Kurt Lewin’s Field Theory: a review and Re-evaluation

Lewin’s philosophy of science

As the above shows, field theory in psychology is most closely associated with gestalt psychology (Deutsch 1968). This can clearly be seen by examin- ing the six fundamental characteristics that underpin Lewin’s (1942, pp. 60–64) field theory, as follows:

1. 
   Constructive method: For Lewin, the meaning of any concept is derived from its relationship to other concepts. This allows the relationship between a theory or system and the elements that make it up to be clearly seen. This stands in con- trast to what Lewin saw as the shortcomings of the classificatory approach to theory-building, which derives an ‘ideal’ class of object by abstraction from ‘particular’ objects, but which does not allow the particular to be derived from the ideal (Deutsch 1968). Applying the constructive method to the creation of a life space enabled Lewin to establish the relationship between the life space and the elements that compromise it, such as psychologi- cal position and psychological force.
   
2. 
   Dynamic approach: In psychology, people and groups are seen as behavioural systems that tend to maintain a dynamic equilibrium (Deutsch 1968). Lewin (1947b) shared this view, seeing equilibrium in social life as a dynamic process where change occurs, but a recognizable form is maintained. Lewin referred to this as a ‘quasi- stationary equilibrium’ (Lewin 1947a). For Lewin (1943c), a change from one ‘quasi-stationary equilibrium’ to another is brought about by a change in the psychological forces in a life space. For example, new or unfulfilled needs disrupt the equilibrium and it can only be restored when the needs are met (Wheeler 2008). Therefore, by ana- lysing the forces in a life space, it is possible to understand, predict and, by altering these forces, change behaviour.
   
3. 
   Psychological approach: Though Lewin often borrows terms from the physical sciences, he argued that ‘psychological phenomena must be explained in psychological terms’ (Deutsch 1968,
   

p. 415). He also argued that the elements of an individual or group’s life space must be based on their perception of their reality at the time rather
than seeking to construct it from the ‘objective’ viewpoint of an observer.

4. 
   Analysis beginning with the situation as a whole: For Lewin, all ‘psychological events (thinking, acting, dreaming, hoping, etc.) are conceived to be a function of the life space’(Deutsch 1968, p. 417). Therefore, rather than attempting to understand a situation by focusing on one or two elements in isolation, one needs to consider the situation as a whole. It then becomes possible to judge the importance, or not, of individual elements and the
   

5. 
   interdependence
   

6. 
   of the elements in the life space.
   
7. 
   Behaviour as a function of the field [life space] at the time it occurs: Unlike many psychologists of his day, Lewin’s gestaltian perspective led him to focus on the psychological forces that impinge on the behaviour of an individual in the ‘here and now’ (Deutsch 1968, p. 418). For Lewin (1936), behaviour is not caused by something in the past (or the future), but is grounded in the totality of the present situation.
   
8. 
   Mathematical representations of the psychologi- cal situation: To be seen as a rigorous, scientific discipline, Lewin maintained that psychology had to represent behaviour in mathematical terms (Deutsch 1968). For him, mathematics was not only ‘logically strict’, but it was also in line with the constructive method (Lewin 1942, p. 64).
   

Looking at the first five principles, it can be seen that these are strongly influenced by gestalt psychol- ogy. The stress on constructing and understanding the situation as a whole, the need to understand the dynamic equilibrium of the life space, and seeing current behaviour as product of the here and now, are all based on gestalt psychology. However, the sixth principle, mathematical representation, does not flow from Lewin’s gestaltian roots; rather, it comes from his philosophy of science.

Like other gestaltians, Lewin was attracted by the parallels being drawn between the psychological concept of perceptual fields and the work that physi- cists were doing on field theory (Köhler 1967). However, in the pursuit of scientific rigour, he sought to take this parallel further than other gestaltists by attempting to base his field theory on the same process of ‘mathematization’ as the physical sciences (Lewin 1949, p. 33). In this, he was strongly influ- enced by the work of the philosopher Ernst Cassirer, who tried to establish physics as the ‘paradigm science’ (Danziger 2000, p. 341). In particular, Lewin (1949, p. 35) saw Cassirer’s development of a‘mathematical constructive procedure’ as a way of determining the relationship between general psy- chological laws and individual behaviour, which he saw as central to applying the constructive method to psychology.
Based on the application of Cassirer’s approach, Lewin believed his development of field theory would bring about a scientific revolution in how psycholo- gists perceive the world, similar to the Galilean revo- lution in astronomy (Danziger 1992; Lewin 1942). In order to do this, Lewin maintained that psychology must begin to use constructs such as force, locomo- tion, mass and energy, as used by physicists, as a way of identifying and representing the forces that bring about individual behaviour and that these concepts had to be measured mathematically (Lewin 1944, 1949; Lippitt 1939; Marrow 1969).
Lewin was convinced by Cassirer’s argument that physics through its mathematical rigour was the ‘paradigm science’. Therefore, for Lewin, physics was the benchmark against which all other sciences were to be measured. Consequently, the ‘mathemati- zation’ of gestaltian field theory would raise it to the same level of respectability as field theory in physics. Unfortunately, as will be shown later, Lewin’s pursuit of scientific rigour and respectability, through the application of a mathematical dimension to his field theory, led him to lose sight of relevance.