International Relations. A self-Study Guide to Theory

particular institution such as sovereignty, and 
the specific relevant actors acting within these specific structures, such as 
states or non-state actors (Wendt 1999: 6). In contrast, “second order theory” 
or “social theory” refers to the abstract categories of “actor”, “structure”, 
“system”, etc., and how these categories are interrelated. 
Understanding the difference between “social theory” and “International 
Relations theory” is crucial when it comes to the core question of Wendt’s 
theoretical work. Wendt is interested in the implications of second-order the-
orizing (philosophy of science) for first-order theorizing, i.e. for the substan-
tive theory of IR. He calls this approach “applied philosophy” (Wendt 1999: 
6). Using his terminology of “social theory” for second order theorizing (phi-
losophy of science), the title of his seminal book (1999) perfectly reflects the 
approach he takes: Social Theory of International Politics (my italics).
Following the logic of the previous paragraphs, it then becomes clear that 
a substantial theory of IR (first order theory) would qualify as “social con-
structivist” when it shares assumptions of constructivism (second order, the 
philosophy of science or social theory). IR theories informed by social con-
structivism challenge the ontology of positivist IR theory. Ontologically so-
cial constructivist theorizing is different to positivist IR theorizing because of 
its focus on shared meaning and norms; ideas matter in social reality, while 
reality is perceived as a social construction.
Following along those lines, Wendt’s work is claimed to be ontologically 
“social constructivist” because of his theoretical position on the ideational na-

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ture of the deep unobservable structure of the international system that con-
stitutes the agents and rules of interaction in international politics.
These social constructivist positions are post-positivist positions in that 
they challenge the positivist ontology. 
In the next step, let me briefly reflect on the term “post-positivism” as 
used in this unit. What has been said above about social constructivist-
informed IR theorizing is true more generally for “post-positivist” IR theory: 
it can relate to a diversity of different ontological, epistemological and meth-
odological claims. What unites these approaches is no more than the fact that 
none are positivist. In terms of their underlying philosophy of science per-
spectives, however, they are quite diverse; what is referred to as “post-
positivism” artificially unifies a variety of approaches with competing per-
spectives. It reflects the broader search for different, alternative meta-
theoretical foundations for the formulation of theories of IR after or “post”-
positivism. The label “post-positivism” thus unites theories that are as diverse 
as post-structuralism (genealogical, discourse-analytical and deconstructive 
studies drawing on the works of French philosophers Michel Foucault, 
Jaques Derrida or Francois Lyotard), critical theory based on the work of the 
Frankfurt School, normative IR theory, (different types of) feminist IR theo-
ry, Neo-Gramscian and Neo-Marxist approaches as well as social construc-
tivist IR theories.
However, to place all these theories into a “positivist/post-positivist” di-
chotomy obscures the nature of the challenge. A philosophy of science perspec-
tive will reveal the diversity of the so-called “post-positivist” approaches. At 
the same time, it will highlight the commonalities of positivist approaches. In 
contrast, most traditional textbook presentations depict the differences between 
IR theories within a positivist philosophy of science approach.
To return to our focus on Wendt, this argument retains its relevance there 
as well: Wendt’s work is basically post-positivist in that it challenges the pos-
itivist ontology. More specifically, his post-positivist approach is ontological-
ly social constructivist; however, he aims at keeping a positivist epistemolog-
ical position. For Wendt, the so-called “Third Debate” in IR is about two dif-
ferent things: ontology (what the world is made of) and epistemology (what 
questions we should ask) (Wendt 1998: 103). For him, the meta-theoretical 
Third Debate should be focused on the former, not the latter (Wendt 1999: 
90, also Wight 2006). Wendt claims that a shift to the “nature” of the prob-
lems in international politics is required in IR theory because the “content” of 
substantive IR theory (i.e. ontology) is distorted (Wendt 1999: 48).
When we apply philosophy (that is, philosophy of science) as described 
above, the central question for Wendt in his Social theory of International 

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Politics (1999) emerges as: “…given a similar substantive concern as Waltz, 
i.e., states systemic theory and explanation, but a different ontology, what is 
the resulting theory of international politics?” (Wendt 1999: 6).
In other words, what he has in mind is a new type of systems theory for 
international politics. 
In Step 1, we will examine the ontological assumptions of this new type 
of systems theory. Before you continue reading, please take some time to re-
cap what you have learned about the implications of different philosophy of 
science positions for the study, explanation and hence practice of interna-
tional politics. In this unit, we return to this issue in more detail. As you will 
have recognized while reading this introduction, this unit may well be the 
most theoretically complex and difficult one in the book. As a result, you will 
probably need to allocate more time for your work than has been the case for 
other units in the book.
Step 1: 
The ontological status of “structure” as an unobservable 
and “object” of scientific inquiry 
Social Theory of International Politics as formulated by Alexander Wendt 
(1999) is based on a systems-theoretic standpoint (Wendt 2006: 217, my ital-
ics). It is Wendt’s objective to formulate a new approach to structural theo-
rizing about international relations (Wendt 1987: 336, my emphasis). 
Wendt’s approach to structural theorizing is novel because it employs a new 
ontological status of “structure” as an unobservable. Compared to the ontol-
ogy of other forms of “structural” theorizing (Wendt mentions neorealism 
and world-systems theory), the concept of “structure” of the international 
system has been ontologically re-thought.
Wendt’s new ontological approach to “structure” is best understood by 
starting with a reflection of his critique and a comparison of what he per-
ceives to be two different types of “structural theory” in IR: neorealism and 
world-systems theory. You will find the basic arguments in his famous article 
“The agent-structure problem in International Relations” (1987). The article, 
together with that of Dessler (1989), marked the beginning of the so-called 
“constructivist turn” in IR in the second half of the 1980s. They are part of 
the post-positivist challenge to positivist theorizing mentioned in the intro-
duction. In the follow-up to these publications, the attention of the IR com-
munity has been heavily directed towards meta-theoretical questions related 

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to the interrelation of “actors” and “structures” in international politics (see 
also Wight 2006 for an excellent overview).
In addition to the article mentioned above, the comparison and critique of 
neorealism and world-systems theory is formulated in Chapter 1 of Wendt’s 
Social Theory of International Politics (1999: 1-44). The core of his argu-
ment is that different ontologies lie at the heart of both attempts to formulate 
a structural theory of international politics; neorealist theory is based on an 
individualist ontology, world-systems theory on a holistic ontology (Wendt 
1987: 336). For Wendt, both perspectives are reductionist: either the actors 
are assumed to be ontological prior to structure and hence “given” (ontologi-
cal individualism/neorealism) or structure is assumed to be ontological prior 
to actors and hence given (ontological structuralism/world-systems theory).