Grand Coulee Dam and the Columbia Basin Project usa final Report: November 2000

3.8.1 Pre-Project Conditions 
 
As with the US Columbia River Basin tribes, salmon were also central to the economic, cultural and 
spiritual life of the Columbia River Basin First Nations in Canada. These First Nations marked the first 
salmon harvest with special ceremonies and rituals to confirm the relationship between humans and 
salmon, thereby ensuring the annual return of the salmon. Salmon were particularly important to 
Canadian First Nations since they created opportunities for communal gathering and group action. 
 
Prior to construction of GCD, chinook and sockeye ascended the Columbia River to its headwaters at 
Columbia Lake, approximately 1 240 miles (2 000km) from the mouth of the river. Principal fishing 
locations along the migration route were at Fairmont Hot Springs (aka, Klaqakinuknana) immediately 
downstream of Columbia Lake, Athalmere (aka, Kwataqnuk) at the outlet of Windermere Lake, Brisco, 
near the confluence of the Columbia and Jordan rivers, at the south end of the Arrow Lakes, and at and 
below the confluence of the Columbia and Kootenay rivers. Salmon could only ascend the Kootenay 
River to Bonnington Falls and into the Slocan River system. Upstream fisheries usually involved 
individuals or small groups at fishing locations; those downstream of the Columbia-Kootenay rivers 
confluence more typically involved entire bands or groups of bands of tribal members
.  
 
While the Canadian First Nations share many cultural attributes with US tribes in the Columbia River 
Basin, the experiences that followed the imposition of non-native governments are markedly different. 
First contact between Europeans (fur traders) and Canadian First Nations did not happen until early in 
the 19
th
 century in the Canadian portion of the basin. Early contact was established in the context of the 
“Royal Proclamation of 1763,” which acknowledged Indian ownership of lands not ceded to or 
purchased by the Crown (ie, the colonial government). The Oregon Treaty of 1846 and subsequent 
surveying settled the boundary between Canada and the US west of the Rocky Mountains. The 
establishment of this boundary had profound effects on the Okanagan, Lakes-Sinixt and Ktunaxa 
Nations since it separated groups north and south of the border. Tribes that were previously united in the 
border area became divided after the establishment of this international border. 
 
British Columbia colonial and subsequent (ie, post-Confederation) policy was largely defined by then 
governor Joseph Trutch, despite the fact that the British North America Act (the British law that 
established the Canadian federation in 1867) accorded power over Indian matters and lands reserved for 
Indians to the federal government. In most of the rest of western Canada, colonial and then federal 
governments entered into treaties with First Nations. This was not the case in British Columbia, where 
Trutch’s government refused to acknowledge aboriginal title and rights and to enter into treaties with 
First Nations. Most of the Indian reserves in the Canadian portion of the Columbia River Basin were 

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This is a working paper prepared for the World Commission on Dams as part of its information gathering activities. The views, conclusions, and 
recommendations contained in the working paper are not to be taken to represent the views of the Commission 
 
established in the 1880s by “Order-in-Council,” which is roughly analogous to the executive order 
process used in the US where reserves were not mutually agreed upon by means of treaties. The 
importance of fishing in general and salmon fishing specifically is demonstrated by the locations of 
current and former reserves at important fishing locations, including the confluence of the Kootenay and 
Columbia rivers and Invermere (aka, Kyanuqli?it).The “Oatscott” reserve along lower Arrow Lake 
reverted to the government in the mid-1950s because the Arrow Lakes band no longer had any enrolled 
members. The members of Arrow Lake dispersed to other communities largely because of the loss of the 
salmon fishery along the Columbia River. The salmon fishery was the principal reason for the initial 
establishment of the reserve. The size of many reservations was substantially reduced in the early 1900s 
following the decision of a joint federal-provincial “Royal Commission” on Indian affairs.  
 
Indian policy from establishment of the Canadian confederation (1867) to the 1970s was assimilationist. 
A law passed by the government of British Columbia in 1875 prohibited Indians from voting to prevent 
First Nations from attempting to advance their rights through the electoral process. In 1876, the federal 
Indian Act was passed. In it, the Canadian Prime Minister spoke explicitly of the assimilationist 
objectives of the Act. Amendments to the federal Indian Act were passed in 1884 to prohibit Indian 
cultural and religious ceremonies, like the first salmon ceremonies. Later Indian Act amendments 
prohibited First Nations from raising funds or hiring lawyers to promote aboriginal rights and interests. 
 
The assimilationist Indian policy was not dropped by the Canadian federal government until the 1970s. 
Abandonment of the policy at that time was a result of important “aboriginal rights and title” decisions at 
the Supreme Court of Canada (eg, R. vs. Calder and R. vs. White and Bob)
 
and the associated Indian 
rights movement. The federal and British Columbian provincial governments agreed to negotiate modern 
day treaties with British Columbia First Nations in 1991. Fisheries issues in general, and fisheries 
restoration in particular are key issues for Columbia Basin First Nations. 
 
The description of the economies and cultures of US Columbia Basin tribes in the 1930s presented in 
Section 3.7 applies equally well to Canadian First Nations. However, in contrast to the situation in the 
US, Canadian First Nations were unaware of the plans to construct GCD. The dam was partially 
completed when the US applied to the International Joint Commission for approval of the dam. There is 
no evidence that either the Canadian government or the International Joint Commission consulted with 
Canadian First Nations prior to IJC approval of the dam. Indeed, when GCD construction was being 
considered in the US in 1934, the Deputy Minister of the Department of Fisheries advised the Canadian 
embassy in Washington that “…the assumption that there is no commercial salmon fishery on the 
Columbia River in Canada is correct, and hence Canadian interests in that respect will not be affected if 
the dam at Grand Coulee is not equipped with fishery facilities” (Pitzer, 1994: 224). 
 
3.8.2  Project Impacts on First Nations 
 
As was the case for US Native American tribes, GCD also caused major adverse effects for Canadian 
Columbia River tribes. Salmon runs to the upper Columbia River provided an important foundation for 
the subsistence economies of the Canadian tribes, particularly the Ktunaxa and Lakes/Sinixt. The 
construction of GCD was the final blow, in addition to commercial overharvest in the lower Columbia 
River and the construction of Rock Island and Bonneville dams, which virtually extinguished the 
livelihoods of these tribes. While the Columbia River Basin in Canada provided spawning, rearing, and 
migration habitat for a large number of spring, summer, and fall chinook, sockeye and steelhead 
populations, completion of GCD left only one chinook and one sockeye population remaining in the 
Canadian portion of the basin within the Okanagan sub-basin
.
 
 
The near elimination of Canadian-origin salmon populations caused by construction of GCD had major 
adverse effects on Canadian First Nations. For example, the almost complete loss of access to salmon 
had severe dietary, health, and economic consequences for Canadian First Nations. Salmon had formerly 
provided a foundation for the subsistence economies of First Nations, and, at the time GCD was built, 
these economies were far more important than the wage or commercial economy to First Nations. The 

Grand Coulee Dam and Columbia Basin Project 
 
         83 
 
This is a working paper prepared for the World Commission on Dams as part of its information gathering activities. The views, conclusions, and 
recommendations contained in the working paper are not to be taken to represent the views of the Commission 
 
loss of salmon also had severe cultural and spiritual consequences, including the elimination of 
traditional social and communal practices, and celebrations integral to First Nations’ way of life.  
 
GCD blocks all anadromous fish runs to the Ktunaxa, Shuswap, and Lakes-Sinixt territories. Because of 
dam construction, the following fish populations or stock aggregates became extinct: 
 
• 
Arrow, Slocan, and Whatshan sockeye populations (Fulton, 1970)
;
 
• 
Columbia and Windermere Lake sockeye populations (Bryant & Parkhurst, 1950); 
• 
Spring/summer chinook populations, which spawned downstream of the Columbia/Kootenay 
confluence, in the lower Pend d’Oreille River and the tributary Salmon River, in the Slocan 
River downstream of Slocan Lake, downstream of Bonnington Falls in the Kootenay River, 
between the Arrow Lakes, intermittently upstream in the Columbia River main-stem between 
Upper Arrow Lake and Radium Hot Springs, and heavily downstream of Windermere and 
Columbia Lakes (Fulton, 1970; Scholz et al., 1985); and 
• 
Fall chinook populations that spawned in the lower Pend d’Oreille River, intermittently 
downstream of the Columbia/Kootenay confluence, in the lower Kootenay below Bonnington 
Falls, in the lower Slocan River and in the Columbia River downstream of lower Arrow Lake 
(Fulton, 1968). 
 
Salmon consumption levels before and during the early period of white settlement in First Nations in 
Canada have been estimated at 300 pounds per capita
 
per year for the Ktunaxa, and 400 pounds per 
capita per year for the Okanagan and Lakes (Hewes, 1947) These estimates, of course, apply to a period 
when salmon were far more abundant than they were in the period immediately prior to the construction 
of GCD.  
 
Effects of GCD on First Nations are important not only because the dams provided the final blow to 
salmon runs that had already been decreasing because of other factors, but also because it eliminated the 
ability to restore these populations in the future (at least with the dam in its present configuration, and 
with the pre-existing genetic attributes) to levels of abundance that might sustain similar harvest levels. 
GCD represented an irreversible change: the pre-existing genetic attributes of certain salmon species 
cannot be regained.  
 
The complete loss of salmon from the diets of Canadian First Nations has had substantial negative 
impacts on health conditions. As discussed in Section 3.7, for Native Americans in the US, the shift in 
diets of tribal members away from “country foods” (including salmon) has contributed to significant 
increases in illnesses like heart disease, diabetes and arthritis.  
 
GCD does not block the salmon populations that return to spawn and rear in the Canadian portion of the 
Okanagan River Basin. However, the Okanagan River sockeye population has been adversely affected 
by GCFMP because of the harvesting of Okanagan fish for hatchery broodstock, the genetic mixing of 
wild and hatchery stocks (and resultant reduced fitness), and ineffective hatchery practices. 
 
In contrast to the mitigation efforts for Native Americans in the US, there has been no mitigation for the 
impacts of GCD on First Nations salmon fisheries in Canada. First Nations are not party to US v. 
Oregon, and until 1999, the NPPC had not supported funding for projects to mitigate for the impacts of 
US dams on Canadian fish or wildlife populations. Unlike their counterparts in the US, Canadian First 
Nations have not had access to the legal mitigation and compensation mechanisms and funds. Canadian 
First Nations are actively pursuing mitigation and compensation for their salmon losses, particularly 
through efforts to achieve their long-term goal of salmon restoration. 
 
 
 
 
 
 

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This is a working paper prepared for the World Commission on Dams as part of its information gathering activities. The views, conclusions, and 
recommendations contained in the working paper are not to be taken to represent the views of the Commission 
 
4.  Basin-Wide Impacts and Operations 
 
As the preceding sections make clear, GCD cannot be analysed in isolation. Notwithstanding that some 
early project advocates in eastern Washington were not thinking in terms of basin-wide planning, the 
definitive appraisal of GCD, the 1932 report for the Columbia River above the Snake prepared by the 
Corps, was conducted as part of a basin-wide planning effort. One indication of the significance of this 
early basin-wide planning effort is whether or not projects detailed by the Corps in 1932 were actually 
constructed.  
 
4.1  The 1932 Butler Report as a Plan for the Upper Columbia Basin 
 
In examining whether the Corps’ 1932 comprehensive plan for development for the Columbia River 
above the Snake River was implemented, it is useful to review the primary components of this plan. The 
scheme outlined in the Butler Report called for construction of six dams on the Columbia River: Priest 
Rapids, Rock Island Rapids, Rocky Reach, Chelan, Foster Creek, and Grand Coulee. Major Butler 
recommended that navigation facilities be built up to Rocky Reach Dam, and he also recommended the 
regulation of Flathead and Pend Oreille Lakes and the construction of Hungry Horse Dam, with its 
accompanying reservoir. Finally, the Butler Report advocated adoption of a plan for irrigation of the 
Columbia Plateau. 
 
In terms of hydropower projects on the Columbia River above the Snake, every one of the dams the 
Butler Report recommended for construction was eventually built. The Corps built Chief Joseph Dam at 
the Foster Creek site, and the Douglas County PUD constructed Wells Dam at the Chelan site. Rocky 
Reach and Rock Island dams were built by the Chelan County PUD, and Priest Rapids Dam was built by 
the Grant County PUD. Moreover, Reclamation followed Butler’s recommendation of a high dam at 
Grand Coulee.  
 
The major exception to implementation of Major Butler’s plan for the upper basin is the case of Priest 
Rapids and Wanapum dams; the latter is located 18 miles (29km) upstream from Priest Rapids. Major 
Butler compared the potential power possibilities under two different scenarios for Priest Rapids. In one 
scenario, he examined the power potential with a low dam at Priest Rapids and another dam 25 miles 
(40km) upstream, at the vantage site (USACE, 1933: 1003-1004,1007). The other scenario envisioned a 
high dam at Priest Rapids that would inundate the Vantage site and create a reservoir back to Rock 
Island. Since Butler concluded that the low dam-Vantage scenario would lose 18,000kW of power 100% 
of the time, he recommended the high Priest Rapids Dam (USACE, 1933: 1004). This recommendation 
was not implemented. Instead, the low dam was built at Priest Rapids, and another dam, Wanapum, was 
constructed not far from the Vantage site. As in the case of Priest Rapids, Wanapum was constructed by 
the Grant County PUD. 
 
Not all of the other elements of Major Butler’s plan were implemented. The navigation facilities 
proposed for Priest Rapids and Rock Island dams were never built. Also, the plan implemented at Grand 
Coulee represented a modest departure from the scheme outlined in the Butler Report. Reclamation 
employed the pumping plan Butler advocated. However, Butler’s recommendation for “Plan 4-A,” with 
part of the project supplied with irrigation water from Priest Rapids, was not followed. Instead, 
Reclamation’s plans for GCD and CBP adhered closely to Butler’s “Plan 4,” with the vast majority of 
irrigation water for CBP coming from Lake Roosevelt.
116
  
 
The Butler Report recommended regulation of Pend Orielle Lake through the construction of a dam at 
Albeni Falls, and that recommendation was followed: the Corps completed Albeni Falls Dam in 1955. 
Reclamation built Hungry Horse Dam, which went online 1952. Private groups constructed Kerr Dam at 
the outflow of Flathead Lake. 
 
In summary, the comprehensive plan of development in the Butler Report was not implemented in its 
entirety, but most of the main hydropower and irrigation features recommended by Major Butler were 

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This is a working paper prepared for the World Commission on Dams as part of its information gathering activities. The views, conclusions, and 
recommendations contained in the working paper are not to be taken to represent the views of the Commission 
 
eventually built by various public and private entities. Interestingly, when the chief of the Corps 
submitted the Butler Report to the Secretary of War in 1932, he recommended that the hydropower and 
irrigation projects for the Columbia River Basin be undertaken by parties other than the US government. 
 
4.2  Influence of GCD on Decisions to Build other Water Projects in 
the Basin 
 
Given that so many of Major Butler’s general plans for projects in the Columbia River above the Snake 
were implemented, there is a clear link between GCD and many other dams on the Columbia River. 
However, some projects in both the US and Canada are particularly noteworthy because of the way the 
existence of GCD influenced decisions pertaining to these projects. 
  
4.2.1  Effect of GCD on Projects in the US 
 
Two specific examples of how GCD affected the construction and design of other dams in the basin are 
Libby Dam (located upstream), and Chief Joseph Dam (located immediately downstream). Construction 
of Libby Dam is closely tied to the Columbia River Treaty, which, among other things, authorised the 
US to build a dam on the Kootenay River, near Libby, Montana. The project was built and is operated by 
the Corps; its significance in controlling floods is reflected in the following statement: “Libby Dam is 
the culmination of years of effort on the part of both the United States and Canada to develop a flood 
control plan for the Columbia River Basin.” (USACE, 1996) 
 
Libby Dam, completed in 1973, provides over 5 MAF (6 165 million m
3
) of storage to the basin-wide 
system. The dam's reservoir, Lake Koocanusa, is a total of 90 miles (145km) long and extends 42 miles 
(68km) into BC, Canada. Without GCD and the Columbia River Treaty, it is highly unlikely that Libby 
Dam would have been built the way it was, since all the storage projects in the Treaty take into account 
the flood control capacity of GCD (USACE, 1972). The presence of GCD was a major factor affecting 
the design and operation of Libby (Brooks 1999). 
 
Chief Joseph Dam, built by the Corps in 1958, has also been influenced by GCD. This run-of-the-river 
project lies 51 miles (82km) immediately downstream of GCD and is one of the Corps' largest 
power-
producing dams in the basin.
 When all 27 generators are operating, the dam can produce over 2.6 million 
kilowatts. Currently, the value of electricity produced at Chief Joseph Dam exceeds $200 million 
annually (USACE, 1998). To produce more power for the US Northwest, the Corps raised the height of 
Chief Joseph Dam by 10ft (2.64m) and installed 11 additional turbine generators in 1980 (USACE, 
1998). After the dam was raised, the Corps raised the level of Rufus Woods Lake (the reservoir created 
by the dam) by 10ft (2.64m), bringing the lake level to 956ft (254m) above sea level. With the higher 
lake level and a total of 27 generating units, Chief Joseph Dam is now the second largest hydropower 
producer in the US — second only to GCD. The powerplant at the dam produces enough power to 
supply the electrical needs of over 1.5 million people (USACE, 1998).  
 
The ability of the Chief Joseph Dam to generate this much electricity is directly tied to the upstream 
regulation of flow by GCD. The operation of the two dams is closely linked. As stated by Reclamation, 
“The water levels between Grand Coulee Dam and Chief Joseph Dam are a complex function of the 
operation of both dams and their powerplants” (USBR, 1976: I-105). Since the Chief Joseph Dam is run-
of-the-river, it is not designed to control large amounts of water flow.
117
 Therefore, power generation 
activities at the dam are closely synchronised with activities at GCD. 
 
Another major influence of GCD on Chief Joseph Dam concerns its lack of fish passage facilities. As 
mentioned in Section 3.5, GCD was built without fish passage facilities. This condition set the stage for 
the subsequent decision not to provide fish passage facilities at Chief Joseph Dam. While there are no 
major spawning tributaries between GCD and Chief Joseph, the fact that Chief Joseph Dam was built 
without fish passage facilities eliminated the possibility of using the area between the two dams as 
spawning habitat (ICC, 1978a; ICC 1987b; Peone et al 1999; NPPC, undated; Bosse 1999). 

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This is a working paper prepared for the World Commission on Dams as part of its information gathering activities. The views, conclusions, and 
recommendations contained in the working paper are not to be taken to represent the views of the Commission 
 
 
4.2.2  Influence GCD on projects in Canada
118
 
 
As detailed in the Annex titled “Negotiating the Columbia River Treaty,” the perceived need to increase 
power output at GCD led to discussions in 1944 about the prospect of building water storage facilities in 
Canada. After nearly two decades of negotiation, the Columbia River Treaty was ratified in 1964. The 
Treaty led directly to the development of three new storage dams in BC, Canada, and to the US 
development of Libby Dam on the Kootenay River in Montana. Significantly, in the absence of financial 
benefits provided by the Treaty, Canada would not have built the three “Canadian Treaty dams” — 
currently named Duncan, Hugh Keenleyside, and Mica Creek. The Treaty requires that these dams be 
operated to prevent downstream flooding and to increase downstream power generation. As the stored 
water flows through generators at the Canadian dams, Canada retains all the electricity produced at those 
sites. As the same stored water flows through generators at US dams, it increases the production of 
electricity at downstream sites. Using calculation procedures specified by the Treaty, the downstream 
energy production benefits of the water stored in Canada can be calculated, and Canada is entitled to 
50% of these benefits. These funds are commonly referred to as “downstream power benefits”. 
 
According to Gordon MacNabb, one of the advisers to the Canadian Treaty negotiators, had downstream 
benefits not been negotiated, Canada would have met its energy needs by building coal-fired 
powerplants to generate electricity. These plants represented a less expensive alternative to independent 
development (by Canada) of the hydropower projects on the portions of the Columbia River within 
Canada. In other words, the three Canadian Treaty dams would not have been built in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s if the Columbia River Treaty had not provided the additional power and monetary 
benefits.
119
 
 
As the previous observations suggest, the indirect effects of GCD on the course of water resource 
development in British Columbia have been profound. The existence of GCD led directly to the 
negotiation of the Columbia River Treaty, and the benefits provided by the Treaty led Canada to develop 
three major water resource projects in BC. This chain of indirect effects extends even further when the 
following three facts are considered. First, storage provided by the Canadian Treaty dams led to 
additional electricity generation capacity for the Mica project. Second, the Treaty dams led to the 
development of the Revelstoke Dam (downstream of Mica in Canada). Third, the Treaty dams led to the 
construction of the Kootanai Canal Plant (downstream of both the Duncan Dam and Libby Dam in 
Canada).