Kryachkov 2!indd

sel)
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always the West against (to recognize)
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breakaway provinces such as Kosovo. Within a few 
weeks, the Wall Street collapse brought reality home, with Russia this time on the receiving end of 
acute market contagion. 
It is against this dangerous backdrop that the newly (to elect)
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Barack Obama put forward the 
idea of a “reset” of bilateral relations. The Russians at first (to react)
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with skepticism but now (to 
tend)
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to view Mr. Obama as somebody they can do business with. More important, the Russian 
elite has had time to reflect on where their long-term interests (to lie)
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.
A recently (to leak)
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Russian foreign ministry “white paper” (to suggest)
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an important de-
bate is under way. The paper (to echo)
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President Medvedev’s themes of the urgent need for 
modernization and closer association with the West. 
Mr. Medvedev talks about promoting nanotechnology in Russia. This is a perfectly rational eco-
nomic objective, but Russia’s deeper challenge is that it needs a new operating system, preferably 
a European-oriented one (to base)
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on representative government, civil liberties, property rights 
and true federalism.
The great Russian historian Vasily Klyuchevsky (to write)
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of the 18th-century czar Peter the 
Great: “He (not to want)
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to borrow the results of Western technique, but (to want)
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to appropri-
ate the skill and knowledge, and build industries on the Western European model.” Peter himself 
said: “We need Europe for a few decades; later on we must turn our back on it.” 
The Russian president seems (to say)
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something different. Only time (to tell)
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whether Mr. 
Medvedev can deliver.
Ex. 30. Use of English. Fear of Russia.
a) Choose the best variant.
b) Comment on the influence of fear in interstate relations in general and on 
relations between Russia and the US in particular.
The United States has/have (1) spent the past century pursuing a single objective: evading/
dodging/avoiding (2) the rise/raise (3) of any single hegemon that might be able to exploit West-
ern European technology and capital and Russian resources and menpower/manpower (4) . The 
United States intervened in the/a/x (5) World War I in 1917 to block German hegemony, and again 
in the/a/x World War II. In the/a/x (6) Cold War the goal was to prevent Russian hegemony. U.S. 
strategic policy has been consistent for a century.
The United States has/have been cautious of any rising hegemon. In this case the fear of a(n) 
insurgent/resurgent/surging (7) Russia is a recollection of the/a/x Cold War, but not an unreason-
able one. As some pointed out to me/As I was pointed out by some (8) during my visit to Russia, 
economical/economic (9) weakness has rarely meant military weakness or political disunity. Rus-
sians tend to support the government regardless of competence when Russia feels threatened. I 
agreed with them on this and pointed out that this is precisely why the United States has/have a 
legitimate fear of Russia in Ukraine. If Russia manages to reassert its power in Ukraine, then what 
will come the/a/x (10) next?
The United States and Europe have trouble in/with/x (11) understanding Russia’s fears. Russia 
has trouble in/with/x understanding particularly American fears. The fears of both are real and 

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