International Relations. A self-Study Guide to Theory

ists. In the second complex, the focus will be more related to how to know 
and the methodology of knowing. 

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2.2. Epistemology, ontology and methodology in positivist science
2.2.1. Complex 1 
Positivism is best understood by starting with its epistemological assump-
tions. This is not a didactical decision; rather, it is because, for a positivist 
account of science, epistemology matters more than ontology. Scientific pri-
ority is clearly given to epistemology. This is due to the privileged status of 
observation or, in other words, empirical experience. In positivism any 
statements about what exists depend on what we can know. What we can 
know in positivism is intimately linked to what we can observe/experience. 
As the latter question belongs to the domain of epistemology, the positivist 
account of science thus prioritizes epistemology over ontology. Epistemology 
is “philosophically prior” – it gives more importance to “what can be known 
by science” as compared to “what exists”. 
Empiricism 
The core epistemological position of positivism is empiricism. Empiricism in 
philosophy is a theory of knowledge (epistemology) which claims that there is 
(and must be) an empirical foundation for knowledge. Empirical experience is 
information perceived by the senses; knowledge ultimately results from sensual 
observation/experience. Hence, positivist science understands observation/
empirical experience to be a representation of reality, not reality itself – as we 
can only perceive “reality” through our senses. Consequently, only statements 
about phenomena that can be observed or that can be experienced count as 
knowledge. This means that only “observables” are the objects of scientific in-
quiry in the positivist account of science and can be known by science. It thus 
follows that theories and hypotheses are only acceptable if they can be induc-
tively proved, that is, proved through experience/observation. 
As an epistemological position, empiricism was largely developed 
through British Empiricism and is associated with the works of Francis Ba-
con, Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, David Hume, and Adam Smith. In Unit 3, 
you will find core elements of their ideas of science in more detail. However, 
as will also be demonstrated in Unit 3, empiricism draws on a long historical 
tradition of philosophical thought that goes back to ancient Greece. 
The central features of empiricism become clearer when compared to the 
opposite position, called rationalism. Rationalism (from ratio, reason) is the 
epistemological assumption that knowledge mainly derives from human rea-
son. It gives a privileged epistemological status to the human mind (and not 
to sensory, empirical experience). Rationalism as an epistemological position 

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also has a long tradition in European philosophy and is usually associated 
with the work of René Descartes, Baruch de Spinoza and Gottfried Wilhelm 
Leibniz. In fact, like empiricism, rationalism actually dates back to ancient 
Greece and the ideas of Aristotle and Plato.
In short: in positivist science, knowledge derives from experience. Expe-
rience is information received through the senses. Only statements about 
phenomena that can be directly experienced/observed can count as knowl-
edge, whereas any statements that do not refer to the world of observable ob-
jects cannot be granted the status of justified knowledge. Empiricism there-
fore results in a scientific method which requires that all hypotheses and theo-
ries must be tested against observations of the natural world. It is a belief that 
empirical validation or falsification is at the heart of real inquiry. Science is 
therefore considered to be methodologically empirical in nature. We will 
come back to the methodological aspects later in more detail. 
Materialism/physicalism/ontological naturalism 
The empiricist epistemological core position of positivism is easier to com-
prehend when linked to the fundamental materialist ontology of positivism; 
this philosophical position is called materialism or often physicalism. Materi-
alism/physicalism is the ontological assumption that reality ultimately con-
sists of “matter”. According to this assumption, the world is a material world 
and “governed” by the laws of matter (nature). The position is sometimes al-
so called ontological naturalism, in which everything is “nature” – with an 
understanding of “nature” as physical nature. Physical nature is material na-
ture, hence the position’s interchangeable names of materialism, physicalism 
and ontological naturalism.
A material/physical/natural world can be “observed” by the senses and 
thus be known, if not directly, then with the help of technological facilities 
such as microscopes, telescopes, laboratories, etc. 
The ontological position of materialism/physicalism/naturalism usually 
implies not only that the world is ultimately made of “matter”, but also that 
the human mind and consciousness belong to the material world as a result of 
their ultimately material/physical nature. This nature consists of nerve cells, 
neurons and the material structure of the brain, the activity of which can be 
observed for example in computer-assisted tomography. From a materialist 
ontological perspective, everything – including ideas and human thought – 
are ultimately attributed to matter. 
Here again the argument about ontological materialism/physiccalism/ 
naturalism should be exemplified by pointing to the opposite position, onto-
logical idealism. From an idealist position, the world is ultimately made of 

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(immaterial) ideas, theories and mental constructs. The ontological idealist 
position goes back as far as Plato’s theory of forms (or theory of ideas), 
which states that reality consists of non-material, abstract forms or ideas and 
not the material world known to us through the senses. The forms or ideas are 
present “in” nature/matter (physis). These forms or ideas are understood to be 
distinct, singular extra-mental entities that are plurally represented “in” par-
ticular material objects. Forms and ideas are the “essence” of material ob-
jects: there is no being (ontology) of material objects without their intrinsic 
“idea” or form. For example, the idea or form of “circle” is represented by 
the many material things expressing the form of circles. The essence of all 
circles is the idea or form of “circle”. Forms and ideas are thus superordinate 
to matter. Ideas/forms are also transcendent to time and space; they are non-
local and non-physical, even though they are real. The ideas and forms are 
often called the “universals” that are represented in the many particular 
things that we can see: the form/idea (universal) ”appears” to be material ob-
jects (particulars). True knowledge is thus knowledge that the human mind 
gains about the world of ideas/forms. For Plato, evidence of the existence of 
abstract forms is by intuition. For example, a tool-maker’s blueprints provide 
evidence that forms/ideas are real and guide the practice of a manufacturer.
Atomism/particularism/individualism 
The materialist ontology of positivism is an atomist one. Ontologically, atom-
ism is the assumption that the (material) world is made up of the smallest in-
divisible material particles or can ultimately be reduced to such elementary