Grand Coulee Dam and the Columbia Basin Project usa final Report: November 2000

 
4.3  Effects of the Treaty Dams on Canadian Resources and People 
 
4.3.1  Environmental and Social Impacts of the Treaty Dams   
  
Construction of the Columbia River Treaty dams created a new reservoir (Kinbasket, behind Mica Dam) 
and enlarged two lakes — Arrow and Duncan. In addition, Libby Dam created Koocanusa reservoir, 
which lies in both the US and Canada. Table 4.3.1 summarises storage and generation capacities for the 
Treaty dams. 
 

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This is a working paper prepared for the World Commission on Dams as part of its information gathering activities. The views, conclusions, and 
recommendations contained in the working paper are not to be taken to represent the views of the Commission 
 
Table 4.3.1 Storage and Generation Capacity of Columbia River Treaty Dams 
Dam Lake  Comp-
letion 
Date 
Generat-
ing 
Capacity 
(MW) 
Treaty 
Storage 
(MAF) 
Treaty 
Storage 
(million 
m
3
) 
Non-
Treaty 
Storage 
(MAF) 
Non-
Treaty 
Storage 
(million 
m
3
) 
Duncan Duncan 1967 
None  1.4 1 
727 None  None 
Keenleysid
e
a 
Arrow 1968 
None 7.1 
8 
758 0.25  308 
Mica 
Kinbasket 
1973 
1 740 
7.0 
8 624 
5.0 
6 167 
Libby Kookanusa 
1973 
640 5.0 
6 
167 
None None 
a 
Keenleyside dam was previously referred to as the Arrow Lakes project; hydroelectric power 
generators are currently being installed at Keenleyside. 
 
The advantages of the Columbia River Treaty projects to Canada go well beyond the downstream  power 
benefits and flood control payments from the US detailed in the Treaty. For example, Duncan and Libby 
produce power benefits downstream in Canada on the Kootenay River that are retained entirely by 
Canada.
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 They also create flood control benefits within Canada on both the Kootenay and Columbia 
rivers, and these benefits are not shared between the US and Canada. (The Treaty did not require Canada 
to pay the US for the flood protection in Canada provided by Libby Dam in the US.) In addition, Mica 
Dam produces large amounts of power both on site and downstream at Revelstoke Dam. Power-
generating capacity is also currently being added to Keenleyside Dam. All of these benefits from the 
Treaty projects are retained by Canada. Because of the Treaty dams and other hydroelectric projects in 
the Canadian portion of the Columbia River Basin, people in British Columbia enjoy one of the lowest 
power rates in North America. 
 
While there is substantial agreement about the nature of the flood control and power benefits within 
Canada, there are differences of opinion about the adverse environmental and social effects of the Treaty 
dams within Canada. Although we were unable to conduct an extensive study of the divergent opinions, 
the observations below give some sense of how views differ. The source of these observations consists 
of opinions expressed by citizens and officials from communities affected by the Treaty dams as 
contained in reports prepared for the Columbia River Treaty Committee,
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 an organisation created by 
local governments in 1994 to negotiate on behalf of the Canadian region affected by the Treaty dams 
with the province of British Columbia. Another important source of information consists of comments 
made at a workshop held on 4 October 1999 in Castlegar, Canada to discuss the influence of the GCD on 
people and resources in BC.
122
 
 
The Columbia River Treaty projects have had numerous adverse effects, including the  displacement of 
residents forced to relocate because of reservoir-filling, and reductions in community population with 
consequent reductions in the provision of core community services and community and social 
infrastructure. Although the total number of people displaced is disputed (estimates vary from 1 600 to 2 
200 residents), the number of people involved is significant. At the time the Treaty was ratified, the 
region was dependent on agriculture, lumber, and mining in sparsely settled, steep, mountainous terrain. 
The region's bottom lands are extremely important for human habitation, agriculture, wildlife wintering 
areas, migratory bird rest areas and habitat, as well as transportation routes. Some of these relatively 
scarce bottom lands were inundated by the Columbia River Treaty projects, and compensation was paid 
to the affected people at that time. In the opinion of some current residents of areas affected by the 
projects, landowners who had their properties expropriated were not compensated adequately. Moreover, 
because lengthy litigation faced those who were forced to relocate, some people with grievances related 
to land expropriation could not afford to press their claims. 
 
The Canadian Treaty projects caused significant disruption to aquatic ecosystems in the region. The 
dams separated individual populations and caused the local extinction of specific fish stocks. Moreover, 
bank sloughing caused by fluctuations in reservoir water levels have damaged natural spawning areas 

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This is a working paper prepared for the World Commission on Dams as part of its information gathering activities. The views, conclusions, and 
recommendations contained in the working paper are not to be taken to represent the views of the Commission 
 
and wildlife habitats. In addition, the reservoirs have caused significant fragmentation of wildlife habitat; 
Kinbasket reservoir was particularly damaged in this regard.  
 
The Columbia River Treaty projects also led to a loss of forestlands in Canada and the jobs associated 
with those lands. However, estimates of those losses vary. The range of values for total land area losses 
(including grasslands, forests, agricultural areas, and so forth) varies from a low of about 150 700 acres 
(61 000ha) to a high of about 192 200 acres (77 800ha).
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 According to Josh Smienk, executive director 
of the Columbia Basin Trust, a conservative estimate of land flooded by Mica and Duncan dams would 
be 110 000 acres (44 500ha) and most of that would be in forestlands (Smienk 1999a). In addition, about 
52 700 acres (21 000ha) would have been in some type of agricultural use, mainly in the area flooded by 
Lake Koocanusa and the expansion of Arrow Lakes. Notwithstanding the differences of opinion about 
the number of acres inundated, there is no question that the land area involved was substantial. The 
aforementioned reports detailing opinions of residents in affected communities contained numerous 
examples of forestry jobs lost, ranches flooded, livestock production eliminated, agricultural activities 
disrupted, and so forth. 
 
Recreational activities were also transformed by the Columbia River Treaty projects. For example, there 
was interference in guiding and other tourist-related activities tied to hunting and fishing in pristine 
wilderness. This was of particular significance in the area affected by the Kinbasket reservoir. At the 
same time, however, there is ongoing, extensive recreational activity on portions of the new lake areas 
created by the Treaty dams, and the highway systems have been improved significantly. 
 
One aspect of the operation of Columbia River Treaty dams that has been in particularly troublesome to 
many local residents is the wide fluctuation in reservoir levels. During the first years after ratification of 
the Treaty, reservoir operations focused exclusively on the generation of electricity and flood protection. 
Reservoirs were full in late spring and summer, and lower during the coldest months of the year — 
November to March. However, during the past few years, operations at Libby Dam have been modified 
by US authorities to release water for fish mitigation purposes, and this has created circumstances where 
the Kookanusa reservoir has experienced significant drawdowns during the summer and fall months, 
thereby seriously affecting use of the reservoir in Canada and creating unsightly conditions around the 
shoreline. 
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In a November 1994 report on the “Effects of the Mica Dam and Kinbasket Lake on the Economy of 
Golden and Area (prepared for the Columbia River Treaty Committee),” Hambruch (1994: 10) makes 
the following observations: 
 
The water level in Mica [ie, Kinbasket] reservoir fluctuates by up to 53 m (175 feet).
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 The effects of 
these fluctuations include: 
 
• 
Sediment brought in by glacier-fed rivers that settles out on the reservoir bottom becomes  
exposed and creates a dust problem. 
• 
Access for log transport is greatly complicated or made impossible. 
• 
Boating access is next to impossible at certain times of the year. 
• 
Fishery enhancement programmes are greatly affected or made impossible. 
 
Moreover, it is a common perception in the region that the fluctuations in Lake Koocanusa are so great 
as to leave the lake empty part of every year (Smienk 1999a). (In fact, however, Mica reservoir is always 
a long way from empty because it needs a minimum head for power generation purposes. (MacNabb 
1999a). Low water levels reveal a wide valley that is barren gravel and a silt bed with a relatively narrow 
river running through it. Changes in reservoir and lake levels are particularly dramatic in drought years. 
During those periods, some homeowners who are normally situated lakeside might have a shoreline in 
front of their houses in May, but their houses might be as far as 35 miles (56km) from the water in July.  
 

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This is a working paper prepared for the World Commission on Dams as part of its information gathering activities. The views, conclusions, and 
recommendations contained in the working paper are not to be taken to represent the views of the Commission 
 
Another set of issues about which local residents are concerned centres on local tax base. The new dams 
that were built as a result of the Columbia River Treaty enjoy a special exemption from property taxes in 
the region. This exemption, provided by the Province of British Columbia, is specific to the Columbia 
River Treaty projects. However, BC Hydro, owner of the projects, pays a grant-in-lieu of taxes.
126
 This 
equals about 7% of what the tax assessment on the lands would otherwise be if they were owned by 
private utilities. Some local residents estimate that if the dams and transmission lines were taxed at a 
similar rate to private utilities, the local tax base would increase by 25%.  
 
Overall, some local residents have felt a sense of betrayal over the difference between what they thought 
they were getting in 1964 and what actually occurred. For example, residents of the Village Valemount 
area recall government promises that Kinbasket would be managed as a lake with relatively stable water 
levels and subsequent uses that depended on minimal lake fluctuations. In 1964, the Minister of Lands 
and Forests and Water Resources indicated that “only 14 miles [23km] out [from Valemount] will be 
formed one of the greatest man-made lakes in the world”. (Hon. Ray Wiliston as quoted in Townsend, 
1994: 16).
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 Instead, Kinbasket is a managed reservoir that has drawdowns as great as 150ft (46m), 
approximately four times the amount that local residents expected. Moreover, some people in the region 
feel they had little opportunity to participate in the decision processes associated with the Columbia 
River Treaty. Although there may have been many exceptions to the rule, local hearings that were held 
in connection with the Treaty required the public to speak only to the issue of the engineering of the 
structures involved, not about social impacts affecting local communities.
128
 
 
4.3.2  Programmes to Compensate Communities Adversely Affected by 
Canadian Treaty Dams
129
 
 
Most hydroelectric development by BC Hydro in the Columbia Basin occurred between 1960 and 1985. 
Some of the projects are Columbia River Treaty dams and others are not, while some of the impacts of 
the new dams were obvious immediately (eg, the Seven Mile Dam projects flooded prime white-tailed 
deer habitat in the Pend d’Oreille Valley), other impacts became evident slowly. An example is the 
decline in Kootenay Lake productivity, which took up to 25 years to become obvious. 
 
The Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Compensation Programme (CBFWCP) is a non-profit entity 
separate from, but not independent of, its BC Hydro and BC Environment partners. CBFWCP, which 
was created in 1994, evolved from existing Mica, Arrow, Duncan, Revelstoke, and Pend d'Oreille 
compensation programmes. The mandate of CBFWCP is to deliver projects to conserve and enhance fish 
and wildlife populations affected by BC Hydro dam-related activities throughout the Canadian portion of 
the Columbia River Basin. CBFWCP receives $3.2 million a year from a perpetual fund established by 
BC Hydro as part of the requirement under the crown corporation's water license agreement. 
 
A key component of CBFWCP's mandate is consultation and communication with the public. The 
objective is to build involvement in the programme among residents, community groups and other key 
stakeholders including First Nations, local governments, resource users, government agencies and the 
media. CBFWCP work led to 325 fish and wildlife projects with 276 partners between 1995 and 1999.
130
 
  
Other efforts to ameliorate the adverse effects of the Canadian Treaty dams involve activities of the 
Columbia Basin Trust (CBT).
131
 In 1995, the Province of British Columbia recognised that "the People 
of the Canadian Columbia River Basin were not adequately considered in the original negotiations of the 
Columbia River Treaty" (Bill 5, 1995 Columbia Basin Trust Act) and created the CBT as a form of local 
empowerment to address past injustices. CBT has broad powers and was created to ensure that benefits 
derived from the Columbia River Treaty help create a prosperous economy with a healthy, renewed 
natural environment in the region impacted by the Canadian Treaty dams. 
 
The region, through the CBT, was given approximately $300 million Canadian ($321 million in $1998) 
and investment opportunities in the form of ownership and development rights at existing dams in the 
region. One objective in creating these opportunities is to have more localised control over the region’s 

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This is a working paper prepared for the World Commission on Dams as part of its information gathering activities. The views, conclusions, and 
recommendations contained in the working paper are not to be taken to represent the views of the Commission 
 
water resources. Trust directors reside in the Canadian portion of the Columbia River Basin, and the 
majority of the Trust’s Board of Directors is appointed by local government. CBT operates within a plan 
that has been developed with broad community input. 
 
CBT’s mandate is to invest the region’s share of “downstream benefits” created by the Columbia River 
Treaty and to spend the income earned from these investments to deliver social, economic, and 
environmental benefits to the basin and its residents. Activities of CBT do not relieve governments of 
their obligations. CBT also has a number of other legislated responsibilities including the following: 
participating in a review of the Columbia River Treaty when that opportunity arises in 2014; providing 
input into water licenses issued in the basin; and playing an advocacy role in water management issues 
in the basin. 
 
4.4  Cumulative Impacts of Projects on Ecosystems 
 
4.4.1  Basin-wide Factors Affecting Anadromous Fish 
 
In addition to project-specific factors (eg, lack of fish passage facilities at GCD), anadromous fish 
populations have also been affected by basin-wide factors. In recent years, the major factors affecting 
salmon populations have been categorised under “the four H’s:” harvest, hatcheries, hydropower, and 
habitat. These categories are not mutually exclusive (eg, a dam can cause effects through its passage 
facilities as well as affect salmon habitat). Moreover, it is typically very difficult to determine the extent 
to which one factor (eg, hydropower) is responsible for a specific percentage of fish population decline. 
Nevertheless, the four H’s form a useful framework for introducing the many different issues that affect 
salmon and steelhead in the Columbia River Basin. 
 
4.4.1.1 Harvest 
 
The impact of harvest on salmon and steelhead is straightforward — overharvest impairs the ability of a 
species to maintain a self-sustaining population. Overfishing during the heyday of the salmon canning 
industry, for example, is widely cited as a primary reason for salmon declines prior to the construction of 
large dams in the basin. Similar to the other “H’s,” harvest effects are cumulative. When fish populations 
decrease for other reasons, even if catch levels remain constant, the percentage of fish harvested from a 
run has a much more significant effect (Bennett 1999). The harvest of Columbia River salmon has been 
regulated by state,
132
 federal, and international
133
 law. However, these laws and treaties can be difficult 
to implement and enforce.
134
 
 
4.4.1.2 Hatcheries 
 
The influence of hatcheries on anadromous fish is widely debated. Proponents view hatcheries as a 
necessary measure for augmenting wild populations, whereas critics see hatcheries as exacting negative 
effects on fish via genetics
135
 and disease.
136
 Some scientists also contend that the release of hatchery 
fingerlings, which tend to be larger than their wild counterparts, contributes to increased mortality of 
wild fish.
137
 Hatcheries are a large component of fish recovery plans, not only for GCD itself, but for the 
system of multi-purpose projects in the Columbia River Basin. Numerous hatchery facilities have been 
built in the middle Columbia River and its tributaries. Table 4.4.1 presents descriptive information on 
some of the major ones. Hatchery operations are generally managed by state and federal agencies and 
operations and maintenance costs are often paid by the operators of multi-purpose projects (eg, 
Reclamation, the Corps).  
 

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This is a working paper prepared for the World Commission on Dams as part of its information gathering activities. The views, conclusions, and 
recommendations contained in the working paper are not to be taken to represent the views of the Commission 
 
Table 4.4.1 Selected Hatchery Facilities in the Middle Columbia River and Tributaries 
Facility Species 
Capacity 
in 
Millions of 
Smolt 
Year in 
Service 
Agency River 
Ringold Fall 
Chinook 
Spring Chinook 
Steelhead 
4.0  
1.0  
0.18 
1962 WDFW
a 
Mid-Columbia 
Hanford Fall 
Chinook 
4.0–5.0 
    Mid-Columbia 
Priest Rapids 
Fall Chinook 
6.7–7.7  1963 
 
Mid-Columbia 
Wells Summer 
Chinook  4.4 
1967 
WDFW 
Mid-Columbia 
Eastbank Summer 
Chinook 
Steelhead 
Sockeye 
1.816 
0.25 
0.2 
1989 WDFW 
Wenatchee 
Turtle Rock 
Coho 
1.0  1990 
WDFW 
Mid-Columbia 
Chelan Summer 
Chinook 
Steelhead 
4.4 
1.05 
1965 WDFW 
Mid-Columbia 
Methow Spring 
Chinook 
0.738 
  WDFW 
Methow 
Winthrop Spring 
Chinook 
1.0 
1941 
USFWS 
Methow 
Leavenworth Spring 
Chinook 
3.0 
1941  USFWS Wenatchee 
Entiat Spring 
Chinook 
0.8 
1941 
USFWS 
Entiat 
Okanogan Sockeye 
0.2 
 
 
Okanogan 
Yakima River 
Fall Chinook 
Spring Chinook 
Summer Chinook 
Coho 
Steelhead 
3.6 
1.125 
0.2 
2.0 
0.6 
   Yakima 
Oak Springs 
Steelhead 
0.14  1923 
ODFW
b 
Deschutes 
Round Butte 
Spring Chinook 
Steelhead 
0.3 
0.16 
1974 ODFW 
Deschutes 
Warm Springs 
Spring Chinook 
0.7   
USFWS 
Deschutes 
Irrigon Steelhead 
1.677 
1984 
ODFW 
Mid-Columbia 
a
 Washington Department of Fish and Wildlife; 
b 
Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife
 
Sources: CRITFC, 1995: Appendix B; Busby et al., 1996: Appendix C 
 
4.4.1.3 Hydropower 
 
GCD is one of many major dams in the US portion of the Columbia River Basin. Table 4.4.2 lists a 
number of these dams and indicates whether or not they have fish passage facilities. As physical barriers, 
dams present challenges to both adult salmon spawning upstream as well as smolts during outmigration 
to the sea. Adult salmon must be able to locate and have the strength to traverse fish ladders.
138
 Some 
mortality occurs at each dam the fish must pass. Mortality rates of adult fish migrating upstream are 
generally estimated at 5% per dam (NPPC, 1986: 3). For example, the NPPC estimated that cumulative 
impacts of dams (as physical barriers to passage) over a series of nine dams as physical barriers would 
result in an overall adult mortality rate of 63% (NPPC, 1986: Appendix E). The range of mortality rates 
for juveniles migrating downstream varies considerably and is the subject of much debate. Recent 
estimates range from 5% to 15% per dam.  
 

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This is a working paper prepared for the World Commission on Dams as part of its information gathering activities. The views, conclusions, and 
recommendations contained in the working paper are not to be taken to represent the views of the Commission