Lars Östman towards a general theory of financial control
Resource allocation and horizontal alternatives
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Resource allocation and horizontal alternatives
Vertical transmittances are dependent on how principals in the vertical line regard horizontal processes, the character of their involvement, the financial capacity that is available for them and the outlook of these processes. For some activity flows, external interests and needs are basically similar over time, but volume and form may change. For other activities, the significance of certain horizontal processes may shift continuously or abruptly. Great challenges may follow for an organisation, including new conditions in terms of activity orientation and target groups. Through methods of accumulating and transmitting capital, the horizontal outcome during one period can affect horizontal processes in the following periods. Surpluses are made directly available within a generating pay-driven unit, or funds are allocated to function-driven units based on performance in other respects. Mainly, function-driven organisations are financed through periodical capital input. To some extent, capital may be accumulated. Connections are weak to individual users and their output. Nowadays, pseudo-pricing is common, perhaps combined with periodical input. For some function-driven organisations, opportunities for horizontal substitution are small because activities are lastingly indispensable, potentials for rationalization are relatively limited and operating revenues are only a fraction of total funds. Relationships between decreases in resources and performance are difficult to capture in a meaningful sense, including prospects and capacity for the future. An organisation and surrounding parties are exposed to uncertainties for variables that are not easily defined. Allocation is often based on some reception of needs and how these are satisfied – for example, purely verbal goals, data about the scope of activities and the expressed views of users. A fundamental issue is how allotments are related to the development of incoming prices. This determines how costs and price risks are borne at different levels in an organisational hierarchy. In business life, principals in the vertical line may have direct intentions with function- driven units but these units are not lastingly indispensable. On the contrary, such a function- driven unit fulfils a function for a greater whole but substitutes often exist. Selection is possible in some time horizon but may have repercussions on other units. Resources are not allocated to such a function-driven unit only on the basis of the merits of the unit as self- sustained. Various forms of pseudo-pricing are common, sometimes combined with vertical transmittances. In the public sphere, many control approaches are applied in order to get functions accomplished. Pseudo-commercial models are used, or assignments are given to pay-driven organisations that are privately owned. Normally for these suppliers, functions are satisfied to the extent that there is willingness and capacity to pay. Basically, revenues in these cases are determined by what funds the public buyer makes available, and their risks are affected by the durability of their relations to the buyer. In these cases, a complex vertical structure
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stands above activities. Some parts are dependent on periodical allotments that are shaped by accounting concepts of public administration. Other parts have a direct connection to cash flows and the rate of return requirements in pay-driven organisations. Interaction between different control models becomes a key issue for the functions that are aimed at. Pay-driven units are based on the original capital input from founders and the subsequent non-periodical input that may have been determined by special decisions. Often, the most essential source is capital accumulated through retained earnings, period by period. Financial benefit is related to individual input. Normally, individual shares represent transferable values. Basically, vertical principals of pay-driven organisations are in the business for the sake of surpluses, but of course their motives may be related to specific horizontal processes as well. The alternatives of developing or winding up can be evaluated for a unit irrespective of other units. Selection is important, as well as competitiveness. For transfer-driven organisations, principals in the vertical line have no direct interest in a specific horizontal process, with the possible exception of markets where transfers and financial transactions are made. Their focus is basically on transfers of equities or parts. The selection of equities is a core activity. In addition, adapting organisations in order to facilitate transfers may be a main interest. Shifts in ownership may take place because transfers are possible and without any particular relation to horizontal structures for the future. Attractive media story-telling becomes blurred with acquisition processes in a narrow sense.
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