the Kootenay River that are retained entirely by Canada. 120 They also create flood control benefits within Canada on both the Kootenay and Columbia rivers, and these benefits are not shared between the US and Canada. (The Treaty did not require Canada to pay the US for the flood protection in Canada provided by Libby Dam in the US.) In addition, Mica Dam produces large amounts of power both on site and downstream at Revelstoke Dam. Power- generating capacity is also currently being added to Keenleyside Dam. All of these benefits from the Treaty projects are retained by Canada. Because of the Treaty dams and other hydroelectric projects in the Canadian portion of the Columbia River Basin, people in British Columbia enjoy one of the lowest power rates in North America. While there is substantial agreement about the nature of the flood control and power benefits within Canada, there are differences of opinion about the adverse environmental and social effects of the Treaty dams within Canada. Although we were unable to conduct an extensive study of the divergent opinions, the observations below give some sense of how views differ. The source of these observations consists of opinions expressed by citizens and officials from communities affected by the Treaty dams as contained in reports prepared for the Columbia River Treaty Committee, 121 an organisation created by local governments in 1994 to negotiate on behalf of the Canadian region affected by the Treaty dams with the province of British Columbia. Another important source of information consists of comments made at a workshop held on 4 October 1999 in Castlegar, Canada to discuss the influence of the GCD on people and resources in BC. 122 The Columbia River Treaty projects have had numerous adverse effects, including the displacement of residents forced to relocate because of reservoir-filling, and reductions in community population with consequent reductions in the provision of core community services and community and social infrastructure. Although the total number of people displaced is disputed (estimates vary from 1 600 to 2 200 residents), the number of people involved is significant. At the time the Treaty was ratified, the region was dependent on agriculture, lumber, and mining in sparsely settled, steep, mountainous terrain. The region's bottom lands are extremely important for human habitation, agriculture, wildlife wintering areas, migratory bird rest areas and habitat, as well as transportation routes. Some of these relatively scarce bottom lands were inundated by the Columbia River Treaty projects, and compensation was paid to the affected people at that time. In the opinion of some current residents of areas affected by the projects, landowners who had their properties expropriated were not compensated adequately. Moreover, because lengthy litigation faced those who were forced to relocate, some people with grievances related to land expropriation could not afford to press their claims. The Canadian Treaty projects caused significant disruption to aquatic ecosystems in the region. The dams separated individual populations and caused the local extinction of specific fish stocks. Moreover, bank sloughing caused by fluctuations in reservoir water levels have damaged natural spawning areas Grand Coulee Dam and Columbia Basin Project 88 This is a working paper prepared for the World Commission on Dams as part of its information gathering activities. The views, conclusions, and recommendations contained in the working paper are not to be taken to represent the views of the Commission and wildlife habitats. In addition, the reservoirs have caused significant fragmentation of wildlife habitat; Kinbasket reservoir was particularly damaged in this regard. The Columbia River Treaty projects also led to a loss of forestlands in Canada and the jobs associated with those lands. However, estimates of those losses vary. The range of values for total land area losses (including grasslands, forests, agricultural areas, and so forth) varies from a low of about 150 700 acres (61 000ha) to a high of about 192 200 acres (77 800ha). 123 According to Josh Smienk, executive director of the Columbia Basin Trust, a conservative estimate of land flooded by Mica and Duncan dams would be 110 000 acres (44 500ha) and most of that would be in forestlands (Smienk 1999a). In addition, about 52 700 acres (21 000ha) would have been in some type of agricultural use, mainly in the area flooded by Lake Koocanusa and the expansion of Arrow Lakes. Notwithstanding the differences of opinion about the number of acres inundated, there is no question that the land area involved was substantial. The aforementioned reports detailing opinions of residents in affected communities contained numerous examples of forestry jobs lost, ranches flooded, livestock production eliminated, agricultural activities disrupted, and so forth. Recreational activities were also transformed by the Columbia River Treaty projects. For example, there was interference in guiding and other tourist-related activities tied to hunting and fishing in pristine wilderness. This was of particular significance in the area affected by the Kinbasket reservoir. At the same time, however, there is ongoing, extensive recreational activity on portions of the new lake areas created by the Treaty dams, and the highway systems have been improved significantly. One aspect of the operation of Columbia River Treaty dams that has been in particularly troublesome to many local residents is the wide fluctuation in reservoir levels. During the first years after ratification of the Treaty, reservoir operations focused exclusively on the generation of electricity and flood protection. Reservoirs were full in late spring and summer, and lower during the coldest months of the year — November to March. However, during the past few years, operations at Libby Dam have been modified by US authorities to release water for fish mitigation purposes, and this has created circumstances where the Kookanusa reservoir has experienced significant drawdowns during the summer and fall months, thereby seriously affecting use of the reservoir in Canada and creating unsightly conditions around the shoreline. 124 In a November 1994 report on the “Effects of the Mica Dam and Kinbasket Lake on the Economy of Golden and Area (prepared for the Columbia River Treaty Committee),” Hambruch (1994: 10) makes the following observations: The water level in Mica [ie, Kinbasket] reservoir fluctuates by up to 53 m (175 feet). 125 The effects of these fluctuations include: • Sediment brought in by glacier-fed rivers that settles out on the reservoir bottom becomes exposed and creates a dust problem. • Access for log transport is greatly complicated or made impossible. • Boating access is next to impossible at certain times of the year. • Fishery enhancement programmes are greatly affected or made impossible. Moreover, it is a common perception in the region that the fluctuations in Lake Koocanusa are so great as to leave the lake empty part of every year (Smienk 1999a). (In fact, however, Mica reservoir is always a long way from empty because it needs a minimum head for power generation purposes. (MacNabb 1999a). Low water levels reveal a wide valley that is barren gravel and a silt bed with a relatively narrow river running through it. Changes in reservoir and lake levels are particularly dramatic in drought years. During those periods, some homeowners who are normally situated lakeside might have a shoreline in front of their houses in May, but their houses might be as far as 35 miles (56km) from the water in July. Grand Coulee Dam and Columbia Basin Project 89 This is a working paper prepared for the World Commission on Dams as part of its information gathering activities. The views, conclusions, and recommendations contained in the working paper are not to be taken to represent the views of the Commission Another set of issues about which local residents are concerned centres on local tax base. The new dams that were built as a result of the Columbia River Treaty enjoy a special exemption from property taxes in the region. This exemption, provided by the Province of British Columbia, is specific to the Columbia River Treaty projects. However, BC Hydro, owner of the projects, pays a grant-in-lieu of taxes. 126 This equals about 7% of what the tax assessment on the lands would otherwise be if they were owned by private utilities. Some local residents estimate that if the dams and transmission lines were taxed at a similar rate to private utilities, the local tax base would increase by 25%. Overall, some local residents have felt a sense of betrayal over the difference between what they thought they were getting in 1964 and what actually occurred. For example, residents of the Village Valemount area recall government promises that Kinbasket would be managed as a lake with relatively stable water levels and subsequent uses that depended on minimal lake fluctuations. In 1964, the Minister of Lands and Forests and Water Resources indicated that “only 14 miles [23km] out [from Valemount] will be formed one of the greatest man-made lakes in the world”. (Hon. Ray Wiliston as quoted in Townsend, 1994: 16). 127 Instead, Kinbasket is a managed reservoir that has drawdowns as great as 150ft (46m), approximately four times the amount that local residents expected. Moreover, some people in the region feel they had little opportunity to participate in the decision processes associated with the Columbia River Treaty. Although there may have been many exceptions to the rule, local hearings that were held in connection with the Treaty required the public to speak only to the issue of the engineering of the structures involved, not about social impacts affecting local communities. 128 4.3.2 Programmes to Compensate Communities Adversely Affected by Canadian Treaty Dams 129 Most hydroelectric development by BC Hydro in the Columbia Basin occurred between 1960 and 1985. Some of the projects are Columbia River Treaty dams and others are not, while some of the impacts of the new dams were obvious immediately (eg, the Seven Mile Dam projects flooded prime white-tailed deer habitat in the Pend d’Oreille Valley), other impacts became evident slowly. An example is the decline in Kootenay Lake productivity, which took up to 25 years to become obvious. The Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Compensation Programme (CBFWCP) is a non-profit entity separate from, but not independent of, its BC Hydro and BC Environment partners. CBFWCP, which was created in 1994, evolved from existing Mica, Arrow, Duncan, Revelstoke, and Pend d'Oreille compensation programmes. The mandate of CBFWCP is to deliver projects to conserve and enhance fish and wildlife populations affected by BC Hydro dam-related activities throughout the Canadian portion of the Columbia River Basin. CBFWCP receives $3.2 million a year from a perpetual fund established by BC Hydro as part of the requirement under the crown corporation's water license agreement. A key component of CBFWCP's mandate is consultation and communication with the public. The objective is to build involvement in the programme among residents, community groups and other key stakeholders including First Nations, local governments, resource users, government agencies and the media. CBFWCP work led to 325 fish and wildlife projects with 276 partners between 1995 and 1999. 130 Other efforts to ameliorate the adverse effects of the Canadian Treaty dams involve activities of the Columbia Basin Trust (CBT). 131 In 1995, the Province of British Columbia recognised that "the People of the Canadian Columbia River Basin were not adequately considered in the original negotiations of the Columbia River Treaty" (Bill 5, 1995 Columbia Basin Trust Act) and created the CBT as a form of local empowerment to address past injustices. CBT has broad powers and was created to ensure that benefits derived from the Columbia River Treaty help create a prosperous economy with a healthy, renewed natural environment in the region impacted by the Canadian Treaty dams. The region, through the CBT, was given approximately $300 million Canadian ($321 million in $1998) and investment opportunities in the form of ownership and development rights at existing dams in the region. One objective in creating these opportunities is to have more localised control over the region’s Grand Coulee Dam and Columbia Basin Project 90 This is a working paper prepared for the World Commission on Dams as part of its information gathering activities. The views, conclusions, and recommendations contained in the working paper are not to be taken to represent the views of the Commission water resources. Trust directors reside in the Canadian portion of the Columbia River Basin, and the majority of the Trust’s Board of Directors is appointed by local government. CBT operates within a plan that has been developed with broad community input. CBT’s mandate is to invest the region’s share of “downstream benefits” created by the Columbia River Treaty and to spend the income earned from these investments to deliver social, economic, and environmental benefits to the basin and its residents. Activities of CBT do not relieve governments of their obligations. CBT also has a number of other legislated responsibilities including the following: participating in a review of the Columbia River Treaty when that opportunity arises in 2014; providing input into water licenses issued in the basin; and playing an advocacy role in water management issues in the basin. 4.4 Cumulative Impacts of Projects on Ecosystems 4.4.1 Basin-wide Factors Affecting Anadromous Fish In addition to project-specific factors (eg, lack of fish passage facilities at GCD), anadromous fish populations have also been affected by basin-wide factors. In recent years, the major factors affecting salmon populations have been categorised under “the four H’s:” harvest, hatcheries, hydropower, and habitat. These categories are not mutually exclusive (eg, a dam can cause effects through its passage facilities as well as affect salmon habitat). Moreover, it is typically very difficult to determine the extent to which one factor (eg, hydropower) is responsible for a specific percentage of fish population decline. Nevertheless, the four H’s form a useful framework for introducing the many different issues that affect salmon and steelhead in the Columbia River Basin. 4.4.1.1 Harvest The impact of harvest on salmon and steelhead is straightforward — overharvest impairs the ability of a species to maintain a self-sustaining population. Overfishing during the heyday of the salmon canning industry, for example, is widely cited as a primary reason for salmon declines prior to the construction of large dams in the basin. Similar to the other “H’s,” harvest effects are cumulative. When fish populations decrease for other reasons, even if catch levels remain constant, the percentage of fish harvested from a run has a much more significant effect (Bennett 1999). The harvest of Columbia River salmon has been regulated by state, 132 federal, and international 133 law. However, these laws and treaties can be difficult to implement and enforce. 134 4.4.1.2 Hatcheries The influence of hatcheries on anadromous fish is widely debated. Proponents view hatcheries as a necessary measure for augmenting wild populations, whereas critics see hatcheries as exacting negative effects on fish via genetics 135 and disease. 136 Some scientists also contend that the release of hatchery fingerlings, which tend to be larger than their wild counterparts, contributes to increased mortality of wild fish. 137 Hatcheries are a large component of fish recovery plans, not only for GCD itself, but for the system of multi-purpose projects in the Columbia River Basin. Numerous hatchery facilities have been built in the middle Columbia River and its tributaries. Table 4.4.1 presents descriptive information on some of the major ones. Hatchery operations are generally managed by state and federal agencies and operations and maintenance costs are often paid by the operators of multi-purpose projects (eg, Reclamation, the Corps). Grand Coulee Dam and Columbia Basin Project 91 This is a working paper prepared for the World Commission on Dams as part of its information gathering activities. The views, conclusions, and recommendations contained in the working paper are not to be taken to represent the views of the Commission Table 4.4.1 Selected Hatchery Facilities in the Middle Columbia River and Tributaries Facility Species Capacity in Millions of Smolt Year in Service Agency River Ringold Fall Chinook Spring Chinook Steelhead 4.0 1.0 0.18 1962 WDFW a Mid-Columbia Hanford Fall Chinook 4.0–5.0 Mid-Columbia Priest Rapids Fall Chinook 6.7–7.7 1963 Mid-Columbia Wells Summer Chinook 4.4 1967 WDFW Mid-Columbia Eastbank Summer Chinook Steelhead Sockeye 1.816 0.25 0.2 1989 WDFW Wenatchee Turtle Rock Coho 1.0 1990 WDFW Mid-Columbia Chelan Summer Chinook Steelhead 4.4 1.05 1965 WDFW Mid-Columbia Methow Spring Chinook 0.738 WDFW Methow Winthrop Spring Chinook 1.0 1941 USFWS Methow Leavenworth Spring Chinook 3.0 1941 USFWS Wenatchee Entiat Spring Chinook 0.8 1941 USFWS Entiat Okanogan Sockeye 0.2 Okanogan Yakima River Fall Chinook Spring Chinook Summer Chinook Coho Steelhead 3.6 1.125 0.2 2.0 0.6 Yakima Oak Springs Steelhead 0.14 1923 ODFW b Deschutes Round Butte Spring Chinook Steelhead 0.3 0.16 1974 ODFW Deschutes Warm Springs Spring Chinook 0.7 USFWS Deschutes Irrigon Steelhead 1.677 1984 ODFW Mid-Columbia a Washington Department of Fish and Wildlife; b Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife Sources: CRITFC, 1995: Appendix B; Busby et al., 1996: Appendix C 4.4.1.3 Hydropower GCD is one of many major dams in the US portion of the Columbia River Basin. Table 4.4.2 lists a number of these dams and indicates whether or not they have fish passage facilities. As physical barriers, dams present challenges to both adult salmon spawning upstream as well as smolts during outmigration to the sea. Adult salmon must be able to locate and have the strength to traverse fish ladders. 138 Some mortality occurs at each dam the fish must pass. Mortality rates of adult fish migrating upstream are generally estimated at 5% per dam (NPPC, 1986: 3). For example, the NPPC estimated that cumulative impacts of dams (as physical barriers to passage) over a series of nine dams as physical barriers would result in an overall adult mortality rate of 63% (NPPC, 1986: Appendix E). The range of mortality rates for juveniles migrating downstream varies considerably and is the subject of much debate. Recent estimates range from 5% to 15% per dam. Grand Coulee Dam and Columbia Basin Project 92 This is a working paper prepared for the World Commission on Dams as part of its information gathering activities. The views, conclusions, and recommendations contained in the working paper are not to be taken to represent the views of the Commission Download 5.01 Kb. Do'stlaringiz bilan baham: |
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