Grand Coulee Dam and the Columbia Basin Project usa final Report: November 2000

July 
• 
Operate to maintain reservoir elevation of 1 280ft (338m) to  
       1 290ft (341m)  
• 
Continue TMT 
• 
Irrigation pumping continues 
• 
Continue irrigation pumping  
• 
Continue spill for laser light show 
August 
• 
Must reach reservoir elevation level of 1 280ft (338m) by end of 
August (10ft (2.64m) draft from July elevation required by TMT 
for anadromous fish) 
• 
Continue TMT 
• 
Irrigation pumping continues 
• 
Continue spill for laser light show 
September 
• 
Maintain reservoir elevation at 1 283ft (339m) for kokanee 
spawning 
• 
Continue TMT 
• 
Irrigation pumping continues 
• 
Continue spill for laser light show 
October 
• 
Maintain reservoir elevation of 1 283ft (338.7m) to 1 285ft 
(339.2m) for kokanee spawning 
• 
Beginning mid-October operate to meet requirements of Vernita 
Bar (ie, minimum flow between 80 and 100 kcfs)  
November 
• 
Operate to meet requirements of Vernita Bar (ie, minimum flow 
between 80 and 100 kcfs) through Sunday prior to Thanksgiving 
December 
• 
Provisionally draft reservoir elevation level to 1 270ft (335m) to 1 
280ft (338m)  
• 
NMFS biological opinion draft limit of 1 265ft (334m) reservoir 
elevation level if cold snap occurs 
Sources: BPA, 1999; McKay 1999. 
 
 
 

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This is a working paper prepared for the World Commission on Dams as part of its information gathering activities. The views, conclusions, and 
recommendations contained in the working paper are not to be taken to represent the views of the Commission 
 
4.7  Evolution of Basin-wide Planning Institutions
142
 
 
As detailed in the Annex titled “Attempts at Comprehensive Planning for the Columbia River Basin,” a 
valiant effort was made during the 1930s and 1940s to create a new institution for comprehensive 
planning in the Columbia River Basin: the Columbia Valley Authority (CVA). Despite the efforts of its 
promoters, CVA never became a reality. Failure to create CVA ended any hope of a comprehensive 
basin-wide planning body for the region.  
 
BPA was initially created in 1937 as a temporary entity (then called the “Bonneville Project”) to market 
power from Bonneville Dam. It became a permanent agency charged with marketing the power 
generated at all federal dams on the Columbia River, including that produced at GCD. World War II —
which accelerated so much economic development in the US Northwest, and which made the power 
from the Bonneville and Grand Coulee dams so vital to aluminum production, not to mention the atomic 
works at Hanford, Washington — created the circumstances that forced BPA into existence. Once in 
place, BPA made itself, if not indispensable, at least vital in the overall power picture. As historian 
Richard Lowitt writes, "The Bonneville Power Authority [sic], a temporary expedient, by default 
remains to this day the primary federal authority promoting regional interests" (Lowitt, 1984: 170).  
 
Long term squabbles between Reclamation and the Corps, and the reluctance of US Northwest residents 
to surrender the economic future of their region to some unknown and untested body also helped kill the 
CVA idea. Post-war fear of communism tainted centralised planning in general and caused many to 
repudiate what they had seen as so necessary in the 1930s. The Korean War shifted attention away from 
the CVA issue. (Richardson, 1973; 37-38.) All of these factors conspired to end any hope that a long 
range, co-ordinated regional planning vehicle, or even a lesser agency to deal in a comprehensive way 
with only power issues, could be created. 
 
BPA has emerged as it exists today, out of the ashes of the CVA concept, along with the often-confusing 
collection of other state and federal agencies that share the sometimes-overlapping responsibilities for 
the health and economic welfare of the US portion of the basin. Between World War II and the 
ratification of the Columbia River Treaty in 1964, BPA, Reclamation and the Corps dominated in terms 
of decision-making for hydropower. Once the treaty was in force, a fourth powerful agency, BC Hydro, 
played a key role, and the focus on hydropower in operations was broadened to include flood control. As 
fisheries-related issues became more prominent in the 1980s and ’90s, other actors, such as the NPPC 
and NMFS gained influence over the decision-making process, and decision-making became much more 
open than it had been in the past.  
 
This sketch of historical developments only hints at the institutional complexity that exists today. 
Concurrently and separately, the Federal Power Commission, the Washington State Department of 
Public Works, the Washington State Department of Conservation and Development, the State Planning 
Council, the Northwest Resources Association, Washington State College, and the University of 
Washington, not to mention the numerous federal agencies, are all taking a hand in planning and 
developing the US Northwest, and they are only a sampling of the many national, state, and local bodies 
with intertwined jurisdictions (Mitchell, 1967: 39). 
  
This ongoing proliferation of agencies has inevitably resulted in duplication of effort and cases where 
agencies, unable to work together and unco-ordinated, have missed or ignored cautions presented by 
others. The most striking example might be the current plight of the salmon. The USFWS warned in the 
1940s that without proper planning, the dams proposed by the Corps would seriously endanger the 
annual salmon runs (McKinley, 1952: 385-388).
143
 Also, in 1946, local agricultural agencies, through the 
Columbia Basin Inter-Agency Committee, warned that proposals by the Corps were made without much 
study of or knowledge of the agricultural agencies that would be affected. (McKinley, 1952: 416-420) In 
1952, Reed College Professor Charles McKinley outlined the benefits that might come from increased 
co-operation and co-ordinated regional development: “Unified planning, programming, and control of 
investment in basic drainage-basin development must be provided in the interest of financial prudence 

Grand Coulee Dam and Columbia Basin Project 
 
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This is a working paper prepared for the World Commission on Dams as part of its information gathering activities. The views, conclusions, and 
recommendations contained in the working paper are not to be taken to represent the views of the Commission 
 
and maximum financial and economic return on the large outlay required.” (McKinley, 1952: 448) 
 
Concerns about salmon, however, were hardly new and had been expressed as early as the turn of the 
19th century (Netboy, 1980: 28). Despite the severe depletion of the runs long before the advent of any 
Columbia River dams, little attention was paid to the salmon, except by some fishermen and scientists. 
And the history of salmon mismanagement is only one example of an issue where co-ordination and 
long-term vision might have yielded a more favourable outcome. Other notable planning and 
management failures in the US Northwest concern the unsatisfactory handling of issues related to Indian 
tribes whose lands and fisheries were affected by dam construction, inefficient and costly duplication of 
studies and development plans (eg, both agencies conducted comprehensive basin-wide studies during 
the 1930s), and increased pollution in all its forms.  
 
The history of the failed attempts to plan effectively the long-term use and development of the Columbia 
River demonstrates, if nothing else, the evanescent nature of goals and priorities, let alone conflicting 
economic and political interests and jurisdictions. For example, the very nature of "conservation" has 
changed from "best and wisest use" to "preservation of biological diversity" over the last nine decades. 
While the plethora of federal, state, and local agencies that operate in the US Northwest can be 
inefficient because of duplication and contention, there is no proof that a unified planning agency, given 
rapidly changing values and conditions over time, would have produced a more satisfactory long-term 
result. There are, after all, limits to what planning can accomplish, given the unpredictable nature of 
major socioeconomic events like economic depressions and wars. The influx of "dust-bowl" refugees to 
the US Northwest during the 1930s, and the greater migration of workers brought by World War II 
dramatically altered the economy of the region in ways hardly predictable.  
 
Despite the lack of a CVA or anything like it, federal and local agencies co-operated when conditions 
forced it. There was growth and development beyond anything predicted in the 1920s or 1930s. And 
CBP produced a viable economy that balanced agriculture and industry. What difference centralised 
planning would have made is both debatable and unascertainable.  
 

Grand Coulee Dam and Columbia Basin Project 
 
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This is a working paper prepared for the World Commission on Dams as part of its information gathering activities. The views, conclusions, and 
recommendations contained in the working paper are not to be taken to represent the views of the Commission 
 
5.  Distribution of Benefits and Costs 
 
5.1  Anticipated Beneficiaries and Cost Bearers 
 
Having detailed the projected, actual, and unintended effects of GCD and CBP, we now examine those 
affected by looking at predicted and actual beneficiaries and cost bearers. The Butler Report provided a 
comprehensive discussion of the predicted beneficiaries (and to a lesser extent, cost bearers) of GCD and 
CBP. Since the Butler Report was completed prior to the passage of the Flood Control Act of 1936, 
which introduced the requirement that benefits must exceed costs for Corps projects in order to be 
authorised by Congress, a strict benefit-cost analysis was not undertaken (Eckstein, 1958: 47). In terms 
of distribution of costs and gains, Major Butler made it clear that power revenues would have to 
subsidise irrigation. He reiterated this point in a 1932 hearing of the US House of Representatives by 
indicating that the costs of irrigation development were so high that without the subsidy from power 
revenues irrigation could not bear the costs of development (US Congress, 1932: 46). Although the 
Butler Report does not include a benefit-cost analysis, it does provide a very detailed economic analysis 
that incorporates direct and indirect benefits (USACE, 1933: 1037-49).  
 
In his economic analysis, Butler placed the benefits of the Columbia Basin irrigation project into three 
general categories: (i) direct benefits in the form of profits to farmers and local and regional businesses; 
(ii) indirect benefits in the form of increased farmland, urban land, and franchise values; and (iii) public 
benefits in the form of an increased supply of produce for consumption and processing, as well as 
reduced food prices. Butler argued that the first and third types of benefits are worthy of federal subsidy 
while the second kind “forms an assessable asset upon which an estimate of the economic feasibility of 
the project may depend” (USACE, 1933: 1049). Butler valued these benefits at $217 483 875 ($2 600 
000 000 in $1998) (USACE, 1933: 1049),
 144
 $33 million more in 1932 dollars (390 million in $1998) 
than the estimated cost of construction. He recommended a land tax in order to assess beneficiaries other 
than CBP farmers (USACE, 1933: 1050).  
 
Similarly, the Reclamation Report called for assessments to be charged to beneficiaries, stating that “it 
will be necessary that the State of Washington, municipalities, and all interests benefiting within the 
irrigation district contribute toward the direct cost in proportion to such benefits” (USBR, 1932: 81). The 
Reclamation Report recommended an ad valorem tax on all properties that benefited (USBR, 1932: 117). 
Owners of properties that benefited were expected to bear costs in proportion to the benefits they 
received. 
 
The Butler Report discussed briefly the people upstream that would be relocated because of reservoir 
creation. Three bridges (one rail and two highway) that cross the Columbia River upstream would need 
to be torn down with construction of the dam. In addition, “a number of small towns, several miles of 
highway and railroad, and a considerable area of tillable land would be inundated”. (USACE, 1932: 
747). Butler also reported that during periods of low flow, the head of the Washington Water Power 
Company’s Little Falls Dam would be reduced 10ft to 12ft (3 to 3.7m). In addition, the Fish Hawk 
power site would be completely submerged. In an earlier part of his report, Butler stated: 
 
The high dam would submerge the city of Marcus and about 15 miles [24km] of the Great Northern 
Railway Company’s branch lines, as well as above mentioned power sites. The flowage area would 
include isolated tracts of cultivated land closely adjacent to the river and principal tributaries and 
also some higher areas that could be irrigated economically by pumping. Otherwise, damage to 
agricultural interests would be sligh.t (USACE, 1933: 612) 
 
Neither the Butler nor the Reclamation reports mention the effect GCD and CBP would have on the 
Colville and Spokane tribes. 
 
Existing farmers were also predicted to be disadvantaged by CBP. Major Butler discussed the possible 
effect of an increase in cultivated land on farmers: “Farmers as a class receive no direct benefit. They 

Grand Coulee Dam and Columbia Basin Project 
 
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This is a working paper prepared for the World Commission on Dams as part of its information gathering activities. The views, conclusions, and 
recommendations contained in the working paper are not to be taken to represent the views of the Commission 
 
are, in fact, damaged by the increased competition, particularly if the increased production of new land is 
sufficient to reduce prices. This fact forms the basis for opposition to any plan for increasing 
production.” (USACE, 1933: 1039) Butler tried to address this concern by recommending that CBP only 
be approved when the demand for land and agricultural products required the development of new 
farmland. 
 
5.2  Major Project Beneficiaries and Cost Bearers 
 
The effects of GCD and CBP on major beneficiaries and cost bearers are summarised in Tables 5.2.1 and 
5.2.2. A matrix graphically depicting the distribution of benefits and costs of the project is presented in 
the Annex titled “Distribution of Benefits and Costs”. 
 
Table 5.2.1 Major Project Beneficiaries 
Group 
Main Project Benefit(s) 
Irrigators and associated agribusiness 
• 
Subsidised water, power, and land 
BPA ratepayers (eg, public utilities, DSIs) 
• 
Inexpensive power 
Downstream residents 
• 
Flood control protection 
Recreators who use project-related facilities 
and recreation-related commerce  
• 
Use of recreational facilities 
• 
Tourism-based commerce 
• 
Augmentation of resident fishery resources 
US Northwest economy and residents 
• 
Socioeconomic development of US 
Northwest 
• 
Growth of regional industry 
• 
Creation of metropolitan cities 
BC Hydro ratepayers 
• 
Inexpensive power 
 
5.2.1 Major Beneficiaries 
 
5.2.1.1  Irrigators and Associated Agribusiness 
 
As planned, irrigators and the agricultural sector in Washington State were primary project beneficiaries. 
As of 1998, there were 660 794 acres (267 400ha) receiving some form of project water (including 
groundwater). Section 3.1 provides details on gross crop values returned to these lands. Farmers have 
benefited from the project by receiving water and power at subsidised prices. Farming communities have 
also benefited from the infrastructure created as a result of the project, including roads and educational 
systems. The crops produced in the project area have also supported a major food-processing industry. 
All this activity would not have been possible without a tremendous investment by the federal 
government (ie, the US taxpayer). BPA ratepayers through the “irrigation assistance” programme 
discussed later in this section will eventually pay for a large portion of project costs allocated to 
irrigators for the capital costs of the project. 
 
5.2.1.2 BPA 
Ratepayers 
 
The project has also been a boon to BPA ratepayers, which include public utilities and select industrial 
customers (DSIs). The FCRPS, of which the GCD is a key component, supplies roughly 75% of the US 
Northwest’s power needs at rates well below the national average.  
 
5.2.1.3 Downstream 
Residents 
 
A substantial number of Oregonians and Washingtonians enjoy increased flood protection from the 
upstream series of 14 dams that provide storage capacity in the Columbia River system. GCD is the 
largest source of active storage in the US portion of the basin. In conjunction with an extensive system 
of levees, FCRPS dams and the Columbia River Treaty projects provide substantial flood control 

Grand Coulee Dam and Columbia Basin Project 
 
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This is a working paper prepared for the World Commission on Dams as part of its information gathering activities. The views, conclusions, and 
recommendations contained in the working paper are not to be taken to represent the views of the Commission 
 
protection to population centres of Portland, Oregon, and Vancouver, Washington. Additionally, GCD 
also provides for local flood protection in the immediate vicinity of the project area. 
 
5.2.1.4  Recreators and Recreation-related Commerce 
 
Many recreators — engaging in activities such as boating, fishing, hunting, and wildlife viewing—have 
benefited from facilities provided by the Lake Roosevelt National Recreation Area, the GCD, and the 
multitude of seep ponds and wetlands within CBP’s irrigation command area. A major recreational 
activity enjoyed by anglers is fishing for certain species of resident fish that are now plentiful in the 
project area. While recreational uses of the facilities do not receive the same priority as other project 
purposes, the net benefits to recreators in Washington State as well as visitors from other US states and 
other countries have been significant. Annually, project-related recreational facilities generate 
approximately three million visitor days. Extensive use of recreational facilities in the project area also 
supports recreation-related commerce in towns such as Grand Coulee, Coulee Dam, Davenport, Quincy, 
Moses Lake, and Kettle Falls. 
 
5.2.1.5  US Northwest Economy and Residents 
 
GCD and CBP have been instrumental in the socioeconomic development of the US Northwest. During 
dam construction, the project provided jobs to thousands of workers. After the project was completed, 
low-cost power attracted important industries to the area, such as aluminium processing, shipbuilding, 
weapons development, and aeronautics. The defence industry that sprang up in the region contributed to 
employment and technology helped the Allied Forces emerge victorious from World War II. 
Additionally, inexpensive power supplied to publicly owned utilities has facilitated the growth of 
regional hubs such as Seattle, Washington and Portland, Oregon. 
 
5.2.1.6  BC Hydro Ratepayers 
 
Electricity in the Canadian portion of the Columbia River Basin that is sold by BC Hydro is less 
expensive than it would be otherwise because of Canada’s participation in the Columbia River Treaty. 
Canada used the payments it received from the Columbia River Treaty to build major water resource 
projects in British Columbia. If Canada had not received the financial benefits from the Treaty, it was 
prepared to construct coal-fired powerplants in British Columbia.
 
 
5.2.2  Major Cost Bearers 
 
Table 5.2.2 presents the project’s major cost bearers, which include Native Americans and First Nations 
tribes, individuals concerned with maintaining the integrity of ecosystems, commercial and sport fishing 
interests (for anadromous fish), non-indigenous people forced to resettle, US taxpayers, farmers outside 
the CBP area, and upstream residents and businesses. 
 
 

Grand Coulee Dam and Columbia Basin Project 
 
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This is a working paper prepared for the World Commission on Dams as part of its information gathering activities. The views, conclusions, and 
recommendations contained in the working paper are not to be taken to represent the views of the Commission 
 
Table 5.2.2 Major Project Cost Bearers 
Group 
Main Project Cost(s) 
US Native American and Canadian First 
Nations Tribes 
• 
Loss of anadromous fish and associated 
impacts 
• 
Loss of land and homes because of 
inundation 
• 
Inconvenience of resettlement 
Individuals concerned with maintaining 
ecosystem integrity 
• 
Loss of anadromous fish and associated 
aquatic and riparian ecosystems 
• 
Loss of river in its natural state 
Commercial fishing interests in the US and 
Canada 
 
• 
Adverse affects on commercial salmon 
industry 
Sport fishing interests 
• 
Loss of anadromous fisheries 
Non-Native Americans forced to resettle 
• 
Loss of land and homes because of 
inundation 
• 
Inconvenience of resettlement 
US taxpayers 
• 
Paid for construction of much of CBP 
Some US farmers outside CBP area 
• 
Increased competition from CBP farmers 
Upstream residents and businesses 
 
• 
Loss of land and forest resources, jobs, and 
tax revenues 
• 
Indirect effects via impact of Canadian 
Treaty dams 
• 
Increased competition from CPB-supported 
agriculture