International Relations. A self-Study Guide to Theory

structures (sub-systemic or “domestic” structures). 
1.2.
Assumptions about domestic structures: assumptions about 
the state 
It may come as a surprise that the first point raised under the headline “as-
sumptions about structures” is an assumption about the nature of the state it-
self. In our units on neorealist and neoinstitutionalist theory, assumptions 
about structures have been assumptions about the actual international system. 
Assumptions about the state, on the other hand, have been assumptions about 
actors in international politics.
This pattern differs in new liberal theory; here, states are assumed to be 
representative institutions, not actors (Moravcsik 1997: 518-520; 2008: 237-
239). The state as a representative institution represents the parts of domestic 
society whose interests shape the definition of state preferences (see Step 1.1, 
Assumptions about actors). The state as representative institution forms a 
“transmission belt” that “translates” the preferences of individuals and groups 
into foreign policy. The sub-systemic, intra-state structures have selective ef-
fects which influence the choice of actors that will be successful in shaping 
the political agenda. In this manner, sub-systemic structures impact foreign 
policy through their selective effects.
Different sub-systemic structures can be formed either as a result of the 
type of socio-economic organization (modern or traditional societies) or the 
type of political order (liberal democratic states or non-democratic, autocratic 
or authoritarian states). The different ways in which internal decision-making 
processes and interest intermediation are organized (for example, pluralist or 

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corporatist structures) also result in varied structures. These differences in 
sub-systemic structures have implications for power relations, i.e. power dis-
tribution between state and society. The power of the state in state-society re-
lations is crucial; there can be a “strong” state with a highly centralized state 
apparatus or a “weak”, fragmented state with federalized or decentralized 
state functions. In new liberal theory, differences in the type of democracy 
(such as consensus democracy or majoritarian democracy, according to a 
well-known differentiation drawn by Lijphart, 1999) could be relevant for the 
final explanation of outcomes in international politics.
In terms of structures, this means that in liberal theory the most relevant 
structures are domestic, sub-systemic structures. These are the structures of 
the state and of society. Anarchy is not the dominating structure in explaining 
either outcomes in international politics (as we have learned in our unit on 
neorealist theory) or interdependence as a systemic structural feature (as in 
neoinstitutionalist theory).
State preferences are derived from social preferences through the selec-
tive effects of sub-systemic structures. Political action is therefore “embed-
ded” in domestic and transnational civil society. State preferences are en-
dogenized in new liberal theory. This endogenicity contrasts with neoinstitu-
tionalist and neorealist theory, in which state interests are treated as “exoge-
nous” or “given”. In new liberal theory, the state (as a representative institu-
tion) serves to aggregate domestic interests before presenting them to the out-
side. State preferences are FIRST derived from social preferences; only 
THEN does the state present these preferences to the outside. State prefer-
ences are instrumental in managing globalization – the “source” of social in-
terests that is relevant to the study of international politics (1.1). In the words 
of Moravcsik, “states act instrumentally in world politics to achieve particu-
lar goals on behalf of individuals, whose private behavior is unable to 
achieve such ends as efficiently.” (Moravcsik 2008: 237)
However, this raises another question: what happens once states present 
their preferences to the outside? 
1.3.
Assumptions about the nature of the international system 
We now enter into the realm of international politics, where states present 
the preferences they have derived from societal actors – this is the outside. 
AFTER the foreign policy preferences have evolved in the internal decision-
making processes, the governments then interact on the international scene. 
The “outside” is the international system in which states interact, negotiate, 

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cooperate or interfere (the outcomes in international politics are e.g. conflict, 
war, cooperation). The point here is to show how the sub-systemic structures 
and the preferences they brought about relate to each other, i.e. the constella-
tion of structures and preferences. New liberal theory assumes the nature of 
the international system to be a “constellation” of sub-systemic structures 
characterized by a “configuration” of interdependent state preferences (Mo-
ravcsik 1997: 520-524; 2008: 239-240). This “configuration” of interdepend-
ent state preferences shapes international political interaction. This is where 
similarities or differences in sub-systemic structures and state preferences are 
significant for outcomes in international politics. A state’s actual behavior in 
international politics then depends on the constellation of sub-systemic struc-
tures and the foreign policy goals of all interacting states. Whether or not in-
teracting states share preferences defines the scope of the cooperation or con-
flict among those states. For example, transparent internal decision-making 
processes enhance the tendency to cooperate. The relevant internal structures 
here are the role of the public, checks and balances and the rule of law. These 
internal structures all serve to reduce uncertainty and mistrust and their ef-
fects. They thereby build confidence. However, this generalization only ap-
plies when all interacting states have similar internal structures. The resulting 
effect is then mutual trust, which reduces the dilemma in international poli-
tics and contributes towards peace, cooperation and stability. In neo-
institutionalist theory, this effect is due to international institutions. In new 
liberal theory, on the other hand, it is due to the constellation of those sub-
systemic structures that are conducive to peace and international cooperation. 
The crucial link between state preferences and state behavior is the con-