Laclau and Mouffe: The Radical Democratic Imaginary

The question of supplementing Marxism
As we have seen, Marxist critics have rightly pointed out that the most progressive
aspects of the liberal democratic tradition—such as the individual’s right to self-
development—are incompatible with the perpetuation of capitalist relations of
exploitation. Some have even argued that socialism—as opposed to Stalinist forms
of bureaucratic collectivism—necessarily entails democracy, and that democracy
necessarily entails socialism. Radical democratic pluralists, however, have expressed
concerns about socialist theory’s inadequate attention to difference. Anti-racists,
feminists and queer theorists have pointed out that Marxist class analysis fails to
provide an adequate framework for understanding the structural relations of racism,
sexism and homophobia. This does not mean, however, that we ought to develop
isolated analyses of each of these different forms of oppression and then merely
add them one by one to the analysis of class exploitation. A theoretical model
that starts with abstractions—a set of socio-political relations artificially isolated
and removed from a complex historical formation —and then proceeds to
“reconstruct” the social formation by adding several abstractions together, will
always be inadequate. Each set of relations—class, race, gender and sexuality, and
so on—is fundamentally shaped by its historically specific interactions with other
sets of relations. We cannot assume that one set of relations, such as class relations,
is necessarily more fundamental than all of the other structures. In capitalist

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formations, class will always be relevant, but the ways in which class actually
interacts with race, gender and sexuality will be contextually specific.
Radical democratic pluralist theory must provide the tools that would allow
democratic activists who are engaged in the struggles against capitalist exploitation,
sexism, racism and homophobia to map out the context of those struggles, namely
the given configurations of power relations. We should, however, acknowledge
the fact that democratic activists are already engaged in this important work;
radical democratic theory needs to learn from their activism and to keep pace
with their valuable innovations. In any event, radical democratic pluralist theory
cannot stop short with a model based on “scientific” abstractions, however elegant
they may be. What is needed is a theory of social structures and identity formation
that explores the complex ways in which the multiple forms of exploitation and
oppression intersect, overlap, combine together, shape one another and contradict
one another. Attention must be paid to both genealogical continuities and to
historical specificities. Power relations are never totally dispersed; they are always
concentrated in various institutional centers. At the same time, the irreducible
differences between the various centers of power will always preserve some degree
of tension between them such that no single system of power will emerge. Similarly,
radical democratic pluralist theory cannot suggest that any one subject or struggle
will be able to embrace the demands of virtually every democratic movement.
There are, nevertheless, concrete possibilities for effective forms of democratic
solidarities across enormous differences; indeed, the advance of radical democratic
pluralism depends precisely on these articulations.
It is at this juncture that we can begin to grasp the role of anti-essentialist
theory in the advance of radical democratic pluralism. As we saw above, some of
Marx’s sympathetic critics fault him for giving inadequate emphasis to individuality,
pluralism and human rights in his vision of a democratic post-capitalist society. It
is of course true that Marx intended only to provide a provisional outline of the
transition to socialism. He held that his provisional outline could only be filled in
as human knowledge developed further and that it was therefore impossible to
predict exactly what a socialist order would look like (Wood 1981:53–4).
It may be tempting to argue that radical democratic pluralist discourse should
merely take Marx’s historical materialist theory as its basic foundation and then
add to that foundation a supplementary plan for the formal guarantee of human
rights in a post-revolutionary society. Even with this approach, however, tensions
would remain between the resulting theory and the task of moving towards a
radical democratic pluralist society. The shortcomings of Marxist discourse are so
fundamental to its central structure that they cannot be overcome through
secondary additions. Marxist discourse privileges class as the primary form of social
agency and capitalist exploitation as the primary form of domination. It is, in this
sense, an essentialist discourse that cannot grasp the irreducible multiplicity of
oppressive power relations; only an anti-essentialist discourse can perform this
task. The radical democratization of contemporary societies depends upon the
advance of struggles against both class exploitation and non-class-based oppressions

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as they are experienced today in their historically specific hybrid forms. Progress
towards radical democratic pluralism would be halted in a social order that
overcame capitalist exploitation but left structural oppressions such as racism,
sexism and homophobia intact. Even more important, the intertwining of these
forces is so extensive that the advance of the struggle against class exploitation
often depends upon the advance of the democratic struggles that address non-
class-based oppressions.
Anti-essentialist theory can help us to think through these hybridities and
historical specificities, and it can also help theorists to catch up with the innovative
political practices that democratic activists have already deployed. Anti-
essentialism is not in itself a panacea against authoritarianism. Anti-essentialism
is, on its own, politically indeterminate; the right has proven its ability to borrow
anti-essentialist formulations to great effect.
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A complete break with the essentialist
moments of the socialist tradition is nevertheless crucial to the construction of
radical democratic pluralist theory.

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2
E S S E N T I A L I S M ,
N O N - E S S E N T I A L I S M A N D
D E M O C R AT I C L E A D E R S H I P
From Lenin to Gramsci
For Laclau and Mouffe, radical democratic pluralist theory must appropriate the
most progressive moments of the socialist tradition while subverting its essentialist
moments. The authors argue that nothing less than the “whole conception of
socialism” is in crisis: “the ontological centrality of the working class,” the very
notion of “Revolution” as the “founding moment in the transition from one type
of society to another,” and the utopian dream of a post-revolutionary and post-
political society in which a “perfectly unitary and homogeneous collective will”
would prevail (Laclau and Mouffe 1985:2). Because essentialist Marxism
presupposes the existence of “universal” subjects and conceptualizes the social as
a “rational, transparent order,” it cannot adequately capture the complex
negotiations of difference that are crucial to radical democratic pluralism (Laclau
and Mouffe 1985:2; Mouffe 1993b:12).
The authors’ critique should be read as a post-Marxist—rather than an anti-
Marxist—strategy. As we saw in Chapter 1, they do recognize that progress towards
genuine democratization requires, in part, the advance of the socialist struggle in
some form. They nevertheless admit that their critique of essentialism amounts to
a radical break with the Marxist tradition. Further, the authors would not accept
the displacement of essentialist Marxism for another type of foundationalist
discourse. Unlike the “post-Marxism” of MacKinnon, who substitutes gender
reductionism for class reductionism and women’s consciousness for proletarian
consciousness (1989), Laclau and Mouffe’s post-Marxism takes the form of an
anti-foundationalist theory of politics.
Because Laclau and Mouffe’s intervention in Marxist theory is shaped by their
commitment to radical democratic pluralism, they do not take aim at essentialist
class theory merely because foundationalist discourse has fallen out of fashion in
contemporary intellectual circles. As we will see in Chapter 4, the authors reject
many aspects of “postmodern” theory as well. Their concern is, rather, a practical
one. Essentialist theory tends to construct a political horizon in which authoritarian
practices are legitimated and radical democratic pluralist negotiations of difference
are foreclosed. It is for this reason that the radical democratic pluralist project

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must be based on anti-foundationalist epistemological and ontological
presuppositions. The authors’ analysis of Leninist discourse brings the logic of this
connection between essentialist logic and the potential for authoritarian practice
to the fore (1985:48–65). Gramsci’s political theory, by contrast, is a valuable
example of a socialist discourse that attempts to develop a more democratic
conception of leadership precisely by moving away from essentialist closures. Leftist
politics have obviously changed enormously since the days of Lenin and Gramsci.
Their discourses nevertheless remain relevant today, for they can clarify our
contemporary debates on political leadership, unity, autonomy and democracy.