International Economics
particularly in temperate products, such as grain from the United States
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Dominick-Salvatore-International-Economics
particularly in temperate products, such as grain from the United States. The development of a common agricultural policy (CAP) was particularly trouble some for the EU. The final outcome sacrificed consumers’ interests to those of EU farmers in gen- eral, and French farmers in particular, by setting relatively high farm prices. The procedure Salvatore c10.tex V2 - 10/16/2012 10:45 A.M. Page 311 10.6 History of Attempts at Economic Integration 311 is as follows. First, the EU determines common farm prices, and then it imposes tariffs so as always to make the price of imported agricultural products equal to the high established EU prices. These are the so-called variable import levies . The high farm support price level has also led to huge agricultural surpluses within the EU, high storage costs, and subsidized exports (see Section 9.3e on export subsidies and Case Study 9-4). This farm policy was a major obstacle to British entry into the EU because Britain kept agricultural prices low and instead aided its farmers by “deficiency payments” to raise their income to desired levels. It has also been responsible for some of the sharpest trade disputes with the United States and at the Uruguay Round and Doha Round negotiations (see Section 9.7). At the Lom´e Convention in 1975, the EU eliminated most trade barriers on imports from 46 developing nations in Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific region that were former colonies of EU countries. This treaty was renewed every five years—1980, 1985, 1990, and 1995—and the number of associate states (AS) rose to 71. Earlier, in 1971, the EU had granted generalized tariff preferences to imports of manufactured and semimanufactured products from developing nations. But textiles, steel, consumer electronics, shoes, and many other products of great importance to developing nations were excluded. Preferences were extended to trade in tropical products in the Tokyo Round in 1979. However, since these preferences fell short of the complete elimination of trade barriers granted to former colonies, a bitter controversy arose because of the alleged trade diversion. Quotas and tariffs on developing countries’ exports were gradually reduced as a result of the Uruguay Round completed in December 1994 (see Section 9.7). In February 2000, Lom´e IV expired and was replaced by a new agreement, the Cotonou Agreement , signed in Cotonou, Benin, in June 2000. The new agreement had the same general purpose as the Lom´e Convention. The EU replaced the Cotonou Agreement in January 2008 with “new partnership agreements (NPAs) based on reciprocity” with the 79 countries involved, broken into six regional groups. As pointed out earlier, the static welfare benefits resulting from the formation of the EU are estimated to be 1 to 2 percent of GDP, while the dynamic benefits are estimated to be much larger (see Case Study 10-2). Perhaps the greatest benefit has been political, resulting (continued) ■ CASE STUDY 10-2 Gains from the Single EU Market At the beginning of 1993, all remaining restric- tions to the free flow of goods, services, capital, and labor among member nations were eliminated so that the EU became a single, unified market. Over time, this was expected to result in substan- tial efficiency gains and other benefits to the EU. Table 10.2 shows that the EU’s gross domestic product (GDP) was expected to increase by 0.2 percent from the removal of nontariff trade bar- riers, 2.2 percent from the removal of production barriers, 1.65 percent from economies of scale, and 1.25 percent from intensified competition, for an overall total (one-time) gain of 5.3 percent of the EU’s GDP in 1988. This was equivalent to about $265 billion. In addition, the overall rate of inflation was expected to fall by 6.1 percent and 1.8 million additional jobs were expected to be created, thereby reducing the average rate of unem- ployment in the EU by 1.5 percentage points. The EU92 Program also induced large foreign direct investments from the United States and Japan in anticipation of a possible increase in EU protec- tionism against outsiders. In 2003, the European Commission actually put the gains of EU92 at about 2 percent of EU’s GDP. Salvatore c10.tex V2 - 10/16/2012 10:45 A.M. Page 312 312 Economic Integration: Customs Unions and Free Trade Areas ■ CASE STUDY 10-2 Continued ■ TABLE 10.2. Potential Benefits from a Fully Integrated Internal Market in the EU Percent of EU’s 1988 GDP Gains from Removal of nontariff trade barriers 0.20 Removal of production barriers 2.20 Economies of scale 1.65 Intensified competition 1.25 Overall total gains 5.30 Source: P. Cecchini, The European Challenge: 1992 (Aldershot, England: Wildwood House, 1988). from unifying into a single economic community nations, such as Germany and France, that were once bitter enemies. The United States has been of two minds on European unity, supportive yet wary of losing influence. In 1986, the EU amended the Treaty of Rome with the Single European Act , which provided for the removal of all remaining barriers to the free flow of goods, services, and resources among members. This was actually achieved with the EU 1992 Program, which turned the EU into a single unified market at the beginning of 1993. This led to the pouring in of foreign direct investments into the EU out of fear of increased protectionism against outsiders. Other highlights in the operation of the EU are as follows: (1) Member nations have adopted a common value-added tax system, under which a tax is levied on the value added to the product at each stage of its production and passed on to the consumer. 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