International Relations. A self-Study Guide to Theory

the practices of states. This is in contrast to the structuralism of world-
systems theory with its position of an ontological priority of structure that de-
termines or prescribes the actors’ actions.
For Wendt, there are two relevant types of structure: social kinds are con-
stituted by internal (organizational) structures and by external social struc-
tures. Both form a “constituting social structure”, a set of relationships that 
define a social kind as such (Wendt 1998: 113).
With an emphasis on structuration theory and a holistic ideational per-
spective on structure, agents are mainly perceived as being constituted by ex-
ternal social structures. Internal organizational structures (Wendt calls them 
“anatomy”) explain intrinsic causal powers and interests of agents. “Internal 
structure” refers to the “structure of a thing as such” (Wendt 1998: 112). Ex-

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amples for this include water being constituted by an atomic structure, human 
beings constituted by genetic structure and brain, or states constituted inter-
nally by organizational structures. Because of their internal structure (“anat-
omy”), actors are able to reflect on their activities. Reasonable action, reflec-
tion and adoption of behavior, and the ability to make decisions are all there-
fore possible (Wendt 1987: 359): Wendt applies the idea of internal structure 
to states and treats them as agents/persons – a position that has been heavily 
criticized but revised in his later work (for a critique and auto-critique of the 
treatment of the state as an agent/person see the contributions in Guzzi-
ni/Leander 2006 and Wendt 2006: 182). 
The distinction of internal organizational structures and external social 
structures is demonstrated by using the example of state sovereignty: here, 
“internal structure” refers to exclusive political control and territorial monop-
oly and the legitimate use of violence. For example, “internal sovereignty”, is 
treated as the intrinsic properties and causal powers of agents/states. “Exter-
nal sovereignty” exists because of states’ mutual recognition of each other’s 
sovereignty, a relational, generative aspect. Sovereignty is an institution (so-
cial structure) between states that is decisive for their rights. Sovereignty (as 
the external social relation) does not exist independently of or prior to these 
internal rights. On the other hand, internal rights do not exist when they have 
not been constructed by the external social relations of mutual recognition 
(see in more detail Wendt 1998: 114). 
The ontological and conceptual interdependence of agents and structures 
as mutually constitutive agencies (as derived from structuration theory) thus 
has implications for explanation. We will learn about the specific approach to 
explanation in the next step. For this purpose, please keep in mind that Wendt 
is interested in the effects of (unobservable) ideational structures. 
Step 4: 
Explanation 
4.1. A question-driven approach 
Just as structuralist (holistic) and agent-based (individualist) approaches are 
distinct in their underlying ontology, structural and individualist approaches 
are distinct in their explanation of social action. An explanation that takes 
“structure” as the starting point (such as in the structuralist approach of 
world-systems theory) epistemologically usually draws on “understanding” 

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(or interpretation). Recall what you have learned about interpretation in our 
learning unit on world-systems theory. An explanation that takes actors as the 
starting point (actor-centered approach, such as in neoinstitutionalism or new 
liberal theory) usually involves “explanation” (recall “explanation” in neoin-
stitutionalist and new liberal theory). For Wendt, such a distinction between 
an “insider approach to knowledge” (understanding) and an “outsider ap-
proach to knowledge” (explaining) is not helpful (Wendt 1998: 102-104). 
What he is criticizing is the “second-class status” for “understanding” in the 
social sciences (Wendt 1998: 104; for explaining and understanding see Hol-
lis/Smith 1990: Explaining and Understanding International Relations). Tra-
ditionally, only “explaining” is associated with “science”. This comprises an 
epistemological perspective that equates positivism with science – a position 
that has already been discussed in the Part 1 of this book. 
Wendt takes a position against the view that there is a distinction between 
explanation and understanding as science and non-science. For him, explana-
tion and understanding are not mutually exclusive (Wendt 1998: 103). Ex-
planation and understanding should not be distinguished by drawing a line 
between “science” versus “non-science”, but by the type of questions that the 
researcher is asking. Hence Wendt epistemologically suggests a “question-
oriented approach” (Wendt 1998: 103). For him, non-causal inquiry (tradi-
tionally associated with understanding) can be explanatory: “The distinction 
between Explanation and Understanding is not one between explanation and 
description, but between explanations that answer different kinds of question,