International Relations. A self-Study Guide to Theory

particulars relate to each other (remember: is the whole more than the sum of 
its parts?) is one of the central ontological questions. As will be demonstrat-
ed, the question of how universals and particulars are assumed to relate to 
each other is highly relevant for how science is conducted – for the method-
ology as well as the epistemological aspect of explanation. 
To start, please remember that at the core of positivist science lies theory 
and the formulation of theoretical hypotheses that have to be tested by empir-
ical experience. That is, when we try to know about “society”, “the state”, 
“the states system”, “institutional structures”, or “foreign policy” in the social 
sciences, positivist research requires that we formulate theories and hypothe-
ses about these “objects” of inquiry in order to gain general, valid knowledge 
about them. However, from what you have learned so far in Step 1 and Step 
2, you can see that the empirical testing of hypotheses and theories about 
“society”, “the state”, or the “international system” is not actually that easy, 
as these objects are not “observable”. They are general theoretical terms. 
Linking the discussion back to the previously mentioned ontological problem 
of how “universals” and “particulars” are assumed to relate to each other, 
general theoretical terms like “the state”, “society”, “structure”, etc., refer to 

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what are also called “universals”. That is, in most cases in the social sciences, 
we operate with concepts and theories that do not directly refer to (observa-
ble) particulars. As has been said above, methodologically these concepts and 
theories have to be operationalized, or “translated” into statements about “ob-
servables” (by way of variables). From an ontological perspective, the gen-
eral theories and concepts themselves – as we have seen above – have no be-
ing (ontology) and are not assumed to be “real”. In positivist science they are 
analytical “instruments” only. 
A huge ontological controversy exists with regard to what extent theories 
and concepts can be claimed to exist, to be “real”. This argument is often 
called the “universals controversy” and, in the history of philosophical 
thought, goes as far back as ancient Greece. Because of its relevance to the 
status of theory in science, it is worthwhile to take a closer look at this con-
troversy by discussing the issue against the background of the broader philo-
sophical debate. 
Nominalism 
A core aspect of the “universals controversy” is the question of whether or not 
general theoretical terms and concepts (the “universals”) exist or are simply 
pure mental constructions. Remember what we discussed in Step 1: a universal 
is an abstract term such as “man” or “humankind” or mathematical entities 
such as “number”, “relation” or a “class” in biology. For example, does the 
class “living being” actually exist? Do theoretical terms exist? Are they? Or are 
they pure conceptualizations of the human mind and as such do not “exist”? 
The debate goes back as far as Plato and his theory of forms (theory of ideas). 
As you have learned above, for Plato, ideas and forms (the universals) exist, 
they are (real). This controversy reached its peak in scholasticism in the Mid-
dle Ages; however, it still continues as a philosophical controversy today. 
Positivist science usually takes an ontologically nominalist position in the 
controversy. Nominalism denies the existence of universals, stating that uni-
versals and abstract objects do not exist; they have no being. They are only 
general terms and concepts to which the objects correspond. No objective 
meaning exists for the abstract words and concepts we use. Features of a uni-
versal are thus as follows: pure mental conception, time independence, lack 
of observableness, no causal effects. An example already mentioned in Step 1 
is a universal such as “human” or “humankind” that needs a reference to a